Compensation: requirement of statute trumps procedural rule requirements

The Upper Tribunal has considered whether a claim for compensation was referred to the tribunal within the limitation period allowed by s9(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 in Five Oaks Land Ltd v London Borough of Redbridge [2021] UKUT 304(LC). On 31 March 2015 the defendant compulsorily acquired 66 separate parcels of land at Five Oaks Lane in Redbridge. The last date by which claims for compensation arising from the acquisition could be made was 31 March 2021. On 30 March 2021, 17 individual notices of reference were filed with the Tribunal claiming compensation under the Land Compensation Act 1961. Each notice named a different claimant or group of claimants, was in the tribunal’s standard form and provided the required information under the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010. The notices related to 22 separate parcels of land but each was accompanied by a single statement of case covering all of the claims which listed the persons on whose behalf it was being submitted, the last of which was Five Oaks Land Ltd (FOLL). However, none of the notices of reference was lodged on behalf of FOLL or referred to it as the claimant, although it was referred to as having an interest in the land in some of the notices of reference. Was FOLL’s claim referred to the tribunal before expiry of the limitation period? S9(1) of the 1980 Act requires a claim to recover compensation to be brought within six years from the date when the claimant’s cause of action accrues, which is the date of entry: Hillingdon LBC v ARC Ltd [1999] Ch 139. S1 of the 1961 Act provides that a claim will be brought for limitation purposes if it is referred to the UT within the required period. The Tribunal Rules provide that proceedings must be started by sending or delivering to the tribunal a notice of reference. FOLL contended that its claim for compensation was referred to the tribunal in time based on the content of the statement of case filed with each reference. FOLL’s case arose under a series of options, and while at the entry date a number of those options had lapsed, the value of those that remained was included in the total of £17.5m sought by all 17 notices of reference. The UT was satisfied that a notice of reference was not necessary and that the statement of case submitted on behalf of all of the claimants satisfied the requirements of the 1961 Act and was enough to refer a claim by FOLL to the tribunal. The Tribunal Rules could not impose substantive limitations on the making of a claim which are not found in the 1961 Act. The statute only requires a document to be submitted to the tribunal asking it to resolve a dispute over the amount of compensation payable to a named claimant, and a single copy of the statement of case satisfied this requirement. It would be unfair and unjust for FOLL not to be allowed to pursue what may be a valuable claim for compensation. Louise Clark is a property law consultant and mediator