Disregarding a framework designed to protect freedom of expression converts a licence into a trespass.
The High Court has considered this issue in Queen Mary University of London v LSY and others [2024] EWHC 2386 (Ch) giving its reasons for granting the claimant an order for possession of its Mile End campus in July 2024 to allow graduation ceremonies to take place. The claim related to possession of the university’s Mile End campus.
The lawn area in front of the Queen’s Building and the tarmac road connecting the Queen’s Building with the People’s Palace was occupied by a group of protesters as an encampment since mid-May 2024.
The protests were mainly in support of Palestine and against Israel and aimed to persuade the university to disinvest from and cease to use the services of companies which the protesters believed directly or indirectly supported Israel.
The university’s prima facie right to possession of the site was subject to its students’ rights by licence to be on and to use it in the normal course of their education and student life.
The university’s Code of Practice on Free Speech – implemented to comply with its duties under the Education (No 2) Act 1986 as amended – aimed to secure freedom of speech for students and staff alike.
Events on university premises – which included the encampment and associated rallies and protests – required the university’s permission under the Code.
The protesters made clear in a letter to the university’s senior executive team following the setting up of the encampment that they were not concerned as to whether they had or would obtain agreement to the encampment, under the Code or otherwise.
The university became concerned over a growing and unacceptable risk to the health and safety of staff, students, the public and the grounds and in a series of letters to “members of the encampment” made it clear that the university did not agree with the protesters and asked them to disperse.
By disregarding the Code, the protesters became trespassers and the university was entitled to an order for possession.
A summary possession order did not amount to an unjustified interference with the encampment members rights to manifest their beliefs, freedom of expression or freedom of assembly under Articles 9-11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The qualifications to those articles – that the interference was prescribed by law, necessary for the protection of the rights of others and was proportionate – were all satisfied.
The university’s view that health and safety concerns justified possession proceedings was not unreasonable.
Louise Clark is a property law consultant and mediator
