What constitutes a screening opinion for the purposes of the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011?

The decision in R (on the application of Lebus) v South Cambridgeshire District Council [2002] EWHC 2009; [2002] Env.L.R. 17 illustrates what is required to generate a screening opinion for the purposes of the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011 (“the Regulations”). It is important to bear in mind that regulation 4(7) stipulates that a screening opinion must be accompanied by “a written statement giving clearly and precisely the full reasons” for the conclusion reached by the local planning authority (“LPA”). In Lebus, the court held that the requirements of the (predecessor) Regulations, in the absence of a document setting out a screening opinion, could not be met by evidence of an informal unminuted meeting between planning officers, at which it was decided that an environmental impact assessment was not required, a checklist of environmental impacts placed on the planning file and the views of officers being recorded in the committee report. Clearly what is required is a document setting out a conclusion, and the reasons for that conclusion. One issue in R (on the application of CBRE Lionbrook (General Partners) Limited) v Rugby Borough Council [2014] EWHC 646 (Admin) was whether the LPA, having adopted a negative screening opinion in relation to proposals for the redevelopment of an existing retail park, falling within Schedule 2 to the Regulations, breached the Regulations by deciding that it was not required to adopt a further screening opinion on those proposals being subsequently revised. The revisions, which were submitted in an email letter by the applicant’s planning consultants, amounted essentially to a net increase in floor space, with the underlying scheme other remaining unchanged. In an e-mail letter by way of reply, the planning officer informed the planning consultants that he agreed with their view, namely that a further screening opinion was not necessary. The claimant contended that the LPA could not rely upon its screening opinion, since the revisions amounted to a different proposal, and that the email exchange of letters did not constitute a fresh negative screening opinion. It cited the decision in Lebus. The court rejected this contention. It refused to accept that the facts of the case bore any similarity to the facts of Lebus, where the LPA had failed altogether to adopt a screening opinion. The applicant’s planning consultants, in detailing the revisions, had not requested a fresh screening opinion. The planning officer’s reply did not purport to amount to a fresh screening opinion. It was simply the LPA’s decision that a further screening process was not required for the proposals in their revised form. John Martin