Tingey v Sutton

Rent Act 1977 — Application of section 141 — Restricted function of county court in determining questions as to the ‘rent limit’ in subs (1)(b) — Function of county court not to fix amount of registered rent or to set it aside or to be an appeal court from a rent officer or rent assessment committee — A tenant who felt aggrieved at a rent increase determined by a rent officer, soon after the tenant had moved into alternative accommodation in pursuance of a possession order, gave notice of objection to the rent assessment committee and also applied to the county court under section 141(1)(b) — His application to the county court was rejected and an appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed while the objection to the rent assessment committee did not proceed — The landlord made a fresh application for a fair rent after the usual interval and the rent officer determined an increased rent which, on the tenant’s objection, was somewhat varied by the rent assessment committee — The next step in this history of litigation was a refusal by the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court to give the tenant leave to bring proceedings to quash the committee’s decision — At this stage the tenant revived further proceedings which he had previously commenced in the county court under section 141 with a view to setting aside the registration — The county court judge, although in doubt as to whether he had jurisdiction to consider the matter at all, heard the application but after consideration dismissed it — The tenant now appealed to the Court of Appeal and, appearing in person, submitted that the county court judge should have set aside the registered rent and substituted his own decision as to the proper rent payable — Held, following views expressed in Druid Development Co (Bingley) Ltd v Kay, that the judge had no jurisdiction to set aside a fair rent fixed by a rent officer or rent assessment committee — The court’s functions under section 141(1)(b) were to determine what was the rent limit under the relevant Part of the Rent Act — If the rent was registered under Part IV, the registered rent was the limit and the function of the court was to apply it in conjunction with other relevant provisions of the Act — The court had no appellate or concurrent jurisdiction to determine the registered rent or to alter it in any way — Appeal dismissed This was an appeal by the tenant, William Michael Tingey, from a decision of Judge Blomefield, at Newbury County Court, dismissing the tenant’s application under section 141 of the Rent Act 1977 to set aside a rent registration relating to a property at 87 Bath Road, Speen, near Newbury, Berkshire. The respondent was Cecil Roland Sutton, the landlord. The appellant appeared in person; J G Ross (instructed by Charles Lucas & Marshall, of Newbury, Berks) represented the respondent. Giving judgment, BROWNE-WILKINSON LJ said: This is an appeal from an order of His Honour Judge Blomefield sitting at Newbury County Court whereby he dismissed an application brought by Mr Tingey against his landlord, Mr Sutton, the application being made under section 141 of the Rent Act 1977. The story is quite a long one and it is unnecessary for me to go into it in great detail. The position was that Mr Tingey used to be a tenant of a flat at Speen House, near Newbury, of which Mr Sutton was the landlord. In 1977 Mr Sutton obtained possession of that flat on the grounds that he had offered suitable alternative accommodation to Mr Tingey at 87 Bath Road, Speen. The matter was contested before the judge and it was part of the landlord’s case, apparently, that the new house, 87 Bath Road, would be at a rent of £26 per month. On that basis the judge made the possession order asked and Mr Tingey moved into 87 Bath Road. 129 On May 5 1978 the landlord made an application to the rent officer asking for an increase in the registered rent. The rent officer on October 12 1978 registered the rent at £660 per annum including certain services, but excluding rates. On November 4 1978 Mr Tingey gave notice of objection to that registration, which would have given rise to the matter going before a rent assessment committee. On December 26 1978 he made an application to the county court, his first application under section 141(1)(b), objecting to the registration and saying that the county court could deal with it, but his application was rejected. He appealed to the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal also rejected his appeal. Accordingly, on June 13 1979, he made a fresh application to the county court under section 141. In the meantime, the rent assessment committee had been trying to proceed with the fixing of the rent but, due to the circumstances which it is unnecessary to go into in great detail but due certainly to the action of Mr Tingey, it was precluded and prevented from performing its duty of fixing the registered rent. That remains the position down to date and no determination by the rent assessment committee pursuant to the 1978 application has ever been made. On October 16 1981 the landlord made fresh application to register an increased rent. An increased rent was registered by the rent officer on January 14 1982, such registration taking effect from January 14 1982. Following objection by Mr Tingey the matter was considered by the rent assessment committee. On August 19 1982 they substituted a rather different rent which is the registered rent. On September 23 1982 Mr Tingey applied to McNeill J sitting in the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench for leave to bring proceedings to quash the 1982 determination. His application was rejected. At that stage Mr Tingey’s application of June 13 1979 was revived and he applied and had a hearing before Judge Blomefield on November 3 1982 in the Newbury County Court. His application as finally amended reads as follows. He applied to the court for an order that ‘the rent limit from May 9 1978 to August 18 1982 was £312 per annum and that the rent registration dated October 12 1978 relating to 87 Bath Road, Speen, near Newbury in Berkshire, be and here is set aside’. It is clear from his application that it is made under section 141 of the Rent Act 1977. Substantially the grounds relied on in support of the application related to alleged invalidities in the manner in which the rent officer had fixed the registered rent and registered it, and the failure of the rent assessment committee to deal with the application. The learned judge plainly had great doubts whether he had jurisdiction to deal with the matter at all under section 141 of the 1977 Act. It is not clear to me whether he actually ruled that he had not got such jurisdiction. He certainly went on and dealt with the specific items urged before him by Mr Tingey and rejected them all. The application was therefore dismissed. Mr Tingey appeals to us and has presented his case very concisely and civilly. The application, as I have said, is under section 141(1)(b) of the Rent Act 1977, which reads as follows: (1)  A county court shall have jurisdiction, either in the course of any proceedings relating to a dwelling or on an application made for the purpose by the landlord or the tenant, to determine any question — (a)    as to whether a tenancy is a protected tenancy or whether any person is a statutory tenant of a dwelling-house . . . (b)    as to the rent limit; or . . . as to any matter which is or may become material for determining any such question. Mr Tingey submits that that section gives a county court jurisdiction to set aside the registered rent and to substitute its own decision as to what is the proper rent payable. For myself, I am unable to accept that submission. The structure of the Rent Act 1977 appears to be this. The various Parts of the Act deal with tenancies of different kinds. Part II originally dealt with controlled tenancies, although that species of protected tenancy has now been repealed by the Housing Act 1980. Part III deals with rents under regulated tenancies. Part VI deals with rents payable in respect of dwellings let by housing trusts and housing associations. In each of those Parts there is a limit to the rent chargeable in respect of a dwelling-house which falls within the relevant definition. In my judgment, the jurisdiction of the county court under section 141(1)(b) is to determine what is the limit (ie the maximum rent chargeable) in respect of any given dwelling-house in accordance with the provisions of Part III, is the limit applicable to the dwelling-house If the case fell within Part II the rent limit was basically to be ascertained by a formula based on the gross value of the dwelling and certain increases. There was no statutory machinery for establishing the necessary factual material; it was obviously the county court’s function to apply the words of the statute to the facts as found if an application was made under section 141. However, when one comes to regulated tenancies under Part III, the county court’s function is to determine what, under the provisions of Part III, is the limit applicable to the dwelling house subject to the regulated tenancy. This present case falls within Part III. Section 44, which is part of Part III, provides: (1)  Where a rent for a dwelling-house is registered under Part IV of this Act, the rent recoverable for any contractual period of a regulated tenancy of the dwelling-house shall be limited to the rent so registered. Similarly, in section 45 the maximum rent recoverable is linked to the amount of the registered rent. The only function of the county court, therefore, in a case brought under section 141(1)(b), is to discover whether there is a registered rent and, if so, to apply it in conjunction with the other provisions of Part III of the Act. The actual fixing of the registered rent is provided for by Part IV of the Act, which establishes the statutory machinery of rent officers and rent assessment committees. After going through those statutory procedures eventually a rent is registered. The function of the county court is not to fix the amount of the registered rent but simply to give effect to the terms of Part III applicable, having ascertained what the registered rent is. I am unable to see anything in the Act which would justify a county court in going into the way in which the registered rent came to be registered, or indeed dealing in any way with the proper performance of the machinery laid down in Part IV. The rent officer and rent assessment committee constitute a statutory machinery to fix the registered rent. The county court has no power on appeal or concurrent jurisdiction to fix the registered rent or to alter it in any way. For those reasons, in my judgment, there is no basis for the application made to the county court by Mr Tingey in this case. I receive considerable support for that view by the remarks made in this court in Druid Development Co (Bingley) Ltd v Kay (1982) 44 P & CR 76,* in which two members of this court expressed the view that a county court judge did not have jurisdiction to set aside a fair rent fixed by the rent officer and rent assessment committee. With respect, I would adopt the view there expressed. For those reasons, I think the learned judge’s doubts about his jurisdiction in this case were well founded and he had no jurisdiction to entertain the application on the grounds that it was brought before him. *Editor’s note: Also reported at (1982) 264 EG 1080, [1982] 2 EGLR 108. Before us today Mr Tingey has apparently changed his ground and is seeking to put forward a case based on the proposition that the landlord has only got the possession of the flat in the first case on the basis of a promise made to the judge that the rent for 87 Bath Road would be a low and moderate one; Mr Tingey alleges it was a breach of good faith to apply to increase the registered rent shortly thereafter. It does not seem to me that that is any part of what we have to deal with today. It was not the case before the judge; it is not the case made on the pleadings. There is certainly no evidence as to the matter examined before the learned judge. It is, therefore, not a matter which we can deal with today. I would only say this: from what we have seen, though it is clear that Mr Tingey feels very strongly about it, he certainly has not shown us anything which suggested that, when the original application for possession of the flat was made, an indication of any sort was given that there would be no subsequent increase in the rent. Indeed, he does not even contend that that would be the position. He merely says that it was a breach of good faith to apply so soon to increase the rent. As I say, the matter is not before us, but I think there is, from what I know of it, not much in the point. For those reasons, in my judgment, the learned judge’s decision was correct and the appeal must be dismissed. Agreeing, SIR DENYS BUCKLEY said: I would only say this. I think that Mr Tingey is really actuated by a sense of grievance because he thinks that it was unfair or unjust that the landlord should apply for an increased rent so soon after he had been moved into the alternative accommodation in respect of which the increase of rent was asked for, at which time the rent was stated to be at £26 a week. Mr Tingey130 takes the view, perhaps not altogether surprisingly, that he expected that he would be allowed to stay in that alternative accommodation at that rent for what he calls a reasonable time. But, from what I can see of the papers that have been before us, there is absolutely no ground for saying that the landlord was under any binding obligations in respect of the alternative accommodation not to apply for an increased rent if and when he thought he might be able to obtain a higher rent from a rent officer or the rent assessment committee. So it seems to me that the basis of Mr Tingey’s grievance is really one without substance. I entirely agree with what my lord has said in the judgment which he has delivered as to the jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction of the county court to interfere with a revised rent when it has been registered. There is nothing further I think that I can usefully add. The appeal was dismissed with costs.