R v Rent Officer of Nottinghamshire Registration area, ex parte Allen

Rent Act 1977 — Whether a caravan was a ‘house’ within section 1 of the Act so as to be within the jurisdiction of the rent officer for the purpose of the determination of a fair rent — Caravan in present case, although fully mobile, was connected to a mains water and electricity supply and to a sewage pipe, but all these services could be disconnected within a few minutes without the use of tools — Also the caravan could be connected easily to a towing vehicle and driven off — As a result of an application by the local authority under section 68 of the 1977 Act, the rent officer decided that he had jurisdiction to determine a fair rent and fixed a rent for the caravan of £15 a week — The owner of the caravan, who owned the site licensed for 40 caravans, applied for judicial review, seeking an order of certiorari to quash the registration — It was argued on his behalf that the caravan which retained features of mobility could not be a house within the meaning of section 1 of the Act, but was a mere chattel — The judge pointed out that a caravan could, depending on the circumstances, be a house or a chattel and drew attention to a number of features which would indicate elements of site permanence or immobility — On the whole the characteristics in the present case, including the impermanence of the various services, established that the caravan could not properly be described as a house — Certiorari would accordingly go to quash the entry in the rent register — Attention was drawn in the judgment to the fact that a county court judge had no power to order the rectification of a rent register or the expunging of an entry, although he could make a declaration as to the status of a tenancy — Only the High Court could order an entry to be quashed — A multiplication of applications to the High Court was not, however, to be encouraged — A party who wished to challenge a rent officer’s finding as to jurisdiction should do so promptly, before an entry is made in the register — If the rent officer is of the opinion that there is substance in the challenge he can delay making an entry in the register until the question can be determined in the county court — Otherwise, if the registration is made and the county court subsequently decides that there is no jurisdiction, the most convenient solution is the present practice of leaving the entry in the register as it is, but making an endorsement against it that there is no jurisdiction to act on it — Certiorari ordered The applicant, Frank Allen, applied for judicial review of a registration made by a rent officer in the Nottinghamshire Registration Area determining a fair rent for a caravan occupied by a Mrs Moore on the applicant’s caravan site at Ollerton. The initiative in seeking a determination of a fair rent was taken, not by Mrs Moore herself, but by the local authority under the powers given to it by section 68 of the Rent Act 1977. Kim Lewison (instructed by Colton & Franks, of Newark) appeared on behalf of the applicant; A Moses (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) represented the rent officer. Giving judgment, FARQUHARSON J said: This is an application for judicial review of an entry in the register of rents made by the respondent, a rent officer of the Nottinghamshire Registration Area, dated March 15 1984. The applicant submits that there should be an order of certiorari to quash the registration. The applicant owns the freehold of a caravan site at Ollerton, in Nottinghamshire. The site is licensed for up to 40 caravans and there are concrete pitches or bases for 38 of them, nearly all of which are used by the applicant himself to support his own caravans. Each concrete base is occupied by a single caravan, which is not affixed to the base. The caravans rest on their own wheels and stabilising stands, which are part of the original manufacture. One such caravan, no 22, was let to a Mrs Moore on or about January 23 1984. There is no evidence before me whether the letting included the concrete base upon which that particular caravan stood. Like the others, this caravan, although fully mobile, was connected to a mains, water and electricity supply and also to a sewage pipe. All these services are provided for each of the caravans on the site. It is the applicant’s case that these services are easily connected. It is his practice from time to time to remove the caravans from their bases for the purpose of carrying out repairs and renovations. He describes his system of moving individual caravans in this way: I personally go to the caravans. I disconnect the electricity by pulling out two wires from a trip switch located inside the caravan. I disconnect the water by turning off a mains tap and manually unscrewing the hose. The hose is finger tight and no tools are needed. I then disconnect the waste pipes by unscrewing a plastic connector. This, too, is finger tight. I then disconnect the sewage outlet. I do this by pulling off a four inch flexible rubber hose. All these operations can be carried out in approximately five minutes. I then back a towing vehicle up to the caravan. I screw down the handle at the front of the caravan, so as to connect the caravan to a towing vehicle. I then lift up the stays at the corners of the caravan (which are the manufacturer’s stays) and drive off. Caravan no 22 was a large vehicle. There are photographs exhibited to the applicant’s affidavit showing its dimensions and the way that the services are connected. It is some 30 ft long. It seems that Mrs Moore was eligible for and receiving housing benefit under section 8 of the Social Security and Housing Benefit Act 1982 from the local authority, the Newark District Council. Being concerned about the extent of Mrs Moore’s liability for rent and the limitations on the help available under the statute, the local authority, through its housing officer, applied to the rent officer for the registration of a fair rent for the caravan occupied by Mrs Moore under section 68 of the Rent Act 1977. This application was made on January 30 1984. During the month of February the rent officer made the usual inquiries of both the landlord and the tenant and all parties had a consultation on the matter on March 8 1984. On March 15 1984 the rent officer, being of the opinion that he had jurisdiction to do so in as much as he was satisfied that Mrs Moore enjoyed a protected tenancy under the Rent Act 1977, fixed a fair rent of £15 a week for this caravan no 22 and thereafter made the appropriate entry in the register of rents under the Act. On March 20 the applicant informed the rent officer that he contested the issue of jurisdiction and on April 26 1984 he issued an originating application in the Mansfield County Court for the judge to determine the matter under section 141 of the Rent Act. 154 While the county court judge has power under section 141(1)(a) to determine whether a tenancy is protected under the Act, he can only make a declaration to that effect. It is agreed by both sides before me that the judge cannot order rectification of the register or the expunging of any particular entry. In those circumstances, if the rent officer has entered a fair rent in the register and it is then held that he had no jurisdiction so to do the only way in which that entry can be removed is by issuing proceedings like the present before the High Court under Order 53. The first matter argued before me was this point as to jurisdiction. The rent officer has power under section 70 to determine a fair rent for a regulated tenancy. By section 18 a regulated tenancy is, for the purposes of the Act, a protected tenancy. Finally, by section 1 of the Act, a protected tenancy is one under which a dwelling-house, which may be a house or part of a house, is let as a separate dwelling. It is the applicant’s case that a caravan which retains its features of mobility cannot be a house within the meaning of section 1. Mr Lewison obtains support for this submission from various learned authors: first, from Woodfall, 28th ed, where it is said at p 3030 that: ‘house’ must be limited to a permanent structure either the whole or part of which is intended for a person to live in, thus excluding at once movable structures such as caravans and tents, as well as permanent buildings of a nature unsuitable for living in, such as stables, garages with no living-rooms attached, and workshops. Second, the learned author of Megarry on The Rent Acts, 10th ed, at p 50, says: in addition to structural suitability for forming a home, some degree of permanence and immobility appears to be requisite, so that a stationary but not immobile caravan has been held to be outside the Acts, and doubtless the same would apply to a houseboat or yacht afloat. The last of the writers to which counsel refers is the author of vol 27, on ‘Landlord and Tenant’, of Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed, para 583, where the author says: In deciding whether a structure is capable of being a house, regard must be had to its essential nature and degree of permanence. Thus it would appear that a hut or mobile caravan does not constitute a house. Presumably, however, a cave or other form of natural structure which is permanent in form might constitute a house if suitably adapted. I have been referred to a number of authorities which, in the main, have been concerned with different statutes or with different issues. In particular, I have been referred to an Australian case called R v Smith and Johnston, ex parte Loy [1952] SRQ 227 where, under a similar statute, the court distinguished once again between mobile and immobile structures in considering whether a dwelling was a house within the meaning of that particular statute. Other cases referred to are Norton v Knowles [1969] 1 QB 572, Makins v Elson (Inspector of Taxes) [1977] 1 All ER 572 and Bakes v Huckle [1948] VLR 159. There is no doubt in my mind that there was a letting of the caravan by the applicant to Mrs Moore and that the purpose of that letting was that she should have the use of it as a separate dwelling. As counsel has emphasised, the only issue is whether the caravan is a house. In my judgment, it is not possible to say that because the subject-matter is the letting of a caravan, it cannot be within the Act. Plainly, it must depend on the circumstances of the letting. Where the caravan is let as a movable chattel, there can be no question of its being properly described as a house. Where, on the other hand, it is rendered completely immobile, either by the removal of its wheels or by its being permanently blocked by some brick or concrete construction, then it is more likely to be regarded as a house in the same way as a bungalow or prefabricated dwelling would be. Difficulties will arise when the facts are somewhere between those two extremes. The rent officer or the county court judge, as the case may be, will have regard to the features of the caravan which may reveal elements of site permanence on the one hand or immobility on the other. Are the wheels still on the vehicle?  Are the stabilising struts of a permanent nature or of a kind ordinarily used by a caravan when moving from site to site?  Are the services attached to the caravan?  If so, are they of a fixed nature or readily detachable?  Is the caravan ever moved?  If so, for what purpose and with what facility?  Plainly, rent officers will be on their guard against landlords who rent out caravans on their estate, on a permanent or long-term basis, and who seek to avoid the controls of the Rent Act by making superficial arrangements tending to show some mobility in their caravans when the reality is that they are permanently based on the site. If the occupancy of the caravan is such that it is plainly used by the tenant as his or her permanent home, then there is a greater likelihood of the caravan’s being permanently in place rather than its being used as a temporary expedient. The present case, on its facts, is not altogether easy to determine because the characteristics of this vehicle place it on both sides of the line, but overall, in my judgment, the movement of these caravans from time to time, as disclosed by the applicant’s affidavit and the impermanence of the connection of the various services, establish that they could not, in reality — although I am concerned only with caravan no 22 — be described as houses. The feature of mobility is not, of course, the sole determining factor in deciding on which side of the line any particular case will fall. However, it is perhaps more significant than any other. For the reasons given, I hold that the present applicant is entitled to an order of certiorari and the entry relating to caravan no 22 in the relevant rent register will be quashed. Mr Moses, on behalf of the respondent, questions the need for applications of this kind, which are essentially private disputes rather than involving matters of public law, to be made under Order 53: see R v Rent Officer for London Borough of Camden, ex parte Plant (1981) 257 EG 713, [1981] 1 EGLR 73. As already noted, there is no power for the county court to order deletion of entries in the rent register, but I agree with Mr Moses that that deficiency in the procedure provided by the Act should not encourage applications to the High Court. His solution, which I endorse, is that landlords who wish to challenge a rent officer’s findings as to jurisdiction should do so promptly, and before the entries are made in the register; then, if the rent officer is of the opinion that there is substance in the challenge, he can delay making the registration until the question can be determined in the county court: see R v Camden London Borough Rent Officer, ex parte Ebiri [1981] 1 WLR 881.*  Otherwise, the most convenient solution is to abide by the present practice of allowing the entry to remain on the register, with the rent officer’s endorsement against it that there is no jurisdiction to act upon it. *Editor’s note: Also reported at (1980) 257 EG 605, [1981] 1 EGLR 71. Order of certiorari was granted, with costs against respondent rent officer.