Sovmots Investments Ltd and Brompton Securities Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment and others

Compulsory purchase of 36 maisonettes in Centre Point–Question whether acquiring authority was entitled to acquire rights in respect of other parts of Centre Point without which the maisonettes could not be used for housing accommodation–No authorisation in present case either at common law or by statute for acquisition of such ancillary rights–Court of Appeal’s decision reversed by majority of four to one–Compulsory purchase order quashed These were combined appeals by Sovmots Investments Ltd and Brompton Securities Ltd from the decision of the Court of Appeal, who had reversed the decision of Forbes J, quashing a compulsory purchase order made by the London Borough of Camden in respect of 36 maisonettes forming part of the complex known as Centre Point, St Giles Circus, London WC1. K F Goodfellow QC and Brian Knight (instructed by Goodman, Derrick & Co) appeared on behalf of Sovmots Investments Ltd; A B Dawson QC and John Furber (instructed by Cowan, Lipson & Rumney) appeared for Brompton Securities Ltd; N C H Browne-Wilkinson QC, Harry Woolf and Andrew Morritt (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) represented the Department of the Environment; and David Widdicombe QC and Guy Roots (instructed by B H Wilson, Town Clerk, Camden) represented the London Borough of Camden. In his speech, LORD WILBERFORCE said: In these conjoined appeals, the appellants (1) Sovmots Investments Ltd ("Sovmots") and (2) Brompton Securities Ltd ("Brompton") are seeking to have quashed a compulsory purchase order made by the London Borough of Camden ("Camden") and confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Environment. At first instance Forbes J on August 1 1975 quashed the order, but his decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal on July 21 1976. The full title of the order is the London Borough of Camden (Centre Point Residential Accommodation) Compulsory Purchase Order 1972. It was made on September 12 1972, under Part V of the Housing Act 1957, in particular under sections 96 and 97. Centre Point is a remarkable, elaborate and expensive complex of buildings at St Giles Circus, London WC. The site freeholders are the Greater London Council, and Sovmots are lessees for 150 years from September 29 1960. The present litigation, and the difficulties in its resolution, arise directly out of the unique character of this development. Centre Point was completed in the winter of 1966-67, but with minor exceptions, which at the date of the order did not include the residential section, has never been occupied. There is a considerable housing shortage in Camden, so it is not surprising that in 1972 the council decided compulsorily to acquire the residential section in order to provide housing accommodation for people on its housing list. Centre Point consists of three main parts. First, on the west side, there is a very high tower block meant for office use. Second, there is a low Bridge Block running west to east, joining the other two parts: this is intended for shops and showrooms. Third, on the east side, running from north to south, there is the Earnshaw Wing. This is of unusual construction. The lower part consists of a basement car park and four floors intended for shops, showrooms and offices. This part has a flat roof, called a "podium."  From the podium there rise columns, or stilts, architecturally keyed-in with the lower part, which support a massive block of distinct architectural design containing 36 two-storey maisonettes in six floors. Each maisonette is reached from a corridor running from south to north through the middle of the block on alternate floors. Access to the upper floor of each maisonette is by an internal staircase. It is these maisonettes which are the subject of the compulsory purchase order. The structure of the Earnshaw Wing and of the maisonette block is elaborate and can only be adequately described with the help of plans and photographs. These were available to your Lordships. Your Lordships found it useful to visit the site and inspect it in some detail. The following features are particularly relevant for the purposes of these appeals. Access to the maisonette block is provided by lifts and staircases. There are two passenger lifts at the south end from an entrance hall on the ground floor of the Earnshaw Wing: these serve only the maisonettes via the corridors. There is also a goods lift from the ground floor to the podium which also serves the shops. There is a staircase alongside the passenger lifts: this also provides access for showroom and office floors in the lower part. There is another staircase at the north end of the Earnshaw Wing: this is in two parts. The upper part provides exits, really for emergency use, at alternate floor levels from the maisonettes’ corridors. At the other (alternate) levels it is possible to escape from the maisonettes on to the staircase through hatches. Below podium level, this staircase provides access to the floors from mezzanine level downwards and emerges on to the street. There is a connection between the two parts of this staircase by a one-way door which allows access from the maisonettes, but is supposed to deny access to them. Also at the north end of the maisonettes there is a small rubbish chute to which the maisonettes have access: this terminates in a receptacle in an enclosed chamber on the podium. This receptacle is said to be capable of being wheeled across the podium to the goods lift at the south end. There are common services available for the Earnshaw block which are to a great extent combined and not capable of separation as between the upper and lower part. Electricity is controlled from an intake room in the basement where there are five switch-geared supplies, four for the maisonettes, the fifth for the general services provided in the wing, viz, lifts, ventilation, lighting and power to stairs, corridors, car parks and showroom and shops areas. Water is supplied to the maisonettes by extensions of the mains supplying the lower part of the building. Soil and surface23 water from the maisonettes runs from drains in the block into drains for the lower part and thence to inspection chambers below the block. Overflow pipes from the maisonettes discharge on to the podium roof. It is obvious, on examination, and it was so found by the inspector, that the Earnshaw Wing, and indeed the whole of Centre Point, was designed as one complex unit suitable for a single office user with a need of showroom space. The maisonettes seem to have been an after-thought and indeed an embarrassment, but they were "part of the planning permission package."  The idea was that they should be pieds-a-terre for the offices’ directors and executives. This combination of units turned out difficult, indeed so far impossible, to let as a whole. So on November 23 1973, ie after the making of the order, Sovmots entered into an underlease of the maisonettes to Brompton. This underlease was for 45 years from September 29 1973. It included, in addition to the maisonettes themselves, the southern staircase and entrance hall, also the northern staircase above podium level. As would be expected, it contained a number of detailed provisions, covenants and reservations. In particular it contained a grant of easements, or rights, as to the passage of water, soil, electricity and gas, as to the use of the goods lift, and as to the use of the northern staircase below podium level, with corresponding reservations for the benefit of Sovmots and their tenants in the rest of the block. Brompton have in turn sublet maisonettes to tenants at high rents. The appropriate notices and advertisements, having been given and made, Sovmots and Brompton objected to the compulsory purchase order and a public inquiry was ordered by the Secretary of State. This was held by Mr Peter Boydell QC, as inspector, assisted by Mr W J N Oswald FRICS. The inspector produced his report on March 28 1974, a document of admirable clarity and comprehensiveness, and it dealt fully and fairly with the objections, in fact and in law. The recommendation was that the order be confirmed with certain modifications, and this was accepted by the Secretary of State. The material modification related to the description of the property. I set out in parallel the original description as it appeared in the order and the modified description as confirmed. There were corresponding differences in the maps. Original Order Order as confirmed 36 Residential maisonettes on the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th floors forming part of and adjacent to the east side of the property known as Centre Point, London WC1. Together with such parts of the building which are necessary for access thereto and the maintenance thereof. 36 Residential maisonettes on the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th floors of the part of and adjacent to the east side of the property known as Centre Point, London WC1, together with, (i) the corridors giving access to the said maisonettes, (ii) the entrance hall, staircase and lifts at the south end and (iii) the staircase above podium level at the north end. There was an argument based upon the original terms of this description and its modification by the Secretary of State to the effect that the first was uncertain and the second ultra vires. However, I take the view, on a fair reading, that the original order contemplated acquisition of certain–then unspecified–physical parts, which parts were then specified under the numbering (i)–(iii) in the confirming order. Neither description, in my view, contemplated in terms the acquisition of rights. We are, in these appeals, not concerned in any way with the financial or sociological merits of the proposed compulsory acquisition. On the other hand, the courts have power on legal grounds to quash a compulsory purchase order–indeed they must do so if a proper case is made out. Three reasons were put forward by Sovmots why the order should be quashed, namely: 1. That a local authority cannot be authorised by the minister under the Housing Act 1957 to acquire compulsorily a horizontally-divided part of a building (or "stratum") excluding the underlying soil on which the building stands. 2. That a local authority cannot be authorised by the minister not only to acquire a corporeal hereditament but also to compel the grant for the benefit of such hereditament of new rights over lands or buildings not authorised to be acquired. 3. That a local authority cannot be authorised by a compulsory purchase order to compel the grant of such new rights if there is no description or mention of them in such order. The first of these reasons was rejected both by Forbes J and by the Court of Appeal and was ultimately not pursued in this House. Reasons (2) and (3) were accepted by Forbes J but rejected by the Court of Appeal. Two further reasons for quashing the order were given on behalf of Brompton, one of which related to the description of the property I have already referred to. The second related to an agreement between Camden and the Greater London Council and in the view which I take of the appeals does not arise for decision. I come therefore to deal with the second objection put forward by Sovmots. The relevance of this objection to the validity of the order arises under the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act 1946 which in turn is incorporated by the Housing Act 1957, section 97 and schedule 7. Under paragraph 15 of schedule 1 to the Act of 1946 an order may be quashed by the High Court (inter alia) if the court is satisfied that the authorisation granted by the compulsory purchase order is not empowered to be granted under the Act or under the Housing Act 1957. It is common ground between the appellants and the respondents that if Camden cannot under the compulsory purchase order acquire the ancillary rights over the appellants’ property which are necessary if the maisonettes, when severed in ownership from the rest of Centre Point, are to be used as dwellings, then the Secretary of State could not confirm the order and it must be quashed. So the question is whether these ancillary rights can be acquired. I start with the proposition that an acquiring authority cannot, under a mere power to acquire land, and in the absence of a special provision in the relevant "special" or general Act, require an owner of land to grant to it rights over his land which did not exist at the time of the purported acquisition. The proposition is, I think, correctly stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed, vol 8, paragraph 56, as follows: There is no power to create and take an interest in land such as a lease without acquiring the freehold or other interests unless specific power to do so is given in the special Act; nor is there power to create and purchase an easement without purchasing the land unless special provision is made or in either case the owner agrees. This proposition simply states a consequence of the process of compulsory acquisition. Parliament can authorise an authority to take the land of private persons; but if it wishes to confer on an authority power to require an owner to create, in its favour, limited interests or rights, less than the owner’s interest (for which, of course, less compensation might be paid) it must do so in specific terms. Parliament has done this in certain cases (for example in the Water Act 1948, section 11) and it is argued that, by implication, it has done so in the Housing Act 1957. I shall deal with that argument. But without specific power this cannot be done. The main argument before the inspector and in the courts below was that in this case and under the compulsory purchase order as made no specific power to require the creation of ancillary rights was necessary because these would pass to the acquiring authority under either, or both, of the first rule in Wheeldon v Burrows (1879) 12 ChD31 ("the Rule") or of section 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925. Under the rule (I apologise for the reminder, but the expression of the rule is important) "on the grant by the owner of a tenement or part of that tenement as it is then used and enjoyed, there will pass to the grantee all those continuous and apparent easements (by which, of course, I mean quasi easements), or, in other words, all those easements which are necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted, and which have been and are at the time of the grant used by the owners of the entirety for the benefit of the part granted" (loc cit p 49 per Thesiger LJ, my emphasis). Under section 62 a conveyance of land operates to convey with the land all ways, watercourses, liberties, privileges, easements, rights, and advantages whatsoever, appertaining or reputed to appertain to the land, or any part thereof, or, at the time of conveyance, demised, occupied or enjoyed with, or reputed or known as part or parcel or appurtenant to the land or any part thereof. My Lords, there are very comprehensive expressions here, but it does not take much analysis to see that they have no relevance to the situation under consideration. The rule is a rule of intention, based on the proposition that a man may not derogate from his grant. He cannot grant or agree to grant land and at the same time deny to his grantee what is at the time of the grant obviously necessary for its reasonable enjoyment. To apply "this" rule to a case where a public authority is taking from an owner his land without his will is to stand the rule on its head: it means substituting for the intention of a reasonable voluntary grantor the unilateral, opposed intention of the acquirer. Moreover, and this point is relevant to a later argument, the words I have italicised show that for the rule to apply there must be actual, and apparent, use and enjoyment at the time of the grant. But no such use or enjoyment had, at Centre Point, taken place at all. Equally, section 62 does not fit this case. The reason is that when land is under one ownership one cannot speak in any intelligible sense of rights, or privileges, or easements being exercised over one part for the benefit of another. Whatever the owner does, he does as owner and, until a separation occurs of ownership or at least of occupation, the condition for the existence of rights, etc, does not exist–see Bolton v Bolton (1879) 11 ChD 968, 970 per Fry J and Long v Gowlett [1923] 2 Ch 177, 189, 198, in my opinion a correct decision. A separation of ownership, in a case like the present, will arise on conveyance of one of the parts (eg the maisonettes), but this separation cannot be projected back to the stage of the compulsory purchase order so as, by anticipation, to bring into existence rights not existing in fact. My Lords, I have thought it necessary to deal with these arguments in spite of their virtual abandonment in this House, for two reasons. First, they were the foundation of the inspector’s recommendation and some of his findings, as I shall show, are clearly based on his view as to the validity of the arguments. And secondly, I have little doubt that the contentions which were presented to your Lordships are, in reality, but a thinly disguised or gently refurbished version of them. To see this it is only necessary to quote two passages from the judgment of the Court of Appeal ([1976] 3 WLR 597) which the respondents seek to uphold: 1. Although no question of common intention arises, one must construe the compulsory purchase order and ascertain the intention of the acquiring authority. Camden must have intended to acquire the rights here in question, without which it would be impossible for the maisonettes to be used as houses. The description of the physical property which they are empowered to take therefore includes by necessary implication all ancillary rights necessary for its use for the purpose for which it is being acquired–that is, as houses (p 613). 2. The maisonettes were being acquired for the purpose of being used as houses. There is a finding of fact that these ancillary rights are necessary to enable them to be used for that purpose. Camden must therefore have intended to acquire these "rights" with the houses, and on the true construction of the compulsory purchase order they are included by necessary implication in the description of the "houses" themselves (p 614). Before I deal with the argument based on "necessary implication."  I should describe in more detail the "ancillary rights" in question. There was produced before the inspector a document–marked CBC 2A–in which Camden gave its description of these rights. I quote the relevant part. Note of Ancillary Rights and Obligations for Inclusion in the Conveyance A. The London Borough of Camden will acquire the following rights pursuant to the first rule in Wheeldon v Burrows (1879 12 ChD 31 and section 62(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925. (1)   A right (in case of emergency only and for no other purpose whatsoever) for the Council, their tenants and occupiers of the acquired premises to use the staircase below podium level at the north end of the demised premises. (2)   A right in common with the owners and occupiers of the remainder of the building to use the goods lift (when operating) for the purpose only of removing rubbish from the acquired premises and for no other purpose whatsoever. (3)   A right of support from the building below podium level and from the columns supporting the residential block. (4)   A right of free passage or running of water, soil, electricity, gas, and other services through the pipes, wires, and cables serving the acquired premises. (5)   A right of access by means of the outside of the building for purposes of window cleaning, maintenance, and repair. (6)   All other such rights as are within the said rule and section. There are several points to notice about this. First, the document formed no part of the compulsory purchase order so has no status in law. Secondly it is non-exhaustive (see paragraph 6) and indeed learned counsel for Camden described the items as "illustrations": one, possibly important, other right not specifically mentioned was a right of access to the electricity meter room. Third, the list is headed with a reference to Wheeldon v Burrows, and to section 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925, so confirming that what we have is an attempt to gain by a new phrase of "necessary implication" exactly what Camden cannot get under either of these rules. Fourthly, it is obvious from the list, and also from the factual situation of the maisonette block, that just what rights the occupiers of the maisonettes should have over the retained portion of the building must be a matter of discussion and negotiation, and in no way comes under a heading "necessity."  That word might indeed cover access to the block, but this is provided for by acquisition of the lifts and staircases: other exits and entrances can be provided through several permutations; it might cover drains, but the situation as regards these is not simply one of an easement of pipes, since below podium level the same pipes and mains have to serve the needs of both parts of the wing; it might cover support, but the precise obligations of the subjacent owner as regards the elaborate structure of "stilts" and cement blocks most evidently need description. A confirmation of this is provided by the underlease of the maisonettes from Sovmots to Brompton dated November 23 1973. This, as one would expect, contains an extensive body of reservations and covenants consequent on the separation or occupation. It resembles–and probably inspired–the document CBC 2A but is not identical with it; it clearly represents the result of careful negotiation between landlord and tenant. And this is surely the reality of the matter. Centre Point was designed as a combined unit: it was not constructed for separation into parts. If separation is carried out, there is no evident, apparent, and still less necessary list of rights which, without specification, or in the nature of things, attach to a separated part. And if these rights24 cannot (for the reasons I have given) arise under the rule or under section 62, a fortiori, in my opinion, they cannot arise as necessary. Or, to put it in another way, Camden while professedly contending for necessities is really adopting a standard of reasonable enjoyment and convenience which must be custom-made for this structure. This argument from necessary implication overlaps with two other arguments, based on definitions appearing in the legislation. 1. What is authorised to be acquired is "land."  By the combined operation of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, section 1(3), the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act 1946, section 8(1), and the Housing Act 1957, section 189(1), land is defined as including "any right over land."  In my opinion this is a carefully spelt out definition within which the acquiring authority is confined. There is no room here for extension by way of "necessary implication" whatever that expression is supposed to mean. If what is authorised to be acquired cannot be used for the purpose for which its acquisition is intended, unless by agreement, and if agreement is not forthcoming, I know of no doctrine by which, under some rule of implication, the power of acquisition can be extended beyond the statutory definition. I accept, of course, as authority amply demonstrates, that statutory powers can, indeed should, be construed in accordance with Parliament’s intention, so as to include what may fairly be regarded as incidental to or consequential upon what has been authorised–this is the well-known principle of Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co v Riche (1875) LR 7 HL 653: for a recent application see Loweth v Minister of Housing and Local Government (1970) 22 P & CR 125. But it is one thing to say that an express power to acquire land may be valid, if fairly within the statutory purpose: It is quite another to say that under a power to acquire land there follow with the land some other interests not mentioned in the authority to acquire. Expropriation cannot take place by implication or through intention: it is authorised or not authorised. And to see which, it is necessary to construe the authority. So is acquisition authorised under these words?  In my opinion, clearly not. A power to acquire a right over land cannot authorise compulsion of an owner of land not being acquired to grant new rights over that land; for the latter, quite different words would be needed. Parliament has tried its hand at them in the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, section 13–the contrast with the words relevant here is clear. 2. The Housing Act 1957 contains specific provision for the acquisition of houses (section 96). I am willing to accept, for the purpose of this argument, that there is power compulsorily to acquire "houses" as defined in the Act–as well as to acquire "land."  Section 189(1) contains this: "’house’ includes (a) any yard, garden, outhouses and appurtenances belonging thereto or usually enjoyed therewith." and it is said that these words carry the ancillary rights. But I cannot agree. These words are a clear echo of those used in the first rule in Wheeldon v Burrows and in section 62. "No doubt," said Fry LJ, "the word ‘appurtenances’ is not apt for the creation of a new right, and the word ‘appurtenant’ is not apt to describe a right which had never previously existed."  But he continued, "appurtenant" had long been held "to admit of a secondary meaning and as equivalent in that case to ‘usually occupied’": Thomas v Owen (1887) 20 QBD 225, 231-2. The draftsman might have had this passage in mind. The words are totally inadequate to create or define or to pass a complex of ancillary rights which at the time of the order had no definition and, with only some possible exceptions, no existence. So, by whichever route the respondents attempt to go, I find that they fail in the contention that the compulsory purchase order secures them the rights which they require. I must mention, in conclusion, two arguments. 1. As the second quotation I have made from the judgment of the Court of Appeal shows, that court took the view that the necessity of the ancillary rights claimed was established by a finding of fact of the inspector. I do not so read his report. He accepted the argument put before him that the rights could pass to the purchaser under the rule and under section 62. He accepted that the rights had not been exercised. He considered that one could look "to the common intention of the parties" and that when the relation of vendor-purchaser between the parties exists they must be deemed to have intended that those rights would pass. In any event they would pass under section 62 so long as the right words were put into the notice to treat. It was in this context, which (as is really now accepted) was not maintainable in law, that he wrote "it is obvious that the rights claimed are necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the maisonettes."  I do not regard this finding as going beyond the establishment of a set of facts which, in his opinion, might bring in the rule and section 62. 2. The learned inspector, in this followed by the Court of Appeal, held that the rights, though not enjoyed or exercised, existed "in a latent form."  But this, with respect, is either a contradiction in terms, or a very great, and indeterminate, extension of both rule and section. Each is based on enjoyment and exercise: neither is warrant for an emergence–Athene-like–of rights fully defined, on a unilateral act by the acquiring authority. In my opinion, therefore, since the minister when confirming the order did so upon a hypothesis, as to the ancillary rights, which turns out not to be well founded, the order must be quashed. I therefore find it unnecessary to decide whether, if there is power under the Housing Act 1957 to require new rights to be created, such new rights must be specified in the compulsory purchase order. While I incline to think that in the interest of fairness and justice they should be, I wish to cast no doubt upon what I understand is accepted procedure, namely, that such existing legal rights (eg, easements) as go with land being acquired or are on the title to that land need not be so specified. I would allow the appeal and restore the order of Forbes J quashing the order. The respondents must pay the costs of the appellants in this House and in the Court of Appeal. Agreeing, LORD EDMUND-DAVIES said: It appears that Camden erred in three respects in making the CPO. First they paid insufficient attention to the legal problems inherent in the compulsory acquisition of a unique type of property. This was far from being an ordinary compulsory purchase project. Camden were not contemplating the acquisition of houses or a block of flats or of some independently occupied flats in a block, but of 36 maisonettes within the outer shell of a gigantic building whose internal construction was elaborately interlocked, and regarding which the inspector reported (para 135): Centre Point was conceived as a complex suitable for a single office user with a need of showroom space. It seems clear that from the outset there were misgivings about the maisonettes. They were an embarrassment, but they were part of the planning permission package. The idea therefore developed, and was fostered, that they should be pieds-a-terre for the offices’ directors and executives. The second point of importance which Camden seemingly failed to regard as legally significant is that even up to the last day of the inquiry (February 8 1974) Brompton, who had become underlessees of the maisonettes in the preceding November, had not let any of them and that the whole of the vast Centre Point building had throughout remained unoccupied. The third error was the authority’s failure to appreciate the basic difference between the consequences flowing from the compulsory acquisition of property and25 those which follow when parties have agreed the terms upon which the title to landed property is conveyed. . . . The appellants have throughout stressed that Camden were seeking both to create new rights over the rest of Centre Point and promptly to acquire them. But the inspector found that . . . the rights which Camden seeks to acquire are not in reality new rights created by the order for the first time. These were all rights which in effect existed in a latent form to benefit one part of the building vis-a-vis another part. Each of the rights set out in Part A of CBC 2A already existed and could have been enjoyed . . . by whomever the maisonettes were occupied. If I may be permitted to say so of an inspector whose report is a model of clarity and care, I find that as startling a proposition as Mr Boydell said he found the contrary proposition. At the making of the CPO, in truth there existed stairs which could be climbed, drainage pipes which could be used, and lifts which could be made operable. But there existed no easements in favour of the empty maisonettes, and not even quasi easements, and yet it is said that "rights over land" already existed in a latent form and could therefore be acquired. No authority for the proposition was cited and I do not think any exists; and the extent to which the law has been altered for the future in this respect by section 13 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 does not call for present consideration. In his reply Mr Browne-Wilkinson referred your Lordships to the decision in Wong v Beaumont Property Trust Ltd [1965] 1 QB 173, but that case related to an easement of necessity, and learned counsel had been at pains throughout to base his claim to CBC 2A rights on a wholly different basis. . . . I hold that Camden was not empowered to acquire under Part V of the Housing Act 1957 any of the rights set out in CBC 2A. As they could acquire property solely in order to provide housing accommodation, and those rights having been found necessary for the maisonettes to be so used when they became severed in ownership from the rest of Centre Point, it follows that the CPO was invalid. It should here be added, though parenthetically, that the inspector nowhere reported that the CBC 2A rights were in themselves sufficient for the statutory purpose. Indeed, it emerged that Camden would need yet further important rights not covered by the CPO, such as a right of access to the electric meter in the intake room and another to the drainage inspection chamber, both of which are located outside those physical parts of Centre Point which are comprised in the order. In a dissenting speech, LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN said: . . . On the whole, with all respect to those who hold a contrary view and who have expressed it so cogently, I am of opinion that there is in the Housing Act by necessary implication a power to acquire with the maisonette block and the passenger lifts and south staircase and entrance hall such rights over the remaining property of Sovmots as are essential to the use of the maisonette block for housing purposes–ie without which it cannot be so used. In any given case what are those rights must be defined by the character of the building and the layout: they are objectively determinable and do not require to be set out in the compulsory purchase order. In any given case the acquisition of such rights may be relevant to quantum of compensation. . . . I would dismiss these appeals. Agreeing with Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies, LORD KEITH OF KINKEL said: . . . The definition of "house" in section 189(1) of the Act is a wide one, but it does not expressly cover ancillary rights such as are here sought to be created and acquired. Where Parliament intends to confer power to create and acquire compulsorily new easements over land it says so expressly, as in section 11 of the Water Act 1968 and section 55(2) of the Post Office Act 1969. Compulsory purchase enactments are to be strictly construed, and a particular power of compulsory acquisition, which is not expressly conferred, can be conferred by implication only where the statutory provisions would otherwise lack sensible content. That is not the position here. . . . In my opinion Parliament, when it passed the 1957 Act, did not have in view the possibility of the acquisition by local authorities for housing purposes of part of a building in single ownership, and in particular of a horizontally divided part of such a building. Horizontally divided ownership of a building was extremely uncommon in England and Wales in 1957, being practically unknown, so it was said, outside Lincoln’s Inn. It is a conception which gives rise to a very complicated situation as regards the mutual rights and obligations of the several owners. It is, however, a conception familiar to the law of Scotland for centuries, and the difficulties have there been resolved, in a mass of case law, on the basis of rights of common property and common interest, rather than by reference to the law of servitudes. In section 184(1) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1950, which corresponds to section 189(1) of the 1957 Act, "house" is defined as including a "flat" which in turn is defined as premises "forming part of a building from some other part of which it is divided horizontally."  The absence from the 1957 Act of any similar reference indicates that Parliament in enacting it did not have in contemplation the acquisition of such premises by a local authority for housing purposes, and although the appellants now accept that "part of a building" on a proper construction includes a flat, I think it is right to infer that Parliament did not intend to deal with the problem raised by horizontal severance of part of a building in single ownership. . . . LORD FRASER OF TULLYBELTON expressed agreement with the speech of Lord Keith. The appeal was allowed, the respondents to pay the appellants’ costs in the Court of Appeal and the House.