Westminster City Council v Quereshi and another

Compulsory purchase — Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, section 4 — Acquisition of Land Act 1981, section 26(1) — Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981, sections 3 and 4(1) — Whether compulsory purchase powers were exercised within the time-limit of three years from the date when the compulsory purchase order became operative — Effect of preliminary notices served under section 3 of the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981 — Analogy between such notices and a notice to treat discussed — Authorities reviewed — Decision in favour of plaintiff acquiring authority’s contention that powers were exercised in time This case raised questions of law arising out of compulsory purchase orders made by the acquiring authority, Westminster City Council — The owner of properties affected by the orders had contended that vesting declarations made by the authority were of no effect because the orders in question had lapsed — The ground for this contention was that the authority’s powers had not been exercised before the expiration of three years from the date when the relevant compulsory purchase orders became operative — This date was July 19 1985 when notice of the confirmation of the orders was published in the local press — It was therefore clear that the three-year period started to run on that date — The acquiring authority had proceeded in due course to implement the provisions of the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981 — The preliminary notices required by section 3 of that Act were served eventually on February 1 1988 — The authority were then in a position to execute a vesting declaration under section 4 of that Act — The exact date of vesting is not entirely clear from the judgment, but it is clear that it was later than three years from the operative date of the compulsory purchase order The question for decision by the judge was whether the acquiring authority, by serving the section 3 preliminary notices on February 1 1988, had exercised the power for the compulsory purchase of the properties — If so, the time-limit laid down by section 4 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 was satisfied — If not, the act of making the vesting declarations was too late and the compulsory purchase orders lapsed — The plaintiff council submitted that there was a close analogy between the preliminary notice required by section 3 of Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981 and a notice to treat — Relying on the cases which held that the notice to treat was an exercise of the power of acquisition, it was argued that the preliminary notices served in February 1988 were also an exercise of the power of acquisition — After considering a number of authorities at length, Aldous J concluded that the analogy, although attractive, was not close enough to resolve the question in the plaintiffs’ favour — However, although rejecting the analogy, he did conclude that the section 3 notices were the key to the solution — Once these notices were served the formal transfer of title by the execution of a vesting declaration followed — Section 4 of the 1965 Act stated that the powers for the compulsory purchase of land shall not be exercised after three years, not that all the formalities for the vesting of title must be completed within the three-year period — Thus the service of the preliminary notices activated the powers of compulsory purchase — The plaintiff council had therefore complied with the section 4 time-limit and were entitled to the relief they sought — Declarations accordingly The following cases are referred to in this report. Advance Ground Rents Ltd v Middlesbrough Borough Council [1986] 2 EGLR 221; (1986) 280 EG 1015, LT Grice v Dudley Corporation [1958] Ch 329; [1957] 3 WLR 314; [1957] 2 All ER 673; (1957) 55 LGR 493; 9 P&CR 58; [1957] JPL 723 Salisbury (Marquis of) v Great Northern Railway Co (1852) 17 QB 840; 21 LJQB 185; 16 Jur 740 Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation [1964] AC 1088; [1963] 2 WLR 1187; [1963] 2 All ER 484; (1963) 62 LGR 1; 14 P&CR 386; [1963] EGD 207; 187 EG 581; [1963] RVR 522, HL; [1963] Ch 57; [1962] 3 WLR 666; [1962] 3 All ER 75; (1962) 60 LGR 393, CA This was an originating summons by which Westminster City Council sought declarations that their powers of compulsory purchase in respect of certain properties in London W9 had been exercised within the time-limit set by section 4 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, and other associated relief. The first defendant to the summons was Mr Quereshi, the owner of the properties; the second defendants, Barclays Bank plc, were the mortgagees. Andrew Collins QC and Robin Campbell (instructed by the solicitor to Westminster City Council) appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs; the first defendant appeared in person; Ms Margaret McCabe (instructed by Harry I Alkin & Co) represented the second defendants. Giving judgment, ALDOUS J said: An application has been made by Mr Quereshi for an adjournment. The case in which I am to give judgment is a case brought by the plaintiffs seeking declarations by way of an originating summons. Although the originating summons was properly served, the first defendant failed to file the appropriate acknowledgement of service. He did, however, attend with a solicitor at a hearing before the master when directions were given for the summons to be set down for hearing in the non-witness list. Because he failed to file an acknowledgement of service the court did not have available to it a document with his recorded address upon it. Further, there is no solicitor on the record who could be notified of the date. On the date for the hearing being appointed, the plaintiffs made all reasonable attempts to notify him of the date of the hearing, including sending to a variety of addresses notification of the hearing. Further, the court wrote a letter telling him of the date of the hearing. That letter was addressed to him at 77 Elgin Avenue. Mr Quereshi has told me that he is at the moment residing at 71 Elgin Avenue and that he did not hear of the appointment of the hearing in time for him to attend. He did in fact come on the last day of the hearing but by that time the hearing had been concluded. He now attends in person on the date when the case is listed for judgment and has applied to me for an adjournment to enable him to be represented and the case in effect to be reheard. The fault that he was not notified of the hearing date, as he says he was not, is entirely257 his. He did not give to the court an address which could be used to notify him of the hearing. Further, he has no solicitors upon the record. In those circumstances I would only adjourn this case upon terms that he did file an acknowledgement of service and upon terms that he should pay all the costs that have been thrown away by the adjournment. It would seem that those costs will be substantial, and the case would need to be re-argued, probably in front of another judge. The dispute raised is a matter of law, not fact, and if Mr Quereshi had appeared in person he could not have helped me. His English is poor and he has no legal training. Because the dispute is one of law I have come to the conclusion that the best course is to deliver the judgment which I have prepared. If Mr Quereshi does not accept my judgment then he should appeal and instruct solicitors and counsel on his behalf. In my view, that may well be the cheapest and best course for him to adopt if he wishes to contest the matter further. Such a course would prevent the costs which have already been incurred being thrown away and would also keep open to him the opportunity of having his case properly and fully argued before a court, namely the Court of Appeal. In those circumstances I refuse Mr Quereshi his request for an adjournment. In my view, the plaintiffs were entitled to proceed with the hearing for the declaration even though Mr Quereshi did not attend because he failed to file the appropriate acknowledgement of service. I, therefore, will deliver the judgment which I have prepared. By an originating summons dated March 30 1989 the plaintiffs, Westminster City Council, seek the following declarations: 1  That the powers of the City of Westminster, as acquiring authority for the compulsory purchase of land at 210 Ashmore Road, London W9, were exercised prior to the expiration of three years from the date on which the City of Westminster, 210 Ashmore Road W9, Compulsory Purchase Order 1984 became operative. 2  That the powers of the City of Westminster as acquiring authority for the compulsory purchase of land at 75 and 77 Elgin Avenue, London W9, were exercised prior to the expiration of three years from the date on which the City of Westminster, 75 and 77 Elgin Avenue W9 Compulsory Purchase Order 1984 became operative. 3  That the City of Westminster have vested in themselves the land known as 210 Ashmore Road, London W9 and also the land known as 75 and 77 Elgin Avenue, London W9 respectively, by virtue of Part III of the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981. 4  That the City of Westminster are entitled to enter upon and take possession of respectively the land known as 210 Ashmore Road, London W9 and also the land known as 75 and 77 Elgin Avenue, London W9. The first defendant is the owner of the properties at 210 Ashmore Road, London W9, and 75 and 77 Elgin Avenue, London W9, mentioned in those declarations. He did not attend the hearing and was not represented, but it is clear that he was properly served with the summons. I understand from the evidence that his ability to read and write English is limited. The second defendants are mortgagees. They were represented at the hearing but took no part. As the first defendant did not appear, I was taken in detail through the documents, the relevant statutes and such cases as there are which might have a bearing on the dispute between the plaintiffs and the first defendant, and I am indebted to counsel for their assistance. The facts are not in dispute. On May 16 1984 the plaintiffs served upon the first defendant a compulsory purchase order in respect of 210 Ashmore Road, and on July 5 1984 served an appropriate preliminary statement of reasons for making the order. The compulsory purchase order and preliminary statement of reasons for the properties in Elgin Avenue were served on July 5 1984 and November 29 1984 respectively. The plaintiffs applied, as is required by the statute, for confirmation of those orders by the Secretary of State for the Environment. The order in respect of 210 Ashmore Road was confirmed on September 24 1984 and the order in respect of Elgin Avenue on January 25 1985. On July 18 the plaintiffs sent to the first defendant, by recorded delivery, notices of confirmation of both orders and informed him that press notices of confirmation of the orders would be advertised in the Kilburn Times and in the Paddington Mercury on July 19 1985. This was done. On August 29 1985 the first defendant issued a notice of motion in the divisional court, seeking an order that the compulsory purchase orders be quashed on grounds which I need not go into. Roch J dismissed the motion with costs on May 18 1987. The first defendant appealed. That appeal was dismissed for failure by the first defendant to comply with Ord 59, r 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, but before the order had been issued solicitors acting for the first defendant applied to have the appeal reinstated. The Court of Appeal held up the issue of the order and relisted the case for hearing on October 28 1987. On that date the Court of Appeal heard the matter and I believe read the evidence filed. They refused to alter the decision reached and therefore the first defendant’s appeal was finally dismissed. During the period when the first defendant’s application to quash the order was before the court, the plaintiffs took no action to enforce the compulsory purchase orders. On February 1 1988 they served a statement concerning general vesting declarations and advised the first defendant that a press notice of the statement would be advertised on February 11 and 18 1988. These advertisements appeared on those dates. On September 30 1988 the plaintiffs executed vesting declarations vesting the properties in the plaintiffs as from the end of the period of 28 days from the date on which the notices were served. On October 28 1988 the plaintiffs served upon the defendant notices of the vesting declarations and a notice stating the effect of such declarations and informing the first defendant that the properties would vest in the city council on December 5 1988. On November 30, solicitors acting for the first defendant wrote to the plaintiffs contending that the vesting declarations were of no effect as the compulsory purchase orders in question had lapsed. They said: We have taken counsel’s advice and it appears these vesting declarations are of no effect as the compulsory purchase orders in question have lapsed. Section 4 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 requires that the powers of the acquiring authority for the compulsory purchase of land shall not be carried out after the expiration of three years from the date on which the compulsory purchase order becomes operative. By section 26 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 a compulsory purchase order becomes operative on the date on which the notice of the confirmation or making of the order is first published in accordance with the Act. We understand that so far as 75/77 Elgin Avenue W9 is concerned, the compulsory purchase order became operative when publication took place in the Kilburn Times and Paddington Mercury on July 19 1985. We are not sure when publication took place in respect of 210 Ashmore Road but we understand that the order was confirmed by the Secretary of State in September 1984, and we imagine therefore that it would have been published in a local newspaper within a reasonable time thereafter. Please let us know the date of publication as regards this property. Certainly as far as 75/77 Elgin Avenue W9 is concerned, the vesting declaration made on September 30 1988 cannot be valid as more than three years have elapsed since publication in July 1985. We draw your attention to the decision in Advance Ground Rents Ltd v Middlesbrough Borough Council [1986] 2 EGLR 221, in which it was held that a notice to treat, served on a mortgagee more than three years after the compulsory purchase order became operative was invalid, and the Lands Tribunal had no jurisdiction to determine compensation under section 1 of the Act of 1961. In the circumstances would you please confirm that your council accepts that the compulsory purchase orders made in respect of the above properties no longer have any effect. Otherwise we must ask you to let us have your detailed grounds for any assertions to the contrary. Having considered the evidence in this case, I have come to the conclusion that the only possible argument that could be raised against the plaintiffs’ case is that set out in the letter which I have read. Thus the question for decision is whether the compulsory purchase orders had lapsed. The statutory provisions for compulsory acquisition of land are contained in the Acquisition of Land Act 1981. Section 10 requires that a compulsory purchase order shall be in the prescribed form and shall describe the property by reference to a map. The relevant compulsory purchase orders complied with this requirement. Section 11 provides for advertisement of the orders so that objections can be raised. Such advertisements were placed by the plaintiffs and no objection was raised. Further, the requirements of section 12 were met in that the appropriate notices were served on the first defendant. Pursuant to section 13 the Secretary of State confirmed the orders. On July 19 1985 advertisements of the confirmation of the orders were published as provided for in section 15. Section 3 of the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981 precluded the plaintiffs from executing the vesting declarations without having included certain particulars either in the statutory notice of confirmation of the orders, or in another notice given afterwards. The notice of confirmation which had been served did not contain the relevant particulars and therefore these were included in the258 statement served on February 1 1988, to which I have referred. That being done, section 4, which is in these terms, enabled the acquiring authority to execute a vesting declaration: 4.–(1)  The acquiring authority may execute in respect of any of the land which they are authorised to acquire by the compulsory purchase order a declaration in the prescribed form vesting the land in themselves from the end of such period as may be specified in the declaration (not being less than 28 days from the date on which the service of notices required by section 6 below is completed). I need not read subsections (2) and (3). Section 4 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 is in these terms: The powers of the acquiring authority for the compulsory purchase of the land shall not be exercised after the expiration of three years from the date on which the compulsory purchase order becomes operative. Section 26(1) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 is as follows: Subject to section 24 above, a compulsory purchase order, other than one to which the Statutory Orders (Special Procedure) Act 1945 applies, shall become operative on the date on which notice of the confirmation or making of the order is first published in accordance with this Act. Having regard to those sections, there can be no dispute that the three-year period mentioned in section 4 of the 1965 Act started running from July 19 1985. The dispute turns on whether the plaintiffs had prior to July 1989 exercised the power of compulsory purchase of the properties or not. The plaintiffs submit that the powers were exercised by service of the notices on February 1 1988 as required by section 3 of the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981 and the first defendant contends that the powers were not purported to be exercised until the vesting declarations were made under section 4 of that Act in July 1989. Thus the question for decision is whether the plaintiffs, by serving the section 3 notice under the 1981 Act in February 1988, had exercised the power for the compulsory purchase of the properties. If they did not, then the act of making the vesting declarations was too late and the compulsory purchase orders lapsed as the solicitors for the first defendant contend. I did not have any case drawn to my attention which directly bears upon the question I have to decide and I believe there is no such case. Advance Ground Rents Ltd v Middlesbrough Borough Council, which was referred to in the first defendant’s solicitor’s letter, does not help. In that case the confirmation of the order was advertised on June 24 1977 and the council elected to proceed by way of notice to treat which was served on February 26 1985. Thus, on any basis, the three-year period had elapsed. That case has no bearing upon whether a notice under section 3 of the 1981 Act is an exercise of the compulsory purchase power. Mr Collins, who appeared for the plaintiffs, submitted that some guidance could be obtained from the cases dealing with notices to treat. He drew to my attention the procedure for notices to treat which is laid down in the 1965 Act. Section 5 of that Act lays down that when the acquiring authority require to purchase any land subject to compulsory purchase, they shall give a notice to treat setting out certain particulars and the intention of the authority. Section 6 provides for the amount of compensation, if not agreed, to be settled by the Lands Tribunal. Section 9 deals with the case where the owner refuses or fails to give good title to the property. In such cases the authority may pay the compensation into court and, having done so, execute a deed poll. Upon execution of the deed poll all estate and interest in the property vests in the authority. Mr Collins submitted that a notice to treat was equivalent to a section 3 notice and the payment into court and deed poll were equivalent to the vesting declaration. If so, relying on authorities which held that the notice to treat was an exercise of the power of acquisition, he submitted that the section 3 notice served in February 1988 was also an exercise of the power of acquisition. Thus, the plaintiffs had exercised the powers of compulsory purchase prior to a lapse of the three-year period. In Salisbury (Marquis of) v Great Northern Railway Co (1852) 17 QB 840; 117 English Reports 1503, the defendants on May 21 1851 gave to the plaintiff a notice to treat. No agreement was reached as to the compensation to be paid and a surveyor appointed by two justices of the peace fixed that at £158. That sum was deposited with the Bank of England and on June 23 1851 the defendants delivered to the plaintiff a bond as prescribed by the relevant statute. In July 1851 the defendants threatened to enter upon the land and thereafter the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent this happening. The relevant statute provided that the powers of the defendants of compulsory purchase should not be exercised after the expiration of five years from the passing of the Act, and therefore this period ended on June 26 1851. Thus the plaintiff contended that the defendants had not exercised the compulsory purchase powers in time, as they had only served a notice to treat and the five-year period had elapsed. Lord Campbell CJ at p 1507 of English Reports, (p 853 of the QB report) said: We have, therefore, at present, to consider what would be the effect of a company not entering within the prescribed period. This depends much upon whether the entry is an exercise of one of the powers of compulsory purchase. In my opinion it is not. I think the power of entry is a power necessary for the completion of the purchase, but is not itself one of the powers of compulsory purchase. Those powers had been, I think, exercised within the five years. Strictly speaking, there is no purchase, and no contract, created by the notice under section 18; but the company and the landowner are placed by the notice in the same position as if a contract of purchase had actually been entered into by them. After considering certain authorities, he concluded: But I consider that I am justified, both by the language of the statute and by the existing decisions upon it, in holding that the contract of purchase must be looked upon as completed upon the notice being given to the company, the amount of purchase money alone remaining undetermined. I am therefore of the opinion that we should certify that the defendants had a right to take the lands in question. Patteson J at p 1508 said: The question therefore is, whether, not having entered within the prescribed period, they are precluded by section 27 of their special Act, from doing so now. That depends upon whether the entry upon the lands is or is not an exercise of one of their compulsory powers. I am of the opinion that it is not, and that the company have, within the prescribed period, taken all the steps necessary for the compulsory purchase of the lands. I do not at all dissent from the decisions in which it is laid down that the mere notice by the company is of itself sufficient to create a contract of purchase between them and the landowner. But here much more has been done; all the steps prescribed by section 85 have been taken by the company. The principle, however, established by the cases is that the notice is all that is necessary as an exercise of the compulsory powers; the steps which follow are not of a compulsory character, but are merely for the purpose of completing the compulsory purchase to which the company had acquired a right by the notice. Coleridge J was of the same view. He said at p 1509: The question turns on the construction of section 27 of the company’s special Act. What are ‘The powers of the company for the compulsory purchase of lands’ there mentioned?  A distinction must be drawn between the powers for compulsory purchase, and powers for completing a compulsory purchase. In a large sense both may be called powers for compulsory purchase and that may account for the word ‘powers’, in the plural, being used in section 27 of the special Act. But a power for compulsory purchase, strictly speaking, is a power which enables one to purchase land from an owner who is unwilling to part with it. I consider the giving the notice to be a sufficient exercise of that power: the notice does enable the company to purchase, whether the landowner chooses or not; and all that is done by them afterwards is done only for the purpose of completing the title, and is done as much for the benefit of the landowner as of themselves. Wightman J’s judgment was to the same effect. He said at p 1509: The only question is, whether, after the expiration of the period prescribed for the exercise of the compulsory powers, the company could enter upon the lands and hold them as against the plaintiff. I think this case is governed by Doe dem Armstead v North Stafford Railway Company (16 QB 526). It is admitted by the plaintiff that all steps prescribed by section 85 have been taken by the company, and that entry by them, within the five years, would have made the exercise of their compulsory powers complete. I do not see how it can make any difference whether the taking possession of the land occurs before or after the expiration of that period. If the company, after what they had done, had a right to enter at once, the entry is not an exercise of their compulsory powers, but an act which the previous exercise of those powers entitles them to do. Here they had acquired the right of entry; and it is immaterial whether they exercised that right within the five years or not. The ratio of that case is that the power of entry was not one of the powers of compulsory purchase. The judges drew the distinction between powers for compulsory purchase and powers for completing the purchase. In that case, as was pointed out by the Chief Justice and Wightman J, the defendants had a right to enter after service of the notice; thus entry was not an exercise of the compulsory powers but an act which the previous exercise of the powers entitled them to do. In the present case the section 3 notice gave to the plaintiffs the right to make a vesting order and in that sense is equivalent to a notice to treat. However, the procedure laid down in the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981 is different. Section 7 of that Act provides that on the vesting date certain statutory provisions259 shall apply as if the vesting declaration was a notice to treat. Further, section 8 provides that on the vesting date the land and the right to enter shall vest in the authority. Thus until a vesting declaration has been made an authority has no right to enter, and that is different to the position considered in the Marquis of Salisbury case. In Grice v Dudley Corporation [1958] Ch 329 Upjohn J considered a case where the defendants served a compulsory purchase order in 1937. That was approved by the minister on December 2 1938 and in July 1939 the compensation was agreed at £6,000. The war intervened and nothing happened until August 1954, when the defendants raised the question of purchasing the property for the sum that had been agreed in 1939. The plaintiffs objected. The judge held that the notice to treat served in 1938 was for the purposes of the relevant Act an exercise of compulsory purchase powers and therefore the defendants had exercised their powers within the statutory time-limit. However, he held that the defendants had, by reason of the delay, abandoned their rights. Section 123 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 was in these terms: And be it enacted, that the powers of the promoters of the undertaking for the compulsory purchase or taking of lands for the purposes of the special Act shall not be exercised after the expiration of the prescribed period, and if no period be prescribed not after the expiration of three years from the passing of the special Act. At p 336 the judge set out the position that is arrived at on service of a notice to treat. He said: Upon the first point, provision is made for the service of the notice to treat by section 8 of the Lands Clauses (Consolidation) Act, but the operation of a notice given under that section is now so well settled that I need not read it. It may have any one of the following effects. First, the landowner may be a willing vendor and the parties may agree upon the price or compensation and enter into a binding agreement of sale and purchase whence the usual results flow as in the case of any other contract of sale and purchase. Secondly, the landowner may be a willing seller but the parties may fail to agree upon the price, in which case either party can proceed to have the compensation payable assessed by the appropriate authority; originally it was by arbitration or by summoning a jury; then by an official arbitrator under the Acquisition of Land Act 1919, and, finally, now by the Lands Tribunal. In this case there is a limited right in the acquiring authority to withdraw the notice to treat on seeing the claim for compensation delivered by the landowner; see the Acquisition of Land Act 1919, section 5(2). The third position is this: the landowner may be entirely hostile, in which case the promoter can proceed to have compensation assessed, and if the landowner refuses or neglects to make title, or to convey the land, the promoter can pay the compensation money into court and execute a deed poll vesting the property in himself. (That is by sections 76 and 77 of the Lands Clauses (Consolidation) Act.)  The relationship between the parties thus created by the service of the notice to treat has sometimes been described as quasi-contract. It is, further, clear that where the parties have agreed upon the compensation, or it has been assessed, but not before, the remedy of specific performance is open to either side: see Fry on Specific Performance, 6th ed, p62. That state of affairs has sometime been referred to as a parliamentary contract. That then is the nature of the legal relationship created by the parties, and the question is whether the giving of such a notice is the exercise of compulsory powers of acquisition of land for the purposes of section 123 of the Act. Having set out that section, he continued: Apart altogether from authority, I should be of the opinion that the service of a notice to treat is an exercise of a compulsory power because it enables the promoter to proceed to acquire the land, whether the owner likes it or not. Mr Collins relied on that passage. He said that the section 3 notice enabled the plaintiffs to proceed to acquire the land, whether the owner liked it or not. That is true, but it is also true of the other steps in the procedure for the compulsory purchase of land. The actual purchase is dependent upon the steps required by the statute being carried out, and if carried out enable the authority to purchase the land. Further, as I pointed out, the actual right of entry is dependent upon a vesting declaration being made and that was not executed until after the three-year period had elapsed. With a notice to treat, the authority has the right of entry pursuant to section 11 of the 1965 Act, but to obtain title to the land it has to carry out further acts, namely paying money into court and executing a deed poll. Only in that respect is the procedure the same as the compulsory purchase route using a section 3 notice. Upjohn J continued on p 339: So far therefore the result seems to be to be this: the promoters, ie the corporation, served a valid effectual notice exercising compulsory powers which led to the creation of a legal relationship between the parties which I have already described. Once that notice was served, section 123 was out of the picture and no further period is laid down by the statute within which the next step to acquire the property must be taken. The legal relationship that the judge referred to must be one of the relationships referred to in the passage which I have read. I do not understand him to be saying that there was something in the nature of a contract for sale but only that the relationship was one in which legal rights were given. That was, I believe, made clear by the Court of Appeal in Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation [1963] Ch 57. That case went to the House of Lords [1964] AC 1088, and the judgment of Upjohn LJ was accepted as correct. In that case a compulsory purchase order was made on March 25 1952 and on August 13 1952 a notice to treat was served. Provisional agreement on compensation was agreed at £1,400. The acquiring authority changed their mind about their plans but in 1958 sought to acquire the land for the sum previously agreed. The court held that the notice to treat was valid. Upjohn LJ, giving the judgment of the court, said at p 82: Upjohn J stated the principles applicable to this type of case in the recent case of Grice v Dudley Corporation. As the relevant principles do not seem to have been considered in this court for many years restatement thereof seems not out of place. It is not in doubt that service of the notice to treat confers legal rights on both parties: on the acquiring authority the right to acquire the land on payment of the proper compensation to be assessed if necessary by the Lands Tribunal; on the owner, the right to have the compensation assessed and paid. Mere service of a notice does not give the acquiring authority any estate or interest in the land, nor of itself constitutes a contract. The various ways in which the compulsory purchase procedure may be completed after service of the notice were discussed fully in the judgment in Grice’s case, and it is not necessary to restate them here, because no binding agreement as to the amount of compensation was reached in this case, and it falls to be decided upon the footing that there is no consensual or parliamentary contract in evidence. There is similarity between a section 3 notice and a notice to treat in that they basically contain the same essential particulars. Further procedure thereafter is similar, but in both cases execution of a document has to take place before title passes. There is, however, a basic difference. After a notice to treat a legal relationship exists which enables the authority to enter upon the land. That right is not given by service of a section 3 notice. Further, with a notice to treat both parties have rights in that, save where the authority elects to withdraw which is given in limited cases, the landowner has a right to compensation; whereas after service of a section 3 notice the landowner has no right to compensation. His right is dependent upon a vesting declaration being executed. I conclude that the analogy which the plaintiffs seek to draw between a notice to treat and a section 3 notice is not so close as to resolve the dispute in the plaintiffs’ favour. I must therefore go back to the statutes to try to ascertain what was the intention of Parliament. Section 26 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, which I have read, provides that a compulsory purchase order shall become operative on the date that the confirmation of the order or the making of the order is first published. Section 5 of the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981 prevents the authority, save with consent, executing a vesting declaration before two months have elapsed from the date of publication of the section 3 notice, and in any case before the compulsory purchase order has become operative. Section 3 of that Act lays down that certain preliminary notices have to be given before a vesting declaration can be made. Thus the compulsory purchase order became operative in 1985 and enforceable subject to a valid section 3 notice being given. Those notices were given within the three-year limit laid down in section 4 of the 1965 Act. Thus the compulsory purchase orders were operative and effective within the three-year limit. All that required to be done was formally to transfer the title by executing the vesting declarations. Section 4 of the 1965 Act states that the powers for the compulsory purchase of land shall not be exercised after three years, and not that all acts to vest title must be completed within the three-year period. Thus, what is covered by the section is the powers of compulsory purchase. I believe that once the compulsory purchase orders had become operative and all conditions had been met which made them effective so that the authority could vest the land in themselves, then the powers of compulsory purchase had been exercised. Having exercised such powers, section 4 of the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981 entitled them to execute the vesting declarations. That entitlement was dependent upon the authority validly exercising the powers given to them for compulsory purchase. 260 The word ‘declaration’ also suggests to me that the powers of compulsory purchase have been exercised and that the vesting declarations are documents declaring that the compulsory purchase has taken place and having the effect of formally transferring the title to the land. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion the plaintiffs had, prior to the lapse of the three-year period, exercised the power of compulsory purchase for the properties and that they are entitled to the declarations sought.