Hunter v Manchester City Council
(Before Lord DENNING MR, Lord Justice ORR and Lord Justice SCARMAN)
Compensation–Unfit property–Owner-occupier payment–Owner who occupied part of house and let remainder entitled to full compensation on the concessionary basis
This was an
appeal by Mr Eric Melbourne Hunter, of Lindum Avenue, Old Trafford, Manchester,
from a decision of the Lands Tribunal (Mr R C Walmsley FRICS) on July 23 1973
holding that he was entitled to be paid only £464 as compensation on the
compulsory acquisition by the respondents, Manchester Corporation, of his
dwelling-house in Stockton Street, Moss Side, Manchester.
Mr H S Singer
(instructed by Adam Burn & Metson, agents for Bieber, Travers & Libman,
of Manchester) appeared for the appellant, and Mr N R B Macleod (instructed by
L Boardman, of Manchester) represented the respondents.
Compensation–Unfit property–Owner-occupier payment–Owner who occupied part of house and let remainder entitled to full compensation on the concessionary basis
This was an
appeal by Mr Eric Melbourne Hunter, of Lindum Avenue, Old Trafford, Manchester,
from a decision of the Lands Tribunal (Mr R C Walmsley FRICS) on July 23 1973
holding that he was entitled to be paid only £464 as compensation on the
compulsory acquisition by the respondents, Manchester Corporation, of his
dwelling-house in Stockton Street, Moss Side, Manchester.
Mr H S Singer
(instructed by Adam Burn & Metson, agents for Bieber, Travers & Libman,
of Manchester) appeared for the appellant, and Mr N R B Macleod (instructed by
L Boardman, of Manchester) represented the respondents.
Giving
judgment, LORD DENNING said: In 1954 Mr Hunter came here from Jamaica. In 1957
he bought a house in a slum area of Manchester, 98 Stockton Street, Moss Side,
Manchester. It was a terraced property with two rooms plus bathroom upstairs.
Twelve years later, in 1969, the Manchester Corporation made a survey of the
area. They took the view that it should be a clearance area, because the houses
were unfit for human habitation, and the most satisfactory method of dealing
with them was by pulling them all down. Mr Hunter heard of the proposal, so he
made arrangements to buy another house. He bought 4 Lindum Avenue, Old
Trafford, Manchester. His wife and seven children moved into this property on
July 10 1969, but he himself did not go with them at that stage, because he was
advised by an estate agent that he had better remain in part occupation of 98
Stockton Street. So he let the downstairs of 98 Stockton Street to a Mrs
Grenyion, and he himself continued to occupy one of the upstairs rooms, ‘where
he slept, and sometimes his wife visited him there.’ That continued until July 1971. Meanwhile, on
December 3 1969, the corporation had declared the area to be a clearance area.
It took some time to get the proceedings through, but on May 10 1971 a
compulsory purchase order was made, and on March 19 1972 this was confirmed by
the Secretary of State. No 98 Stockton Street was included as a house to be
pulled down. A month or two later, notice to treat and notice of entry were
served, and the acquisition became effective in June of 1972. The question that
arises is the amount of compensation to which Mr Hunter is entitled for the
compulsory acquisition of his house.
If he had
never been in occupation of the house himself, but had always let it out to
others, he would only get the site value. That is clear from section 59 (2) of
the Housing Act 1957. The site value of this house was only £130. But he had
been an owner-occupier for many years, and there are provisions in the Housing
Acts in favour of owner-occupiers. They are contained in the fifth schedule to
the Housing Act 1969. I will not read the details, because it is quite plain
that Mr Hunter was a person who qualified for a higher payment. He satisfied
paragraph 5 (1) (e) of the schedule, because he had been in occupation
throughout the qualifying period, which in this case was April 23 1968 to
December 3 1969, when the house was declared to be in a clearance area. He
satisfied paragraph 1 (1)(b), because during that period the house was wholly
or partly occupied as a private dwelling by Mr Hunter, who was a person
entitled to an interest in the house. It was wholly or partly occupied by him
throughout that period. He occupied it wholly from April 23 1968 until July
1969, and partly from July 1969 to December 3 1969. So Mr Hunter was a
qualified person who had an interest in respect of which he was entitled to
payment. The amount of the payment is given by paragraph 2. It is an amount
equal to the full compulsory purchase value less the site value. The full compulsory
purchase value was £1,800, less the site value, which would be £130. So the
full payment under paragraph 2 would be £1,670. Now we come to the crucial
point in the case. Paragraph 3 (1) says:
The amount
which would otherwise be payable under paragraph 1 of this schedule shall be
reduced by such part, if any, of that amount as may reasonably be attributed to
any part of the house occupied for any purposes other than those of a private
dwelling at the date of the making of the compulsory purchase order. . . .
The question
is whether this means that the £1,670 is to be reduced. It is to be reduced if
‘any part of the house [is] occupied for any purposes other than those of a
private dwelling at the date of the making of the compulsory purchase order.’ That date is May 1971. At that date no 98 was
occupied in part by Mr Hunter in the upstairs room in which he slept, while the
other part, the downstairs room, was occupied by Mrs Grenyion. Both those
purposes are those of a private dwelling. In G E Stevens (High Wycombe) Ltd
v High Wycombe Corporation [1961] 3 WLR 228 Diplock J said at p 233:
I think
occupation of a ‘private dwelling’ means occupation as the dwelling-house of a
private person, or occupation by a person in his private capacity as opposed to
being occupied for business purposes.
It seems to me
that when a man uses part of his house for his own dwelling purposes and lets
the other part to a subtenant as a dwelling, the whole house is used as ‘a
private dwelling’. So there is no ground for reduction. If part of the house
had been used for business purposes, of course, there would be grounds for a
reduction. What is argued for the Manchester Corporation is that we should look
at the overriding intent. The overriding intent, it is said, was that an
owner-occupier should only be compensated in respect of his own personal
occupation of the house. He should not be compensated for parts which he lets
off to tenants. That is an attractive suggestion, but I am afraid that it does
not fit in with the words. Nor is there any such overriding intent. We were
referred to Ministry of Housing and Local Government Circular 68/69, but the
intent is well put in a comment in the Encyclopedia of Housing vol 1 p
2641:
The object of
this [provision] is to mitigate hardship to those persons who have been driven
by the extreme shortage of housing to buy unsound and substandard dwellings to
live in themselves.
These words
apply to the present case. Mr Hunter in 1957 bought this old house in Moss Side
in Manchester, no doubt at its then value, because he had nowhere else to live.
Twelve years later, when it was going to be pulled down, he naturally looked
for another house. In order to buy another house he ought to be able to provide
some of the money out of the compensation he gets for his interest in the old
house which was going to be pulled down. Although he learned early in 1969 that
the house was in an area that was proposed to be a clearance area, he had to
remain partly in occupation until the clearance area was declared in December
1969 fully to qualify. But once he did so, it is quite right for him to get
compensation for his interest in the old premises even though he let part of it
meanwhile to help other people in their housing needs. In my opinion, seeing
that this house at the date of the compulsory purchase order in May 1971 was
still being used as a private dwelling, there is no ground for reduction. I
would only add this, that Mr Hunter appeared in person before the Lands
Tribunal, and we have been better placed, because he was represented by counsel
before us. On the argument before us, I think the Lands Tribunal did not
construe the provisions rightly. The compensation should be determined at the
full amount of £1,670.
ORR LJ: I
agree; and in adding nothing to what my Lord has said, I intend no disrespect
for the Lands Tribunal or for the very able argument we have had from counsel
on both sides in the case.
SCARMAN LJ: I
also agree. The respondents submit that the effect of the fifth schedule to the
Housing Act 1969 is that an owner-occupier of a house to be demolished can
receive compensation over and above the site value only to the extent of his
own occupation at the date of the compulsory purchase order. The wording of
paragraph 3 (1) is, I think, a great difficulty in the way of this submission,
which is really based upon a view of the overriding intent of the provisions of
the Housing Act, a view which upon analysis is, I believe, unsound. Mr Macleod,
who argued the case very attractively for the respondents, drew our attention
to section 68 of the Housing Act 1969, under which it is clear that payments
are to be made under the fifth schedule in respect of owner-occupied housing in
certain circumstances, and he invited us to infer from that provision and others
that the policy was that full compensation should be made available only if the
whole of the house was owner-occupied by the person entitled to compensation at
the date of the compulsory purchase order. I think that that inference is
negatived both by the provisions of the Housing Act 1957, the predecessor of
the Housing Act 1969, and by the provisions of the fifth schedule to the 1969
Act. It is clear from the qualifying provisions of each Act that compensation
is payable in respect of houses that are owner-occupied as to part only. Then
one sees in the schedule to the 1969 Act–the schedule, of course, with which we
are concerned–that a person who so occupies a house, that is to say, wholly or
partly himself, and has an interest in that house, is entitled under paragraph
2 to the full compulsory purchase value, unless his compensation has to be
reduced under paragraph 3. Now, the qualifying period for that entitlement ends
with what the statement calls ‘the relevant date’. The relevant date is very significant:
it is the date on which the house was declared as being within a clearance area
(in this case, December 3 1969). From that moment on it appears to be
reasonable that an owner-occupier–almost certainly a family man–should be
looking around for accommodation and should have a reasonable expectation that
part of the capital needed for his alternative accommodation will come from the
compensation for the loss of the house which sooner or later he is going to be
compelled by law to vacate.
Paragraph 3, upon
which the respondent corporation relies, and which does provide in certain
subsequent events for a reduction of the compensation available to an
owner-occupier, appears to me to do no more than ensure that some one who has
qualified for compensation is not going to be permitted to make a profit out of
his situation. If the house remains in use as a private dwelling, of course he
is not going to make any great amount of money if he lets it: he will be
restricted by the Rent Acts. If he takes lodgers, he may lose all or part of
his compensation on the ground that the house, or part of it, is being put to a
business use. If he does put the house after the relevant date to a business
use, then the effect of the paragraph is that, to the extent of that use, his
compensation is to be diminished: but if he goes on allowing the house (and it
is in the public interest that he should) to be occupied as a private dwelling
until such time as it has to come down, then the paragraph contains nothing to
deprive him of compensation upon the expectation of which he may well have made
utterly admirable and reasonable family arrangements. I think therefore, upon a
proper analysis, the policy of the Act coincides with the actual wording of
paragraph 3 (1) of the schedule, and I, like my Lord, would allow the appeal.
The appeal
was allowed, and the decision of the Lands Tribunal varied to provide for
compensation of £1,670. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.