COHEN AND ASQUITH LJJ AND ROXBURGH J
Rent Restrictions Acts — Claim for possession — Greater hardship — “Landlord who has become a landlord by purchasing,” etc — Title derived from disqualified purchaser
This was an appeal from a decision of the Croydon County Court Judge giving possession of 300, Stafford Road, Wallington, to Mr George Robert Lucas, the landlord, against the tenants, Mr David Lineham and Mrs Florence Lineham, in seven months from the date of the order.
The grounds of appeal were that the Judge had misdirected himself as to the true construction of paragraph “h” of the First Schedule to the Rent Act, 1933; and that he was wrong in law in holding that the plaintiff, who had derived his interest in the house from a landlord who had become a landlord by purchasing the property after September 1, 1939, was in any better position that that landlord or was entitled to recover possession.
Rent Restrictions Acts — Claim for possession — Greater hardship — “Landlord who has become a landlord by purchasing,” etc — Title derived from disqualified purchaser
This was an appeal from a decision of the Croydon County Court Judge giving possession of 300, Stafford Road, Wallington, to Mr George Robert Lucas, the landlord, against the tenants, Mr David Lineham and Mrs Florence Lineham, in seven months from the date of the order.
The grounds of appeal were that the Judge had misdirected himself as to the true construction of paragraph “h” of the First Schedule to the Rent Act, 1933; and that he was wrong in law in holding that the plaintiff, who had derived his interest in the house from a landlord who had become a landlord by purchasing the property after September 1, 1939, was in any better position that that landlord or was entitled to recover possession.
Mr TM Eastham, and Mr C Sherwood (instructed by Messrs Copley, Singleton and Billson, Croydon) appeared for the appellants; Mr John Perrett (instructed by Messrs Lloyd and Davey) represented the respondent.
Mr TM Eastham, for the appellants, said the question was whether a landlord, who had not himself purchased the house since the material date, but had become landlord by taking a lease from a former landlord who had purchased the house after the material date, was entitled to bring an action for possession successfully. In this case Mrs Lucas, the plaintiff’s wife, bought the house in 1947, subject to the Linehams’ tenancy.
She could not, by virtue of the provisions of paragraph “h” of the First Schedule to the Rent Act, 1933, claim possession of the house from the tenants, but in 1949 she granted a three years’ lease to her husband, who thereby became the landlord, and he claimed possession on the ground that he wanted the house for his own occupation.
There was, said counsel, no appeal from the Judge’s decision on the question of greater |page:155| hardship, but he contended that it would be a remarkable hiatus in the Act if a person could purchase, and then, by leasing to a nominee, be able to deprive the tenant of the protection which would undoubtedly be his while the original landlord held the premises.
Mr John Perrett, on behalf of the respondent, argued that he was outside the disability which rested on Mrs Lucas, because he derived his title from the people from whom Mrs Lucas bought and who were under no restriction because they became landlords before the material date.
Lord Justice Asquith, giving the judgment of the Court allowing the appeal, said that the argument for the appellants was that the plaintiff was disabled from taking advantage of the provision in paragraph “h” of the First Schedule to the Rent Act, 1920, and relied on the words of the paragraph itself, which excluded from the class of landlords who could avail themselves of it, any landlord who had “become a landlord by purchasing the dwelling-house or any interest therein after September 1, 1939.”
The appellants did not argue that the plaintiff fell directly within the class of persons disabled by these words – that the plaintiff was himself a purchaser; the argument was that he derived his title as a landlord from a person who was so disabled and was, therefore, tainted with the disability of his predecessor in title.
The Court considered that they were bound by a decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Littlechild v Holt (1950, 1 KB p1) and that it governed this case and precluded the plaintiff from succeeding. In both cases the plaintiff, though not a disqualified purchaser, derived title from a predecessor who was a disqualified purchaser.
The argument for the respondent assumed that the decision in Littlechild’s case rested essentially on the operation of Section 12(1)(f). The Court considered that the section was not necessary to the decision in Littlechild’s case, but if it was, it was a decision that “original landlord” in paragraph “f” was or included the intermediate predecessor in title of the plaintiff landlord.
The appeal would be allowed.