Batchelor v Kent County Council

Compulsory purchase — Compensation — Pointe Gourde principle and rule (3) in section 5 of Land Compensation Act 1961 — Appeal by case stated by acquiring authority from decision of Lands Tribunal — Valuation of two small parcels of land — Some matters remitted to tribunal      The dispute arose out of the compulsory acquisition of two parcels of land belonging to the claimaint (respondent to the present appeal) — The appellant acquiring authority had taken possession of 0.86 of an acre under a road improvement compulsory purchase order (“the order land”) — The second parcel, 0.97 of an acre, was the subject of a counternotice served by the respondent under section 53 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 and accepted by the acquiring authority (“the adjoining land”) — Planning permission had been granted for a large residential development to the south of the two parcels and the order under which the respondent’s 0.86 of an acre was taken related to access to this development — A roundabout was constructed on the order land to provide more convenient access — The Lands Tribunal awarded the respondent £500,000 compensation in respect of the order land and £150,000 in respect of the adjoining land on the basis that the order land had potential as an access to the development and a ransom value — The acquiring authority appealed, contending that the award for the order land was in conflict both with the Pointe Gourde principle and rule (3) of section 5 of the Land Compensation Act 1961; the authority also complained that there was no evidential basis for the award of £150,000 for the adjoining land — The respondent disputed these criticisms and also challenged the £500,000 for the order land on the ground that it involved an unexplained rejection of one of his valuations, which put a figure of £5,991,000 on the order land      Mann LJ dealt with the appeal under four headings: 1 Pointe Gourde The principle, as stated in the Pointe Gourde case itself, was that “compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land cannot include an increase in value which is entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition” — In the present case the suggestion that the principle had not been observed was due entirely to an inference from the amount of the award — It was important to remember that the value to be excluded must be value “entirely due to the scheme” — The Pointe Gourde principle cannot diminish pre-scheme value — To exclude pre-scheme value would be to expropriate property rights without compensation, contrary to the fundamental principle of equivalence in Horn v Sunderland Corporation — In the present case the tribunal had found a particular pre-scheme value — Hence the tribunal could not be faulted for failing to observe the Pointe Gourde principle 2 Rule (3) in section 5 The appeal based on rule (3) in section 5 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 failed because the order land was not shown to have “the special suitability” which the rule required — It was true that the tribunal found that “the most suitable access to the land to the south was that which had been formed on the order land” — But “most suitable” does not carry the same connotation as “special suitability” — The order land may have been the most suitable land for access to the south, but it was not “specially suitable” within the meaning of the rule 3 The adjoining land The adjoining land was not affected by the scheme — The only question was as to the value of the land for residential purposes — It was impossible to understand how the tribunal arrived at £150,000 — This assessment would have to be remitted to the tribunal 4 The £500,000 for the order land The challenge here was by the respondent — There was a procedural difficulty, but the point was allowed to be argued — It was submitted that the award of £500,000 was not explained — The acquiring authority did not produce a valuation which incorporated a premium value — The respondent submitted two — One of these produced a valuation of £5,991,000 — The tribunal’s conclusion on this was found by the court to be inexplicable — The valuation of the order land must also be remitted to the tribunal The appeal was allowed in respect of the matters under headings 3 and 4 above, which were remitted to the tribunal The following cases are referred to in this report. Blandrent Investment Developments Ltd v British Gas Corporation [1979] EGD 721; (1979) 252 EG 267; [1979] JPL 828, HL Camrose (Viscount) v Basingstoke Corporation [1966] 1 WLR 1100; [1966] 3 All ER 161; (1966) 64 LGR 337, CA Fraser v City of Fraserville [1917] AC 187; 116 LT 258; 33 TLR 179, PC Horn v Sunderland Corporation [1941] 2 KB 26; [1941] 1 All ER 480, CA Inland Revenue Commissioners v Clay [1914] 3 KB 466; (1914) 83 LJKB 1425; 111 LT 484; 30 TLR 573 Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565, PC Raja Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam [1939] AC 302 Stokes v Cambridge Corporation (1961) 13 P&CR 77; [1961] EGD 207; 180 EG 839, LT Wilson v Liverpool Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 302; [1971] 1 All ER 628; (1971) 22 P&CR 282; [1971] EGD 144; 217 EG 987, CA This was an appeal by case stated by Kent County Council from a decision of the Lands Tribunal on a reference by Hubert Dorrington Batchelor, the respondent to the appeal, in regard to the compensation payable to him for the compulsory purchase of two small areas of land situated on the eastern side of the junction of New Cut Road and Bearsted Road, Maidstone, Kent. The Lands Tribunal member was Mr W H Rees FRICS. Malcolm Spence QC and Adrian Trevelyan-Thomas (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard for the solictior to Kent County Council) appeared on behalf of the appellant council; Robin Purchas QC and Meyric ap Michael Lewis (instructed by Hallett & Co, of Ashford, Kent) represented the respondent. Giving the first judgment at the invitation of Fox LJ, Mann LJ said: This is an appeal by way of case stated from a decision of the Lands Tribunal (W H Rees Esq FRICS) dated February 19 1988. The decision was made on a reference by Hubert Dorrington Batchelor (“the claimant”) which sought the determination of the amount of compensation payable to him by the Kent County Council in its capacity as a highway authority consequent upon the compulsory acquisition of the freehold estate in two parcels of land situate on the eastern side of the junction of New Cut Road and Bearsted Road, Maidstone. The case was stated at the request of the acquiring authority and is dated June 9 1988. We were told that the claimant requested a case to be stated but that the request was withdrawn before there was a statement in pursuance of the request. The Maidstone and Vicinity Town Map 1970 allolcated the two parcels together with a large area to their east and south for residential development. Pursuant to that allocation Maidstone Borough Council on March 30 1982 granted, on the application of Ward Holdings plc, an outline planning permission for the development of a substantial area to the east and south of the two parcels for the erection of 1,750 dwellings. The permission was subject to a number of conditions of which the one material is xvii(b), which inhibited the occupation of dwellings in Phase II of the three-stage development until “off site road works… in respect of that Phase are completed”. Ward Holdings plc is the parent company of Wards Construction (Medway) Ltd (“Wards”), which owns a substantial part of the allocated land and whose boundary is at the north west contiguous with the two parcels. Other parts of the allocated area are owned by other developers (Abbey Homesteads, McLean Homes/Barratts and Hillreed Homes). Their ownerships are, in general terms, to the south and east of the land of Wards. The lands of the various developers are shown on the plan at p 463 of the papers (“DEF1”). On February 1 1983 the county council’s highway authority entered into an agreement with Wards pursuant to section 278 of the Highways Act 1980 in regard to the improvement of New Cut Road and Bearsted Road. The improvement included the construction of a new roundabout at the junction of the two roads. The improvement (which has now been completed) would have the effect of unlocking phase II of the development. The roundabout was to be (and is) situate upon the claimant’s land. It was secured for the county council by the promotion of the Kent County Council (New Cut Road/Bearsted Road Improvement) Compulsory Purchase Order 1983, which was confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Environment on September 12 1983. The order authorised the acquisition of 0.86 acre of the claimant’s land. The order land is the first of the two parcels with which the tribunal was concerned. Entry was made on the order land on August 1 1984. The second of the two parcels is immediately to the east of the order land and is 0.97 acre in extent. It was the subject of a counternotice under section 53 of the Land Compensation Act 1973. That notice was accepted by the county council, which entered into possession on December 1 1986. The second parcel is conveniently referred to as “the adjoining land”. The decision of the tribunal was that compensation for the order land (assessed as at August 1 1984) was £500,000 and for the adjoining land (assessed as at December 1 1986) was £150,000. The acquiring authority now contend that the award for the order land did not observe the principle in Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565 or alternatively did not heed rule (3) of section 5 of the Land Compensation Act 1961. The authority also contend that the award for the adjoining land had no basis on the evidence. The claimant disputes the application of both the principles in Pointe Gourde and rule (3) and contends that the award for the adjoining land does have an evidential basis. In addition the claimant challenges the figure of £500,00 for the order land in that it involves an unexplained rejection of one of the claimant’s valuations (valuation B) which put the value of the order land at £5,991,000. I shall deal with the appeal under four heads, that is to say: the principle in Pointe Gourde, rule (3), the £150,000 and the £500,000. Pointe Gourde The principle expressed by the Privy Council in Pointe Gourde does not have a statutory basis although it has a statutory extension in the Land Compensation Act 1961, section 6 (as to which see Camrose v Basingstoke Corporation [1966] 1 WLR 1100). The principle was expressed in the advice of the Privy Council in these short terms (at p 572): It is well settled that compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land cannot include an increase in value which is entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition. The principle had an origin in the 19th century. It is to be found in high authority before 1947. Thus: The value to be ascertained is the value… excluding any advantage due to the carrying out of the scheme for which the property is compulsorily acquired, the question of what is the scheme being a question of fact… in each case (Fraser v City of Fraserville [1917] AC 187 at p 194). The principle has never been doubted (see, for example, Wilson v Liverpool Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 302 at pp 309 and 310). Mr Malcolm Spence QC for the acquiring authority asserts that the tribunal did not observe the principle. If it did do so, the lack of observance is not expressed in the decision but is an inference. That it could be inferred is due to the sum awarded (£500,000) being in excess by far of any valuation of the order land in its existing state (£5,000) or as land available for residential development in accord with the Town Map allocation (£129,000 for the claimant at his higher figure and £38,907 for the acquiring authority). An excess over the value with actual or deemed planning permission can on occasion be justified on an assessment of compensation. Rule (2) of section 5 of the Act of 1961 provides: … The value of land shall… be taken to be the amount which the land if sold in the open market by a willing seller might be expected to realise. An occasion for justification which was required by rule (2) was identified by the Lands Tribunal in Stokes v Cambridge Corporation (1961) 13 P&CR 77*. In that case there was an assessment of compensation for land which had an agreed potential for industrial use, subject to the provision of satisfactory access. Satisfactory access should be secured across an adjoining strip of land which was in separate ownership. The Lands Tribunal held that the value of the subject land should be diminished in the open market to take account of what the owner of the ransom strip would require before granting access across his land. The tribunal said (at p 90): Manifestly, the owner of the front land, aware that he held the only key to the development of the [acquired] back land, would expect to receive a substantial share of the profit which, if he withheld the key, would be unobtainable. What is “substantial” must be a question for the tribunal. * Editor’s note: Also reported at [1961] EGD 207; (1961) 180 EG 839 Stokes v Cambridge Corporation was not doubted before this court. Nor was it suggested that the open market value of acquired land cannot embody a ransom component if it holds a key to development elsewhere. Mr Spence’s argument was that in this case an embodiment of the component would contravene the Pointe Gourde principle. The principle enjoins the tribunal to ignore “an increase in value which is entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition”. The scheme underlying the acquisition was here stated by the tribunal to be “the construction of the roundabout and the associated road works”. The roundabout and the associated roadworks when they were completed removed the inhibition imposed by condition xvii(b) of the planning permission of March 30 1982. The removal of the inhibition was a removal naturally to be desired by the landowners whose development was otherwise curtailed. The critical question, as it seems to me, is whether the scheme underlying the acquisition, as found, did enhance the value of the order land. The question is a question of fact. If there were found to be an enhancement, its dimension was a matter of valuation. It is to be observed, and critically so, that the tribunal must search for an increase in value “entirely due to the scheme”. The Pointe Gourde principle cannot diminish a pre-scheme value. Was there a particular value prior to the scheme underlying the acquisition? As it seems to me, the tribunal found that there was. At pp 8-9 of the decision it is recorded: …any of the owners of the [development lands to the east and south east] other than Wards would bid for [the Order land] as would Wards who are the most likely purchasers. Here, Wards were in a somewhat similar position to a party seeking premises in a given area who have [sic] four properties in view. Having regard to such a party’s requirements… the party prefers one of the four properties to any of the other three. Such a party would be keen to purchase the preferred property and would bid relatively more for it. The Order land, taking the whole of the evidence together, is equivalent to the preferred property… The amount of the bid in the instant case would depend on, among other considerations, the likelihood of the Kent County Council as highway authority permitting a connection for the roundabout (for which planning permission is to be assumed: Act of 1961, section 15) to be made to Bearsted Road. There was no evidence that the highway authority would raise an objection to the connection. Indeed, the improvement of the Bearsted Road/New Cut Road junction would seem to be required by a projected traffic overload in the year 2000 without the flows generated by the inhibited land. Mr Spence told us that this case was the first to come before this court in which the relationship between the Pointe Gourde principle and Stokes v Cambridge Corporation had to be considered. I find no difficulty with the relationship. If a premium value is “entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition”, then it must be disregarded. If it was pre-existent to the acquisition it must, in my judgment, be regarded. To ignore the pre-existent value would be to expropriate it without compensation and would be to contravene the fundamental principles of equivalence (see Horn v Sunderland Corporation [1941] 2 KB 26). There is no ground on which the tribunal can be flawed as having failed to have regard to the Pointe Gourde principle. Accordingly I would reject this ground of appeal. Rule (3) Rule (3) of section 5 of the Act of 1961 was introduced into the statute book in 1919 (see Acquisition of Land Act 1919, section 2) and was, and is, thought to have been intended to reverse the impact of the decision in IRC v Clay [1914] 3 KB 466. The rule provides that in assessing compensation: The special suitability or adaptability of the land for any purpose shall not be taken into account if that purpose is a purpose to which it could be applied only in pursuance of statutory powers, or for which there is no market apart from the special needs of a particular purchaser or the requirements of any authority possessing compulsory purchase powers. There are two (maybe three) limbs to the rule. The perception of limbs by the acquiring authority was first made in this court. No objection was made to the perception by the claimant. Howsoever the rule is divided, one or other of the limbs can be motivated only if the land has a “special suitability or adaptability”. This involves a consideration both of ordinary English words and of fact (as to the latter see Blandrent Investment Developments Ltd v British Gas Corporation (1979) 252 EG 267 at p 273 per Lord Scarman). A special suitability can be found where land has a positional advantage for the purpose in hand (see Raja Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v Revenue Divisional Officer Vizagapatam [1939] AC 302 at pp 312-313). What, then is “special”? This ordinary word in its adjectival sense is given the following meaning in the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed), vol XVI, p 149: Of such a kind as to exceed or excel in some way that which is usual or common; exceptional in character, quality or degree. The tribunal found that “the most suitable access to the land to the south is that which has been formed on the order land”. The tribunal further found it was “unable to find that the order land would have been the only access to the land to the south”. There were other options. The findings of the tribunal, in my judgment, are decisive against a “special suitability”. The order land may have been the most suitable land for access to the south, but it was not specially suitable for that purpose. Most suitable does not correspond with specially suitable. In my judgment, the appeal by reference to rule (3) fails in that the prefatory words of the rule are not satisfied upon the facts as found. The adjoining land and £150,000 The adjoining land was unaffected by the scheme. There were no entanglements. The only question was as to the value of the land for a residential purpose, which was the purpose envisaged by the Town Map. I find, and so find with regret, that it is impossible to understand how the tribunal arrived at the figure of £150,000. The figure of £150,000 appears in the decision devoid of explanation. Mr Purchas QC on behalf of the claimant suggested that the tribunal preferred and adjusted the valuation for the acquiring authority (valuation Y). That was a valuation which resulted in £127,650 after deduction from a residential value of (inter alia) the cost of road improvements and sewerage. If the deductible amounts were diminished or extinguished, the valuation would be higher. We were told by Mr Purchas there there was dispute as to the need for the deductible amounts. I accept the dispute, but as to how it was resolved I do not know. Upon the decision the resolution (if such there was) is not discernible. The suggestion of Mr Purchas may be correct, but this court cannot proceed on the basis of a beguiling suggestion. I regret the choice, but there is no option, in my view, save to remit to the tribunal the assessment for the adjoining land. The £500,000 for the order land This award was challenged by Mr Purchas. Mr Purchas did not have an appeal nor was there a respondent’s notice. The challenge appeared in the skeleton argument and was brought to the attention of both the registrar and the respondent by a letter dated May 15 1989. There was no surprise. If a respondent has no appeal of his own (as is the case here), then it seems to me that he can do nothing by way of formal step. Ord 61 (which regulates appeals from tribunals to the Court of Appeal by way of case stated) contains no provision for a formal step and the expressed application of Ord 59, r 10 by Ord 61, r 3(5) seems to me to be decisive against the incorporation of the provisions for a respondent’s notice in Ord 59, r 6. There is an omission in the rules which the Rules Committee may wish to consider. As it is, Mr Purchas was invited to argue his point. The point is that the award of £500,000 is neither explained nor explicable. The acquiring authority did not submit a valuation which incorporated a premium value. The claimant (through Mr Pocock) submitted two. Of the two, valuation B is the one which seems to have been relevant. It was a valuation which had as its basis “one third of the difference between the immediate net increased development value of the remainder of the development land and its deferred value for, say, 10 years”. The conclusion of this valuation was the figure of £5,991,000. The tribunal said [at p 11 of the decision]: The amount for the Order land on the basis of either [valuations] X or F can be considered as being “back markers” in the negotiations. However, they are dwarfed by two amounts contained in Valuation B which would in my judgment be the most important amounts which would be in the minds of the parties. These were: — 1. One-third of the difference due to deferment £5,491,000 2. The advantage to a developer [of a secured access] £500,000 These amounts were criticised by the respondent; it was said that £500,000 had no support. Corresponding sums are to be found in valuation Y but generally they are much lower than the above as were the amounts of additional costs spoken to by Mr Heard [for the county council]. However all indicate substantial sums. It does not follow that the whole of such amounts should be added in a calculation; in negotiation the parties would divide them and not necessarily equally. Counsel on each side found this passage to be inexplicable. So do I. Valuation Y for the acquiring authority was a valuation for a residential development and had no correspondence with valuation B. I thought that some words were missing from the decision, but we were assured that there had been no omission. If the order land had a premium value (as inferentially it had), then why and how was the tribunal’s figure determined? I do not and cannot know. My ignorance is not founded on an absence of reason (no complaint was made of absence) but upon a reason which does not approach the conclusion. The value of the order land must, in my judgment, also be remitted to the tribunal. Fox LJ and Sir Roualeyn Cumming -Bruce agreed and did not add anything. The matters specified in the judgment were remitted to the Lands Tribunal, costs reserved; leave to appeal was refused.       NOTE     Six valuations, identified respectively as A, B, D, F, X and Y, were appended to the decision of the Lands Tribunal. To assist in an understanding of the valuation aspects of the case, these valuations, including two (A and D) not referred to by the Court of Appeal, are reproduced below. It is emphasised that they do not form part of the Court of Appeal’s judgments.         Valuation A                                                by R W R Pocock FRICS for the claimant                                                                    The Order Land The major assumptions made are: (a) (i) The net area dependent upon the road improvement scheme is 123 acres.   (ii) In valuations and sale of development land one considers the land as a gross area from which any provision for roads, services, schools, public open spaces and church, etc are made. The gross area of the land to the east of New Cut Road, excluding Phase I and also 4 acres allocated for the 40 houses (grossed up as 5.72 acres) is 182.52 acres upon which these valuations are based.   (iii) The overriding assumption is that the Order Land is necessary to enable residential development of 182.52 acres to proceed. (b)   For the purposes of valuation, it is considered that potential purchasers for the Order Land fall into two categories:   (i) A prospective developer of the development land – at the material time Wards.   (ii) Other developers or investors. (c)   The infrastructure in respect of roads and services relating to one of the Housing Areas of the development land should be completed by 1987 at the latest.Against all these facts and assumptions I conclude the valuation to be:One-third of the net increased value of the development land, which is dependent upon the junction improvement. Development value    £150,000 per acre Existing use value        £3,000 per acre Net increased value    £147,000 per acre Calculation one-third of 182.52 acres at £147,000 per acre £8,943,480       The Adjoining Land The major assumptions made are: (a) The same assumptions as in (a) and (c) of the valuation of the Order Land (above). (b) The valuation basis of the land (0.97 acre) is:Its value with planning consent for residential purposes at December 1 1986, deferred one year, less a payment for access through the development land to the south. Calculation     0.97 acre at £300,000 per acre £291,000   Less Abnormals for road cost only     60,000       231,000   PV of this sum deferred 1 year at 10%        0.909       209,979   Less “ransom strip” payment of one-third     69,993 £139,986         VALUATION B by R W R Pocock FRICS for the claimant 1. As to the Order Land and the Adjoining Land the facts and assumptions made are as in (a) and (c) as to the Order Land facts and assumptions in Valuation A, together with the following assumption:                   That the land is necessary to enable development of the 200 acres (less Phase I and 40 houses) to proceed without delay, thus avoiding an uncertain period of at least 10 years when the junction improvement might otherwise be carried out by the highway authority. 2.   As to potential purchasers, the assumptions are as in (b)(i) and (ii) as to the Order Land assumptions in Valuation A.   The Order Land The valuation basis is: (i) One-third of the difference between the immediate net increased development value of the remainder of the development land and its deferred value for, say, 10 years.plus (ii) A sum in respect of the advantage to the developer in securing a certain and immediate access. It is considered this should be significant, havng regard to the inevitable uncertainties of public-sector finance and other aspects of prospective development. Development value £150,000 per acre Existing use value        3,000 per acre Net increased value    147,000 per acre   Calculation     The immediate net increased value of 182.52 acres at£147,000 per acre £26,830,000   PV of £26,830,000 deferred 10 years at 10% (0.386)   10,356,000   The difference 16,474,000   One-third of this is   £5,491,000 Plus     The advantage to a developer of securing certainaccess, say          500,000     £5,991,000   The Adjoining Land As in Valuation A       £139,986   VALUATION D by R W R Pocock FRICS for the claimant The major assumptions made are the same as those in Valuation A together with the assumption that the valuation of the land (both parcels) be for residential development on its own.   The Order Land 0.86 acre at £150,000 per acre       £129,000 The Adjoining Land 0.97 acre at £300,000 per acre       £291,000      £420,000   VALUATION F by R W R Pocock FRICS for the claimant The major assumptions made are the same as those in Valuation A and: (i) That the value of the land be only for residential development as show in Valuation D but deferred 3 years in respect of the Order Land and deferred 1 year for the Adjoining Land. (ii) That a “ransom” payment is made to gain access to the whole of the subject land at the time of development. (iii) That an additional length of road was necessary between the closest point of the road layout to one of the Housing Areas and the southern boundary of the claimant’s land. (iv) That a drainage “pump back” system was necessary between the claimant’s land and the drainage system serving Housing Area 11.   The Order Land The valuation basis is the value for residential purposes as in Valuation Ddeferred 3 years Calculation     Assumed value £129,000   Less 50% of access and drainage abnormals (total£70,100 at August 1984) say    £35,000  £94,000 Deferred 3 years at 10% on the basis the land to the south-east would not be developed before 1988-1991 -although roads would be in by 1987             0.75     70,500 Less one third “Stokes” payment       23,500       £47,000   The Adjoining Land The valuation basis is the value for residential purposes as in Valuation Ddeferred 1 year. Calculation     Assumed value £291,000   Less 50% of access and drainage abnormals (total£77,200 at November 1986)    38,600  £252,400 Deferred 1 year at 10%. The land to the south-eastwould not be developed before 1988/1991 – althoughroads would be in by 1987             0.91     229,684 Less one third “Stokes” payment       76,561       £153,123   VALUATION X by D E Fletcher ARICS for the acquiring authority The Order Land Agricultural value (reflecting additional value as possible paddock)0.86 acre at £3,000 per acre  £2,580 The Adjoining Land As above, 0.97 acre at £3,000 per acre £2,910   VALUATION Y Mr Fletcher’s version of Mr Pocock’s Valuation D Alternative valuation – Access from Bearsted Road 1. As to the Order Land, the site value for residential purposes as at August 1984:   Assumptions (a) Access at eastern end of Adjoining Land with visibility splay across Wards’ land and land at cottage and localised road improvements to Bearsted Road. (b) Sewerage abnormals still apply as no sewer in Bearsted Road or New Cut Road.   Area = 0.86 acre at £150,000 per acre £129,000   Less abnormal development costs (as at August 1984) of£42,600 (localised road improvement and visibility splay works£27,000 – sewage pumped system £15,600)     Shared equally with adjoining land      21,300     107,700   Less payment to Wards of, say, £3,800 (as at August 1984) toconnect to their sewer in Area 11, shared equally withadjoining land           1,900     105,800   Deferred 2 years at 10% (2 years to appeal access provision andnegotiation with 2 owners             0.83     87,814   Less planning appeal costs shared equally with AdjoiningLand        10,000     77,814   Less 50% to reflect cost of negotiation visibility splay with two adjoining owners       38,907            38,907 2. Land possession of which was taken on December 1 1986 (ie the AdjoiningLand)(County Council has accepted notice under section 53 of the LandCompensation Act 1973)     Assumptions     Area = 0.97 acre at £300,000 per acre £291,000   Less abnormal costs (as at December 1986) of £47,200(localised road improvements and visibility splay works£30,000 – sewage pumped system £17,200 (shared equallywith land valued above), say        23,600     267,400   Less payment to Wards of, say, £4,200 (as at December 1986)to connect to their sewer in Area 11 shared equally with landvalued above      &nbsp  2,100     265,300   Less planning appeal costs shared equally with land valuedabove      10,000     255,300   Less 50% to reflect cost of negotiating visibility splay with two adjoining owners    127,650     £127,650