DHN Food Distributors Ltd (in liquidation) and others v London Borough of Tower Hamlets

Food distribution business run by company with two wholly-owned subsidiaries, one of which owned the warehouse used8 for the business’s purposes–Warehouse compulsorily acquired–Compensation payable for disturbance despite the technicality as to ownership–Whole court of opinion that corporate veil can be lifted in such a case, and that in any event the head company had an irrevocable licence from its subsidiary–Majority holds that head company also had an equitable interest This was an appeal by DHN Food Distributors Ltd (in liquidation) and by two of its wholly-owned subsidiaries, Bronze Investments Ltd and DHN Food Transport Ltd, from a decision of the Lands Tribunal (the President) on January 30 1975 holding that the companies were not entitled to substantial compensation for disturbance upon the acquisition by the respondents, the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, of land in Malmesbury Road, London E3. The Lands Tribunal’s decision was reported at (1975) 233 EG 1109, [1975] 1 EGLR 168. Mr G Dobry QC and Mr D M W Barnes (instructed by Asher, Fishman & Co) appeared for the appellants, and Mr G N Eyre QC and Mr A D Dinkin (instructed by the council solicitor) represented the respondents. Giving judgment, LORD DENNING said: This case might be called the ‘three in one,’ three companies in one, or alternatively the ‘one in three,’ one group of three companies. In 1963 at Bow in the East End of London there was a firm, as I will speak of it for the moment, of grocery and provision merchants. It imported groceries and provisions and distributed them to shopkeepers. It had a warehouse in Malmesbury Road and lorries which collected goods from the docks and distributed them to shopkeepers. Soon afterwards the firm developed a ‘cash and carry’ business. Private individuals came by car. They bought substantial quantities wholesale. They paid for them in cash and carried them away. Six years later, in 1969, the London Borough of Tower Hamlets made a compulsory purchase order. They wanted to acquire the property of the firm, demolish the warehouse and build houses on the site. In February 1970 there was a local inquiry. The firm made strong objection. They said that if the property was taken, it would mean the end of their business. The borough council realised that the firm would lose its business, but they said that the housing requirements took priority and that the firm would receive compensation for any loss. The inspector accepted the view of the borough council. He said in his report: ‘Whatever the cost [of acquisition] may be, it must be seen against the gain in housing accommodation which would result from the residential development of the application site.’  So he recommended the implementation of the compulsory purchase order, and the order was confirmed by the Minister in his decision letter of October 12 1970. The borough council acted quickly. On October 30 1970 they gave a notice to treat and a notice of entry. The firm tried to find other accommodation so as to move their business there, but finding none, had to close down the business. Now comes the point. It is about compensation. Compensation under the statute is to be made for the value of the land and also for disturbance of the business: see section 5, subsections (2) and (6) of the Land Compensation Act 1961. If the firm and its property had all been in one ownership, it would have been entitled to compensation under those two heads: first, the value of the land, which has been assessed in excess of £360,000, and second, compensation for disturbance in having its business closed down. The figure has not yet been assessed. But the firm and its property were not in one ownership. It was owned by three companies. The business was owned by the parent company, DHN Food Distributors Ltd. The land was owned at the time of acquisition by a subsidiary called Bronze Investments Ltd. The vehicles were owned by another subsidiary, DHN Food Transport Ltd. The parent company, DHN, held all the shares both in the Bronze company and in the Transport company. The directors were the same in all three companies. As the result of the business having to be closed down, all the three companies are in liquidation. The question is, what is the effect of the firm being in truth the three companies? The local authority say that the owners of the land were the Bronze Investment company, and that that company are entitled to the value of the land, £360,000. They have actually been paid it. But the local authority say that that company are not entitled to compensation for disturbance because they were not disturbed at all. The local authority admit that DHN (who ran the business) and the Transport subsidiary (who owned the vehicles) were greatly disturbed in their business. But the local authority say that those two companies are not entitled to any compensation at all, not even for disturbance, because they had no interest in the land, legal or equitable. They say that in 1970 DHN were only licensees of Bronze, the subsidiary who owned the land: and DHN being licensees only, with no interest in the land, their only claim was under section 20 (1) of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965. That says that if a person has no greater interest than a tenancy from year to year in the land, then he is only entitled to compensation for that lesser interest. Seeing that a licensee can be turned out on short notice, the compensation payable to DHN would be negligible. The strange thing about the case is this, that the local authority admit that at any time from February 1970, during the local inquiry and afterwards, right up to the time in October 1970 when the council gave notice to treat, the people running these three companies could have put their house in order so as to make the claim impregnable. All they had to do was to take a very simple step. Being in control of all three companies, they could have arranged for Bronze to convey the land to DHN. No stamp duty would have been payable because the conveyance would have been exempt under section 42 of the Finance Act 1930. And DHN, being the owners, could also claim compensation for disturbance. So at any time up to October 30 1970 this group of three companies could have put themselves in an unassailable position to claim not only the value of the land but also compensation for disturbance. But that was not done. The local authority say that by failing to do it, the group have missed the boat. They are left behind on the quay because of the technical provisions of our company law whereby each of the three companies is in law a separate person. Each of their interests must be considered separately. DHN had no interest in the land, but were only licensees, so that they cannot claim compensation for disturbance. The President of the Lands Tribunal, who was asked to determine preliminary points of law, held that DHN had no interest in the land such as to entitle them to any compensation for disturbance beyond the amount allowed by section 20 of the 1965 Act, which is negligible. DHN appeals to this court. We were told by Mr Eyre, who argued the appeal for Tower Hamlets, that a similar contention has succeeded in other cases before the Lands Tribunal. So much so, that in order to overcome the technical point it is the regular thing for the legal advisers of a group of companies to do the necessary conveyancing before the notice to treat, it seems. But in this case the group did not put their house in order in time; and so, counsel submits, there is no claim for disturbance. Mr Dobry, for DHN, took three points before us: first, that they had an equitable interest in the land; second, that alternatively they had an irrevocable licence; third, that we should lift the corporate veil and treat DHN as the owners; and that in one or other of these three capacities, DHN were entitled to compensation for disturbance. First, equitable interest. This depends on the conveyancing transactions by which the land was acquired. They were very complicated. In 1963 the vendors of the factory and warehouse agreed to sell it to the group for £115,000. The group had not the money to pay the price, so they got the help of the Palestine British Bank. This bank provided the £115,000. In 1964 the conveyance was made to the Bronze Investment company, which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the bank. Two years later, in 1966, DHN, having borrowed money elsewhere, acquired all the shares in Bronze; Bronze thus became a wholly-owned subsidiary of DHN, and DHN repaid the £115,000 provided by the bank. So the legal title remained in Bronze, but DHN had the benefit of the property. DHN occupied the premises from the time when they were first acquired in 1964 until the local authority entered under their compulsory powers. It is said that on those facts, in the first place Bronze held the legal title on a resulting trust for the bank (which provided the purchase-money): and that afterwards, when DHN repaid the purchase-money to the bank, DHN acquired the equitable interest of the bank. That may be right, but the President of the Lands Tribunal rejected it, and I am not prepared to say that he was wrong. Second, irrevocable licence. It may be that on those facts, the bank lent to Bronze the £115,000 with which Bronze bought the property. If so, the bank would not have acquired any equitable interest. They would only be creditors of Bronze. Then when DHN repaid the £115,000 to the bank, they simply stood in the shoes of the bank as creditors of Bronze. In that case, Mr Eyre submits that DHN have no legal or equitable interest in the property, but are only licensees. Now, I am prepared to allow that DHN were licensees of Bronze. Mr Eyre suggested that they were bare licensees, but I do not think so. Bronze was a wholly-owned subsidiary of DHN. Both companies had common directors running the companies. It is plain to me that thereafter Bronze could not determine the licence so as to ruin DHN. The directors of Bronze could not turn out themselves as directors of DHN. They would be in breach of their duties to both companies if they did so: see Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Meyer [1959] AC 324 at pp 366-7. In the circumstances, I think the licence was virtually an irrevocable licence. DHN was the parent company holding all the shares in Bronze. In those circumstances DHN were in a position to carry on their business upon these premises unless and until, in their own interests, DHN no longer wished to continue to stay there. It was equivalent to a contract between the two companies whereby Bronze granted an irrevocable licence to DHN to carry on their business on the premises. In this situation Mr. Dobry cited to us this morning Binions v Evans [1972] Ch 359, to which I would add Bannister v Bannister [1948] 2 All ER 133 and Siew Soon Wah v Yong Tong Hong [1973] AC 836. Those cases show that a contractual licence under which a person has the right to occupy premises indefinitely gives rise to a constructive trust under which the legal owner is not allowed to turn out the licensee. So here. This irrevocable licence gave to DHN a sufficient interest in the land such as to qualify them for compensation for disturbance. Third, lifting the corporate veil. A further very interesting point was raised by Mr Dobry on company law. We all know that in many respects a group of companies are treated together. For the purpose of general accounts, balance sheet and profit and loss account, for instance, they are treated as one concern. Professor Gower in his book on company law (3rd ed at p 216) says, ‘There is evidence of a general tendency to ignore the separate legal entities of various companies within a group and to look instead at the economic entity of the whole group.’  This is especially the case when a parent company owns all the shares of the subsidiaries, so much so that it can control every movement of the subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are bound hand and foot to the parent company and must do just what the parent company says. A striking instance is the decision of the House of Lords in Harold Holdsworth & Co (Wakefield) Ltd v Caddies [1955] 1 WLR 352. So here. This group is virtually the same as a partnership in which all the three companies are partners. They should not be treated separately so as to be defeated on a technical point. They should not be deprived of the compensation which should justly be payable for disturbance. The three companies should for present purposes be treated as one, and the parent company DHN should be treated as that one. So DHN are entitled to claim compensation accordingly, and it was not necessary for them to go through a conveyancing device so as to get it. I realise that the President of the Lands Tribunal, in view of previous cases, felt it necessary to decide as he did. But now that the matter has been fully discussed in this court, we must decide differently from him. These companies as a group are entitled to compensation not only for the value of the land, but also compensation for disturbance. I would allow the appeal accordingly. GOFF LJ: I agree. The book-keeping adopted by the appellants was in many respects unhappy and in some, in my view, wholly inaccurate. The result is that this case has come to appear complicated and difficult, whereas in truth, in my view, it is simple and straightforward. In my judgment the appeal succeeds on each of three entirely separate grounds. First, assuming, contrary to the view which I hold, that DHN were licensees only, and that subject thereto the whole legal and equitable interest in the business premises was vested in Bronze, still it seems to me that one must imply, from the business association between these three companies and the fact (which is uncontroverted) that DHN paid all the money that was paid, that there was an agreement that that licence should not be revoked during the continuation of the business. In my judgment, therefore, compensation for disturbance must be assessed on the basis that DHN had an irrevocable or indefinite licence. Mr Eyre, who argued this case with great skill on behalf of the respondents, relied upon the case of Horn v Sunderland Corporation [1941] 2 KB 26, and he said that compensation for disturbance is only part of the price which is being paid for the land compulsorily acquired, and you cannot acquire a licence even though it be an irrevocable one. But it seems to me that that is answered, if not by section 5 (2) of the Compulsory Purchase Act, then certainly by the case of Binions v Evans [1972] Ch 359 in this court, and I cite from the judgment of my Lord, Lord Denning, at p 367. He there said: Seeing that the defendant has no legal estate or interest in the land, the question is, what right has she?  At any rate, she has a contractual right to reside in the house for the remainder of her life or as long as she pleases to stay. I know that in the agreement it is described as a tenancy, but that does not matter. The question is, what is it in reality?  To my mind it is a licence, and no tenancy. It is a privilege which is personal to her. On all the modern cases, which are legion, it ranks as a contractual licence, and not a tenancy: see Shell-Mex & BP Ltd v Manchester Garages Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 612. What is the status of such a licence as this?  There are a number of cases in the books in which a similar right has been given. They show that a right to occupy for life, arising by contract, gives to the occupier an equitable interest in the land, just as it does when it arises under a settlement: see In re Carne’s Settled Estates [1899] 1 Ch 324 and In re Boyer’s Settled Estates [1916] 2 Ch 404. The courts of equity will not allow the landlord to turn the occupier out in breach of the contract (see Foster v Robinson [1951] 1 KB 149, 156), nor will they allow a purchaser to turn her out if he bought with knowledge of her right. Secondly, on the footing that that is not in itself sufficient, still, in my judgment, this is a case in which one is entitled to look at the realities of the situation and to pierce the corporate veil. I wish to safeguard myself by saying that so far as this ground is concerned, I am relying on the facts of this particular case. I would not at this juncture accept9 that in every case where one has a group of companies one is entitled to pierce the veil, but in this case the two subsidiaries were both wholly-owned; further, they had no separate business operations whatsoever; thirdly, in my judgment, the nature of the question involved is highly relevant, namely, whether the owners of this business have been disturbed in their possession and enjoyment of it. I find support for this view in a number of cases, from which I would make a few brief citations, first from Harold Holdsworth & Co (Wakefield) Ltd v Caddies [1955] 1 WLR 352, where Lord Reid at p 367 said this: It was argued that the subsidiary companies were separate legal entities each under the control of its own board of directors, that in law the board of the appellant company could not assign any duties to anyone in relation to the management of the subsidiary companies, and that therefore the agreement cannot be construed as entitling them to assign any such duties to the respondent. In my judgment this is too technical an argument. This is an agreement in re mercatoria and it must be construed in light of the facts and realities of the situation. The appellant company owned the whole share capital of British Textile Manufacturing Co Ltd, and under the agreement of 1947 the directors of this company were to be the nominees of the appellants. So, in fact, the appellants could control the internal management of their subsidiary companies, and, in the unlikely event of there being any difficulty, it was only necessary to go through formal procedure in order to make the decision of the appellants’ board fully effective. That particular passage is, I think, especially cogent having regard to the fact that Mr Eyre was constrained to admit that in this case, if they had thought of it soon enough, DHN could, as it were, by moving the pieces on their chess board, have put themselves in a position in which the question would have been wholly unarguable. I also refer to Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324 at 343. That was a case under section 210 of the Companies Act, and Viscount Simonds said: I do not think that my own views could be stated better than in the late Lord President Cooper’s words on the first hearing of this case. ‘In my view,’ he said, ‘the section warrants the court in looking at the business realities of a situation and does not confine them to a narrow legalistic view.’ My third citation is from the judgment of Danckwerts LJ in Merchandise Transport Ltd v British Transport Commission [1962] 2 QB 173 at 206, where he said: The cases show that where the character of a company, or the nature of the persons who control it, is a relevant feature the court will go behind the mere status of the company as a legal entity, and will consider who are the persons as shareholders or even as agents who direct and control the activities of a company which is incapable of doing anything without human assistance. The third ground, which I place last because it is longest, but perhaps ought to place first, is that in my judgment, in truth, DHN were the equitable owners of the property. In order to resolve this matter, it will be necessary for me to refer in some detail to the facts. When the three original companies had amalgamated by causing DHN to be incorporated and assigning their businesses to that company, it was necessary to obtain outside financial assistance so that suitable new premises could be acquired. Short-term finance was arranged with the Palestine British Bank (later called the Israel British Bank), and the terms of the arrangements which were made are set out in a letter dated December 2 1963, which is document 12. It was written by DHN’s accountants to the managing director of the bank and confirmed by him by endorsed written note the next day. It is headed in the matter of the three original companies, but I think it is clear it must be treated as embodying an agreement between the bank and DHN. It provided that the bank should buy the property and sell it to the group, meaning, as I have said, DHN, for £120,000, of which £20,000 was to be paid on exchange of contracts between the bank and the group. The group were to have one year after completion of the bank’s purchase in which to complete the subcontract, and were to pay interest on the balance of the purchase-money, £100,000, in the meantime at 12 per cent. There was also a provision giving the bank an option to acquire an equity interest in the group, but nothing turns on that, as it was not exercised. Finally the letter said: ‘It is understood that the group will be permitted full and exclusive use and enjoyment of the said property as from the date of your own completion with the vendors.’  The premises were bought for £115,000 and transferred to Bronze, a then wholly-owned and inactive subsidiary of the bank. Bronze were duly registered at Her Majesty’s Land Registry on March 12 1964 as proprietors of the freehold interest. On May 27 1964 they entered into a contract (which I will call the resale contract) whereby they agreed to sell to DHN for £120,000, and DHN duly paid £20,000 as a deposit to the bank as stakeholders. Pursuant to the original agreement, the resale contract provided for completion on January 6 1965, being in fact one year after the transfer to Bronze. A caution to protect the resale contract was duly entered on the register, and DHN were at once let into possession and began to carry on their new business, which flourished extremely well. So far, all in accordance with the letter of December 2. It seems that DHN needed more time to arrange permanent finance, and therefore, by a further agreement of December 14 1964 made between Bronze and DHN, in consideration of a further payment of £1,150 which DHN made to Bronze, the date for completion of the resale contract was postponed to January 6 1966, and interest was reduced from 12 per cent to 10 per cent. By December 1965 DHN had managed to borrow £100,000 from Credit for Industry Ltd, but at this stage, possibly taking up a suggestion which the bank itself had made on December 6 1963, it was decided that in order to save a second lot of stamp duty on the conveyance by Bronze to DHN, the latter should buy the shares in Bronze from the bank. Those proposals were set out in a letter, which is included in bundle 11, dated December 17 1965 from DHN’s solicitors to DHN’s accountants. That letter reads as follows: Bronze Investments Ltd bought the property in January 1964 for the sum of £115,000. DHN entered into a contract to buy the property from Bronze Investments Ltd for £120,000. It is now intended that in order to obviate stamp duties so far as possible, DHN should buy the issued share capital of Bronze Investments Ltd, and the shareholders of Bronze Investments Ltd are agreeable in principle. They have suggested that since Bronze Investments Ltd is selling for £5,000 more than it paid, the consideration for the shares of Bronze Investments Ltd should be £5,000. They state that Bronze Investments Ltd is indebted to Israel British Bank Ltd for the amount of the purchase money, namely £115,000. DHN have paid a deposit of £20,000 and are, as you know, obtaining a mortgage advance of £100,000 from Credit for Industry Ltd. It is suggested, therefore, that of the £20,000 deposit now held by Israel British Bank Ltd, £5,000 should be applied towards the purchase of the shares of Bronze Investments Ltd and the balance towards discharging the indebtedness of that company to Israel British Bank Ltd. The mortgage advance coming from Credit for Industry Ltd would then be applied entirely towards discharging the remaining part of the moneys due from Bronze Investments Ltd. Then on February 8 1966 there was a further agreement between the bank and DHN under which, first, the bank agreed to sell the shares in Bronze to DHN, not for £5,000, but for £3,597 5s Od. How this particular figure was arrived at I do not know, but no matter. Secondly, DHN undertook that on completion Bronze would pay £116,402 15s Od to the bank, making a total, with the £3,597 5s Od, of £120,000. The sum of £116,402 15s Od was, in clause 6 of the agreement, described as ‘being the amount loaned to the company [that is, Bronze] by the vendor,’ that is, the bank. The bank warranted and declared that on receipt of the sum, it would have no further claim against the company or the purchaser on any account whatsoever. On the same day, February 8 1966, DHN borrowed the £100,000 from Credit for Industry Ltd, and DHN and Bronze concurred to mortgage the freehold to secure repayment. It is clear from that mortgage, and is the fact, that DHN, not Bronze, borrowed this money, and it was utilised to pay the bank for the shares and the £116,400 odd, less credit for the £20,000 already held by the bank. Mr Eyre, for the respondents, takes his stand on that agreement of February 8 1966. He says it is the only, or at any rate the most cogent, evidence of what the relevant transaction was, and he says: ‘There we have the bank and DHN solemnly declaring and agreeing that what happened was that the bank lent the money to Bronze to enable it to purchase for its own benefit; that the relationship between the bank and Bronze was simply that of creditor and debtor; and that when DHN paid off the Bronze liability of £116,400 odd, that was either a voluntary payment, which gave it no rights–but that did not matter because it also bought all the shares–or was a payment which subrogated DHN to the bank’s rights against Bronze as a creditor.’  If this was an action on that agreement, there might well be an estoppel, but it is not, and I do not see anything to prevent DHN asserting, and this court accepting, if it be satisfied, that the agreement of February 8 1966 and the letter of December 17 1965 both misstated the position. In my judgment, that agreement and letter are not the only, or even the most cogent, evidence of the original transaction, since we have the letter of December 2 1963, which I have read, which is the fons et origo of the whole matter, and that clearly provided that the bank were going to be the purchasers. Then the letter four days later, which is also in bundle 11, is not without interest. In that letter the bank itself proposed an entirely different arrangement, namely, that DHN should form a new company and mortgage the shares to the bank. That was never implemented in any shape or form, but the bank there referred to ‘our nominee company,’ clearly Bronze, and suggested that the security should be taken in its name, plainly as nominee. That stamps the character of Bronze. Pausing there, I would have thought the clear inference was that when the property was purchased, the bank was carrying out the original agreement of December 2/3, save only that, as it had the right to do, it caused the property to be conveyed to a nominee. If so, there was clearly a resulting trust situation and Bronze held in trust for the bank. I do not think it would be a correct inference that Bronze borrowed the money from the bank and bought the property for its own use and benefit. Then it was argued, if that were so, Bronze could not have entered into the resale contract because the bank would have been a necessary party, but I do not agree. There was nothing to prevent Bronze entering into that contract with the approval of its beneficiary, which it clearly had, because that was the original agreement. As in all the circumstances DHN would have constructive notice of the trust, the bank would no doubt have been a necessary party to the conveyance had the contract not been rescinded, but that is purely a conveyancing matter. Then came the admittedly important letter of December 17 and the contract of February 8 1966, but it is to be observed that the contract is in any event inaccurate, because it did not provide what was to happen to the £20,000 which was held by the bank as stakeholders. That sum, of course, became repayable to DHN when the contract was rescinded, and was no doubt used towards paying the total of £120,000, but the contract should have dealt with this. Much more seriously, however, on Mr Eyre’s hypothesis, that contract was wrong in substance. If Bronze had borrowed the money to buy the property, it borrowed £115,000 and no more, and that was the sum which fell to be repaid, not £116,402 15s 0d. Even if the bank had chosen for some reason or other to give credit against the loan for the purchase-price of the shares, the £3,597 5s 0d would have fallen to be deducted from £115,000, not £120,000. It is clear that what the parties were seeking to do was to give effect to the original agreement in a substituted form. The bank was to have the £120,000 which it would have got under the resale contract, in return for which, instead of conveying the property, it was to transfer the shares and release its equitable interest. The way in which the contract of February 8 1966 was drawn was, of course, inconsistent with any original resulting trust in favour of the bank, but the substance of the transaction was entirely consistent with it. It went wrong at this stage, as I think, because the solicitors and accountants in the letter of December 17 1965 failed to appreciate the true position. Mr Eyre argued that if DHN had intended to get in an outstanding equitable interest, it would have been easy to say so. Of course it would, and but for the mistake, no doubt that is what would have been done, but if Bronze borrowed the money, it borrowed £115,000. Why then did DHN pay £120,000?  I understand Mr Eyre conceded that if one could go behind the letter of December 17 1965 and the agreement of February 8 1966, and if one found, as I do, an initial relationship between Bronze and the bank of trustee and cestui que trust, not debtor and creditor, the result would be that DHN acquired the bank’s equitable interest. Even if not conceded, it seems to me to follow. True there was no writing such as is required under section 52 of the Law of Property Act 1925 for the assignment of an equitable interest in land, but this was not a gift; DHN were purchasers. On my hypothesis, they paid the £120,000 to acquire the whole of the bank’s interest in the property, and the bank intended to dispose of it. Then DHN would be entitled to call for a proper written assignment, and that would be enough, just as if they had been purchasers under an uncompleted contract to purchase the property itself. Even if clause 6 of the agreement of February 8 operated as a release to Bronze of the bank’s equitable interest, it would not merge, because the price had been paid by DHN, and Bronze would hold it on a resulting trust for DHN. In my judgment, therefore, for those reasons, the appellants are right in saying that in truth Bronze held the premises in trust for DHN. Accordingly, the appeal in my opinion succeeds on each of these three grounds. SHAW LJ: I agree with both judgments, and I add a few observations because it seems to me that the facts of this matter are of an exceptional and unusual character. When DHN were minded in 1963 to acquire the land in question, they sought the assistance of an institution then called the Palestine British Bank, and later the Israel British Bank. The original plan was that the bank should buy the land concerned and then sell it to the group (as the consortium represented by DHN Food Distributors Ltd describe themselves in a letter dated December 2 1963 which initiated the proposals for the acquisition of the land). The date of completion on the resale was to be a year after the date when the bank itself completed. The bank was thus to be the first purchaser from the then owners. No doubt in order to keep this transaction separate from their ordinary banking business, the bank took a conveyance to a shell company called Bronze Investments Ltd which was their wholly-owned subsidiary. Only the subscribers’ shares (two of 2/- each) had been issued, and the company had not carried on any business, though its principal object was stated to be property investment. The introduction of the Bronze company to the scene was, so far as DHN were concerned, both fortuitous and superfluous. So the purchase-money for the payment of10 the original vendors had to come from the bank, who duly paid it. In this situation, before the onset of variations and complications, it can hardly be in question that while the legal title was vested in Bronze, there was a resulting trust of the beneficial interest in favour of the bank. As such a trust arises by operation of law, its existence is independent of the intention of the parties, and their knowledge or ignorance of its existence is irrelevant and immaterial, save in so far as ignorance may throw light on the later conduct of those concerned. In May 1964 Bronze entered into a contract to sell the properties to DHN. The date for completion was January 6 1965, but a supplemental agreement postponed completion for a year. In the interval DHN procured a loan of £110,000 from a company called Credit for Industry Ltd, secured by a mortgage on the referenced properties. To that mortgage Bronze was, of course, a necessary party as the titular owner. The advance was to enable DHN to pay the bank, for the objective was still that DHN should become the owners. They had established themselves in the property and used the warehouse premises comprised in it for their business. But in February 1966 a change of method was proposed and adopted. Instead of taking a conveyance from Bronze, DHN were to buy from the bank their entire shareholding in that company. The value of the shares was adjusted so as to account for the £20,000 which had been paid as a deposit under the contract of sale made in May 1964. There was little, if anything, of advantage to DHN or anyone else in this elaboration of what was meant to be a simple purchase of the referenced properties for the purposes of the group’s business. The role of Bronze was throughout entirely negative. It had no business, no capital and no function. What was in the minds of DHN’s professional advisers in adopting this tortuous mode of proceeding it is difficult to fathom. Their new and more complicated procedure was proposed and documented in a letter dated December 17 1965 and an agreement made on February 8 1966. The outcome of it was that DHN became the owners of all the shares in Bronze while that wholly redundant legal persona retained the bare legal title to the land. According to clause 6 of the agreement, DHN undertook that it would, on completion of the purchase of the shares, procure that Bronze should pay to the vendor the sum of £116,000 ‘being the amount loaned’ to that company by the vendor. Goff LJ has already pointed out the inaccuracy inherent in the introductory passage. As Bronze had no funds and had never had any, it was manifest that the moneys they were to be procured to pay must have their source in DHN, who nonetheless had no direct overt title to the properties concerned. The moneys to be paid were expressed to be ‘the amount loaned to Bronze by the bank.’  This was the method adopted, for whatever reason, of describing the result of the bank having paid the initial purchase-price and taken the conveyance in the name of their then subsidiary. In the light of the history, that language was not only inapt but inept. It seems to me that the true position was that the resulting trust in favour of the bank which came into existence in 1963 still hovered about the parties in 1966. When DHN in their turn paid the bank, that equitable interest settled upon them. Thus they were entitled to call for the execution in due form of an assignment of that equitable interest by the bank. On this basis, DHN would have a sufficient interest in the land, as was properly conceded by Mr Eyre, to make their claim for compensation for disturbance both competent and proper. Even if this were not right, there is the further argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that there was so complete an identity of the different companies comprised in the so-called group that they ought to be regarded for this purpose as a single entity. The completeness of that identity manifested itself in various ways. The directors of DHN were the same as the directors of Bronze; the shareholders of Bronze were the same as DHN, as the parent company, and they had a common interest in maintaining, on the property concerned, the business of the group. If anything were necessary to reinforce the complete identity of commercial interest and personality, clause 6, which I have referred to already, demonstrates it, for DHN undertook the obligation to procure their subsidiary company to make the payment which the bank required to be made. If each member of the group is regarded as a company in isolation, nobody at all could have claimed compensation in a case which plainly calls for it. Bronze would have had the land but no business to disturb; DHN would have had the business but no interest in the land. In this utter identity and community of interest between DHN and Bronze there was no flaw at all. As Bronze did not trade and carried on no business, it had no actual or potential creditors other than its own parent, DHN. The directors of that company could at any time they chose have procured the transfer of the legal title from Bronze to itself. Mr Eyre again conceded that if they had gone through that formal operation the day before the notice to treat was served on October 12 1970, they would have had a secure claim for compensation for disturbance. Accordingly, they could in law have sought and obtained whatever advantages were derived up to that date from a separation of title and interest between the two companies, and still quite legitimately have redisposed matters right up till October 1970 so as to qualify for compensation. They could not have been criticised, still less prevented, if they had chosen to do so. Yet if the decision of the Lands Tribunal be right, it made all the difference that they had not. Thus no abuse is prevented by disregarding the bonds which bundled DHN and Bronze together in a close and, so far as Bronze was concerned, indissoluble relationship. Why, then, should this relationship be ignored in a situation in which to do so does not prevent abuse but would on the contrary result in what appears to be a denial of justice?  If the strict legal differentiation between the two entities of parent and subsidiary must, even on the special facts of this case, be observed, the common factors in their identities must at the lowest demonstrate that the occupation of DHN would and could never be determined without the consent of DHN itself. If it was a licence at will, it was at the will of the licensee, DHN, that the licence subsisted. Accordingly, it could have gone on for an indeterminate time; that is to say, so long as the relationship of parent and subsidiary continued, which means for practical purposes for as long as DHN wished to remain in the property for the purposes of its business. The President of the Lands Tribunal took a strict legalistic view of the respective positions of the companies concerned. It appears to me that it was too strict in its application to the facts of this case, which are, as I have said, of a very special character, for it ignored the realities of the respective roles which the companies filled. I would allow the appeal. The appeal was allowed with costs above and below. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.