Notting Hill Housing Trust v Roomus

Landlord and tenant — Assured shorthold tenancy — Respondent issuing notice purporting to terminate tenancy — Notice specifying possession required at end of period of tenancy — Whether words “at end of” having same effect as “after” so that notice complying with statutory requirements — Appeal dismissed The appellant was the tenant and the respondent was the landlord of a property under an assured shorthold tenancy. The respondent purported to give notice to the appellant under section 21(4)(a) of the Housing Act 1988, requiring possession of the property. The respondent used its standard form notice, which stated that: “Possession is required of the premises which you hold as tenant(s) at the end of the period of your tenancy which will end after expiry of two months from the service upon you of this notice.” A possession order was made on the basis that the respondent had given the appellant a notice in writing stating that, after a date specified in the notice, which was the last day of a period of the tenancy and not earlier than two months after the date upon which the notice was given, possession of the property was required by virtue of section 21(4)(a). An issue arose as to whether the notice was valid. The appellant applied to set aside the possession order, contending that the notice was invalid since it specified that possession was required “at” the end of the period, rather than “after”. The district judge found that the words “at the end of” had the same effect as the word “after” so that the notice was valid. Accordingly, he refused to set aside the possession order. The appellant appealed, contending that previous Court of Appeal decisions in respect of the proper wording of a section 21(4)(a) notice were conflicting. She argued that the phrase “at the end of the tenancy” meant “on the last day” so that the notice did not satisfy section 21. Held: The appeal was dismissed. The judge had been entitled to conclude that the notice complied with section 21(4)(a) since it was clear that, applying a normal use of language, the phrase “at the end of a tenancy” in a notice under section 21 meant “after the end of the tenancy”. It did not mean at the split second after the tenancy came to an end, but any time thereafter. Moreover, the earlier authorities concerning the validity of a section 21 notice were not in conflict. In Lower Street Properties Ltd v Jones [1996] 2 EGLR 67; [1996] 48 EG 154, the Court of Appeal held that a notice, which provided that the tenancy would expire at the end of the period of the tenancy that would terminate after two months from the service of the notice, was valid without having specified a particular date; whereas, in MacDonald v Fernandez [2003] EWCA Civ 1219; [2003] 3 EGLR 22; [2003] 42 EG 128, it was held that section 21(4) required the notice to specify a date that would be the last day of a tenancy, not the date upon which the landlord wanted possession: Lower Street Properties; Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] 1 EGLR 57; [1997] 24 EG 122; [1997] 25 EG 138 and McDonald considered. Alastair Panton (instructed by Brian McKenna & Co) appeared for the appellant; the respondent did not appear and was not represented. Eileen O’Grady, barrister