Wards Construction (Medway) v Barclays Bank plc

Compulsory purchase compensation — Acquisition of land to provide access to development land — Award of £2.15m by Lands Tribunal — Whether tribunal failed to apply Pointe Gourde principle — Whether tribunal wrongly applied Stokes principle In 1982 planning permission was granted for the erection of 1,750 dwellings in four phases on land subject to a condition that no dwellings within phase two should be occupied until certain off-site road works were completed. In 1983 the developers entered into an agreement with Kent County Council by which the county council would make road improvements enabling the planning condition to be complied with and providing that the developers would bear 65% of the land acquisition costs. The county council acquired two parcels of land from HB, the claimant, 0.86 acre under a compulsory purchase order (‘the order land’) and 0.97 acre (‘the adjoining land’) in consequence of a notice to acquire under section 53 of the Land Compensation Act 1973. In 1987 the Lands Tribunal awarded the claimant £500,000 for the order land and £150,000 for the adjoining land. Following an appeal by way of a case stated, the Court of Appeal remitted the claim to the tribunal: see Batchelor v Kent County Council [1990] 1 EGLR 32; the tribunal heard further evidence and awarded the claimant £2.15m for the order land and £10,000 for the adjoining land: see Batchelor v Kent County Council [1992] 1 EGLR 217. The claimant appealed. On the application of the appellant, Wards Construction (Medway) Ltd (‘Wards’), being the original developer liable to make the 65% contribution to the county council, the tribunal eventually agreed to state a case to the Court of Appeal. A further order was made substituting Barclays Bank plc in the place of the claimant in the claimant’s appeal. Wards contended that the tribunal failed to have proper regard to the Pointe Gourde principle and included in the award an increase in the value of the order land which was entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition; it also erred in applying the principle in Stokes v Cambridge Corporation (1961) 180 EG 839. In the claimant’s appeal it was contended that the award for the order land should have been £3.583m on the ground that the relevant development scheme was not a multi-access site. Held: Both appeals were dismissed. Wards’ appeal: While the Pointe Gourde principle is a principle of law, a disregard of which would entitle the court to interfere, the Stokes v Cambridge principle is one of valuation. The tribunal did apply the Pointe Gourde principle and there were several references in its award to the no-scheme world. The award did not include an increase in value which was entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition. It effectively found that in the no-scheme world the order land would have had a very substantial value. It is for the tribunal to decide whether the Stokes principle is a useful starting-point for valuation. The claimant’s appeal: The tribunal was entitled to find that the development area was a multi-access site and the effect of that finding on valuation was a matter for the tribunal. The following cases are referred to in this report. Batchelor v Kent County Council (1989) 59 P&CR 357; [1990] 1 EGLR 32; [1990] 14 EG 129; (1989) RVR 181; [1990] JPL 571, CA [1992] 1 EGLR 217; [1992] 03 EG 127 and 04 EG 138, LT Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565, PC Stokes v Cambridge Corporation (1961) 13 P&CR 77; [1961] EGD 207; 180 EG 839, LT This was the hearing of two appeals by way of cases stated from an award of the Lands Tribunal, the first by Wards Construction (Medway) Ltd to which Barclays Bank plc and Kent County Council were respondents and the second by Barclays Bank plc to which Kent County Council were sole respondents, the tribunal having made its award following the remission of the claim by the Court of Appeal on an appeal by Kent County Council from an earlier award of the tribunal determining the compensation payable to the claimant for the acquisition of land. Peter Boydell QC and Rodney Stewart-Smith (instructed by Kingsley Smith & Co, of Chatham) appeared for Wards Construction (Medway) Ltd; Robin Purchas QC and Meyric Lewis (instructed by Burges Salmon, of Bristol) appeared for Barclays Bank plc; Malcolm Spence QC and Adrian Trevelyan Thomas (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard) represented Kent County Council. Giving judgment, NOURSE LJ said: These are two appeals by way of case stated against a decision of the Lands Tribunal (T Hoyes Esq FRICS) dated October 28 1991. The decision was made on a reference by Hubert Dorrington Batchelor (‘the claimant’), which had been remitted to the tribunal by this court. The reference sought the determination of the amount of compensation payable to the claimant by Kent County Council (‘Kent’) in their capacity as a highway authority consequent upon the compulsory acquisition of the freehold estate in two parcels of land situate on the eastern side of the junction of New Cut Road and Bearsted Road, Maidstone. The compensation awarded by Dr Hoyes in respect of the two parcels of land was £2.15m and £10,000 respectively. The case has a long history which can be collected from the reports of the earlier hearings in the Lands Tribunal and this court. The reference was first heard by W H Rees Esq FRICS, whose decision dated February 19 1988 awarding compensation of £500,000 and £150,000 in respect of the two parcels is reported at (1988) 56 P&CR 320. The decision of this court (Fox and Mann LJJ and Sir Roualeyn Cumming-Bruce) remitting the reference to the Lands Tribunal is reported at (1989) 59 P&CR 357*. The decision of Dr Hoyes, to whom I shall hereafter refer simply as ‘the member’, is reported at [1992] 1 EGLR 217. In the circumstances, the background facts can now be briefly stated, mainly in the words of Mann LJ when delivering the leading judgment in this court on July 26 1989. *Editor’s note: Also reported at [1990] 1 EGLR 32. The Maidstone and Vicinity Town Map 1970 allocated the two parcels of land, together with a large area to their east and south now known as Grove Green, for residential development. Pursuant to that allocation Maidstone Borough Council (‘Maidstone’) on March 30 1982 granted, on the application of Ward Holdings plc, an outline planning permission for the development of a substantial area to the33 east and south of the two parcels for the erection of 1,750 dwellings in four phases. The permission was subject to a number of conditions of which that numbered (xvii)(b) provided that: no dwellings within Phase II shall be occupied until the off-site roadworks . . . in respect of that phase are completed. The reason for that condition, as expressed, was to secure a satisfactory, comprehensive and phased scheme of development. Ward Holdings Ltd is the parent company of Wards Construction (Medway) Ltd (‘Wards’), which owns a substantial part of the allocated land, its north-west boundary being contiguous with the two parcels of land. Other parts of the allocated area are owned by other developers (Abbey Homesteads, McLean Homes/Barretts and Hillread Homes). Their ownerships are, in general terms, to the south and east of Wards’ land. Also on March 30 1982 Wards and another company entered into an agreement with Maidstone pursuant to section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971, one of whose terms was that the agreement with Kent next referred to should also be entered into. On February 1 1983 Kent, as the responsible highway authority, entered into an agreement with Wards pursuant to section 278 of the Highways Act 1980 in regard to the improvement of New Cut Road and Bearsted Road. The improvement included the construction of a new roundabout at the junction of the two roads. The improvement (which has long ago been completed) would have the effect, under condition (xvii)(b) of the planning permission, of unlocking phase two of the development. The section 278 agreement committed Wards to bearing 65% of the land acquisition costs. The roundabout was to be (and is) situate upon the claimant’s land. Kent had decided to use compulsory purchase powers to acquire the land, if necessary, on November 21 1980. It was acquired by the Kent County Council (New Cut Road/Bearsted Road Improvement) Compulsory Purchase Order 1983, which was confirmed by the Secretary of State on September 12 1983. That order authorised the acquisition of 0.86 acre of the claimant’s land (‘the order land’). That is the first of the two parcels with which the reference is concerned. Entry was made on the order land on August 1 1984. The second of the two parcels (‘the adjoining land’) is immediately to the east of the order land and is 0.97 acre in extent. It was the subject of a counternotice under section 53 of the Land Compensation Act 1973. That notice was accepted by Kent, who entered into possession of the adjoining land on December 1 1986. The first hearing of the reference by Mr Rees, at which five witnesses were called, took place over five days in October 1987. Kent then brought an appeal to this court by way of case stated. They contended that Mr Rees’ valuation of the adjoining land at £150,000 should be set aside. The claimant also requested a case to be stated, but that request was withdrawn before it had been complied with. However, he was permitted to challenge the valuation of £500,000 for the order land. This court allowed the county council’s appeal and acceded to the claimant’s challenge. They remitted the assessment of compensation for both the order land and the adjoining land to the Lands Tribunal. The further hearing before the member took place over 14 days in October 1990 and January and March 1991: 13 witnesses were called. Wards, not having been a party to the reference, were not represented at either hearing before the Lands Tribunal. They had been advised that there were procedural difficulties in their becoming a party and they were no doubt content that the battle should be fought by Kent on their joint behalf. However, it is hardly surprising that, after the member had increased the total amount of the compensation from £650,000 to £2.16m, they became increasingly concerned at the prospect of having to bear 65% of that amount. Accordingly, on November 22 1991, less than a month after the member’s decision, Wards, claiming to be a person aggrieved by it, requested the Lands Tribunal to state a case for the opinion of this court. The request was initially refused, but in August 1992, after Wards had been given leave to apply for judicial review by way of an order of mandamus, the tribunal agreed to state a case, which it did on February 22 1993. Meanwhile, the claimant, contending that the member’s award of compensation was still too low, had himself asked for a case to be stated, as it duly was on April 6 1992. On March 1 1994, in circumstances into which I need not go, the registrar made an order substituting Barclays Bank plc (‘the bank’), in place of the claimant, as a respondent to Wards’ appeal and as the appellant in the claimant’s appeal. It is none the less convenient to continue to refer to the claimant’s appeal as such. The dispute relates only to the valuation of the order land. On neither appeal is the valuation of the adjoining land at £10,000 in question. In this court the two cases were heard consecutively, the argument in Wards’ and the claimant’s appeals lasting for four days and one day respectively. My initial impression of the matter was a simple one. It seemed that the member’s valuation of £2.15m for the order land was an enormous amount for 0.86 acre for which the agreed existing use value was £3,000 and so vastly in excess of the £500,000 awarded by Mr Rees as to suggest that it must have been arrived at by some error of law. However, after reflecting carefully on the arguments of the parties and while I may remain mystified by certain aspects of the process of valuation, I have come to the conclusion that no error of law has been shown and that both appeals must be dismissed. Wards’ appeal Although, subject to an estoppel to be mentioned later, it would have been both possible and in their interests for Kent to make submissions in support of Wards’ appeal, they elected not to do so. They simply declared general support for Wards’ contentions. Inevitably, there were differences between the case made by Wards in this court and the case made by Kent before the member. These were mainly differences of emphasis rather than of substance. However, it appears that the member did not consider one of the points on which Wards primarily rely. If that was because he was not asked to consider it by Kent, Wards cannot now complain of his failure to do so. Two well-known decisions are at the heart of Wards’ appeal. In Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565 the Privy Council reaffirmed the established principle (see eg Fraser v City of Fraserville [1917] AC 187) that compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land cannot include an increase in value which is entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition. In Stokes v Cambridge Corporation (1961) 13 P&CR 77 compensation had to be assessed for land for which the parties agreed that a planning permission for industrial development must be assumed, provided that satisfactory access to the land could be obtained. Access could be obtained only across an adjoining strip of land in separate ownership. Since that gave the adjoining strip a ransom value, it was held by the Lands Tribunal that the value of the land compulsorily acquired must be reduced in order to take account of what its owner would have to pay in order to obtain access over the strip. At p90, the tribunal, having dismissed as unrealistic the suggestion that the owner of the strip would be willing to sell it to a prospective developer of the land acquired (the back land) at no more than its bare price for housing or agriculture, continued: Manifestly, the owner of the front land, aware that he held the only key to the development of the back land, would expect to receive a substantial share of the profit which, if he withheld the key, would be unobtainable. The tribunal assessed the share of the profit at one-third and made a corresponding deduction from the value of the land acquired. It is important to emphasise at the outset that, while the Pointe Gourde principle is a principle of law, a disregard of which would entitle this court to interfere, the Stokes v Cambridge principle, if such indeed it is, is one of valuation. In particular, as Mann LJ pointed out at (1989) 59 P&CR 360, what is a ‘substantial’ share of the profit must be a question for the tribunal. When the matter was before this court in 1989 Kent argued that the inclusion of a ransom component in the market value of the order land by reference to the Stokes v Cambridge principle would inevitably contravene the Pointe Gourde principle. Counsel said that it was the first case in which the34 relationship between the two principles had had to be considered. At p34, Mann LJ said: I find no difficulty with the relationship. If a premium value is ‘entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition’, then it must be disregarded. If it was pre-existent to the acquisition it must in my judgment be regarded. To ignore the pre-existent value would be to expropriate it without compensation and would be to contravene the fundamental principle of equivalence (see Horn v Sunderland Corporation (1941) 2 KB 26). It has been pointed out that when Mann LJ referred to a premium value pre-existent to the acquisition, he must have meant one pre-existent to the scheme. Mr Malcolm Spence QC, for Kent, accepted that they are estopped by the 1989 decision from arguing in this court that the inclusion of a ransom component would inevitably contravene the Pointe Gourde principle, although he reserved the right to argue that point at a higher level. Although Wards are not so estopped, Mr Peter Boydell QC, on their behalf, adopted a similar stance. In 1989 this court was of the opinion that Mr Rees’s award of £500,000 for the order land was neither explained nor explicable and that it was also impossible to understand how his award of £150,000 for the adjoining land had been arrived at. The effect of their decision was to remit the matter to the Lands tribunal with a direction that there was no inconsistency between the Pointe Gourde and Stokes v Cambridge principles and that both could and should be applied, so far as appropriate. Wards’ primary contention on this appeal was that the member nevertheless failed to have proper regard to the Pointe Gourde principle and included in his award an increase in the value of the order land which was entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition. Second, and in any event, they contended that by applying the Stokes v Cambridge principle to a case such as this the member erred in law on that ground also. Pointe Gourde principle In order correctly to apply the Pointe Gourde principle it is necessary, first, to identify the scheme and, second, its consequences. The valuer must then value the land by imagining the state of affairs, usually called ‘the no-scheme world’, which would have existed if there had been no scheme. At [1992] 1 EGLR 218J, under the heading ‘The scheme’, the member said: In about 1984 a roundabout was constructed on the order land replacing the former T-junction of New Cut Road with Bearsted Road, and there is no dispute that this is the scheme underlying the acquisition of the order land. It is now common ground that in the ‘no-scheme’ world the market for the reference land comprised the owners and/or developers of the Grove Green area seeking to implement the 1982 planning permission. These observations give rise to two points of a preliminary nature. First, Mr Boydell submitted that the scheme underlying the acquisition of the order land was not limited to the construction of the roundabout and the associated roadworks. He said that it included the sections 52 and 278 agreements and condition (xvii)(b) in the planning permission, so that the scheme should be defined as the construction of the roundabout in accordance with the requirements of those documents. This was hotly contested by Mr Robin Purchas QC, for the bank, who argued that the scheme was limited to the construction of the roundabout and the associated roadworks. Had the point been of real significance, Wards might well have been unable to go behind Kent’s apparent acceptance of the identity of the scheme as stated by the member. However, the difference of opinion in this court seems to me to have been one of emphasis rather than of substance. I cannot myself see how it can have decisive consequences. Second, Mr Boydell and Mr Rodney Stewart-Smith, who followed him, both submitted that the member failed to identify either the no-scheme world or its consequences, that he effectively refused an invitation to do so and even that he was under the impression that this court, by its earlier decision, had directed that the Pointe Gourde principle was not to apply. They took us carefully through the member’s decision with a view to making these submissions good. They placed special reliance on his opening observations at p217K where, having referred to Mr Rees’ decision, he said: That decision was subject to appeal by the acquiring authority by a case stated to the Court of Appeal, which decided that the principle in Pointe Gourde and rule (3) of section 5 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 were not to apply so as to limit compensation. In my view, it is clear that the member was throughout seeking to apply the Pointe Gourde principle. His decision contains frequent references to the no-scheme world; in particular the following passage at p222C under the subheading ‘The ‘no-scheme’ world’: It is accepted that the order land falls to be valued disregarding the scheme underlying the acquisition, identified above, and the fact that the acquisition is taking place under compulsion. It is not disputed that the market for the order land effectively comprised prospective developers of the Grove Green area of which Wards were the most prominent. It is also accepted that if the order land is found to be endowed with some measure of premium value, the amount is entirely in issue, that sum is to be treated as having accrued independent of the scheme. In essence, what falls to be ascertained is the bargain which would have been made between the claimant and a prospective developer-purchaser had the acquiring authority not intervened. In that passage the member gave himself an entirely correct direction as to the application of the Pointe Gourde principle. It fits perfectly with his opening observation on which Wards especially rely. He did not there say that this court had decided that the principle was not to apply. He said that they had decided that it was not to apply so as to limit compensation. In other words, the member well understood that if the land had a premium value pre-existent to the scheme, then, as stated by Mann LJ, it had to be regarded. Mr Boydell’s main submission as to the no-scheme world was that what had to be considered were the events which were likely to have occurred if, on November 21 1980 when Kent decided to use compulsory purchase powers to acquire the land, if necessary, they had instead told Wards that they would not use such powers, so that Wards would have been on their own. Mr Boydell argued that Wards would then have had five choices: (1) to negotiate with the claimant themselves; (2) to explore the four alternative roundabout schemes which the member (see in particular pp218M and 220A) found would provide some competition for the order land; (3) to explore the construction of access into Bearsted Road using land belonging exclusively to Wards; (4) to persuade Kent and Maidstone that there were no sustainable highway grounds for imposing condition (xvii)(b) of the planning permission and, if necessary, to pursue an appeal to the Secretary of State; and (5) to wait for the highway improvements to be made in the normal course. In reply, Mr Boydell suggested that the most realistic of these possibilities was (4), with (3) a close second. Throughout, he maintained that the last thing that Wards would have done would have been to pay the claimant £2.16m. It appears that possibility (4) was not considered by the member. I am by no means satisfied that he was asked to consider it, so no complaint can be made of his failure to do so. Each of the other possibilities was, to a greater or lesser extent, considered. In particular, possibility (3) was specifically considered and rejected on grounds of impracticability. Having carefully considered the member’s decision in all its aspects and the arguments on both sides, I find myself unable to hold that the decision is flawed by a failure to have proper regard to the Pointe Gourde principle. I cannot say that the member included in his award an increase in the value of the order land which was entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition. I agree with Mr Purchas that he effectively found that in the no-scheme world it would have had a very substantial premium value. Once he had correctly directed himself as to the test to be applied, that was a question of fact to be decided by him on the available evidence. His finding was not against the weight of the evidence. I can detect no error of law in his decision. 35 Stokes v Cambridge At p223G under the subheading ‘Valuation principles’ the member rejected the inducement approach to valuation except where there were a number of alternatives for access of about equal merit and thus real competition. He then referred to evidence, which was accepted, that since the decision in Stokes v Cambridge it had become common practice in the land market and in some references before the Lands Tribunal to attribute a percentage of the development value of back land to ‘access’ land as a premium value. There was evidence before him that for small single-access sites the market practice was to attribute up to 50% as a premium value to the access land. He then referred to a transaction at Harlow, of which evidence had been given before him, although not before Mr Rees, which indicated 25% for a very large single access situation. At p223H-J he continued: In the circumstances of a ‘multi access’ site, such as Grove Green, it is unrealistic to attribute 50% . . . to one only of the ‘strategic’ land parcels. Logic and practice (see Ozanne v Hertfordshire County Council [1988] RVR 133) dictate a sharing of the premium value, but not necessarily equally. On the evidence, for a large site the starting figure is 25% and, in my judgment, 15% should be attributed to the order land as a premium value to reflect its relative importance amongst the ‘strategic’ parcels to the incomplete part of the Grove Green development in 1984. At p224G, for the purposes of valuing the order land, the member started from a value for the land to be benefited by the access of £21,520,386. Applying a ransom value of 15%, he arrived at a figure of £3,228,058, which he then discounted by one-third in respect of the risk that one of the four alternative schemes would be adopted, arriving at a figure of £2,149,886, say, £2.15m. Mr Boydell submitted that the Stokes v Cambridge principle applies only to the simple case where the sole physical access to the back land is over the front land and where the whole of the back land and the whole of the front land are each in one ownership. Here the front land did not hold the only key to the development of the back land, since there were at least four possible alternatives; the front land was not required for physical access to the back land, but in order to comply with a planning condition requiring off-site highway improvements; such improvements would in any event have been carried out, regardless of the development of land to the south, possibly by 1994; there were several owners of the back land; this was a multi-access site. In the circumstances, submitted Mr Boydell, the Stokes v Cambridge principle was a wholly inappropriate starting point for the valuation, since the basic ransom element was missing. This point also was lengthily debated and many authorities were cited. Again it must be emphasised that the Stokes v Cambridge principle, if such indeed it is, is one of valuation not of law. It was for the member to decide whether it was a useful starting point for his valuation of the order land. The arguments of Mr Boydell and Mr Stewart-Smith have failed to persuade me that his approach was wrong in law or that his valuation was insupportable on the evidence. On being asked how the member could reasonably have arrived at a valuation so vastly in excess of that of Mr Rees, Mr Purchas pointed to the comparable at Harlow, by which it is clear that the member was greatly influenced. That was entirely a matter for him. Mr Purchas said that that had thrown an entirely different light on the value of the order land. Certainly, I continue to feel that the valuation was very high. But I see no ground on which it can be interfered with by this court. Subsidiary issues Wards raise two subsidiary issues. First, they contend that the member erred in law in attaching neither relevance nor weight to the evidence of Mr J V Walker, a director of Ward Holdings plc, who said that Wards could have secured access for residential development directly from Bearsted Road via frontage land belonging exclusively to them. At p222A-B, the member said of that evidence: Mr Walker did not produce any sketch scheme to demonstrate feasibility wholly within company-owned land nor did he indicate that any such scheme had been discussed with the highway and planning authorities. I therefore attach neither relevance nor weight to this suggestion. In my view, it would be impossible for this court to say that the member erred in law in taking the view that he did of Mr Walker’s evidence. The relevance and weight to be attached to it were entirely matters for him. Second, Wards contend that there was not sufficient evidence on which the member could properly attribute to them either a notable degree of urgency to proceed with implementing the approved proposal or a keen desire for the junction improvements to begin on the order land sufficient to increase its value. Here Mr Boydell submitted that the member rejected the uncontradicted evidence of Mr Walker, disregarded the evidence of Mrs V A Randall and Mr J Atkins, who gave evidence in relation to town planning matters on behalf of Kent and Maidstone respectively, and ignored the difference between the real world and the no-scheme world. He said that in the no-scheme world there would have been no urgency because the terms of any planning permission and connected agreements would have been different. I reject these submissions. Again, these were matters to be decided upon by the member. In my view, there was evidence on which he could make the findings that he did. Claimant’s appeal The claimant’s appeal, to which Kent are the only respondents, seeks to increase the member’s award for the order land from £2.15m to £3.583m by impugning his view that the Grove Green development was a multi-access site and the consequences which were held to follow from it. I have already quoted the passage at [1992] 1 EGLR 223H-J. Also material is a passage at p223D under the subheading ‘Road pattern and order land’ where the member, having passed over phase one of the development said: The other phases require the formation of three new junctions to Weavering Street, one to each of Bearsted Road and New Cut Road, a connection to Grovewood Drive (the phase one spine road) together with some general widening of New Cut Road as a continuation of the junction improvements upon the order land; a number of ‘strategic’ points are therefore involved. In terms of timing and the amount of land upon which development is constrained, 182.5 acres gross or 123 acres net, the works upon the order land are the most significant, but the other junctions and works become equally essential over the years to reducing areas as development progresses. For these reasons there was no absolute monopoly of improved road access, essential for the development of the 182.5 acres, residing in the order land. On behalf of the bank Mr Purchas submitted that the member erred in finding that Grove Green was a multi-access site; alternatively, that his finding was against the weight of the evidence; and that he could not reasonably have come to the view that there was no absolute monopoly of improved road access residing in the order land. It followed, said Mr Purchas, that there was no basis for reducing the percentage of the development value which the member had regarded as appropriate to a very large single access situation from 25% to 15%. Mr Purchas also submitted that the member failed to give any adequate reasons for his conclusion that Grove Green was a multi-access site and that the bank was substantially prejudiced by that failure. In my view, these submissions must be rejected. I agree with Mr Spence that not only was there nothing wrong in law with the member’s finding that Grove Green was a multi-access site; it was also manifestly right in fact. The effect of that finding on the valuation of the order land was again a matter for the member himself. The reasons already given for not reducing his award are equally reasons for not increasing it. Moreover, Mr Spence was able to demonstrate that if the material passages in the member’s decision are put together his process of reasoning sufficiently appears. His decision contains a most careful consideration of the points that were put to him. I would dismiss both appeals. BELDAM and SIMON BROWN LJJ agreed and did not add anything. Appeals dismissed and decisions of Lands Tribunal affirmed.