Ozer Properties Ltd and another v Ghaydi
(Before Sir John DONALDSON MR and Lord Justice STOCKER)
Rent Act 1977 — Possession action — Defendant’s plea of res judicata — Defendant was in occupation of a room in a rooming house consisting of more than 20 rooms — It had been owned by a succession of landlords and rents had been collected by a succession of persons, some of them authorised agents, but at least one of them a fraudulent person who deceived the present defendant — This person took a deposit of £100 and promised a rent book, but then disappeared — In fact the defendant never had a tenancy and, although she did not realise it, was a trespasser — Subsequently the defendant was locked out of her room but obtained an interim injunction ordering the then landlords (not the present plaintiffs) to allow her to return — In subsequent proceedings as plaintiff against these landlords the present defendant obtained a judgment ‘that the plaintiff do recover against the defendant damages to be assessed and costs’ — This judgment and a subsequent assessment of damages were given in default of service of defence by these landlords — These facts gave rise to the issue in the present appeal by the defendant from the judgment of Judge Hayman granting possession to the present landlords — It was contended that the judgment which the defendant had obtained in the previous proceedings for damages to be assessed created a situation of res judicata, determining in her favour that she was a tenant and, it was suggested, that she had a tenancy protected by the Rent Act — Held, rejecting this submission, that in order for a judgment in default to create such a situation there must be an issue which, when formulated, necessarily and with complete precision determined the rights of the parties — It was not, however, necessary in order to support the judgment to postulate that the present defendant had a tenancy of any kind — She was entitled to damages for eviction although she was not in fact a tenant and had not the benefit of the Rent Act — Appeal dismissed
No cases are
referred to in this report.
This was an
appeal by Miss Zara Ghaydi from a decision of Judge Hayman at Bloomsbury County
Court granting to the plaintiffs (the present respondents), Ozer Properties Ltd
and Esther Halpern, possession of room 17 at 93-95 Moscow Road, London W2.
Rent Act 1977 — Possession action — Defendant’s plea of res judicata — Defendant was in occupation of a room in a rooming house consisting of more than 20 rooms — It had been owned by a succession of landlords and rents had been collected by a succession of persons, some of them authorised agents, but at least one of them a fraudulent person who deceived the present defendant — This person took a deposit of £100 and promised a rent book, but then disappeared — In fact the defendant never had a tenancy and, although she did not realise it, was a trespasser — Subsequently the defendant was locked out of her room but obtained an interim injunction ordering the then landlords (not the present plaintiffs) to allow her to return — In subsequent proceedings as plaintiff against these landlords the present defendant obtained a judgment ‘that the plaintiff do recover against the defendant damages to be assessed and costs’ — This judgment and a subsequent assessment of damages were given in default of service of defence by these landlords — These facts gave rise to the issue in the present appeal by the defendant from the judgment of Judge Hayman granting possession to the present landlords — It was contended that the judgment which the defendant had obtained in the previous proceedings for damages to be assessed created a situation of res judicata, determining in her favour that she was a tenant and, it was suggested, that she had a tenancy protected by the Rent Act — Held, rejecting this submission, that in order for a judgment in default to create such a situation there must be an issue which, when formulated, necessarily and with complete precision determined the rights of the parties — It was not, however, necessary in order to support the judgment to postulate that the present defendant had a tenancy of any kind — She was entitled to damages for eviction although she was not in fact a tenant and had not the benefit of the Rent Act — Appeal dismissed
No cases are
referred to in this report.
This was an
appeal by Miss Zara Ghaydi from a decision of Judge Hayman at Bloomsbury County
Court granting to the plaintiffs (the present respondents), Ozer Properties Ltd
and Esther Halpern, possession of room 17 at 93-95 Moscow Road, London W2.
The appellant,
Miss Zara Ghaydi, did not attend and was not represented; M G Warwick
(instructed by Grangewoods) represented the respondents.
Giving the
court’s ruling on an application for adjournment, SIR JOHN DONALDSON MR said:
This appeal has been listed for hearing today. As I have already indicated, we
have received a medical certificate which does not say that Miss Ghaydi is
unable to attend — it says that she is suffering from depression and a
rheumatological complaint — and a letter from a social worker who says that her
depression is made worse by the stress of the court case. It does not seem to
me that an adjournment would relieve her depression — it would tend to make it
worse. This application for an adjournment has been opposed by the respondents.
Undoubtedly it does cause great hardship to the respondents if the appeal is
adjourned. In those circumstances our view is that we ought to deal with the
matter. We have had the advantage of reading it. I will ask Stocker LJ to
deliver the first judgment.
Giving judgment,
STOCKER LJ said: This is an appeal from a judgment of His Honour Judge Hayman
given on December 11 1986 whereby it was ordered that the plaintiffs have
possession of room 17 in a building called 93-95 Moscow Road, London W2. The
appeal by the appellant is that that order should be set aside. There is also a
respondents’ notice justifying the judgment on grounds other than those which
appear in it.
The short
facts are these. The premises in question are a rooming house which contained
something in excess of 20 rooms, each having some form of cooking facilities
but all sharing bathroom accommodation. Room 17 was occupied by the appellant,
Miss Zara Ghaydi. There was a parallel proceedings heard at the same time
before the same judge in respect of a claim for possession of room 23 occupied
by a man called Sanford. This building was, from early 1980, owned by a company
called Gate Investments Ltd. That was a company registered in the Channel
Islands, the controlling shareholder apparently being a Libyan resident in
Libya. It follows therefore that somebody had to carry on the day-to-day
administration of the building and the various occupied rooms in it.
That function
was carried on by a man called Shahumi until about 1981, when it seems that he
was not accounting properly for the rent he collected or producing to anybody
the necessary books. Accordingly, on May 12 1981, a letter was written to him
by the owners’ solicitors telling him to hand over all books of account and
informing him that managing agents would be appointed to take over from him.
Until the events of 1984 occurred that was the last contact which it seems
Shahumi had with those premises at all. It is quite clear that he ceased to
have any authority in the building or to be the landlords’ agent from that time
onwards. A letter in May 1981 was sent or handed to all the tenants in the
various rooms in the premises in effect informing them of the fact that Shahumi
was no longer authorised to collect the rents.
The owners
then had to make some arrangements for the administration of the building. As
an interim matter they appointed their solicitors to do so. In due course two
successive firms of estate agents took over the management of the premises and
were responsible for the collection of rent. Over that period also one of those
managing agents was concerned with trying to negotiate a sale of the freehold.
A sale of the freehold was in fact arranged and the contract of sale was
entered into on May 25 1984, that being a contract for sale of the premises to
a firm called Selous Investments Ltd. By that same contract Selous Investments
were authorised by the vendors to collect the rents in the meantime pending
completion.
In fact there
never was a completion to Selous Investments Ltd. The sale was completed on
February 12 1985 to the plaintiffs. Though it would seem that it does not bear
on the issues to be decided in this court, there was a trust deed regarding the
equity which would be resultant upon the contract of sale itself.
It is now
necessary to deal with the letting to Miss Ghaydi and the circumstances in
which this claim for possession comes about. On March 21 1984, according to her
affidavit — nearly three years after the man Shahumi ceased to have anything to
do with the premises — she was in a cafe with a friend of hers, a Miss Morfid.
They were discussing between themselves the difficulties of obtaining
accommodation in London. It seems that Shahumi overheard their conversation and
indicated that he could perhaps provide rooms for them. He then took them to 93
Moscow Road, having a key to the door, and showed them three rooms. Miss Ghaydi
took one of the rooms, which is the room the subject of this claim, no 17, and
her friend Miss Morfid took another room. They paid a deposit of £100, rent for
the rooms being £20 per week for each room. They were given to understand by
this man, who was apparently Shahumi, that he92
would receipt a rent book for them in due course. In fact he never did so and
they never saw him again. They each moved into possession on March 22 1984.
It may have
some bearing on the subsequent events that the defendant in the parallel
action, Mr Sanford, had an almost exactly similar experience. He was visiting a
friend in the premises of 93 Moscow Road and saw the man who purported to be
Shahumi, who let to him three rooms in the premises, one for Mr Sanford himself
and two for two of his friends. He also took a deposit of £100. Mr Sanford went
out and purchased three rent books and had the appropriate copy keys made,
having been told by Shahumi that he would receipt the rent books when they were
produced. In fact when he returned 20 minutes later Shahumi had disappeared and
was never seen again. Thus the events which have been recited seem to have been
a common experience for both the two defendants to the action.
I might say at
this point that it seems to me perfectly clear that the appellant, and indeed
the other persons involved as well, had not got a tenancy at all. Shahumi had
no authority whatever to let rooms to them or to take any sums by way of
deposit or for any other purpose from them. Accordingly Miss Ghaydi was, though
she did not realise it, in my view undoubtedly a trespasser from that moment
onwards.
It is now
necessary to recite shortly the events which gave rise to an action in which
she herself was plaintiff. They arise out of a dispossession which occurred in
June 1984. On June 12 Miss Ghaydi returned to the premises in the morning with
her friend, having been out for a short visit elsewhere, to find that her keys did
not fit the locks. She was confronted by a man called Edwards who told her that
in future she would have to ring at the front door in order to gain admittance.
That happened for a day or two. On June 15, however, when she returned to the
premises, she was confronted, without the door even being opened, we
understand, by this man Edwards, who told her that ‘they were out’. He refused
her admittance and refused her any access to her room where all her personal
belongings were stored. She took action very promptly and applied to the court
for an injunction.
On June 15,
the very day of her dispossession, His Honour Judge Curtis-Raleigh made an
interim injunction in these terms. He ordered that the defendants, who were
then Selous Investments Ltd, should:
1. Allow the
Plaintiff forthwith to enter and occupy Room 17, 93 Moscow Road, London W2.
2. Should not
interfere in any way with the Plaintiff’s quiet enjoyment thereof.
3. Should
give the Plaintiff forthwith a key to the said premises.
That was an
interim injunction. A return date for an inter partes hearing was fixed
for June 21. On June 21 the same judge dealt with the matter. Undertakings were
given in these terms: each of the defendants (ie Selous Investments and Mr
Edwards) undertook ‘not to interfere in any way with the plaintiff’s quiet
enjoyment of her premises at 93 Moscow Road, London W2,’ that is room 17.
Having made that order, he adjourned generally Miss Ghaydi’s action with
liberty to restore. Miss Ghaydi had undertaken to issue formal proceedings by
Monday June 18. She did so. In accordance with that undertaking particulars of
claim were filed on her behalf. It is necessary, in the light of the issue
which arises on this appeal, to see the form in which that claim was presented.
Having set out the facts relating to her alleged tenancy and to the
circumstances in which she was dispossessed, she claimed: ‘A Declaration that
she holds the premises at Room 17 as a protected tenant under the Rent Act
1977’. ‘An injunction’ in the terms which had already been granted and in
respect of which an undertaking was given. She also claimed damages.
On June 21, as
has been recited, Judge Curtis-Raleigh heard the matter inter partes, when
the undertakings were given to which I have referred. Next, on August 16, the
registrar gave orders for the hearing of the action, ordered that it should be
consolidated with the similar actions by other people and ordered defences to
be filed within 28 days.
In fact the
defendants to that action, Selous Investments and Edwards, did not comply with
that order, and no defences were in fact ever filed. On February 12, as has
already been indicated, there was a conveyance of the premises to the present
plaintiffs. On May 7 1985 the present plaintiffs commenced the action with
which this appeal is concerned.
The defendants
not having filed any defence in accordance with the orders made by the
registrar, on May 24 an order was made that they should file their defences
within seven days or be disbarred from defending. The solicitors then acting
for them applied to come off the record. A date was fixed for an assessment of
damages, and on July 24 judgment was given in favour of Miss Ghaydi in her
action. It is important to look at the precise terms of that judgment. It is
dated July 24 1985 and reads:
IT IS
ADJUDGED that the plaintiff do recover against the defendant damages to be
assessed and costs.
In fact there
was a hearing in respect of the assessment of damages on August 12 1985 before
a different judge, when His Honour Judge Honig assessed the damages at the sum
of £525. The defendants did not attend either on the assessment of damages or
on the occasion when formal judgment was entered in favour of Miss Ghaydi.
Those facts
give rise to the issue which arises on this appeal. It was contended before the
learned judge that the judgment entered in default of service of the defence
created a situation of res judicata on the issue as to whether or not
Miss Ghaydi was a tenant protected by the Rent Acts. Before the learned judge
extensive argument took place, most of which was concerned with the proposition
that the present plaintiffs, who were the people to whom in fact the premises
had been conveyed, were not privies to Selous Investments and Edwards, who were
the defendants in Miss Ghaydi’s action and against whom the judgment in default
had been given.
For my part I
find it unnecessary to consider that aspect of the matter any further, for it
seems to me plain from the terms of the order itself which I have just recited
that no case of res judicata could arise. In order for a judgment in
default to create such a situation there must be, as it seems to me, an issue
which, when formulated, necessarily and with complete precision determined the
rights of the parties. In my view it is really not possible to say that that
judgment, which was a judgment for damages to be assessed, in any way
determines the issue as to whether or not Miss Ghaydi was a tenant and whether
or not that tenancy had the protection of the Rent Act 1977. The judgment was a
judgment for damages to be assessed, and those damages were in fact assessed.
It is not necessary in order to support the judgment to postulate that Miss
Ghaydi had a tenancy of any kind. She would have been entitled to damages having
regard to the events of her eviction even if she had not been a tenant or had
not had the benefit of the Rent Acts.
Accordingly,
in my view the result of the hearing before the learned judge, His Honour Judge
Hayman, could be fully justified on the basis that there was no res judicata
in this case at all without embarking upon the rather complicated
investigation as to whether or not the plaintiffs in this action were privies
to the judgment given against Selous Investments and Edwards.
Accordingly,
although not raised specifically in her notice of appeal, it seems to me
manifest for the reasons that I have already given that Miss Ghaydi was not in
fact a tenant, she never had a tenancy and was a trespasser at all times.
Accordingly, subject to the plea of res judicata, the judgment to the
effect that the plaintiffs should have an order for possession was really
incontrovertible.
For the
reasons which I have shortly endeavoured to give it seems to me that this is
not a case in which a plea of res judicata could succeed either. Indeed
that is the matter raised by the respondents’ notice in this appeal.
One is bound
to feel a great deal of sympathy for Miss Ghaydi. She was an entirely innocent
dupe of a fraudulent person, who obtained from her a sum of money which I do
not doubt she could ill afford to pay. She has been the victim of a mean and
dishonest trick. Nobody could blame her in the least for that, and anybody
would have the greatest sympathy for her. However, we have gone into this
matter with great care, and accordingly, although she is not present to put
forward any arguments in support of her appeal, for my part I have not the
slightest doubt that her appeal was bound to fail.
Accordingly
and for these reasons I would dismiss this appeal.
SIR JOHN DONALDSON
agreed and did not add anything.
The appeal
was dismissed with costs, costs up until June 19 1987 not to be enforced
without the leave of the court.