Procter & Gamble Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment and others

Compulsory purchase order — Whether compulsory purchase order confirmed for a purpose different from that for which it was made — Whether confirming authorities had had regard to an irrelevant consideration — Whether there was evidence that the subject land was required for the purpose for which the order was made On June 26 1989 the Tyne & Wear Development Corporation (‘TWDC’) made a compulsory purchase order (‘the order’) under powers conferred by section 142 of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 — In the non-statutory statement of reasons for making the order the TWDC stated that it was vital to secure the regeneration of an area called East Quayside by the comprehensive redevelopment of the whole area in accordance with a planning permission dated March 3 1989 — The appellants, Procter & Gamble Ltd, are the owners of New Sandgate House, a plot within the order land having a frontage to City Road — On submission of the order to the Secretaries of State for the Environment, Transport and Energy the appointed inspector held a public local inquiry at which evidence was given of a need to widen City Road, a need perceived by Newcastle City Council in their capacity as local highway authority — At the inquiry the TWDC stated that New Sandgate House was required for road widening and that this requirement precluded its retention as sought by the appellants — Following the recommendations of the inspector, the Secretaries of State confirmed the order on July 3 1990 — On appeal from the decision of Auld J it was submitted on behalf of the appellants that the Secretaries of State had confirmed the order for a purpose which was different from, or was additional to, the purpose for which it was made and that such a confirmation was unlawful — The different or additional purpose was the achievement of a scheme of highway improvements which was required to facilitate the development of sites in the urban development area of which East Quayside was but one — In so far as the Secretaries of State had regard to such a scheme of highway improvements, they had had regard to an irrelevant consideration Held: The appeal was dismissed — Despite the absence of authority, a compulsory purchase order made for one purpose cannot lawfully be confirmed for another purpose or for a purpose additional to that for which it was made — The purpose for which the order was made was the regeneration of the East Quayside part of the urban development area — Importance must be given to the expressed purpose selected by the maker of an order — The inspector’s conclusion that the road improvements were reasonably necessary to secure the regeneration of East Quayside makes it impossible to say that the purpose for which the order was confirmed in regard to New Sandgate House was not within the terms of the purpose for which it was made — Although the means of achieving the expressed purpose had plainly changed between making and confirming from an office development to a road improvement, the expressed and actual purpose remained constant — Accordingly, the Secretaries of State had not had regard to an irrelevant consideration in taking into account a scheme of highway improvement — There was ample evidence to enable the conclusion of the inspector that without the agreed improvements the highway authority would object to the present regeneration proposals The following cases are referred to in this report. Carington (Lord) v Wycombe Railway Co (1868) 3 Ch App 377 Galloway v Mayor and Commonalty of London (1866) LR 1 HL 34 Grice v Dudley Corporation [1958] Ch 329; [1957] 3 WLR 314; [1957] 2 All ER 673; (1957) 55 LGR 493; 9 P&CR 58; [1957] JPL 723 Meravale Builders Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1978) 36 P&CR 87; 77 LGR 365; [1978] JPL 699 Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation [1964] AC 1088; [1963] 2 WLR 1187; [1963] 2 All ER 484; (1963) 62 LGR 1; 14 P&CR 386; [1963] EGD 207; 187 EG 581; [1963] RVR 522, HL This was an appeal from a decision of Auld J who, on June 4 1991, had dismissed an application by the appellants, Procter & Gamble Ltd, under section 23(1) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, seeking to have the Tyne & Wear Development Corporation (East Quayside, Newcastle upon Tyne) Compulsory Purchase Order 1989, made by the second respondents, the Tyne & Wear Development Corporation, quashed following its confirmation by the first respondents, the Secretaries of State for the Environment, Transport and Energy. Malcolm Spence QC and Nicholas Nardecchia (instructed by the solicitor to Procter & Gamble Ltd, of Newcastle upon Tyne) appeared for the appellants; Michael Barnes QC and Alison Foster (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared for the first respondents, the Secretaries of State for Environment, Transport and Energy; David Mole QC and Nicholas Huskinson (instructed by Nabarro Nathanson) represented the second respondents, the Tyne & Wear Development Corporation. Giving judgment, MANN LJ said: On June 4 1991 Auld J dismissed an application which had been made by Procter & Gamble Ltd under section 23(1) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981. The company had by their application sought to have the Tyne & Wear Development Corporation (East Quayside, Newcastle upon Tyne) Compulsory Purchase Order 1989 (‘the order’) quashed in so far as it affects their office building and premises known as New Sandgate House. They now appeal against the dismissal of that application. The grounds for an application to quash a compulsory purchase order are prescribed in section 23(1) and (2) of the 1981 Act and the relevant one of them is the ground that the authorisation of the compulsory purchase was not empowered to be granted. It is the appellants’ case that the authorisation of the purchase of New Sandgate House was not empowered to be granted in that: (1) the order was confirmed for a purpose different from that for which it was made; (2) the confirming authorities had had regard to an irrelevant consideration; and (3) there was no evidence that New Sandgate House was required for the purpose for which the order was266 made. Arguments (1) and (2) are interrelated but argument (3) is independent of them. The order was made by the Tyne & Wear Development Corporation (the ‘TWDC’) on June 26 1989 in the exercise of the power of compulsory acquisition conferred by section 142 of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. I shall later come to that power but it is a power exercisable in accord with the procedure specified in Part II of the 1981 Act (1980 Act, section 142(2A)). Under that procedure a compulsory purchase order made by the TWDC had to be submitted to and confirmed by the confirming authority. In this case and for reasons which are immaterial, the Secretaries of State for the Environment, Energy and Transport were jointly the confirming authority. The order was submitted for confirmation and there were objections to confirmation by, among others, the appellants. A public local inquiry was held by Mr J P MacBryde ARIBA MRTPI MCIT FRSA. The inquiry lasted from November 14 to December 1 1989 and on February 16 1990 the inspector reported with his recommendation that the order be confirmed subject to the agreed exclusion of a plot owned by a water authority. On July 3 1990 the Secretaries of State issued a decision letter in which they agreed with the inspector’s conclusions, accepted his recommendation and confirmed the order accordingly. The background to the making of the order by the TWDC is fully set out by Auld J in his judgment and I gratefully accept his unchallenged account as the basis for my own shorter narrative. East of the centre of Newcastle upon Tyne are extensive urban areas, which are either run down or derelict. On April 2 1987 the Secretary of State for the Environment designated 2,375 ha of those areas as an urban development area under section 134 of the Act of 1980. On May 15 1987 and in the exercise of his power under section 135(1) of the Act, he established the TWDC for the purpose of regenerating the designated area. I shall come later to the object and the general power to acquire land of a development corporation. On October 1 1987 and by virtue of an order made under section 149(1) of the Act, TWDC became the local planning authority for the designated area. Within the designated area there is an area of about 12 ha known as East Quayside. It is a strip of land on the north bank of the River Tyne and it is the subject of the order. The northern boundary of the land is the south side of City Road (A186), which is a highway running from Milk Market in the west and approximately parallel to the river. New Sandgate House has a frontage to City Road near the junction with Gibson Street from the north and is designated as plot 11 on the map referred to in the order. Other highways in the East Quayside area are Quayside, which runs along the river bank, and a road called successively Sandgate, St Mary’s Street and St Ann’s Street, which divides laterally the eastern half of the area before turning north to form a junction with City Road opposite Crawhall Road from the north. The TWDC saw East Quayside as having a significant potential for regeneration and they sought proposals for its redevelopment. They held a competition and the winning proposal was one submitted by Newcastle Quayside Developments plc (‘NQD’). Their scheme was for a comprehensive redevelopment for a variety of uses and it involved the demolition of the buildings on plot 11 and their replacement by new office buildings. NQD sought an outline planning permission for their scheme and this was granted by the TWDC on March 3 1989. The siting of the new buildings was not a reserved matter with the result that the scheme’s location of the new buildings was permitted. The order was made on June 26 1989. Article 1 of the order provided so far as is material: the . . . Corporation are, under section 142(1)(a) of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, hereby authorised to purchase compulsorily for the purpose of securing the regeneration of part of the Tyne and Wear Urban Development Area the land which is described in the schedule hereto and is delineated . . . on the [sealed] map. A non-statutory statement of reasons for making the order was issued by TWDC. The conclusion of that statement was: The Corporation considers that it is vital to secure the regeneration of East Quayside within the shortest possible timescale but the only way to guarantee that is by comprehensive redevelopment of the whole area under the control of the Development Corporation in association with a developer and that it is in the public interest that this Order be confirmed. The provision of development on what is a flagship site in Newcastle will instill confidence in both the public and private sectors. A large number of jobs would be created within the proposed development together with attractive residential areas on a prime site. The leisure elements and the commercial trade generated by both the office developments and the hotel are vital economic components. The proposed development would act as a magnet for tourism and inward investment and contribute towards regeneration over a wider area than its immediate locality. The Corporation wishes this proposal to be brought forward without delay and the Secretary of State will be asked to confirm the Order as a matter of urgency. The non-statutory statement indicated at para 9.1 that an application would be made for an order under what was then section 209 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 [section 247 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990] extinguishing existing public rights of way in order to enable development to be carried out in accordance with the permission of March 3 1989. Such an application was made and related among other rights of way to Quayside, Sandgate, St Mary’s Street and St Ann’s Street. It was also the subject of the inquiry held by Mr MacBryde and he recommended that an order be made. His recommendation was accepted by the Secretary of State for Transport, who on July 3 1990 made the Stopping up of Highways (County of Tyne and Wear) (No 15) Order 1990. On October 10 1989, in discharge of the obligation imposed on them by rule 4(4) of the Compulsory Purchase by Public Authorities (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1976, the TWDC served on the objectors to the order a statement of their reasons for making the order. The conclusions of the TWDC were set out in para 6.3 of the statement and among them were these: The Corporation’s comprehensive regeneration strategy for this site is now fully set out in the development framework. The application of the principles underlying that framework enabled the Corporation to grant outline planning permission for a comprehensive redevelopment scheme to Newcastle Quayside Developments plc. The Corporation is confident that its objective of securing comprehensive regeneration of the site can be achieved by the implementation of a proposal such as that for which outline planning permission has already been granted. That proposal satisfies the general requirements of the Corporation in terms of the substance and quality of its vision for East Quayside. If the compulsory purchase order is confirmed and the stopping up Order made the Corporation would have sufficient authority to proceed to regenerate the site as quickly as possible. Nowhere in either the non-statutory statement of reasons or the rule 4 statement is there any mention of a need to widen City Road or to take part of East Quayside for such an improvement. The scheme approved on March 3 1989 did not accommodate such an improvement. A need to widen City Road was, however, to become a factor of critical importance. It was a need perceived by Newcastle City Council (the ‘NCC’) in their capacity as local highway authority and I must give some account of what occurred prior to the inquiry as it can be derived from the evidence produced at the inquiry. On October 25 1989 the regional capital and urban development subcommittee of NCC received a report from the acting city engineer (Mr Peter McNamara) and the director of administration upon the subject ‘East Quayside Development: Highways Agreement and Access Agreement’. The report recited that a formal objection to the stopping-up order had been made by the NCC and described the process of establishing the NCC highways requirements to the point where the terms of a highway agreement with the TWDC could be settled and objections to the stopping-up order could be withdrawn. The officers wrote (para 2.3 of EQ43): Our full and detailed requirements for highway improvements have now been finalised and are shown on Drawing No XH11/01/01, which is displayed, and which forms part of the Highways Agreement. It must be stressed that the improvements are required as a consequence of the development proposals, which received planning approval on the 10 March 1989 and take account of two factors: (i)    the loss of highway capacity resulting from the closure of two existing highways (ie the quayside and St Mary’s Street). (ii)   the traffic that will be generated by the new development and the need to provide adequate access to and from the site. The improvements shown upon drawing XH11/01/01 included a widening of City Road so as to encroach on plot 11 and thereby to preclude both the retention of the existing office buildings and the erection of office buildings in the situation approved on March 3 1989. The subcommittee accepted the officers’ recommendation that the highways agreement be entered into and heads of agreement with the TWDC were concluded on the same day. Those heads recited that their purpose ‘is to secure the improvements in the area which are necessary as a consequence of the stopping up of the highways and the development’. Head (1) was a provision that the TWDC ‘is to267 acquire and dedicate as highway the additional land . . . which is needed to carry out the improvements’. The NCC withdrew their objection to the making of a stopping-up order on November 13 1989. The case put at the inquiry by the TWDC was that plot 11 was required for road widening and that this requirement precluded the retention of the existing office building as was sought by the appellants. Other and independent grounds were also advanced against the case for retention, but I need not discuss them. In support of their highway case the TWDC called Mr David Stewart, who is a senior engineer in Mott MacDonald, who were retained as consulting engineers by the TWDC. He said in his statement (UDC 6 para 2.5): Part of the land covered by the Compulsory Purchase Order is required to enable this highway improvement scheme to be achieved. This scheme has been designed to enable the increase in traffic levels created by the comprehensive redevelopment of this site along with other developments within the urban development area and the closure of the internal road network to be accommodated on City Road. Mr McNamara was called to provide information for the inspector and, as will appear, he said that the widened City Road would accommodate traffic generated by redevelopment elsewhere in the urban development area. The appellants had notice that a highway case was to be made in support of the order and there is no suggestion that the deployment of that case involved any element of unfairness. Indeed the appellants called as a witness Mr John Tomalin, who is a consulting traffic engineer and who propounded alternative traffic schemes. Those schemes were in the event rejected by the inspector as being unsatisfactory and no complaint is or could be made about their rejection. It is unnecessary to refer to all of the submissions which the appellants are reported as having made to the inspector but I must quote the record of one argument (para 149). It is that the TWDC: . . . are seeking to obtain land for a collateral or indirect purpose and they are seeking to dispose of the land [ie part of plot 11] for such a purpose to a third party, namely the local highway authority. The highway improvement is not merely intended for the purpose of accommodating the traffic diverted as a result of the concurrent stopping-up order or the traffic generated by the new development within the East Quayside area. It is also quite clearly seen to be required by the totality of traffic originating from other riverside projects sponsored by the TWDC as they have indeed argued in justification of the precise scale and nature of the improvements. The reply of the TWDC to this argument is recorded (para 151) as being: The question of the improvement of City Road is extremely relevant to the larger issue of East Quayside regeneration because it is fully accepted that such works are necessary to accommodate traffic displaced by the new development, for excellent environmental reasons, and traffic generated by the land in its new (and much more intensive) use. If such traffic cannot be carried on an improved City Road, the regenerative scheme certainly cannot, or rather will not, proceed to completion. The inspector found as a fact (para 156 (18)) that without the agreed improvements ‘the local highway authority would object to the present regeneration proposals, the subject of outline planning consent granted on 3 March 1989’. This finding is now challenged by the appellants and I shall return to it. Those of the inspector’s conclusions which are relevant are contained in para 157(1) and (13). They are: (1)  The submissions made on behalf of Procter and Gamble relate to the use of section 142 powers by the acquiring authority. My conclusions are that these powers appear to have been properly used in relation to the acquisition of the land which is needed for incidental highway improvements. I fully accept the arguments put forward by the acquiring authority, namely that the powers which are conferred by statute are wide and bear little comparison with those the subject of private acts. In addition, the point is made that the essential legal test is the end to which the land so acquired is to be put. In this case I am left in no doubt that the road improvements required by the local highway authority are reasonably necessary to secure the regeneration of East Quayside in that they are the subject of detailed negotiations and agreement between the TWDC and Newcastle City Council. . . . (13)  The decisive objection to retaining New Sandgate House is probably that of the pattern of traffic management which it would impose upon the area which surrounds East Quayside. Any solution of the problem of absorbing more traffic along the restricted width of City Road would seem to require area traffic management involving some degree of one-way working within residential areas. Such proposals are seemingly not acceptable to the City Council and are in marked contrast to those comprehensively agreed between the latter and the development corporation. The need to amend details of siting of the component blocks of the NQD layout to fit in with the highway improvement line cannot truly be compared with the constraints imposed by an existing and substantial office building: the latter is fixed and the former is inherently fluid. The Secretaries of State agreed with those conclusions. A criticism was made of the last sentence of conclusion 157(1) as being one where the conclusion (‘are reasonably . . . East Quayside’) did not follow from the attached reason (‘the subject . . . Newcastle City Council’). I acknowledge the formal defect but the conclusion itself is clear and its clarity is reinforced by the preceding reference to ‘incidental highway improvements’, which must mean improvements following on the redevelopment of East Quayside. In any event the formal defect is I think no more than an infelicity in language, for, as will appear later in this judgment, if the inspector had used the phrase ‘as is shown by the’ instead of ‘in that they are the subject of’ he would not have exposed himself to criticism. Mr Malcolm Spence QC, who appeared for the appellants, made it his first submission that the Secretaries of State had confirmed the order for a purpose which was different from, or was additional to, the purpose for which it was made and that such a confirmation was unlawful. The different or additional purpose he said was the achievement of a scheme of highway improvement which was required to facilitate the development of sites in the urban development area of which East Quayside was but one. Closely related to that submission was Mr Spence’s second submission, which was that, in so far as the Secretaries of State had regard to such a scheme of highway improvement, they had had regard to an irrelevant consideration. We were not referred to any authority which addressed the question of whether a compulsory purchase order made for one purpose can lawfully be confirmed for a different purpose or for that purpose and for an additional purpose. We were, however, referred to some of the authorities for the proposition that the authorisation of a compulsory purchase by statute cannot be used so as to acquire for a purpose other than that for which the authorisation was given: see, for example, Galloway v Mayor and Commonalty of London (1866) LR 1 HL 34 at p 43 per Lord Cranworth; Lord Carington v Wycombe Railway Co (1868) 3 Ch App 377 at pp 380-381 per Lord Cairns LJ. The same rule should sensibly apply where the authorisation is conferred by a compulsory purchase order and there is authority for the proposition that it does: see Grice v Dudley Corporation [1958] Ch 329 at p 344 and also Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation [1964] AC 1088, at p 1117*. *Editor’s note: Also reported at (1963) 187 EG 581. Despite the absence of authority, I have no hesitation in thinking that a compulsory purchase order made for one purpose cannot lawfully be confirmed for another purpose or for a purpose additional to that for which it was made. Confirmation is the ratification by the confirming authority of what the acquiring authority have resolved to do. By hypothesis the acquiring authority will not have resolved to acquire for any purpose other than that for which the order was made. I think it appropriate that a rule analogous to that established for regulating the exercise of an authorisation should apply to the confirmation of an authorisation. There may be room for argument as to whether the rule would preclude confirmation for a purpose which although not the same as that for which the order was made is none the less within that purpose. Common sense may suggest that there could be confirmation to that extent, but I find it unnecessary in this appeal to express an opinion on the point. It was conceded before Auld J by leading counsel for the Secretaries of State (who did not appear for them in this court) and by Mr David Mole QC, who appeared for TWDC, that ‘a compulsory purchase order cannot be confirmed for a different object from that for which it was made’. In this court Mr Michael Barnes QC, who appeared for the Secretaries of State, said that the concession although not literally incorrect, was capable of being misunderstood. The capacity of the concession to give rise to misunderstanding arose, said Mr Barnes, from its failure to make explicit that the only purpose for which a compulsory purchase order can lawfully be made and therefore confirmed is the statutory purpose for which the power of acquisition is given. If this proposition is pursued in the present case it will be found that the power to acquire land within an urban development area given by section 142(1)(a) of the Act of 1980 is given to a development corporation without an expression of the268 purpose for which it is exercisable. However, I think it plain that the power is given for the purpose of achieving the single statutory object of a development corporation, which is ‘to secure the regeneration of its area’ (section 136(1)). That it is plain is because Parliament, in granting to a development corporation their general powers, has empowered them to acquire land ‘for the purpose of achieving the object’. On this analysis, said Mr Barnes, the only purpose of the order could be and was to secure the regeneration of the Tyne and Wear Urban Development Area, and the qualification ‘part of’ in the order was, in his word, ‘surplusage’. If Mr Barnes’ proposition and subsequent analysis is correct then that would be decisive of the appeal, for it was inherent in Mr Spence’s submission that the purpose of the acquisition for the improvement of City Road was that of securing the regeneration of the Tyne and Wear Urban Development Area when viewed as a whole, that is, as including all development sites. Confirmation would have been for the same statutory purpose as that for which the order was made. The purpose would have been and remained the purpose for which acquisition was empowered. The case would in that respect be unlike Meravale Builders Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1978) 36 P&CR 87 where Willis J quashed an order made in the exercise of powers conferred for the purpose of providing housing accommodation and expressed to be made and confirmed for that purpose, on the ground that the actual purpose also included the provision of a road which was to serve a function independent of servicing the housing accommodation which was to be provided. The decision shows that the courts can look behind the expressed purpose of both making and confirming in order to identify on the evidence the actual purpose which axiomatically must be one within the purpose for which the power to make and confirm is granted. It is to be observed that Willis J would have reached a different conclusion had the road been ‘fairly and reasonably incidental to the provision of housing’ (36 P&CR 87 at p 95). Meravale was cited to the inspector (report para 150) and it seems probable that his own use of the word ‘incidental’ in para 157(1) of his report was taken from the judgment, thereby reinforcing my view as to the clarity of the conclusion in that paragraph. I doubt whether Mr Barnes’ proposition is correct although I do not doubt his subsequent analysis. His proposal is that as a matter of law the purpose must be not merely within but must also be the same as that for which the power is conferred regardless of the purpose promoted by the maker of the order. This is a proposition which is supported neither by authority nor by perceptible justification. My doubt is such that I am well content to assume in favour of the appellants that the proposition is wrong. However, I do not decide that it is, for I find that a decision on the proposition is unnecessary for the disposal of this appeal. On the basis of my assumption the question which next arises is as to the identification of the purpose of the order. Mr Spence proposed it was either ‘the regeneration of part of the Tyne and Wear Urban Development Area’ (that is to say East Quayside) as expressed in the order or the implementation of the scheme for which planning permission was granted on March 3 1989, that is to say the NQD scheme. If the latter was the purpose then the appellants would succeed, because the widening of City Road is incompatible with the approved layout. Auld J rejected the second proposal and I think he was right to do so. Indeed Mr Spence did not strenuously suggest to the contrary. Undoubtedly the TWDC had the NQD scheme in mind when they resolved to make the order, but nowhere do they confine their purpose to the implementation of that scheme. I note in particular the reference in para 6.3, 4 of the rule 4 statement, which I have already quoted, to ‘the implementation of a proposal such as that for which outline planning permission has already been granted’ (emphasis supplied). This is an approach which I would have expected, because the means of achieving the regeneration or redevelopment of an area will almost inevitably alter with the lapse of time if only in order to accommodate requirements which hitherto were unforeseen. The accommodation of the requirements of the highway authority in the present case is a good example of the process of change. In my judgment, Mr Spence was correct in his primary contention that the purpose for which the order was made was the regeneration of part of the urban development area, that is to say of East Quayside. That was the expressed purpose of the maker. On my assumption that Mr Barnes’ wider proposition is wrong, I attach decisive importance to the expressed purpose selected by the maker of an order. That is the natural focus of attention for both layman and lawyer. That purpose must of course be either identical to or one selected from within the purpose for which the making of an order is empowered. The inspector concluded (report para 157(1)) that ‘the road improvements . . . are reasonably necessary to secure the regeneration of East Quayside’ (emphasis supplied). The Secretaries of State accepted that conclusion. It is a conclusion which, in my judgment, makes it impossible to say that the purpose for which the order was confirmed in regard to plot 11 was not within the terms of the purpose for which it was made. The means of achieving the expressed purpose had plainly changed between making and confirmation from an office development to a road improvement but, in my judgment, the expressed and actual purpose remained constant. Mr Spence’s first argument accordingly fails. It also follows that his argument to the effect that the Secretaries of State had regard to an irrelevant consideration in taking into account a scheme of highway improvement necessitated by developments of which East Quayside was but one must also fail, for they did not take into account such a scheme. Mr Spence’s third submission was that there was no evidence to support either the inspector’s accepted and critical conclusion in para 157(1) of his report or his accepted finding of fact that without the agreed improvements the highway authority ‘would object to the present regeneration proposals’ (para 156(18)). I am unable to accept this submission. There was, in my judgment, ample evidence to enable the conclusion to be made. I have already quoted from the report by the NCC’s officers to the meeting on October 25 1989 and from the heads of agreement entered into on the same day. The quotations show a direct linkage between the regeneration of East Quayside and the road improvements. This linkage is also found in two statements to the inquiry made by Mr McNamara (NCC/2/WR and /4/WR). In the first statement (made on November 23) the acting city engineer said, after referring to the October 25 report: The . . . proposals [on drawing XH11/01/01], and the associated Highways Agreement, have evolved as a direct consequence of the NQD development proposals which were given planning approval by the Urban Development Corporation on the 10th March 1989. The second statement (made on November 30) was a response to six written questions of which the first was from the inspector, who requested an estimate of the effect of retaining New Sandgate House upon the effective capacity of City Road. Mr McNamara’s answer deserves quotation in full. It was: If we look at the traffic flows [on a specified diagram] we can see that the eastbound traffic flows on the new link from the Milk Market to City Road are such that if the various roads within the East Quayside Development are stopped up, then two lanes will be required on City Road for eastbound traffic, east of Gibson Street. This would be the case even if there was no contribution to that eastbound movement from the East Quayside Development via the Milk Market junction, which is a contribution of 89 vehicles. This then would mean that if New Sandgate House were to be retained, only two lanes would be available for the westbound movements on City Road between Crawhall Road and Gibson Street. The reassigned existing traffic westbound on this section of City Road is shown in Fig Q2 as 1,475 vehicles. The addition of the development traffic (overall) increases this by nearly 900 vehicles, increasing the right turn to Gibson Street by 200 vehicles, the straight ahead movement to Swan House by 450 vehicles and the left slip to Milk Market by 250 vehicles. I am informed that 700 of these vehicles are generated by the East Quayside Development (very nearly 50% of the total existing traffic). It is a matter of agreement that the total westbound traffic on City Road requires 3 lanes, ie one for each movement. It would be difficult for me to postulate at what level of traffic City Road could operate westbound with only two lanes, but on the basis of [certain figures], 1,400-1,700 vehicles/hour would appear to be the limit and this has been confirmed by Mott MacDonald’s computer tests. The implications of this is that all, or the greater part, of the 700 vehicles generated by East Quayside Development in this area would overload the system. It is probable that a certain proportion of this could transfer to the Milk Market Junction. Again it is difficult for me to postulate what level this could be but if between a quarter and a third were considered as an acceptable ‘switch’ within the development, say 200 vehicles/hour, this would leave up to 500 vh/hr which would have to find other routes or which would have to disappear completely, ie by reducing the development content. 500 vehicles is over 40% of the total existing traffic generated by the East Quayside Development. Some proportion of the development content up to that figure could therefore be at risk. The emphases are mine. They show an asserted connection between the stopping-up of highways and the generation of traffic within East Quayside on the one hand and the agreed road improvements on the other. True it is that the loading from developments elsewhere in the urban development area would also be accommodated as seven ninths of the additional west-bound flow was identified as generated within East Quayside and the east-bound problem was said to arise by reason of the proposed road closures in East Quayside. Whether the asserted connection should be accepted as correct was a question for the inspector and the Secretaries of State, but I think that ample evidence was available to enable them to conclude as they did. Our attention was not drawn to any other evidence which might have been capable of displacing the interdependence asserted in the report, the heads of agreement and the estimates by Mr McNamara. The evidence to which I have referred is what led me to think in an earlier part of this judgment that it is permissible to regard the formal defect in the reasoning in para 157(1) of the inspector’s report as being no more than an infelicity of language. In my judgment, that evidence also entitled the inspector to find as a fact, as he did, that without the agreed improvements the NCC would have objected to the regeneration proposals. I have already stated that the council did object to the making of the stopping-up order and did not withdraw their objection until after the heads of agreement had been concluded. Mr McNamara remarked in his second statement that there was no realistic alternative to the agreed improvements which did not involve diverting traffic through a residential area upon which would be inflicted an unacceptable level of traffic noise. He observed that in the event of the land required for the highway improvement not being forthcoming ‘the City Council would need to reconsider its position and they may indeed wish to oppose any alternative form of development’. Here in total is adequate material for enabling the inspector to find as he did. I would dismiss this appeal. Agreeing, SIR CHRISTOPHER SLADE said: I gratefully adopt Mann LJ’s statement of the facts together with his definitions. As he has explained, it is in essence the appellant’s case that the authorisation of the purchase of New Sandgate House was not empowered to be granted because: (1)  the order was confirmed for a purpose different from that for which it was made, (2)  the confirming authorities had had regard to an irrelevant consideration, and (3)  there was no evidence that NSH was required for the purpose for which the order was made. I wish to add a few observations principally in relation to the first of these three points. As was eventually common ground in the court below, I agree that a compulsory purchase order made for one purpose cannot lawfully be confirmed for another purpose. The starting point must therefore be a consideration of the purpose for which the TWDC made the order in the present case. As the premise of the first of his alternative arguments in response to the appeal, on behalf of the Secretaries of State, Mr Michael Barnes QC submitted that the order was made and confirmed for the purpose of securing the regeneration of the whole of the Tyne and Wear Urban Development Area. This, he submitted, was the only purpose for which the order could lawfully have been made and confirmed, having regard to section 136(1) of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, which provides that ‘the object of an urban development corporation shall be to secure the regeneration of its area’. This being so, it was argued, it is irrelevant that, because of the requirements of the local highway authority, the method by which, at the date of the order, it was contemplated this broad purpose would be achieved changed between that date and the date of the confirmation: compare Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd v Hendon Corporation [1964] AC 1088. The making of the order and its confirmation must have been equally lawful. I, for my part, cannot accept this particular argument because I cannot accept the premise. As Mann LJ has pointed out, while the power to acquire land within an urban development area given by section 142(1)(a) of the 1980 Act is given to a development corporation without any expression of the purpose for which it is exercisable, it must be deemed to have been given for the purpose of achieving the statutory object of an urban development corporation, set out in section 136(1), ie ‘to secure the regeneration of its area’. There may well be cases, however, where on the facts a particular acquisition, while undoubtedly appropriate to secure the regeneration of part of the relevant area, will have no effect on the remainder of the area. In the absence of authority precluding a different construction, I would without much hesitation hold that the 1980 Act empowers an urban development corporation to acquire land in their urban development area for the purpose of securing the regeneration of part of such area; the greater includes the less. I cannot believe that Parliament would have intended otherwise. I turn to consider the purpose for which the order in the present case was in fact made. As to this I feel no doubt. By its very terms, the order was expressed to be made ‘for the purpose of securing the regeneration of part of [emphasis supplied] the Tyne and Wear Urban Development Area’. In my judgment, it is plain that the part this referred to was East Quayside, the subject of the order. The order thus purported to be made, and was in truth made, for the purpose of securing the regeneration of East Quayside. I can see no sufficient reason for attributing to the TWDC a purpose in making the order other than that therein stated. This was indeed the principal submission of Mr Spence QC for the appellants. In his skeleton argument, there had featured prominently a different submission, namely that the purpose was the more restricted purpose of regenerating East Quayside by a particular method, that is to say, by carrying out the permitted NQD scheme. However, without formally abandoning it, Mr Spence did not press this different submission on this court and, for the reasons given by Mann LJ, I think he was right not to do so. I now turn to consider the purpose for which the Secretaries of State confirmed the order. In para 6 of their letter of July 3 1990 they said: After careful consideration of all the material before him the Secretary of State wholly agrees with the Inspector’s conclusions and accepts his recommendation. He is satisfied that the Order must be confirmed so that the regeneration of the Order land may be secured. The Secretary of State has accordingly decided to confirm the Order with the modifications shown in it and this letter conveys his decision to that effect. According to their intentions as thus expressed, the Secretaries of State were confirming the order for the same purpose as that for which it had been made, namely the regeneration of East Quayside. For the appellants, however, it is said that the matter is by no means as simple as that. Between the dates of the order and the confirmation circumstances had changed. At the date of the order the TWDC had contemplated that the buildings on Plot 11 would be demolished and replaced by new office buildings. The attitude of the local highway authority (the ‘NCC’) had subsequently necessitated a substantial revision of their plans. As at the date of confirmation, though the buildings on Plot 11 were still to be demolished, the site was intended to be used not for the purpose of erecting new office buildings, but for the purpose of widening City Road. In para 157(13) of his report, which Mann LJ has already quoted, the inspector referred to the pattern of traffic management which the retention of New Sandgate House would impose upon the area surrounding East Quayside and referred to this as ‘the decisive objection to retaining New Sandgate House’. Mr Spence skilfully deployed this and other points to found an argument that the order was confirmed not for the purpose of securing the regeneration of East Quayside but for the purpose of carrying out highway works as required by the NCC. I cannot agree. The road improvements required by the NCC were themselves ‘reasonably necessary to secure the regeneration of East Quayside’. The inspector made an express finding of fact in these terms in para 157(1) of his report (quoted by Mann LJ*) and further found in para 156(18) that ‘without such agreed improvements, the local highway authority would object to the present regeneration proposals, the subject of outline planning consent granted on 3rd March 1989’. I agree with Mann LJ that there was ample evidence to support both these findings. Though Mr Spence has criticised the last two lines of para 157(1) beginning with the words ‘in that’ as involving a non sequitur, and I agree that they could have been more accurately expressed, they do not, in my view, involve a non sequitur if they are read in conjunction with para 156(18) and the other earlier passages in the report dealing with the highways position and the attitude of the highway authority; they are simply to be read as a shorthand reference to that background. *Editor’s note: See p 268 ante. Mr Spence suggested that the reference in para 157(13) to the pattern of traffic management which the retention of New Sandgate House would impose upon ‘the area which surrounds East Quayside’ involved the introduction of an immaterial consideration, namely the effect of the order and scheme for highway improvement on developments other than East Quayside. I do not think this is so. In its context, the reference was, in my opinion, included because it was relevant to the attitude of the NCC, as local highway authority, and that authority’s attitude was highly material to any scheme for the regeneration of East Quayside itself. For these and the further reasons given by Mann LJ, I do not think that any of the three grounds of appeal is well-founded. I, too, would accordingly dismiss this appeal. MUSTILL LJ agreed and did not add anything. Appeal dismissed with costs. Application for leave to appeal to the House of Lords refused.