Campbell v Daramola

Rent tribunal’s grant of less than six months’ security of tenure on reference by tenant after notice to quit–Tribunal wished to give landlord an opportunity to repair the premises, but disrepair said to be attributable to landlord’s own default–Matter nevertheless one within tribunal’s discretion–tenant’s appeal dismissed This was an appeal by Mr Everold Campbell, of 71 St Ervan’s Road, London W10, from a decision of the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court on April 29 1974 upholding the refusal of the Kensington and Chelsea Rent Tribunal on August 14 1973 to grant him more than two months’ security of tenure in proceedings brought by him against the responrent, Mr Stephen Daramola. Mr S J Sedley (instructed by the North Kensington Neighbourhood Law Centre) appeared for the appellant, and Mr R H T Smith (instructed by Webber & Co) represented the respondent. Mr H K Woolf (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared as amicus curiae. Giving judgment, BUCKLEY LJ said that the appellant was a weekly tenant from November 14 1972 at a rent of £5.25 a week under an oral agreement. On June 15 1973 the landlord gave the tenant notice to quit, which was due to expire at a later date than July 8 1973. Before the notice took effect, the tenant referred the matter to the rent tribunal to get a reasonable rent and security of tenure under the Rent Act 1968, section 78. After visiting and inspecting the premises, the tribunal determined that the rent should be reduced and that the tenant should be given security of tenure until October 13. They intimated in their reasons that if a subsequent application were made for further security of tenure, it would be unlikely to be granted. The tenant appealed from that decision, first to the Divisional Court and now to the Court of Appeal, in relation to the length of the period of security of tenure allowed. In their reasons, the tribunal said that the premises were a very poor class of property, and the bathroom, which was shared by the tenants, was cluttered with a large number of boxes owned by the appellant. Damage to the walls and the stairs, which was not very extensive, was said to have been done by the appellant carrying cumbersome boxes up and down the stairs. The room occupied by the appellant was in a poor state of repair, and cluttered up with equipment of various kinds. The landlord wished to carry out repairs, but could not do so while the appellant was in occupation. Counsel for the appellant submitted first, that the evidence about the need for repairs only demonstrated a need for access to, or at most temporary occupation of, the room, and did not require irrevocable recovery of possession by the landlord; and secondly, that the effect and intention of the tribunal’s decision was to frustrate the policy of the Housing Act 1961, section 32, which placed an obligation to repair on the landlord in the case of short leases of dwelling-houses. The effect of the decision, he said, was to enable the landlord to escape from his obligation under that section, and therefore it was an improper or an inappropriate exercise of the tribunal’s discretion under section 78 of the Act of 1968. Counsel contended that by putting an end to the tenancy on October 13, the tribunal would have relieved the landlord of his statutory obligation to do repairs for the benefit of the tenant, and that the landlord would therefore be getting an unjust advantage as a result of the decision. It seemed to him (his Lordship) that to talk about the landlord being relieved of his obligation to do repairs by the termination of the tenancy was really to misrepresent the situation. The landlord was under an obligation to do repairs, and that obligation subsisted as long as the tenancy subsisted. If there was a breach of that obligation during the tenancy, a cause of action arose which would entitle the tenant to damages of such amount as would be appropriate having regard to the continuation of disrepair and the length of time during which it obtained during the tenancy. When the tenancy came to an end, that cause of action did not disappear. The tenant was still entitled to damages and the landlord was not relieved of his obligation, although it was true that the obligation ceased when the tenancy ended and there would be no continuing breach after that date of the duty to repair On the more general question, one had to approach the problem on the basis that the tenant was not a protected tenant. He was a tenant whose tenancy the landlord was entitled to determine by notice, subject to the discretion conferred on the tribunal by section 78 to defer the effect of that notice. It seemed to him (Buckley LJ) that the duty of the tribunal could be comprehended by saying that the tribunal was to take into account all the relevant circumstances, and having done so, make such an order as seemed to be just. In this case the tribunal did not think fit to postpone the operation of the notice to quit, but thought that security of tenure until October 13 would give suitable relief to the tenant from what otherwise would have been a strict operation of the notice to quit. The property was in a bad state of repair–the roof, the walls and the ceiling of the room. The landlord was anxious to carry out the repairs. The tribunal found that it was not possible for him to do so if, during the time the work was being done, the tenant and his possessions were in the room. In the ordinary course, the landlord would be fully justified in serving notice to quit in order to recover possession so that he could carry out repairs for the preservation of what, after all, was his property, although subject to the tenancy. Once he had recovered possession, he would still be liable to the tenant for any damages the tenant might be able to recover for lack of repair during the tenancy. But the tenant could not complain if he was ousted from possession. That might occasion hardship to the tenant in some degree, because the tenant had to find other accommodation. On the other hand, if the position was that the landlord had to66 carry out repairs while the tenant was still his tenant, he would have to make available some alternative accommodation or make some adjustment in the arrangement so that the tenant could be somewhere else during whatever period was occupied by the carrying out of repairs. Those circumstances might occasion hardship to the landlord. It was for the tribunal to decide where the balance of convenience lay. Discretion was conferred by the Act upon the tribunal, and provided it took into consideration all the proper circumstances and did not take into consideration any circumstances which were irrelevant or improper, its decision should not be interfered with. He (his Lordship) was satisfied that the tribunal had not taken into account any circumstances which were not proper for it to take into account. It was clearly proper to take into account the physical condition of the property, and also the fact that the landlord might be under some obligation to the tenant in respect of existing defects. The tribunal balanced all these considerations in arriving at its conclusion, and in arriving at it it had to decide what appeared to be the commonsense and fair conclusion between the parties. He (Buckley LJ) could not see that the tribunal had come to a decision which was in any way open to criticism. STAMP and BROWNE LJJ agreed and the appeal was dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.