Hanson v Church Commissioners for England and London Rent Assessment Panel

Rent Act 1968–Objection to registration of fair rent may be withdrawn if other party agrees and rent assessment committee sanctions withdrawal–Divisional Court’s views on withdrawals not accepted–Natural justice–Position misunderstood by tenant–Certiorari issued This was an appeal by John Hanson, the tenant of 21 Bramerton Street, Chelsea, London SW3, a house owned by the Church Commissioners, from a decision of the Queen’s Bench Divisonal Court on November 11 1975 dismissing his appeal under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971 from the decision of a rent assessment committee and refusing his application for an order of certiorari to quash the committee’s decision on the ground of a breach of the rules of natural justice. Mr Hanson appeared in person, R Moshi (instructed by Radcliffes & Co) appeared for the first respondents, the Church Commissioners, and H K Woolf (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) represented the second respondents, the London Rent Assessment Panel. Giving judgment, LORD DENNING MR said that Mr Hanson had rented his house from the landlords for the past 10 years. The rent in 1973 was £600 a year. The landlords applied to the rent officer for the registration of a fair rent of £900. Mr Hanson thought that was too high and in March 1974 the rent officer determined the fair rent to be £800. Mr Hanson objected and the rent officer, in accordance with his duty under paragraph 6 of Schedule 6 to the Rent Act 1968, referred the matter to the rent assessment committee. The committee notified both parties that the objection would be heard on August 15 1974. Meanwhile surveyors acting for Mr Hanson advised him that he was unlikely to succeed in his objection, and although he still thought £800 was too high, he accepted their advice and said that he did not want them to take his objection any further. On August 8, the surveyors telephoned the clerk to the rent assessment committee. There was some conflict of evidence as to what took place, but as a result a letter was written the same day by Mr Hanson’s surveyors referring to the telephone conversation and saying: ‘we confirm that we shall not be placing our objection before the London Rent Assessment Panel on Thursday August 15.’  The landlords were told nothing about the letter and the case was left in the list for hearing. Accordingly the committee and the landlords’ representative attended on August 15, but Mr Hanson did not. The landlords’ representative said that at the consultation with the rent officer he had accepted the £800 proposed, but that as he was before the committee he would like them to increase the fair rent to £900. In the afternoon the committee went to the house. Mr Hanson was at work but his wife was at home. The committee chairman telephoned Mr Hanson from the house and asked whether the committee could carry out an inspection. Mr Hanson replied that he understood that his objection had been withdrawn and that the hearing would50 not proceed. He could not allow an inspection in his absence. He asked if the committee could wait. The chairman said that the committee could not wait any longer, that the hearing had already taken place and that the purpose of the visit was a purely visual inspection. The committee subsequently notified Mr Hanson of their decision that the fair rent was £900 a year. Mr Hanson appealed to the Divisional Court under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971 and later applied for an order of certiorari. The Divisional Court dismissed the statutory appeal and also refused the application for certiorari on the ground that the application was made far too late. In relation to this ground he (his Lordship) wished to say that fresh evidence had shown that Mr Hanson had not in fact been guilty of any delay and the court would consider the application on its merits. After dismissing as ill-founded a suggestion in the notice of motion that the Lord Chief Justice, being a Church Commissioner, should have disclosed his position before he heard the case, Lord Denning said that both the appeal and the application seemed to raise the same point, so the court did not need to go into any question of jurisdiction. The first point was whether Mr Hanson had any right to withdraw his objection. The court’s attention had been drawn to textbooks in which it was suggested that neither party had any right to withdraw. That view had been accepted by the Divisional Court, but it went much too far. In fact in practice a limited right of withdrawal had always been given before the Divisional Court’s decision. If an objecting tenant or landlord notified the rent assessment committee that he was withdrawing his objection the committee would get in touch with the other party and, if that party had no objection, the committee would allow the withdrawal. That practice was not only convenient but also in accordance with the true interpretation of the statute. In the ordinary way when there was a dispute before a tribunal on a civil matter either party had a right to withdraw his application or objection at any time before the decision was given: Boal Quay Wharfingers Ltd v King’s Lynn Conservancy Board [1971] 1 WLR 1558. But when a dispute involved a public interest it might not be permissible for one party to withdraw on his own. Even if the other side agreed it might not be possible to withdraw unless the tribunal consented: R v Hampstead & St Pancras Rent Tribunal, ex parte Goodman [1951] 1 KB 541 and R v West London Rent Tribunal, ex parte Napper [1967] 1 QB 169. Applying that principle to this case, the fixing of a fair rent was a matter involving a public interest. It affected the premises in rem and could also affect neighbouring properties. No one party had the right on his own to withdraw an objection and stop the proceedings. If the other party objected he could not withdraw. But if the other party did not object the rent assessment committee could permit the proceedings to be withdrawn. It did not need to go on with the hearing unless it thought it proper to do so. As to the question of natural justice, there were errors which vitiated the committee’s decision. On receiving the letter from Mr Hanson’s surveyors the clerk ought to have regarded it as a withdrawal, or, at any rate, he ought to have cleared up any ambiguity by telephoning Mr Hanson’s surveyors. Then, when the chairman telephoned Mr Hanson and was told that Mr Hanson had understood that his objection had been withdrawn, the chairman should have realised that there had been a misunderstanding and given Mr Hanson the opportunity of being heard. It was one of the cardinal principles of natural justice that a matter should not be decided against a person unless he had had a fair warning of the case against him and a fair opportunity of dealing with it. That principle had been broken. There had been some discussion as to the proper remedy. It seemed to him (his Lordship) that the better remedy would be to issue certiorari to quash the decision. Agreeing, ROSKILL LJ said that there could be no unfettered unilateral right to withdraw an objection referred to a rent assessment committee, but there was nothing which prevented the parties from agreeing to withdraw, provided that the withdrawal was sanctioned by the committee. It followed that in this case there had been no effective withdrawal. The Divisional Court had not dealt with the question whether the committee had acted contrary to natural justice, ie whether what they had done had operated unfairly to Mr Hanson. The letter from Mr Hanson’s surveyors was far from clear, but the chairman must have realised from his telephone conversation with Mr Hanson that he thought he had effectively withdrawn the objection and did not know that the landlords were seeking an increase and that there was a possibility that the committee might grant it. He ought to have been told what the position was, asked if he wanted to be heard and been offered an adjournment. Certiorari should go to quash the determination. Also concurring, LAWTON LJ said that, in the absence of a specific statutory provision, proceedings before a tribunal could be brought to an end if to do so would not prejudice any right, either public or private. It was for the tribunal to decide whether prejudice might arise from a withdrawal, and in general the simplest and best way would be by asking the parties. The statutory appeal was dismissed, but certiorari was ordered to issue to quash the decision of the committee, the matter to be remitted to another committee to hear and determine the objection. No order for costs, provided that the appellant obtained his costs from the Legal Aid Fund.