R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages

Religious worship — Premises – Registration — Registrar refusing to certify Scientology chapel as place of meeting for religious worship — Claimant applying for judicial review of decision – Whether Scientology constituting a “religion” for purposes section 2 of Places of Worship Registration Act 1855 — Application dismissed The claimant and her fiancé were both Scientologists who wanted to marry at the chapel of the Church of Scientology, in Queen Victoria Street, London. Since the chapel was not registered under section 2 of the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855 as a “place of meeting for religious worship”, it was not a registered building within section 26 of the Marriage Act 1949. Unless the chapel was registered under the 1855 Act, it was not possible to apply under the 1949 Act for it to be registered for the solemnisation of marriages. On 13 May 2011, the second claimant, the Church of Scientology Religious Education College that owned the chapel, applied to the defendant for its registration as a place of meeting for religious worship under the 1855 Act. The defendant refused the application on the grounds that the chapel was not a place for “religious worship”. The defendant submitted that she was bound to refuse the application by virtue of the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Registrar General ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697, which upheld her predecessor’s refusal to register another Scientologist chapel as a “place of meeting for religious worship”. The claimants argued that, even if Segerdal was binding, on the evidence, it did not preclude the court finding that the London chapel was a place of religious worship. The understanding of Scientology as a religion had developed since 1970; further, better and updated evidence was now available, and a more expansive approach was now required to the meaning of place “for religious worship” in a multi-faith society. Further, the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010, precluding discrimination on the grounds of religious belief, meant that the distinction drawn by the Court of Appeal between Buddhism and Scientology could not be upheld to the disadvantage of Scientology. The practice of the defendant of registering Buddhist temples as places of religious worship, along with Jain temples and others, but not Scientology chapels, also discriminated against Scientologists. That discrimination had to be removed by a different and broader approach to the 1855 Act. Held: The application was dismissed. (1) There was scope for legitimate debate about the ratio of Segerdal. However, the court had decided the case on the basis that whether Scientology was a religion at all was not the crucial point. The crucial factor was that what they did was not worship, rather than that they worshipped outside the scope of a religion. Although “religious worship” was a single concept, the court had focussed on whether the nature of the services was “worship”; if Scientology were a religion its services were not worship. In the present case, the defendant had not misunderstood that decision but had applied it. (2) In the absence of any significant change in the beliefs of Scientologists, or in their services, since the decision in Segerdal, it was binding on the court. It might be that now a different approach to “religious worship” from that in Segerdal would and should be adopted. At least one of the purposes of the 1855 Act was to permit registration of the places for religious worship, because the premises and their services would be treated by those who attended with reverence and would therefore be places where the civil part of marriage ceremonies could be performed and registered openly, voluntarily and lawfully. A “place for religious worship of any other body or denomination” might focus more on the significance for their religious beliefs which the adherents vested in the place and in their services there. However, the decision of the Court of Appeal in that respect was binding in the present case. (3) The phrase “place of meeting for religious worship” meant the place set aside by the body in question for its adherents in congregation to undertake its formal services, affirming its religious beliefs, and their commitment and devotion to its guiding spiritual power, principle or Being. It did not cover places of instruction or meditation alone or in which worship was an incidental use. It was important that the Act was not interpreted in a way which gave a traditional religion greater legitimacy than a new one, or which required a traditional form of worship, when the purpose of the Act could be met without such restrictions, and in a way which reflected the variety of religious beliefs now practised in England and Wales. Nonetheless the court was bound by the Segerdal definition of “worship”. (4) The Human Rights Act 1998 did not provide a basis upon which the court could read the 1855 Act differently; it was not incompatible with the human rights of the claimants. There was no interference with the right to marry or with the right of Scientologists to practise their religion, if such it was. There was no discrimination on the grounds of religion, assuming that Scientology was a religion. Likewise, there was no route to freedom from Segerdal in the Equality Act 2010. If there were discrimination, it was in any event required by the 1855 Act and so could not contravene the 2010 Act. Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC and Naina Patel (instructed by Withers LLP Solicitors) appeared for the claimants; James Strachan (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the defendant. Eileen O’Grady, barrister