Fraser and another v Canterbury Diocesan Board of Finance and another
Land conveyed to defendants’ predecessor for purpose of school — School’s educational provision failing to conform to wording of conveyance — Whether land reverting to claimants — Schools Sites Act 1841 — Reverter of Sites Act 1987
The defendants’ predecessors in title owned land that had been conveyed to them under the School Sites Act 1841. The claimants were the beneficiaries of the original grantor’s estate. The conveyance stated that the land was to be used for a school to educate children and adults from poor families within the ecclesiastical boundary. The school closed in 1995.
Under section 2 of the 1841 Act, if the land ceased to be used for the prescribed purpose, it reverted to the grantor’s estate. The principle of reverter had been abolished by the Reverter of Sites Act 1987 and substituted by a trust mechanism, under which the holders of a legal estate that would have reverted held it on trust for those who would have been entitled to the benefit of the reversion. It had retrospective effect, covering the period of 12 years prior to the passing of the Act. Therefore, claims for title made before 17 August 1975 (the relevant date) were statute-barred.
Land conveyed to defendants’ predecessor for purpose of school — School’s educational provision failing to conform to wording of conveyance — Whether land reverting to claimants — Schools Sites Act 1841 — Reverter of Sites Act 1987
The defendants’ predecessors in title owned land that had been conveyed to them under the School Sites Act 1841. The claimants were the beneficiaries of the original grantor’s estate. The conveyance stated that the land was to be used for a school to educate children and adults from poor families within the ecclesiastical boundary. The school closed in 1995.
Under section 2 of the 1841 Act, if the land ceased to be used for the prescribed purpose, it reverted to the grantor’s estate. The principle of reverter had been abolished by the Reverter of Sites Act 1987 and substituted by a trust mechanism, under which the holders of a legal estate that would have reverted held it on trust for those who would have been entitled to the benefit of the reversion. It had retrospective effect, covering the period of 12 years prior to the passing of the Act. Therefore, claims for title made before 17 August 1975 (the relevant date) were statute-barred.
The claimants contended that the use of the land had changed so that, by virtue of section 2 of the 1841 Act, the land had reverted to the grantor’s estate and they were entitled to the value of the school. The defendants argued that the school had ceased to operate in accordance with the conveyance a long time before the relevant date.
The parties broadly agreed that the school’s educational provision had ceased to conform to the specific wording of the conveyance, in that it had educated children from a wider social class than that prescribed and from outside the specified ecclesiastical district. The question before the court was whether reverter had taken place before the relevant date.
Held: The claim was allowed
The school’s policy of educating children from outside the relevant social classes and beyond the ecclesiastical district constituted a breach of trust. However, the majority of children who had been educated in the school did fit the profile as set out in the conveyance. If land is conveyed to be held on trust for purpose A alone, but the trustees use it for purposes A and B, they are using it for two purposes, one that is permitted and one that is not. But it does not mean that they are no longer using the land for the permitted purpose. The fact that the school educated both qualifying and non-qualifying people did not mean that it ceased to be used for the purpose for which it was established. Thus, no reverter had taken place before the coming into force of the Reverter of Sites Act 1987.
Christopher Nugee QC and Thomas Baxendale (instructed by William Blakeney) appeared for the claimants; Vivian Chapman (instructed by Furley Page, of Canterbury) appeared for the first defendants; the second defendant did not appear and was not represented.
Vivienne Lane, barrister