Meredith v Stevens

Fair rent of Clwyd bungalow–Committee entitled to consider comparables drawn from what they considered a relevant area–No force in remaining criticisms advanced–Landlord’s appeal dismissed This was an appeal by Mr Kenneth Meredith, solicitor, of Middleton, Manchester, from a decision of the Denbighshire Rent Assessment Committee fixing a fair rent of £26 per month in respect of a bungalow owned by the appellant at 11 Pen Lan, Towyn, Abergele, North Wales. Mr A R C Kirsten (instructed by K Meredith) represented the appellant, and Mr H K Woolf (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared as amicus curiae. Giving judgment, LORD WIDGERY said: This is an appeal under section 13 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971 brought by the landlord, Mr Meredith, against a decision of the Denbighshire Rent Assessment Committee given on March 27 1974 determining the fair rent of a dwelling at 11 Pen Lan, Towyn, Abergele, in the county of Clwyd, at £26 per month. The brief history of the matter is that this dwelling, which was I think a bungalow, one of a development of 22 undertaken by the same landlord, had been let under a lease for the contractual rent of £29.25 a month. The matter was referred to the rent officer for determination of a fair rent, and the landlord being dissatisfied with the rent officer’s determination appealed to the rent assessment committee, as he was entitled to do under the terms of the Rent Act 1968. The rent assessment committee entered upon consideration of the rent, and after their deliberations produced as a fair rent for these premises the sum of £26 a month. I am not going to read the reasons given by the committee in detail. It has always to be remembered, as has been pointed out more than once before, that these committees are not staffed by Chancery draftsmen and one must not be unduly particular about the language which they have used. If the basis of their reasoning is clear, that is all that can be expected in such circumstances. These reasons, if I may pass a compliment to the committee in passing, are good ones which have been well and intelligently set out, but nevertheless there is some criticism. The first criticism raised in the notice of motion, though not very hotly pursued by Mr Kirsten, was that the committee held that there was dampness in the front bedroom and that this was contrary to the evidence. A surveyor had said there was no damp in the room. The committee had examined the premises and they had seen no sign of rising damp, but they had seen signs of mildew which in their wisdom they decided was due to some dampness in the premises, and in their reasons they indicate that they were satisfied that there was dampness, although of course they do not attempt to put a figure on the dampness element. A further complaint is that the committee took into account the detrimental effects of an adjoining poultry farm when in fact the poultry farm had been closed down before the inquiry held by the committee. There is nothing in the notes of evidence of the committee about the poultry farm. It is however said by Mr Kirsten that when the inspection took place the poultry farm was closed down, and he contends strongly that the committee have wrongly depreciated the rent on account of the existence of the farm, which was no longer existing at the relevant time. Actually all that the committee have done is to record that the tenant contended that there were unpleasant smells from the poultry farm, but the committee point out that the tenant agreed that the79 public health inspector had not considered that this was sufficient to amount to a statutory nuisance, and the only fair reading of that paragraph is that the committee were not impressed with the argument of the poultry farm anyway, regardless of whether this was operating at the date of the inquiry. They go on in their reasons to review other contentions. In (5) they say: ‘The evidence of the landlord was that the bungalow had been built in 1970 at a cost of £4,050 and that the rent of £351 per annum exclusive of rates had been calculated to give a return of 8 per cent on the capital.’  In other words, the landlord was inviting the committee to at least have regard to the contractor’s theory and consider fixing a fair rent by reference to the capital value of the property, and the committee clearly have done as bidden by the Act, and they have considered the evidence. It is equally clear that they did not regard this as conclusive, and indeed they say so in their reasons. In paragraph (7)–and this is the real gist of the committee’s decision–they say they were ‘unable to find any comparable property in the immediate area where a fair rent had been fixed by a rent assessment committee, but the committee have experience of market rentals of properties along the Denbighshire and Flintshire coastal area.’  If they did not find suitable comparables in the area, they were entirely within their rights in deciding in what area comparable market rents might help, and that is all they say they have done in paragraph (7). Finally, they say that they considered the calculation based on the contractor’s theory, to which I have already referred, but did not find it conclusive. That again is within their rights; they are perfectly entitled to say that evidence of that kind is not regarded by them as either helpful or conclusive, or whatever other phrase they may choose. They go on to say that although the market rental is now above the contractual rent under the lease, after taking into account the scarcity provision of the Act they think it is a fair rent. I can find absolutely nothing in those reasons to indicate an error of law. We get a lot of these cases of course–considerable money is often involved–and landlords very often come here with a sense of grievance, but our powers are restricted to considering an error in law, and once one realises that the committee are entitled to use their own experience and knowledge and they are not bound to follow any specific valuation evidence which may be tendered to them, it must become quite obvious that all the matters in dispute here are valuation matters and not matters of law at all. I would dismiss this appeal. MELFORD STEVENSON J: I agree. WATKINS J: I agree. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.