Dingmar v Dingmar

Jointly owned property — Appellant widow of deceased seeking order for award of his severable half-share — Whether award limited to value of share at time of death — Sections 2 and 9 of Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975 — Appeal allowed The appellant was the wife of the deceased. She had lived with him and the respondent, the deceased’s son by a previous marriage, in a property that was owned jointly by the deceased and the respondent as joint beneficial tenants. The deceased died intestate, leaving no assets of any value in his estate to which the appellant could claim entitlement under the intestacy rules. The appellant continued to live in the property with her children. Some years later, the respondent brought possession proceedings against her. The court found that she had no beneficial interest in the property and made an order for possession. The appellant obtained a grant of administration of the deceased’s estate, and brought proceedings, under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, for an order that the deceased’s severable share of the property be treated as an asset of his net estate, pursuant to section 9. Section 9 provided that the deceased’s severable share of the property, “at the value thereof immediately before his death”, could be treated as part of the net estate to the extent that appeared to the court to be just for the purposes of making financial provision for an applicant under section 2. The judge held that, on a correct construction of the Act, he was not permitted to award one-half of the property to the appellant, but was confined to awarding the value of the deceased’s share at the date of death. He ordered that the appellant was entitled to a fixed beneficial share in the property valued at £20,000. On appeal, the appellant submitted that the judge had been entitled to bring the deceased’s full half-share into the estate and to award her a half-share in the property. Held (Lloyd LJ dissenting): The appeal was allowed. The terms of the Act, in particular the definition of “net estate” in section 25(1), distinguished between sums of money and other property, indicating that property could consist of things other than money. Section 9 brought “property” into the net estate, namely the deceased’s severable share. It was that share in the property that was to be treated as part of the estate. Although the share had a value that could be expressed in monetary terms, the value was not itself a share in property, and it was not possible to order a “value” to form part of the net estate. Accordingly, the wording of the statute contained a contradiction, which had to be overcome. The only rational interpretation of section 9(1) was that the court could take the proportionate share of the property that would have belonged to the deceased if there had been severance of joint ownership, and regard it as the share that the court was entitled to treat as part of the estate. The words “at the value thereof immediately before his death” did not rule out that solution. They could be regarded as referring not to a monetary value, but to the proportion to which the deceased was entitled, or as indicating when the value of the estate was to be assessed for tax purposes. Such a solution was even-handed between the net estate and the other co-owners, since, if property prices rose or fell, each would get a proportionate benefit or loss. In the instant case, it was appropriate to order the transfer of one-half of the property to the appellant. Paul Brook (instructed by Chadwick Lawrence, of Huddersfield) appeared for the appellant; the respondent did not appear and was not represented. Sally Dobson, barrister