Park homes – Protected site – Houseboat – Respondent mooring houseboat at marina owned by appellant – First-tier Tribunal deciding area on which houseboat floated was “protected site” to which Mobile Homes Act 1983 applied – Upper Tribunal upholding decision – Appellant appealing – Whether respondent occupying “caravan” – Whether site being part of protected site – Whether respondent entitled to occupy as sole or main residence – Appeal dismissed
The appellant was the freehold owner of Hartford Marina, Wyton, Huntingdon, which comprised an artificial lake on which there was a marina with around 200 mixed residential and leisure berths. A road gave access to pontoons at which houseboats were moored, and there were also narrowboats and lodges.
The marina benefitted from planning permission granted in 1998 for the “retention of use of land for 15 houseboats to be used only as holiday accommodation and not as the sole or main residence of any person” (condition 1).
The respondent lived in a caravan moored at a pontoon in the marina known as No 8 West Pontoon. The caravan, which had wheels, sat on the frame of a specially designed float and was not secured or otherwise attached to it. It could be rolled on and off the float by means of a detachable ramp. The entire unit was marketed as a houseboat.
The appellant decided to serve the respondent with notice to quit. In response, the respondent sought the protection of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 which applied to any agreement under which a person was entitled to station a mobile home on a “protected site” and to occupy that home as their sole or main residence.
The First-tier Tribunal found that the respondent was entitled to rely on the 1983 Act and the Upper Tribunal upheld that decision: [2023] UKUT 16 (LC); [2023] PLSCS 16. The appellant appealed.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
(1) The respondent’s caravan was stationed on a “caravan site”, as defined in the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960. Therefore, the first part of the definition of “protected site” was satisfied because the land occupied by the statutory caravan was “land in respect of which a site licence is required under [the 1960 Act]”. The next issue was whether the land was “land in respect of which the relevant planning permission … is expressed to be granted for holiday use only”.
The grant of a planning permission identified what was permitted, so far as the use of land was concerned. The scope of the permitted use was defined by the grant. Any conditions attached to the grant of permission would specify what was not permitted, but they would qualify or limit the permitted use, whose scope was delineated by the grant itself.
A distinction had to be drawn between restrictions relating to the manner in which the permitted use could be exercised (which had to be contained in conditions) and the scope or extent of the permitted use itself (which necessarily excluded other uses). If, as a matter of construction, the planning permission only permitted a narrow use, wider uses would be excluded by necessary implication, without the need for express conditions. The use for which a planning permission was granted had to be ascertained by interpreting the words in the planning permission itself. The permitted use here was “retention of use of land for 15 houseboats for holiday use, moorings, parking and ancillary development”: Winchester City Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWCA Civ 563 and Lambeth London Borough Council v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2019] UKSC 33; [2019] EGLR 42 applied.
(2) In reality, what was described in the permission as a “houseboat” was not a boat or vessel of any description. The expression was used to describe what was already there on the land at the time that permission was granted, namely, a statutory caravan which sat on a float which was the means of converting a caravan into a houseboat. The appellant’s predecessor had been permitted to attach floats to the pontoon, on which up to 15 statutory caravans would be positioned, and people could stay in those caravans for holidays. That was both practically and legally a caravan site on water instead of a caravan site on dry land. Permission for the houseboat to be stationed on the land necessarily encompassed permission for the caravan. The fact that the caravan could not be so stationed without a float was irrelevant; the permission encompassed the use of the floats which converted the caravans into houseboats, as well as the stationing of the caravans on the water which the floats made possible.
(3) The respondent relied on a certificate of lawfulness of existing use or development granted in 2014 pursuant to section 191(1)(c) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 which stated that the lawful use was “use (as existing) for occupation as a sole residence”. That meant that by using her houseboat as her sole residence and not as a holiday home the respondent would not be in breach of planning control, because that use was expressly permitted as from the date identified in the certificate. The effect of the certificate was to legitimise that use of the land even if it would also have fallen outside the permitted uses for the same ten-year period.
The certificate did not simply afford the respondent a defence to enforcement action for breach of condition 1, or cause that condition to fall away whilst at the same time maintaining an identical functional limitation on the use of the land occupied by her caravan. It permitted her to live in the caravan on the float as her sole residence and it operated as a grant of the necessary planning permission for that use by virtue of section 191(7). The fact that condition 1 had become unenforceable by 2014 was a good reason both to authorise the breach of condition and to certify that the residential use of the property was lawful, thereby rendering obsolete the limitation to holiday use in the 1998 planning permission.
(4) Accordingly, the Upper Tribunal was right to hold that the certificate was the “relevant permission” for the purposes of ascertaining whether the site was a protected site. That deemed permission superseded the terms of the 1998 permission as the “relevant permission” for site licensing purposes. It followed that the site was a protected site and the respondent was entitled to the protection afforded by the 1983 Act.
Michael Rudd (instructed by Direct Access) appeared for the appellant; Stephen Cottle (instructed by Public Interest Law Centre) appeared for the respondent.
Eileen O’Grady, barrister
Click here to read a transcript of Tingdene Marinas Ltd v Jaffe
