A challenge to the confirmation of a compulsory purchase order made under section 226(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
The local planning authority (“LPA”) in Margate Town Centre Regeneration Company Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWHC 973 (Admin) had made a compulsory purchase order (“the Order”) under section 226(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the 1990 Act”) in respect of land within its area required for regeneration. (The need for such regeneration was recognised in the local plan.) The LPA submitted the Order to the Secretary of State for confirmation. Following an inquiry held before an inspector, and in accordance with the inspector’s recommendations, the Secretary of State confirmed the Order. The claimants, who had objected to the Order, applied unsuccessfully in the High Court under section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 to quash the Order.
A challenge to the confirmation of a compulsory purchase order made under section 226(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
The local planning authority (“LPA”) in Margate Town Centre Regeneration Company Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWHC 973 (Admin) had made a compulsory purchase order (“the Order”) under section 226(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the 1990 Act”) in respect of land within its area required for regeneration. (The need for such regeneration was recognised in the local plan.) The LPA submitted the Order to the Secretary of State for confirmation. Following an inquiry held before an inspector, and in accordance with the inspector’s recommendations, the Secretary of State confirmed the Order. The claimants, who had objected to the Order, applied unsuccessfully in the High Court under section 23 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 to quash the Order.
The section 23 grounds are that the Secretary of State has gone outside the statutory powers or the requirements (mainly procedural) of the appropriate Acts and regulations have not been complied with. They are, therefore, similar to those provided in section 288 of the 1990 Act, which enables – inter alia – a challenge to be made in the High Court to the decision of the Secretary of State, or his inspector, on a planning appeal. There is also a strict six-week time limit in each case. The Margate case demonstrates that a number of principles also apply equally to each form of challenge.
(1) It is clear from decided authority that neither form provides an opportunity for a review of the merits of the decision, and that the court must be astute to ensure that the challenge is not used as a cloak for a re-run of the arguments on those merits. (2) This does not preclude an argument that the decision is Wednesbury unreasonable but where the decision maker is the fact finder, the threshold of Wednesbury unreasonableness is a difficult obstacle to surmount. (3) In each instance, reasons must be given for the decision that are intelligible and adequate and enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the principal important controversial issues. (4) Decision letters must be read fairly, in good faith, as a whole without an unduly legalistic or critical approach and as if by a well informed reader who understands the principal controversial issues in the case.
John Martin
