Savoury and others v Secretary of State for Wales and another

Cardiff clearance area covering streets with close community spirit–Residents’ objections to compulsory purchase order–Council said to have acted without being satisfied, as required, that ‘suitable’ alternative accommodation was available–‘Suitable’ does not necessarily mean ‘located so as to preserve the community spirit’–In any event, council’s own statements as to satisfaction must be accepted in the absence of evidence to the opposite effect This was an appeal by Mr Leonard Savoury and other residents of Nora Street and Helen Street, Adamstown, Cardiff, from a decision of the first respondent, the Secretary of State for Wales, dated June 13 1974, confirming, with minor modifications, a compulsory purchase order made by17 the second respondents, Cardiff City Council, in respect of houses in the district. Lord Gifford (instructed by L Bingham & Co, agents for Anthony W Jeremy & Co, of Cardiff) appeared for the appellants, and Mr H K Woolf (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor and by Collyer-Bristow & Co, agents for the city solicitor) represented both respondents. Giving a reserved judgment, CANTLEY J said that because of strong objections to the compulsory purchase order in question, the Secretary of State caused a public local inquiry to be held. It was very understandable that the appellants and other residents of the two streets concerned strongly objected to the order. It was a very closely-knit community with a strong community spirit. A good percentage of the residents were between 60 and 80 years of age, and some of them had lived in the two streets for the whole of their lives. Many of the elderly residents received practical help and moral support from kind neighbours. In his report, the inspector accepted that a strong case had been presented against the demolition of the houses, based on three aspects: (a) the social consequences of demolition; (b) the economics of preservation as compared with demolition; and (c) the wish of the residents to be allowed to remain undisturbed. The inspector accepted without qualification the case made on the basis of community spirit, and reported that while the council hoped to rehouse many of the residents on the same site after redevelopment, the intervening disruption might result in a failure to regain the close community spirit. The Secretary of State nevertheless confirmed the order. He rejected the appellants’ argument that the houses should be retained and improved, saying that he accepted that the property was in such a condition that improvement was not practicable. The appellants now moved to quash the order on the grounds that it was not within the powers of the Housing Act 1957 and that they had been substantially prejudiced by non-compliance with a requirement of the Act. The basis of the argument presented on their behalf was the proviso to section 42 of the statute, which stated that before passing a resolution declaring an area to be a clearance area, a local authority must be satisfied, first, that it would be in a position to provide, or secure the provision of, such accommodation as would be necessary for persons displaced, in advance of the displacements which would from time to time become necessary, and secondly, that its resources were sufficient for the purpose of putting the resolution into effect. The appellants said that before the council passed their resolution declaring the area to be a clearance area they had not satisfied themselves as to the suitability of alternative accommodation already existing, or secured the provision of accommodation in advance of the displacements. The appellants contended that the council should have satisfied themselves that such accommodation as was, or would be, available would be so located as to preserve the community spirit; at the most, they said, the council had merely satisfied themselves that a sufficient number of suitable houses would be available, and that was not good enough. The effect of a contravention of the second proviso to section 42 (1) had been considered by Lord Parker CJ in Goddard v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1958] 3 All ER 482, in which he had accepted that compliance with the proviso was a condition precedent when making a valid declaration or clearance order, so that if the requirements set out were not met, the subsequent compulsory purchase order would not be within the powers of the Act. He (his Lordship) respectfully agreed. If, therefore, the present appellants could persuade the court that the council had not satisfied themselves in accordance with the requirements of the first limb of the proviso, the compulsory purchase order must be quashed. It should be noted that this point had not been raised at the inquiry. The objectors had, however, argued strongly that proper regard had not been paid by the local authority to the wishes of the residents to remain in the area, and the results of a survey of a local action group, which showed that 60 per cent of the present residents wished to remain, had been put before the inspector. It was also to be observed that it was not suggested that the council had acted otherwise than bona fide in the matter. If, therefore, it appeared that they (the council) had somehow satisfied themselves of the relevant requirements, the court would be in a position to interfere only if it was shown that they had acted capriciously, had not really considered the evidence, or were satisfied on no evidence, or else that such evidence as there was could not possibly have satisfied them. The council had to be satisfied (1) that accommodation was available, or would be provided, in advance of the displacement which would from time to time become necessary, and (2) that the accommodation would be suitable. The statute recognised that displacement of people was inevitable when rehousing took place, and that that meant real inconvenience to everyone. The statute also recognised that demolition might take place in stages, and that everyone in the area would not necessarily be rehoused simultaneously. In the present context, the requirement that the alternative accommodation should be ‘suitable’ meant, as Scarman LJ said in R v Bristol Corporation [1974] 1 WLR 498 at 502, ‘no more and no less than suitable to the requirements of the person and his family in the circumstances in which they find themselves.’  Lord Gifford had adopted that definition on behalf of the appellants, and so did he (his Lordship). He also accepted Lord Gifford’s submission that the accommodation to be provided had to be suitable for the requirements of the real people who were being displaced, and not purely hypothetical people. However, ‘suitable’ was not the equivalent of an ideal or perfect alternative, nor was it equivalent to ‘identical.’  Regard had to be had to what was reasonably practicable and to what accommodation the actual persons being displaced, temporarily or permanently, could reasonably be asked to accept. Accommodation was not unsuitable merely because people displaced by demolition were not going to be rehoused on the old site. The preservation of an established, well-conducted and contented community was a very desirable thing, but it might not always be reasonably practical to achieve it. He (Cantley J) had been shown an extract from the minutes of the council’s estates committee for July 20 1971. This read: ‘Proposed clearance area. Resolved, that subject to the finance committee being satisfied that the resources of the council are sufficient for the purpose of carrying this decision into effect, a compulsory purchase order be made under section 43 of the Housing Act 1957 in respect of the land shown on the plan annexed, and in so far as suitable accommodation available for persons who will be displaced by the clearance of this site does not already exist, the council do secure provision of such accommodation in advance of displacement, and do undertake to carry out or secure the carrying-out of such rehousing within such a period of time as the Secretary of State may consider reasonably necessary.’ It did, therefore, appear that the council had satisfied themselves of the matters set out in the proviso, and the court could in these circumstances interfere only if it was shown that they had not really considered the question at all, or had decided it either upon no evidence, or upon evidence on which they could not reasonably be satisfied. Lord Gifford contended that there was no evidence and that the inspector’s report indicated there had been no consultation with residents. But he (his Lordship) did not read the inspector’s report as indicating that the council were unaware of the community spirit in the area or of the fact that many residents wanted to stay there. Counsel had gone on to contend that it was plain from the evidence that the council had done no more than make a numerical comparison between houses likely to be available and the number of family units in the18 streets. That did not follow from the evidence. In any event, the question with which the court was concerned was whether the council had acted arbitrarily or whether, in declaring themselves satisfied that suitable accommodation was, or would be, available, they had reached a conclusion they could not reasonably have reached. The answer to this must be no. It was finally contended on behalf of the appellants that the council appeared to have thought that the subsequent rehousing of some of the people on the site would meet the objections raised. That was not an inference which could properly be drawn from the evidence. If the intention was to rehouse 50 per cent on the site, that did not mean that the accommodation for the other 50 per cent would be unsuitable. The difficulty in the way of the appellants was that there was no real evidence as to the information upon which the council, before passing their resolution, had decided that suitable accommodation was, or would be, available. On the face of the resolution and the compulsory purchase order, the council had carried out their duties, and there was no evidence that they had not acted regularly and properly. There was nothing established which would justify the court in quashing the order, and the appeal must be dismissed. No order was made as to costs.