Copping and another v Surrey County Council
Mummery, Latham and Carnwath LJJ
Right to buy — Relevant date for valuation — Two notices served 10 years apart — Whether first claim extant — Whether correct valuation date that of first or second notice — Appeal dismissed
In 1991, the appellant tenants served notice on the respondent landlords, pursuant to section 122 of the Housing Act 1985, claiming to exercise the right to buy the property that they occupied. The respondents served a section 124 notice denying the right to buy on the ground that the appellants did not hold a secure tenancy. The appellants took no further action until 2000, when they entered into further correspondence with the respondents in respect of the right to buy. In 2001, they submitted a further section 122 claim, which the respondents rejected on the same ground as before.
In respect of the 2001 claim, the appellants applied, under section 181, for a declaration that they were entitled to purchase the house. The declaration was granted. A further dispute arose over the valuation of the property. Section 122(2) defined “the relevant time” for valuation as the date of service of the tenant’s notice claiming the right to buy. The respondents maintained that the relevant date was that of the 2001 notice. The appellants sought a further declaration that the relevant date was 1991, the date of the first notice, since that notice had not been withdrawn.
Right to buy — Relevant date for valuation — Two notices served 10 years apart — Whether first claim extant — Whether correct valuation date that of first or second notice — Appeal dismissed
In 1991, the appellant tenants served notice on the respondent landlords, pursuant to section 122 of the Housing Act 1985, claiming to exercise the right to buy the property that they occupied. The respondents served a section 124 notice denying the right to buy on the ground that the appellants did not hold a secure tenancy. The appellants took no further action until 2000, when they entered into further correspondence with the respondents in respect of the right to buy. In 2001, they submitted a further section 122 claim, which the respondents rejected on the same ground as before.
In respect of the 2001 claim, the appellants applied, under section 181, for a declaration that they were entitled to purchase the house. The declaration was granted. A further dispute arose over the valuation of the property. Section 122(2) defined “the relevant time” for valuation as the date of service of the tenant’s notice claiming the right to buy. The respondents maintained that the relevant date was that of the 2001 notice. The appellants sought a further declaration that the relevant date was 1991, the date of the first notice, since that notice had not been withdrawn.
The declaration was granted at first instance on the ground that the right to buy was totally independent of any notice purporting to exercise that right. The judge further found that the concepts of abandonment and estoppel, which were not mentioned in the 1985 Act, had no part to play in the statutory procedures, so that the 1991 notice had remained valid despite the passage of time. That decision was reversed on an appeal by the respondents. The appeal judge held that the right to buy, being conferred by statute, could be exercised only in accordance with the statutory provisions. He also found that the appellants had abandoned their 1991 claim to the right to buy, and that their subsequent claim was made solely on the basis of the 2001 notice. The appellants appealed.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
The property was to be valued as at the date of the 2001 notice. The right to buy granted by section 118 of the 1985 Act was expressly subject to the conditions set out in Part V of the Act, including the section 138 requirement that the right be “established” before the duty to convey arose. Consequently, the procedural provisions of section 122 and the following sections had to be followed before the right could be effective. By section 125(1), the right could be “established” by a landlord’s admission or “otherwise”, including, as in the instant case, proceedings under section 181. The appellants’ proceedings were based solely upon the claim made in the 2001 notice. The procedure required by the Act accordingly flowed from that notice and no other, and “the relevant time” for valuation had to be the date upon which that notice had been served: Collin v Duke of Westminster [1985] 1 EGLR 109; (1984) 273 EG 881 distinguished.
Per curiam: The questions of abandonment, waiver and estoppel were not relevant to a solution in the present case. However, the appellant’s argument that a claim under section 122 remained effective unless expressly withdrawn seemed to ignore reality. The withdrawal provisions of the 1985 Act said nothing about the continuing life of a notice, in circumstances where no further steps had been taken, which the landlord could sensibly interpret as meaning that the tenant had decided not to proceed.
Jerome Wilcox (instructed by Campbell Courtney & Cooney, of Frimley) appeared for the appellants; Claire Andrews (instructed by the legal department of Surrey County Council) appeared for the respondents.
Sally Dobson, barrister