University of Brighton v Persons Unknown Occupying Land

Trespass – Injunction – Persons unknown – Claimant owning university premises – Defendants entering property and occupying administrative offices without permission – Claimant granted interim injunction requiring defendants to vacate property – Claimant recovering possession without need for possession order – Whether claimant entitled to final injunction preventing future acts of trespass – Application granted The claimant was the freehold owner of Cockcroft Building, Moulsecoom Campus, University of Brighton, Lewes Road, Brighton. At approximately 3.30am on the morning of 25 May 2023, the defendant persons unknown entered the premises and broke into the 8th floor offices. They subsequently barricaded themselves within, preventing anyone else entering the premises, in protest against the possibility of redundancies taking place among staff at the university. Damage was caused to the premises, and the doors were secured shut from inside by screwing batons into the door and across the frames. The defendants also accessed the roof, which had a terrace around the perimeter, and displayed banners in support of their cause. The claimant brought an action for possession of the property and was granted an interim injunction requiring the defendants to vacate the property. The claimant subsequently recovered possession so that there was no longer a need for a possession order: Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Meier [2009] UKSC 11; [2010] 1 EGLR 169 considered. However, the court was asked to make a final injunction to restrain and prevent future acts of trespass for a period of one year. The claimant argued a final injunction was appropriate as there was no issue as to the claimant’s entitlement to the premises and, in the absence of any defence, there was no reason why it was not appropriate to make the injunction order. Held: The application was granted. (1) Irrespective of the absence of a defence or the appearance of any of the defendants or a representative, the court had to be vigilant to satisfy itself that the order sought was appropriate where one of the parties was not present. It was also extremely important where the order was of the nature of a quia timet injunction granted to prevent the occurrence or repetition of an actionable wrong in the future. An injunction was appropriate to restrain unlawful occupation where a trespass or breach of planning was threatened, particularly where a trespass had been committed in the past. The decision whether to grant an order restraining a person from trespassing would turn very much on the precise facts of the case. Nonetheless, where a trespass to the claimant’s property was threatened, and particularly where a trespass was being committed, and had been committed in the past, by the defendant, an injunction to restrain the threatened trespass, in the absence of good reasons to the contrary, appeared appropriate: Meier considered. There was no evidence before the court that the defendants had expressly articulated any intention to return to occupy the property should the injunction be lifted. However, that was not the test to be applied, although it might be a relevant factor.   (2) Applying the first principle in the six-stage test set out in Boyd and another v Ineos Upsteam Ltd and others [2019] EWCA Civ 515; [2019] 4 WLR 100, there had to be a sufficiently real and imminent risk of a tort being committed to justify quia timet relief. There was no fixed or absolute standard for measuring the degree of apprehension of a wrong which had to be shown to justify such relief. The graver the likely consequences and the risk of wrongdoing, the more the court would be reluctant to consider the application as premature: But there had to be at least some real risk of an actionable wrong: Bromley London Borough Council v Persons Unknown [2020] EWCA Civ 1; [2020] 2 EGLR 10 considered. In the present case, the claimant relied upon the facts that the underlying dispute was still live, lawful protest was continuing in parts of the campus and the recent past conduct of the defendants. In particular, the defendants had shown a flagrant contempt for the court and the interim injunction order by refusing to vacate when served with the interim order and only vacating the property six days later (and not necessarily because of the court order). That was a factor which weighed heavily when concluding that the risk of the protesters returning to the administrative building, with its access to the roof, was sufficiently real and imminent.  (3) As to principles (2) to (6) established in Ineos, it was impossible to name the persons who were likely to commit the tort unless restrained and was possible to give effective notice of the injunction and for the method of such notice to be set out in the order. The terms of the injunction corresponded to the threatened tort and were not so wide that they prohibited lawful conduct. Further, the terms of the injunction were sufficiently clear and precise as to enable persons potentially affected to know what they must not do. Taking those factors together, the injunction sought had been limited to preventing the defendants occupying the premises, a specifically defined area of a specifically defined building. Moreover, the injunction as sought would not affect the right of any student to enter the premises for education/university administration related business: Lawfully entry was clearly not caught by the injunction. Furthermore, the one-year temporal limit was not disproportionate in the circumstances of this case. (4) The court also had to consider whether the resulting harm would be so grave and irreparable that, notwithstanding the grant of an immediate injunction to restrain further occurrence of the acts complained of a remedy of damages would be inadequate: Bromley applied. In the present case, on the evidence, the way in which the protesters had sealed themselves within the property with no easy means of escape created a material risk to health and safety of the protesters and to others. The cost of repairs and the cost, both direct and indirect, to the administration of the university by reason of the occupation, which would include the legal costs of getting a further interim injunction should the defendants repeat their actions, were, in theory, compensatable in damages. However, in practice, they were irrecoverable costs. Furthermore, there might be reputational damage nationally and internationally to the standing of the claimant arising from repeated occupation of its executive administrative areas. In all the circumstances, the remedy of damages would be inadequate and a final injunction would be granted. Steven Woolf (instructed by DMH Stallard LLP) appeared for the claimant; the defendants did not appear and were not represented. Eileen O’Grady, barrister Click here to read a transcript of University of Brighton v Persons Unknown Occupying Land