Wareing v White

Rent Act 1977 — Tenant’s appeal from decision of rent assessment committee — No points of law found to have been established by appellant — Committee’s decision criticised by appellant for the manner in which inflation was taken into account, for alleged inadequacy of reasons and for alleged failure to allow appellant to digest certain material put forward by landlord immediately before commencement of hearing — In rejecting all these criticisms, judge said that it would be wrong for court to lay down precisely how a committee should deal with inflation — It was beyond dispute that inflation was one of the considerations which could be taken into account in fixing a fair rent — While information as to increases in rent in a locality might be of more assistance than general inflation evidenced by the retail price index, it could not be said to be improper for a committee to have regard to the latter — Even without evidence a committee could rely on their own knowledge and experience of what has been happening in previous years — Kovats v The Corporation of Trinity House distinguished — As to the alleged inadequacy of reasons, based mainly on committee’s reference to ‘comparables’, the committee had clearly indicated that they did not have sufficient information in regard to these other properties to take them into account — There was a conflict of affidavit evidence between landlord and tenant as to whether the latter had been given sufficient time to read and digest submissions presented before the start of the hearing, and the judge held that no breach of natural justice had been established — Tenant’s appeal dismissed This was a statutory appeal under section 13 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971 by Alan Wareing, tenant of a property at 41 Gordon Road, Wanstead, London E11, from a decision of a rent assessment committee of the London Rent Assessment Panel, who had increased a rent of £92.95 per month fixed by the rent officer to £115 per month. The respondent was the landlord, Albert Walter Vousdon White. N Ley (instructed by Lomax) appeared on behalf of the appellant; G Conlin (instructed by Edell & Jones) represented the respondent. Giving judgment, WOOLF J said: This is an appeal under section 13 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971. It is an appeal which is on a point of law alone against a decision of the London Rent Assessment Panel (Committee) which was dated March 15 1983. There had been a previous assessment of the appropriate rent for the property in question, 41 Gordon Road, Wanstead, by the rent officer. The landlord was dissatisfied with that assessment by the rent officer and the landlord had therefore caused the matter to be referred to the rent assessment committee. The rent assessment committee increased the rent over and above that fixed by the rent officer and no doubt it is because the tenant was unhappy that this should happen that there has been an appeal to this court on a point of law. I emphasise ‘on a point of law’ since in my view it is quite manifest from the notice of motion and the additional grounds relied upon that those who are responsible for presenting this appeal were not conscious of its limitation or if they were conscious they did not properly comprehend its effect. I am bound to say that, although I have given very careful consideration to the argument that has been advanced by Mr Ley on behalf of the tenant, I have come to the conclusion that there is no possible point of law which arises on this appeal. The reasons which were given by the rent assessment committee were short. In this case the landlord contended that the rent officer had not allowed enough for the effects of inflation since the effective date of the previous committee decision on the same property. The tenant said that, legally speaking, no allowance should be made for inflation. There was no justification for an increase from the amount determined by the previous committees. He had replaced the bed by one of his own. He requested and received an assurance that the committee would take no account of the value of the tenant’s bed. The tenant put forward a number of copies of rent officer registrations but was unable to provide details required to make these comparisons useful to the committee. This was a terrace house on ground and first floor with a small front garden in a reasonably quiet residential road. On the basis of the committee’s inspection, it appeared to be in fair repair and condition externally; internally the decorations were not of a professional standard. There was a reasonably good kitchen and bathroom and a separate we. The flat was provided with an adequate amount of furniture of fairly good quality. Some items of furniture had been replaced and some carpets were relatively new. The committee derived considerable assistance from the decision of the previous committee. The furniture was largely the same. The present98 committee considered that they had to make a reasonable allowance for the effects of inflation up to the date of their decision. Having regard to the evidence put before them, to their inspection, to their knowledge and experience and to the provisions of section 70 of the Rent Act 1977 the committee determined the fair rent which has been notified to the parties. That rent was £115 per month, whereas the rent officer had fixed the rent at £92.95 per month. There was therefore quite a substantial increase made by the committee to the rent above that which was assessed by the rent officer. Furthermore, in relation to services and furniture what the rent officer fixed was £13.45 per month, whereas the rent assessment committee fixed £18.75 per month. The rent assessment committee were well advised to refer to section 70 of the Rent Act 1977 in their decision because that section sets out the general approach to be adopted in determining a fair rent. Subsection (1) provides: In determining, for the purposes of this Part of this Act, what rent is or would be a fair rent under a regulated tenancy of a dwelling-house, regard shall be had to all the circumstances (other than personal circumstances) and in particular to — (a) the age, character, locality and state of repair of the dwelling-house, and (b) if any furniture is provided for use under the tenancy, the quantity, quality and condition of the furniture. There is then subsection (2) which deals with what is sometimes described as a scarcity point, because it provides: For the purposes of the determination it shall be assumed that the number of persons seeking to become tenants of similar dwelling-houses in the locality on the terms (other than those relating to rent) of the regulated tenancy is not substantially greater than the number of such dwelling-houses in the locality which are available for letting on such terms. By subsection (3) there are set out certain items that have to be disregarded and subsection (4) deals with improvements. It is not necessary for me to read out those two subsections. In his submissions Mr Ley says, first of all, with regard to inflation that the committee have taken into account inflation and having regard to the material which was before them that must have been general inflation, since evidence of the landlord had included details of the retail price index between September 1979 and July 1982. In particular, it showed that the increase between September 1979 and July 1982 was 38.51% and here Mr Ley says that according to the calculations he has done (but which I have not separately done), the increase in the rent was in fact 39%. The only comment which I would make with regard to those figures is as follows. First of all, the reference to the retail price index terminates in July 1982, whereas the rent was to take effect from March 1983, and, furthermore, of course, that rent would be a rent which would continue for the period until the next review and there would be an additional amount of inflation over that period. Mr Ley suggested that in this case, as a matter of law, the court should provide guidance to rent assessment committees, both this present committee and other committees, as to the manner in which inflation is to be treated. In particular should the committee take into account general or national inflation and should it look at statistics such as retail price indexes which deal with a large number of items in fixing the increase in price, or should it look at it in a local manner?  Should it confine its attention to inflation in rents and not look at general retail prices which undoubtedly include an element of rent in the total figures that they embrace? In my view it would be quite wrong for this court to lay down precisely how a rent assessment committee should deal with the question of inflation. That in general terms inflation is a matter they can take into account among other considerations in fixing a fair rent I would have thought is beyond dispute. We have reached the stage where there is often a situation where the property has previously been registered and what is being considered by the rent assessment committee is what is the appropriate increase in rent since the property was last registered. This particular committee in its reasoning thought that a previous registration was of considerable help to them. They must be entitled to come to that conclusion and if they then are going to find that of assistance they can only do so if they bear in mind in general terms that there has been inflation since then. Obviously, precise information about the increase of rents in a limited locality is going to be of more assistance to a rent assessment committee than general information provided in relation to the country as a whole from a retail price index, but in the absence of precise information as to what has happened in the locality in relation to rents I certainly would consider it wrong for this court to say that it was improper for a rent assessment committee to have regard to the retail price index. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that in applying their general experience and knowledge of the area, even without evidence, the rent assessment committee could rely on their own knowledge and experience of what has been happening over the previous years. On this subject there is no authority precisely dealing with this situation, although there was a decision of Forbes J where the question of inflation arose. That was in the case, which Mr Ley cited, of Kovats v The Corporation of Trinity House (1981) ESTATES GAZETTE 445. In his judgment in that case Forbes J pointed out that price indexes can be unreliable as a guide in respect of rent. But what Forbes J was dealing with was an argument of the tenant who complained that the committee in that case had gone wrong in law, because as their rent had previously been registered all the committee should have done was to revise the existing registered rent by reference to the effect of inflation. In other words, the submission that was being advanced in that case was the startling submission that on a review of a previously registered rent all the rent assessment committee can have regard to is the increase in inflation since that date. Forbes J rejected that argument. He indicated that all matters have to be taken into account and he said this: ‘If you look at comparable rents you can in fact take into account and properly take into account the effects of inflation.’ I would regard what Forbes J said in that case as being perfectly straightforward and helpful, as long as it is remembered that he was dealing with a very different argument from that which is advanced before me. Here inflation was only one of the matters that this committee considered. In my view, it cannot be said that they have departed from the proper standard in their treatment of inflation. There is only one further point I would make with regard to the approach of the committee and that is this. It appears to me to correspond with that laid down by Lord Reid in Mason v Skilling [1974] 1 WLR 1437 as being the appropriate approach. At p 1439 in that case Lord Reid said: ‘In my view,’ — and here he is referring to the Scottish equivalent of our section 70 of the 1977 Act — this section leaves it open to the rent officer or committee to adopt any method or methods of ascertaining a fair rent provided that they do not use any method which is unlawful or unreasonable. The most obvious and direct method is to have regard to registered rents of comparable houses in the area. There is nothing unlawful or unreasonable in relation to the approach of this committee in respect of the question of inflation. The second principal argument advanced by Mr Ley is that there has been a departure by the committee from the proper standard required in relation to reasons. That the committee are under an obligation to give reasons is clear beyond peradventure and is in fact dealt with by the appropriate regulations to which I need not refer. Are the reasons here adequate reasons to indicate to the persons concerned the basis of the rent assessment committee’s decision?  This is very much a question of judgment and impression, but having looked at these reasons which I have cited I regard them as complying with the required standards. The main objection to those reasons is that they do not deal satisfactorily with the approach of the committee to comparables. Had they taken comparables into account and if so in what way, and why had they rejected comparables if they had not taken them into account?  The only reference to comparables in the decision is the reference to the fact that a number of copies of rent officer registrations were provided, but the tenant had been unable to provide the details required to make these comparisons useful to the committee. Obviously, comparables are only going to be of assistance if a proper evaluation can be made of those comparables. Here the only possible comparisons which the committee had before them were the ones which were annexed to the rent officer’s decision, which on an examination seem to be doubtful comparisons on the evidence to be obtained from the register. In particular I draw attention to the position in relation to bathroom accommodation with regard to the majority of those possible comparables. In addition, there are fuller details in respect of other registered rents which the tenant had put before the committee and it is of significance there that he did not put before the committee full details of any of those referred to by the rent officer. When one looks at this again one can see there are distinctions. I am far from satisfied that they are in anything like the same locality as the99 property which was considered in Wanstead by the rent assessment committee. Having regard to the statement made by the rent assessment committee in their reasons, they were clearly indicating that they did not have sufficient material with regard to those other properties to take them into account. I would have thought that was self-evident. They say that one previous decision which was of assistance was the decision in relation to this particular property made by the previous committee. I do not think I need say any more upon that subject. There are other arguments which are advanced in the notice of motion and additional notice of motion. I do not propose to deal with each of those for the reasons I made clear earlier in the judgment. There is one matter I should refer to and that is the additional ground which was not relied upon until the notice of motion dated January 9 1984 was filed. It states: ‘The committee erred in law in refusing to delay the start of the hearing so that the appellant might be able to read and digest the respondent’s written submissions which had just been handed to him.’  The affidavit of the landlord disputes that allegation. It would be surprising if the chairman had in fact, as was suggested by the tenant, refused him a short time to read and digest certain submissions which were handed to him prior to the commencement of the hearing by the landlord. Having regard to the evidence filed on behalf of the landlord, dealing with the matter as I must from the material which is before me, the conclusion to which I have come is that the appellant has certainly not established what he would need to establish to succeed on this point that there was any breach of the rules of natural justice. Accordingly, it follows that this appeal will be dismissed. An order was made for costs in the respondent’s favour for those periods when the appellant was not legally aided, not to be enforced without an order of the court.