Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council v Wang
Martin Rodger KC (deputy chamber president)
Housing – Civil penalty – Notice of intent – Respondent property owner challenging financial penalties imposed by appellant local authority under section 249A and schedule 13A of Housing Act 2004 – First-tier Tribunal allowing respondent’s appeal against penalties – Appellant appealing – Whether appellant’s failure to give sufficient reasons invalidated penalties or cured by other material from which reasons apparent – Appeal allowed
The respondent owned a property at 132 Aldykes in Hatfield, a two-storey detached house with a kitchen and two other rooms on the ground floor and a bathroom and three bedrooms on the first floor. Each of the rooms was let to separate individuals who shared the kitchen and bathroom; the house was therefore a house in multiple occupation subject to mandatory licensing under Part 2 of the Housing Act 2004.
After carrying out works required by the appellant local authority, the respondent was granted an HMO licence with effect from 1 October 2018, for five years. The licence authorised occupation of the property by up to five people in separate households and identified the respondent as the manager and owner.
Housing – Civil penalty – Notice of intent – Respondent property owner challenging financial penalties imposed by appellant local authority under section 249A and schedule 13A of Housing Act 2004 – First-tier Tribunal allowing respondent’s appeal against penalties – Appellant appealing – Whether appellant’s failure to give sufficient reasons invalidated penalties or cured by other material from which reasons apparent – Appeal allowed
The respondent owned a property at 132 Aldykes in Hatfield, a two-storey detached house with a kitchen and two other rooms on the ground floor and a bathroom and three bedrooms on the first floor. Each of the rooms was let to separate individuals who shared the kitchen and bathroom; the house was therefore a house in multiple occupation subject to mandatory licensing under Part 2 of the Housing Act 2004.
After carrying out works required by the appellant local authority, the respondent was granted an HMO licence with effect from 1 October 2018, for five years. The licence authorised occupation of the property by up to five people in separate households and identified the respondent as the manager and owner.
Following an inspection of the property, the appellant sent a letter to the respondent enclosing a schedule of works required to be carried out. The appellant subsequently served notices of intent to impose financial penalties under section 249A of the 2004 Act on the respondent. The first notice stated the intention to impose a civil penalty of £20,000 for offences under regulation 4 of the Management of Houses in Multiple Occupation (England) Regulations 2006. The second notice stated the intention to impose a financial penalty of £1,000 for breach of regulation 7.
The First-tier Tribunal allowed the respondent’s appeal on the grounds that the information in the notices was insufficient to enable her to make meaningful representations and they were invalid. The appellant appealed.
Held: The appeal was allowed.
(1) Section 234 of the Housing Act 2004 authorised the secretary of state to make regulations for the purpose of ensuring that every HMO was satisfactorily managed. Such regulations might impose duties on the person managing an HMO in respect of the repair, maintenance, cleanliness and good order of the house and facilities and equipment in it.
Regulation 4 of the 2006 Regulations required the manager of an HMO to ensure that all means of escape from fire were kept free from obstruction and maintained in good order and repair, and that all fire-fighting equipment and fire alarms were maintained in good working order. Regulation 7 imposed duties on the manager of an HMO to ensure that all common parts were maintained in good and clean decorative repair and in a safe and working condition and kept reasonably free from obstruction.
Section 249A authorised a local housing authority in England to impose financial penalties on a person if it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person’s conduct amounted to a “relevant housing offence” listed in section 249A(2). The offence of failing to comply with regulations made under section 234 was one such offence.
(2) A sufficient notice of intent had to equip the recipient with the information they required to enable them to answer the charge against them. How precise or particular the contents of a notice had to be to achieve that requirement depended on the circumstances of the case which might include the recipient’s knowledge of other facts.
The validity of a notice was to be assessed objectively, by asking how a reasonable recipient would have understood it. The reasonable recipient was taken to be aware of the relevant objective contextual scene, which would include matters known to the actual recipient that would influence their understanding of the notice. Those matters were taken to be within the knowledge of the notional reasonable recipient: Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] 1 EGLR 57, Newbold v Coal Authority [2013] EWCA Civ 584; [2013] PLSCS 115; [2014] 1 WLR 1288, Waltham Forest London Borough Council v Younis [2019] UKUT 362 (LC) and Maharaj v Liverpool City Council [2022] UKUT 140 (LC); [2022] PLSCS 91 considered.
(3) In this case, the notices of intent were accurate in the information they conveyed but were vague and did not clearly identify the facts that amounted to the offence being alleged. Both pinpointed the offence and the location and date at which it was allegedly committed, but the only description of the regulation 4 offence was that “numerous fire safety deficiencies were identified”, while the regulation 7 offence was described only as “poor management and disrepair, and poorly maintained deficiencies”.
If notices in that form had been the only material available to the respondent, the requirements of paragraph 3 of schedule 13A, that a notice of intent had to set out the appellant’s reasons for proposing a financial penalty, would not have been met.
Regulation 4 covered a range of subjects, which included ensuring all means of escape were free from obstruction and maintained in good order and repair, maintaining fire alarms and fire-fighting equipment, ensuring notices were displayed, taking all reasonable measures to protect occupiers from injury, preventing access to unsafe roofs or balconies, and barring windows. The first notice of intent could cover any of those matters and, without clarification, the respondent would be left guessing which deficiencies were being referred to.
Similarly, regulation 7 covered maintaining common parts in repair, in safe working condition and free from obstruction, and extended to specific features including handrails and bannisters, stair coverings, ventilation, light fittings, common appliances, outbuildings, yards, gardens, boundary walls and fences. The second notice left the respondent ignorant of the case against her.
(4) But the respondent received a schedule of works served with a letter which stated that the deficiencies listed were considered as legal requirements and required the remedial measures to be undertaken within the stipulated time. Each defect was then clearly identified and the remedial action specified.
The notices of intent were not rendered defective because they did not repeat or refer to the detailed information in the schedule of works. Any reasonable person with the knowledge available to the respondent would have known that the fire safety deficiencies referred to in the regulation 4 notice were the same deficiencies as listed in the schedule of works. Similarly, the issues concerning poor management and disrepair in the regulation 7 notice were identified in the schedule. The notices of intent were not invalid. The appeals would be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for determination by a differently constituted panel.
Tara O’Leary (instructed by Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council) appeared for the appellant; the respondent did not appear and was not represented.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
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