Re Leeds Federated Housing Association Ltd
(Before Sir Douglas FRANK QC, sitting as a deputy judge of the division)
Rent Act 1977 and Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971 — Statutory appeal by housing association — No respondent — Complaint by association that rents fixed by rent assessment committee of Yorkshire Rent Assessment Panel were too high — In the course of their decision the committee had incorrectly assumed that certain properties cited as comparable, and included in a previous committee decision, were properties in the private rented sector whereas they were in fact housing association properties — The committee had therefore rejected the comparison with these properties on a wrong assumption — The judge held accordingly that the committee had made an error of law — Case remitted to the panel with a direction that it should be reheard by a committee, it being left to the panel to decide whether case should go to the same committee or a different committee — Rehearing, not merely reconsideration by committee, ordered
This was a
statutory appeal by Leeds Federated Housing Association Ltd under section 13 of
the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971 from a decision of a rent assessment
committee of the Yorkshire Rent Assessment Panel. There was no respondent to
the appeal, the tenants not being named as respondents and the committee not
being capable of appearing or being represented under RSC, Order 55, rule 8.
For the assistance of the court, however, counsel was instructed and appeared
as amicus curiae.
Andrew Arden
(instructed by Pearlman, Grazin & Co, of Leeds) appeared on behalf of the
appellant association; Andrew Collins (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor)
appeared as amicus curiae.
Rent Act 1977 and Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971 — Statutory appeal by housing association — No respondent — Complaint by association that rents fixed by rent assessment committee of Yorkshire Rent Assessment Panel were too high — In the course of their decision the committee had incorrectly assumed that certain properties cited as comparable, and included in a previous committee decision, were properties in the private rented sector whereas they were in fact housing association properties — The committee had therefore rejected the comparison with these properties on a wrong assumption — The judge held accordingly that the committee had made an error of law — Case remitted to the panel with a direction that it should be reheard by a committee, it being left to the panel to decide whether case should go to the same committee or a different committee — Rehearing, not merely reconsideration by committee, ordered
This was a
statutory appeal by Leeds Federated Housing Association Ltd under section 13 of
the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971 from a decision of a rent assessment
committee of the Yorkshire Rent Assessment Panel. There was no respondent to
the appeal, the tenants not being named as respondents and the committee not
being capable of appearing or being represented under RSC, Order 55, rule 8.
For the assistance of the court, however, counsel was instructed and appeared
as amicus curiae.
Andrew Arden
(instructed by Pearlman, Grazin & Co, of Leeds) appeared on behalf of the
appellant association; Andrew Collins (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor)
appeared as amicus curiae.
Giving
judgment, SIR DOUGLAS FRANK QC said: These are two statutory appeals under the
Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971 by, paradoxically, the landlords, who say that
the rent determined by a committee of the rent assessment panel for Yorkshire
was too high. Mr Coulter appeared before the committee for the association. He
invoked 83 Wickham Street as a comparable, the property for consideration by
the committee being 17 Wickham Street. He urged that as one of the comparables
which should be taken into account. The committee took that into account and,
having made the adjustments which they thought appropriate, came to the
conclusion that it supported a rent of £9 per week.
Mr Arden has
made a certain criticism about the adjustment for inflation which, in my
judgment, is ill-founded. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on that.
The committee
then went on to deal with properties in Stratford Terrace which had been the
subject of a decision by another committee, differently composed but from the
same assessment panel, and they, in dealing with that in their decision, said:
‘The committee have found difficulty in accepting the level of rents set by
this decision.’ They then went on to make certain further observations and they
then said:
The decision
of September 24 1980
that is the
one, it appears, which was only made six weeks before
relies
heavily on the use of rents for ‘comparable’ properties in the private sector.
This method of determination is of limited use where a committee does not have
access to the comparables quoted and are unable to compare the quality of the
accommodation, improvements and repairs. The improvements and repairs undertaken
by the housing association are of a very much higher standard than is normally
the case. The committee therefore consider that, even by using the comparative
method, the rents fixed on September 24 1980 were low.
Mr Arden,
relying on a number of authorities, in particular Ezekiel v Orakpo [1977]
QB 260 and Mason v Skilling [1974] 1 WLR 1473, submits that, as a
matter of law, the committee were bound to accept the decision relating to
Stratford Terrace as being correct unless it was wrong in law. On a literal
reading of parts of the judgments in the cases I have cited, there is some
support for that. I am not sure that I would accept such a broad proposition,
because it does seem to me that if it can be shown that a previous decision is
open to attack, for example, that the evidence was incomplete, inaccurate or
false, then it would be quite wrong for a committee to accept it as they would
then be relying on a fair rent which had been determined on a false basis in
fact and therefore it might not be a fair rent as prescribed by the statute.
In Mason v
Skilling, Lord Reid said:
Of course it
must be open to the either party to show that those comparable rents have been
determined on a wrong basis but until that is shown it must be assumed that
rents already determined have been rightly ascertained.
In this case,
the committee rejected the Stratford Terrace comparables because they in turn
were based on comparables in the private sector contrasted with comparables of
properties owned by a housing association. As now appears from an affidavit put
in by Mr Coulter, which is not challenged, in fact the only properties before
the committee deciding the Stratford Terrace case were properties owned by the
housing association. So, in short, what the committee did in the instant case
was to reject the Stratford Terrace properties on a wrong assumption. There is
no knowing what view they might have taken or what weight they might have given
to the Stratford Terrace decision had they known that the comparables invoked in
that decision were not properties in the private sector but owned by a housing
association.
Under those
circumstances, it seems to me that there is an error of law in the decision. I
should say, however, that the committee went to a great deal of trouble in
considering this case and their reasons are set out in a manner which is to be
commended and it is not to be taken as any criticism of them that the court
feels bound to remit this case for further consideration so that they can again
consider the Stratford Terrace properties and what weight they should give to
them. Accordingly, this case will be remitted.
The case was
remitted to the Yorkshire Rent Assessment Panel for rehearing by a committee.