Jedwell v Denbighshire County Council

Jedwell v Denbighshire County Council [2014] EWHC 1633 (Admin) Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court (Birmingham) Foskett J 20 May 2014 Judgment Annabel Graham Paul (instructed by Richard Buxton Environmental and Public Law) for the Claimant Jonathan Easton (instructed by Denbignshire County Council, Legal Services) for the Defendant John Hunter (instructed by Aaron & Partners LLP) for the Interested Parties Hearing date: 30 April 2014 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Approved Judgment MR JUSTICE FOSKETT: Introduction 1. The Interested Parties run as partners an organic livestock farm called Syrior Farm upon which both cattle and sheep are run. It is a tenanted farm located on the outskirts of Llandrillo, Denbighshire, about six miles from Corwen. Large areas of the farm are hillside areas. 2. On 24 April 2012 the Interested Parties submitted an application to the Defendant as local planning authority for planning permission for the installation at the farm of two 46-metre high 50kw micro-generation wind turbines with a control box and access track. (The overall height is measured from ground level to the top of one of the 9-metre blades when vertical, the height of the supporting column being 35.4 metres.) The two turbines were proposed to be located in a pasture field in open countryside on the south-western edge of the broad ridge of Mynydd Mynyllod about 400 metres to the north of the farm complex. The application was said to be based on legitimate “farm diversification”. 3. Not unnaturally, a proposal such as this divides local opinion, reflected in the various representations received and, it may be thought, in the very close vote at the planning committee meeting. On 20 February 2013 the committee resolved to grant permission by 14 votes in favour to 12 votes against, the grant being subject to conditions that would be considered at its next meeting. 4. The Defendant granted planning permission, subject to detailed conditions that had been formulated in the meantime, on 12 July 2013. 5. Various pre-action letters had been exchanged prior to the grant of planning permission (see further below) and on 14 August 2013 the Claimant, one of a number of local residents opposed to the project, issued a claim form seeking an order quashing the grant of permission. 6. Lindblom J granted permission to apply for judicial review on 4 November 2013. 7. The substantive (well attended) hearing took place in Wrexham on 30 April 2014. 8. The broad focus of the challenge is upon (i) the alleged need for an Environmental Impact Assessment (‘EIA’) which, in the circumstances to which I will refer in more detail, was not obtained and (ii) the suggestion that several members of the planning committee demonstrably disregarded the “compelling landscape case” against the proposal and preferred an approach that took into account the personal requirements and interests of the Interested Parties and some perceived “financial benefit” to the local community. In that latter regard it is, accordingly, suggested that immaterial considerations were taken into account in the determination of the application. The first ground also embraces a challenge (or proposed challenge) to the reasons given for the decision not to obtain an EIA. 9. Those challenges are refuted by the Defendant and by the Interested Parties. Detailed background 10. The general nature of the landscape in which the two turbines would be situated will be apparent from the short summary given in paragraphs 1 and 2 above. In terms of the various national and local designations in planning terms, the application site is within 4km of the Snowdonia National Park, just over 6km from the Clwydian Range and Dee Valley Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (‘AONB’) and within 4 km of two separate Landscape of Historic Interest Areas, Y Berwyn and Y Bala a Glannau Tegid. The nearby Berwyn Mountains are a designated Special Area of Conservation (‘SAC’), Special Protected Area (‘SPA’), Site of Special Scientific Interest (‘SSSI’) and a National Nature Reserve (‘NNR’). The Mynydd Mynyllod local wildlife site is about 400 metres to the north of the application site and the Unitary Plan designated Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (‘AONB’) is about 2km to the south-east. The farm is within the Mynydd Mynyllod LANDMAP Character Area in the Denbighshire Landscape Strategy which has been evaluated as having a ‘high’ visual and sensory aspect of County and regional importance. 11. As will be obvious from that synopsis, concerns about the impact of the proposed development on the local landscape have figured largely in the opposition to the proposals. However, as will become apparent, this proposed development is one of a number of actual or proposed “wind farm” developments in the region and concern has also been expressed that its impact should be seen in that wider context also and that its “cumulative” effect should be assessed. It appears that general concerns about development in the area have led to the formation of a local action group called ‘STEMM’ which is an acronym for ‘Stop The Exploitation of Mynydd Mynyllod’ of which the Claimant is a member. 12. The agent for the Interested Parties had engaged in preliminary discussions with the Defendant in early 2012. As a result, Mrs Denise Shaw, a Planning Officer (Renewable Energy Schemes), visited the site on 15 February 2012 and wrote to the agent with information about the likely planning considerations on 20 February 2012. The letter was, of course, designed merely to be of assistance and was expressly said to be “without prejudice and … in no way guarantees that planning permission will be granted or refused.” The letter drew attention to the possible need for an EIA. It referred to “Schedule 2 projects” which was a reference to Schedule 2 of the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations 1999 (‘the Regulations’). I will refer to Schedule 2 developments more fully later, but one potential “Schedule 2 development” is one involving “installations for the harnessing of wind power for energy production” where “the hub height of any turbine … exceeds 15 metres”: Schedule 2, paragraph 3(i), subparagraph (ii). The letter said that in order to confirm whether an EIA was required a “screening opinion” could be obtained from the Defendant. 13. I will return to the more detailed parameters within which a screening opinion may be obtained, and the considerations that apply to the process, in due course. However, to complete this part of the chronology, prior to making the application for planning permission, the agent for the Interested Parties, as suggested by Mrs Shaw, sought a screening opinion from the Defendant by letter dated 23 February 2012. It contained the requisite details of the proposal and contended for the position that an EIA was not required. The principal grounds for that contention were as follows: The development is not classified as a wind farm development, as only one turbine is proposed; the development will not be of more than local importance as only two 50kW 36.4m to hub turbines are proposed. The scale and nature of this proposal is not considered to have more wide-ranging effects; the proposal does not present unusually complex or potentially hazardous environmental effects; the proposal is not for 5 or more turbines; and the proposal is not for the generation of more than 5MW of energy. 14. The first of those considerations was, of course, inaccurately stated because two turbines were proposed. The essential suggestion, however, was that this was a small-scale, local development with no “wide-ranging effects”. 15. At all events, on 2 March 2012 Mrs Shaw e-mailed the Countryside Council for Wales (‘CCW’) inviting its view on the need for an EIA. Its response was dated 15 March 2012 and was expressly said to be “without prejudice to comments we may wish to make when consulted on any subsequent planning application or on the submission of more detailed information.” The two paragraphs of particular relevance were as follows: “Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) The proposed hub heights of the turbines are 35.4m, and therefore the scheme maybe considered a Schedule 2 development as defined by the Town & Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations 1999. However, in terms of likely impacts on natural heritage features, CCW believe an EIA will not be necessary. We do however advise that certain surveys and assessments are submitted as part of any subsequent planning application. Our detailed comments are as follows ….” 16. It then dealt with “protected sites”, saying that the proposal was unlikely to affect any such sites, and then in respect of “Landscape” it said as follows: “Whilst not located within the boundaries of any statutory protected designated landscapes, we note that the application site lies immediately adjacent to the proposed Scottish Power Renewables wind energy development at Mynydd Mynyllod, and approximately 2.2km from the existing wind farm development at Braich Ddu. Consequently, in order to properly assess the cumulative impact of this wind energy development with others in the locality (either existing or within the planning process), we advise that the applicants undertake a Landscape and Visual Impact Assessment (LVIA) appropriate to the proposals scale and location. For guidance in undertaking the assessment, we refer you to Guidelines for Landscape and Visual Impact Assessment, 2nd edition, 2002, The Landscape Institute and CCW’s LANDMAP Information Guidance Note 3 (Nov 2008). We advise that the LVIA includes a map of the Zone of Theoretical Visibility (ZTV) as it will give a better understanding of the extent of visibility and over what distances and from which locations and receptors the visual effects are likely to be significant. Furthermore, a second ZTV map should be produced which shows the cumulative impact of this wind energy proposal with those mentioned above.” 17. That paragraph highlights what has become a central issue in this judicial review application, namely, the cumulative impact of the proposal when considered along with the other “wind farm” developments in the area. As indicated, the application site is about 2.2km from the Braich Ddu wind farm which consists of 3 turbines. The application site is on land also shown on plans for another wind farm development at Mynydd Mynyllod to be pursued by Scottish Power Renewables. There is a suggestion that the freehold owner of the land the subject of the farm tenancy also owns a large part of the Mynydd Mynyllod site and further that Scottish Power Renewables has assisted to some extent with the formulation of the planning application in the present case. As I understand it, no formal application for planning permission has been made for that wind farm yet, and, whilst I have not been given details of the likely proposal, it will plainly be a substantial development if it is pursued. 18. On 15 March 2012 the Defendant issued a negative EIA screening opinion in respect of the proposed development. Mrs Shaw was the author of the letter. It indicated that, whilst the screening opinion was negative (and an EIA would thus not be required), there was an expectation that “detailed supporting information [would] be submitted with the planning application.” She made reference to her letter of 20 February and to what the CCW had said. She set out in full the passage quoted in paragraph 16 above and the further paragraph dealing with “Protected Species”. The formal notice that accompanied the letter identified accurately why the development was a “Schedule 2 development”, but also in the same box on the form indicated the following: “Additional indicative criteria states: EIA is more likely to be required for commercial development of five or more turbines; or more than 5 MW of generating capacity.” 19. The formal determination indicating that the proposed development “is not an Environmental Impact Assessment application under the Regulations” was preceded by the following expression: “Consideration has been given by the Local Planning Authority to the relevant selection criteria in Schedule 3 to the Regulations, the general guidance contained in EIA Circular 11/99, and any indicative criteria in Annex A of the Circular and in the case of the Schedule 2 development, whether it is a sensitive area under Regulation 2(1).” 20. The reason given for not requesting “an Environmental Statement in this case” was expressed as follows: “Having regard to the guidance given in the Regulations and the Circular, the proposed development would not give rise to significant effects in this instance.” 21. I will return to what Miss Annabel Graham Paul, who appears for the Claimant, says about these formulations and about the further elaboration of that reasoning given subsequently in due course. 22. Just over a month later, on 24 April 2012, the planning application was submitted. It was supported by a “Design and Access Statement” by the agent acting for the Interested Parties. When dealing with the policy context in which the application was advanced, the following was urged in respect of farm diversification: “Farm diversification is of increasing importance to those with an interest in agriculture and rural communities as a whole. With rising uncertainty in farming, diversification offers a way of supplementing incomes and improving the economic viability of a farm business. Diversification is taken to mean the entrepreneurial use of farm resources for a non agricultural purpose for commercial gain. Under this definition, activities such as non agricultural contracting, the letting of buildings for non-agricultural purposes, processing and retailing of farm produce, using farm resources for tourism, sport and recreational activities would be included as diversification. On-site energy generation which either offsets on-site use or is exported to the grid is also considered to be a diversification activity. The generation of renewable electricity through the operation of the proposed wind turbines would benefit the applicant in two ways: it would reduce reliance on imported electricity and its associated costs, and it would create an income stream through guaranteed payments for exported power under the Feed-in-Tariff. The applicant would expect to pay off the expenditure on procuring and installing the wind turbines in approximated 7 to 9 years. Following this, the applicant would benefit from both reduced electricity payments and an income from the guaranteed sale of power to the grid. Such diversification activities would be expected to provide a financial benefit to the farming enterprise of the applicant, thereby securing the future of the farm. It is believed that, as such, the proposed wind turbines would be supported by the policy in Technical Advice Note 6: Agriculture and Rural Development. Paragraph 25 under Development Related to Farm Diversification states the following: Small on-farm operations such as food and timber processing and food packing, together with services (eg workshop facilities, equipment hire and maintenance) to other farms, sports and recreation services, and the production of non-food crops and renewable energy, should be encouraged. Local planning authorities should, however, consider the nature and scale of activity that would be appropriate.” 23. An assessment from the landscape point of view was made, but it did not make any reference to any cumulative effect the development might have given the other actual or proposed wind farm developments in the area. 24. The usual consultation process followed and, according to the officers’ report prepared for a planning committee meeting on 17 October 2012, the CCW responded on landscape issues by noting that the scheme would generate an adverse visual effect from parts of north Berwyn (including parts of the Landscape of Historic interest area) and in particular from the access land and public rights of way in the area. It also noted that the cumulative effect of the proposal had not been considered and advised that a revised landscape assessment be submitted assessing the cumulative impact of the proposal in combination with the Braich Ddu wind farm and the proposed Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm. It indicated that it would object to the proposal unless “additional information can show it would not have adverse effects.” 25. The Gwynedd County Council drew attention to the need to consider the cumulative effect of the proposal and the Snowdonia National Park Authority suggested that the turbines may be visible from areas within the Snowdonia National Park, from within the newly extended Clwydian Range AONB and also from other areas. It also made the point that “the visual and landscape analysis [did] not consider the cumulative impacts of the turbines” with the existing (Braich Ddu) and proposed (Mynydd Mynyllod and Bodelith) wind farms in the locality. 26. The Landscape Consultant of the Defendant conducted a landscape and visual assessment which was focused on the effect the proposal would have on the landscape character, locally accessible public views and residential amenity and how it would relate to existing wind farm development in the locality, the emerging pattern of such development and the implications for cumulative impacts on the landscape. In relation to that last matter the report recorded that the Braich Ddu wind farm was already an established prominent feature and the Wern Ddu wind farm was evident in the distance to the north and, although the proposed turbines were of a smaller scale than those at Braich Ddu, their presence would give the appearance of the incremental spread of wind farm development “extending the broken line from the Clocaenog plateau.” 27. The recommendation was that the application should be refused because it would (a) adversely affect the views from the Berwyns, (b) compromise views of Snowdonia and (c) “in conjunction with existing wind development, lead to an adverse cumulative impact.” 28. There were at that stage 6 representations in support, largely on the basis that this was a way of maintaining the farming and rural community without, in this instance, having a significant effect on the landscape. There were many more representations against including 69 from Denbighshire and Gwynedd residents. Those representations raised a large number of objections including objections relating to the effect of the proposal on the landscape, that it would set a precedent for wind energy development in the area and, in that general connection, there would be cumulative impacts and the landscape. 29. The officers’ report noted a number of “non-material considerations” that had been advanced. The report recorded that a significant number of objectors had raised concerns about the relationship between the application and the proposed Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm and that “some objectors [had] requested the application be deferred until such time as the Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm proposal [had] been determined.” The officers had, however, advised that whilst the proposal “would be immediately adjacent to the Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm site”, it was “important to stress the need to assess each planning application on its own merits and without prejudice.” The Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm was still in the pre-application stages and was thus not “in planning” and there was thus “no reasonable basis for deferring [the] planning application until a decision has been made on the Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm proposal.” 30. In relation to farm diversification, the officers’ view “on balance” was that limited weight should be given to the diversification arguments because the scheme should be viewed “as a commercial venture and assessed on its own merits accordingly.” Their advice was that a revised landscape assessment had not been provided and “the cumulative impact of the proposal in combination with the operational Braich Ddu windfarm has not been assessed”. Their view was that “the harmful landscape impacts significantly outweigh the renewable energy benefits” and they offered the following advice: “Officers continue to have concerns over the sporadic spread of ‘one-off’ medium/sub-local authority scale wind turbine developments outside of the Strategic Search Area, which will have strategic implications upon the ability to conserve the integrity of wider Denbighshire landscapes in the longer term. Officers continue to stress the need for Members to take a strategic approach to the determination of one-off applications such as this. It is important to consider the landscape and visual impact of wind turbine development in combination with operational, consented and in-planning wind turbine proposals to ensure cumulative effects are fully addressed, in order to prevent the wind farm landscape encroaching beyond the boundaries of the Strategic Search Area.” 31. Their view on the issue of the cumulative impact of the proposal was expressed as follows: “On the issue of cumulative impact, whilst Officers consider limited weight should be apportioned to the cumulative impact of the proposal in combination with the proposal Mynydd Mynyllod windfarm on the basis that an application for Development Consent is yet to submitted to the Planning Inspectorate, Officers have concern regarding the potential adverse cumulative effects of the proposal when taken into consideration with operational Braich Ddu windfarm, which is little over 2km away from the application site, which has not been adequately assessed in the landscape assessment submitted with the application.” 32. Their recommendation was to refuse the application. 33. After the report was prepared, 23 further letters of support were received and one further letter of objection was received. 34. At the meeting on 17 October 2012 it was agreed unanimously that consideration of the application should be deferred to enable the Interested Parties to deal with the matters raised by the CCW. 35. The Interested Parties engaged landscape consultants who prepared a report which was submitted on or about 5 December 2012. Its purpose was to examine the likely effects of the two turbines on the landscape and the visual amenity of the site and surrounding area “in conjunction with the operational Braich Ddu turbines.” It did not focus on the potential Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm. 36. The conclusion of the report, in summary, was that the effects would be limited and that there would be no significant effects or significant cumulative effects on the landscape designations in the area (see paragraph 10 above) or the visual amenity of most residents, walkers, equestrians, cyclists and motorists. 37. There was further consultation in the light of that report. The CCW considered, contrary to the position taken on behalf of the Interested Parties, that the Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm was “reasonably foreseeable” and, therefore, ought to be included within the cumulative effects assessment. The CCW continued to object to the proposal because it had the potential to affect adversely the local protected landscapes previously identified. Objections were maintained by the other institutions that had previously objected on landscape grounds (e.g., Snowdonia National Park Authority), as did the Defendant’s Landscape Consultant. 38. I will return later to the officers’ report prepared in anticipation of the meeting at which the application was considered, but at this point in the chronology it should be noted that on 22 January 2013 a member of STEMM, Mr John Broughton, wrote to the Defendant in the Claimant’s absence raising concerns about the screening opinion. He suggested there was a “potentially serious problem” with the screening opinion on the basis that it did not appear to take into account the “indirect, secondary and cumulative effects” of the proposal. He asserted that the screening opinion did not lead a reader towards understanding how any relevant guidance had been applied in reaching the conclusion that the effects of the proposal would not be significant. He also suggested that it was wrong to give merely “limited weight” to the proposed development at Mynydd Mynyllod simply because the application had not yet been submitted (see quotation at paragraphs 29 and 31 above). 39. As previously indicated, the substantive planning committee meeting was on 20 February 2013. A site inspection, attended by the Chair, Vice Chair, Local Member (Councillor Cefyn Williams) and two planning officers, took place on 15 February 2013. An Addendum Report was prepared that recorded that the members present saw “a potential for a visual link between the proposed turbines and the existing turbines at Braich Ddu, that they could be viewed together from the upper slopes of the Berwyn SSSI.” 40. The officers’ report maintained essentially the position taken in the original report (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above) and indeed the reasons they gave for recommending refusal were identical to those previously given. They had drafted the provisional reasons for refusal as follows: “It is the opinion of the Local Planning Authority that the erection of 2 no. 46 metre high 50kW turbines in this location would have an adverse impact on the setting of protected landscape areas, including Y Berwyn and the Snowdonia National Park, and have a detrimental impact on the open character and visual quality of Mynydd Mynyllod, a non-statutory landscape of County/regional importance, resulting in adverse visual effects when viewed from parts of north Berwyn, public access land and public rights of way in the area. Additionally, when viewed in combination with consented and operational wind energy development in the locality, 2 no. turbines of the scale proposed in this location would contribute to the perceived incremental spread of wind development extending in a broken line from Clocaenog plateau towards Snowdonia, resulting in an unexpected adverse cumulative impact on the landscape, and in particular when viewed from Y Berwyn, as the sense of expanse and uncontained views associated with Y Berwyn would be greatly harmed. The landscape impacts are considered to significantly outweigh the benefits of increased renewable energy generation and the proposal would be in conflict with Unitary Development Plan Policies GEN 6 i), ii), iii), ENV 1, CON 12 and MEW 10 iii), vii) and the principles set out in TAN 8 and Planning Policy Wales Edition 5, 2012.” 41. It was against that background that the planning committee meeting took place. As already indicated, there was a narrow vote in favour of the application. The Minute of the decision recorded as follows: “The decision, being CONTRARY to the Officers’ Recommendation was taken for the following reason: That the benefit of the development for farm diversification outweighs concerns over the landscape and visual impacts. It was agreed that officers prepare a list of draft conditions for consideration and resolution at the next Planning Committee.” 42. I will return to the issues raised by the Claimant about what was said at the meeting by certain members of the Committee later (see paragraphs 89-102 below). However, I will now turn to the first ground upon which he relies, namely, that relating to the EIA and, more particularly for this purpose, on the screening opinion and the reasons given for the negative screening opinion, an issue first raised in Mr Broughton’s letter (see paragraph 38 above). The screening opinion 43. I will deal, first of all, with the parameters within which a screening opinion fell to be determined by reference, in the first instance, to the Regulations. I have already identified (in paragraph 12) the basis upon which the proposed development came prima facie within Schedule 2. However, merely because a proposed development comes within one of the descriptions and the applicable threshold criteria in Schedule 2 does not inexorably mean that it becomes an “EIA development”. In Regulation 2 it is provided that an “EIA development” is a development which is either (a) a Schedule 1 development or (b) a Schedule 2 development which is “likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue of factors such as its nature, size or location”. Article 2 of the EU Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (85/337/EEC), upon the basis of which that Regulation was formulated, provides that “Member States shall adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject to an assessment with regard to their effects.” 44. The background is set out in full in the judgment of Pill LJ in Loader v SSCLG [2012] EWCA Civ 869 at paragraphs 7-20 and I do not need to recite it for the purposes of this judgment. 45. It was, therefore, incumbent on the Defendant to reach a decision on whether the proposed development was “likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue of factors such as its nature, size or location.” One of the characteristics of any Schedule 2 development to be considered in this context is “the cumulation with other development”: Schedule 3(1)(b). As will be apparent from the above (see paragraph 20), the view formed was that it was not likely to have such effects. The words initially of importance in determining how to answer the question are the words “likely” and “significant”. 46. In Loader reference was made to Circular 02/99 Environmental Impact Assessment, which gives guidance on the application of the Directive and Regulations, and in particular to paragraph 34, which says this: “The number of cases of such development will be a very small proportion of the total number of Schedule 2 developments. It is emphasised that the basic test of the need for EIA in a particular case is the likelihood of significant effects on the environment. It should not be assumed, for example, that conformity with a development plan rules out the need for EIA. Nor is the amount of opposition or controversy to which a development gives rise relevant to this determination, unless the substance of opponents’ arguments reveals that there are likely to be significant effects on the environment.” 47. A number of cases, including Loader, have considered how the question dictated by the Regulations should be answered. Pill LJ said that the test applied needed to “accord with the overall purpose and tenor of the procedure initiated by the Directive” and continued as follows at [46]: “… A formal and substantial procedure is contemplated, potentially involving considerable time and resources. It is contemplated for a limited range of schedule 2 projects, those which are likely to have significant effects on the environment. To require it to be followed in all cases where the effect would influence the development consent decision would devalue the entire concept. It is not contemplated, for example, that if the Secretary of State took the view that a proposed house extension might affect the amenity of a neighbour on environmental grounds, and do so decisively, it would for that reason necessarily be EIA development. I agree with the approach of Moore-Bick LJ in Bateman ….” 48. What Moore-Bick LJ said in R (Bateman) v South Cambridgeshire DC [2011] EWCA Civ 157 was essentially twofold: “In my view something more than a bare possibility is probably required, though any serious possibility would suffice.” “For my own part, I do not think that one should attempt to place too rigid an interpretation on the word “significant” in this context, but the main difficulty I have with this part of Mr. Drabble’s argument is that, if his submission[s] are both correct, an EIA would be required in virtually all cases in which a development might possibly have some effect on the environment, which does not seem to me to be what the directive intended. However, for reasons which will become apparent it is not necessary to reach a final decision on either of these questions in the present case. I would therefore prefer not to place a gloss of my own on the words used in the Regulations and leave it to planning authorities to decide on a case by case basis whether the development under consideration is likely to have a significant effect on the environment, as that expression is to be understood in the light of the developing case law of the European Court.” 49. There can be no doubt that there is a large measure of judgment involved in formulating a screening opinion by reference to the parameters set out in the Regulations, a judgment that may be set aside by the court only on Wednesbury grounds: see R (Jones) v Mansfield District Council [2004] Env LR 391 at [17], [38] and [61]; Bowen-West v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2012] Env LR 448 at [33]; and in Loader itself at [31]. One judgment in this case was the extent to which the Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm proposal was relevant to the decision concerning the need for an EIA. 50. Bateman was a case that focused on the nature of the reasons to be given if a negative screening opinion was to be given by a local planning authority. The judgment of Moore-Bick LJ brought together the relevant authorities in this area as follows: “9. Regulation 4(6) requires a local planning authority which decides that a development requires an EIA to provide a written statement giving clearly and precisely the full reasons for that conclusion, but the Regulations impose no comparable duty in a case where the authority decides that an EIA is not required. However, in R (Mellor) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (Case C-75/08), [2010] Env. L.R. 18 the European Court of Justice confirmed that a decision that a development did not require an EIA must contain or be accompanied by sufficient information to make it possible to check that it was based on adequate screening carried out in accordance with the directive. The court held that it is necessary for third parties, as well as the administrative authorities concerned, to be able to satisfy themselves that the competent authority has actually determined, in accordance with the rules laid down by national law, that an EIA was or was not necessary and for them to have sufficient information to enable them to challenge the decision by legal proceedings, if that is thought appropriate. 10. The following passages in the judgment are of particular relevance: “59. … effective judicial review, which must be able to cover the legality of the reasons for the contested decision, presupposes in general, that the court to which the matter is referred may require the competent authority to notify its reasons. However where it is more particularly a question of securing the effective protection of a right conferred by Community law, interested parties must also be able to defend that right under the best possible conditions and have the possibility of deciding, with a full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in applying to the courts. Consequently, in such circumstances, the competent national authority is under a duty to inform them of the reasons on which its refusal is based, either in the decision itself or in a subsequent communication made at their request . . . 60. That subsequent communication may take the form, not only of an express statement of the reasons, but also of information and relevant documents being made available in response to the request made. . . . 63. While as is clear from the reply to the first question, the reasons need not necessarily be contained in the determination not to carry out an EIA itself, the competent administrative authority can, under the applicable national legislation or of its own motion, indicate in the determination the reasons on which it is based. 64. In that case, the determination must be such as to enable interested parties to decide whether to appeal against the determination in question, taking into account any factors which might subsequently be brought to their attention. 65. It cannot, in those circumstances, be ruled out that in the case in the main proceedings the Secretary of State’s reasons might be considered sufficient, taking into account, in particular, factors which have already been brought to the attention of interested parties, provided that the latter can ask for and obtain from the competent authorities, subject to judicial review, the necessary supplementary information to fill any gaps in that reasoning.” 11. In R (Friends of Basildon Golf Course) v Basildon District Council [2010] EWCA Civ 1432 Pill L.J., with whom Carnwath and Rimer L.JJ. agreed, emphasised in paragraph 62 of his judgment that the decision taken on a screening opinion must be carefully and conscientiously considered and must be based on information which is both sufficient and accurate. The opinion need not be elaborate, but must demonstrate that the issues have been understood and considered.” 51. In Bateman the majority of the Court of Appeal (Moore-Bick and Jackson LJJ) were of the view that the reasons given by the planning officer in that case for the decision to issue a negative screening were not adequate because “the planning officer failed to identify the correct test and failed to explain in any relevant way why she concluded that the development was not likely to have significant effects on the environment” ([29]). Mummery LJ was of the view that the reasons and reasoning were sufficient. 52. Simply focusing for present purposes on the outwardly expressed reasons for reaching the view that no EIA was required in relation to the proposed development at the farm, Miss Graham Paul, in her able submissions, said that the reasons given at the time the decision was reached (see paragraph 20 above) were wholly inadequate: all that the formal notice indicated was effectively the answer to the essential question, with no indication as to the considerations that led to that conclusion. That inadequacy, she submits, was not made good by reference to the “generic statement”, as she characterises it, reflected in the paragraph from the formal notice quoted at paragraph 19 above. 53. Those submissions are directed at what is submitted to have been the inadequate articulation of the reasoning underlying the decision in the sense that there is no clear indication of the way in which the conclusion had been reached. In addition to that, Miss Graham Paul contends that the reference to the “Additional indicative criteria” in the formal notice (see paragraph 18 above) betrays a misunderstanding of the correct approach to determining whether an EIA is required by focusing incorrectly on the thresholds and not upon the intrinsic characteristics of the development proposal. She says (accurately) that the Welsh Circular 11/99 (at Annex A) sets out a number of indicative examples of where an EIA for a Schedule 2 development will be more likely to be required and those examples include “commercial developments of five or more turbines or more than 5 MW of generating capacity.” Reference to that in the notice, she argues, demonstrates that the planning officer was confining her attention to consideration of the thresholds and not to the characteristics of the development proposal. A significant part of the proper consideration of whether an EIA is required in any case, but particularly in this one, she argues, is the likely cumulative impact of the development proposal with other schemes. There is no indication anywhere, she submits, that this factor was considered by the officer. 54. She adds in this context that the CJEU in C-2/07 Abraham [2008] ECR I-01197 made clear at [37 – 38] that the nature and location of a project are important considerations and that focusing on the size of a project would not be sufficient to meet the requirements of the Directive: “… it is appropriate to remind the national court that, although the second subparagraph of Article 4(2) of Directive 85/337 confers on Member States a measure of discretion to specify certain types of projects which will be subject to an assessment or to establish the criteria and/or thresholds applicable, the limits of that discretion are to be found in the obligation set out in Article 2(1) of the directive that projects likely, by virtue inter alia of their nature, size or location, to have significant effects on the environment are to be subject to an impact assessment (Kraaijeveld and Others, paragraph 50). Thus, a Member State which establishes criteria and/or thresholds taking account only of the size of projects, without also taking their nature and location into consideration, would exceed the limits of its discretion under Articles 2(1) and 4(2) of Directive 85/337.” 55. Now this part of the challenge advanced on the Claimant’s behalf would, as advanced, appear to be substantially (albeit not exclusively) a “reasons challenge”. Mr Jonathan Easton, on behalf of the Defendant, and Mr John Hunter, on behalf of the Interested Parties, protested that this was not a pleaded ground and no permission to pursue it had been granted. Their position was that this part of the challenge had been on the basis that the officer did not consider the cumulative impact dimension, not that her reasoning was inadequately rehearsed in the notice giving the opinion. 56. For reasons I will give below, I consider this to be a rather technical argument that, for my part, I would not wish to see preventing consideration of the merits of the point Miss Graham Paul seeks to make provided, of course, no prejudice is occasioned to the Defendant or Interested Parties, although the wider public interest needs also to be considered. There is often an overlap between the argument that there was in reality no properly considered basis for a decision and the argument that whatever reason was given for the decision was not adequately expressed. Miss Graham Paul’s argument has been that until the witness statement of Mrs Shaw dated 1 October 2013 (see paragraph 68 below), no sufficient reasons for the screening opinion (in the Mellor sense: see paragraph 50 above) had been given. Lindblom J gave permission before Miss Graham Paul’s Reply dated 23 January 2014 to the Detailed Grounds of Resistance lodged on behalf of the Interested Parties and to Mrs Shaw’s witness statement. That Reply asserted clearly that the failure to disclose the reasoning disclosed in the witness statement “constitutes a failure to give adequate reasons in accordance with Mellor” and also contended that “if the reasoning failure [had] now been ‘cured’ by … the Witness Statement”, the Defendant should be liable for the Claimant’s costs. 57. Whilst arguably it might have been appropriate to seek permission to amend the Claim Form at that point, I do not consider that the failure to have done so ought to preclude the opportunity to argue the point. Mr Easton did not suggest any prejudice and, whilst Mr Hunter maintained his objection more strongly, I could detect no real basis for preventing the argument being maintained. To the extent that permission to amend the Claim Form to advance the ground is required, I grant it and I also grant permission to apply for judicial review based upon it. 58. I will return to deal with it when I have indicated what happened after the resolution to grant planning was passed on 20 February 2013. 59. On 4 April 2013 the Claimant’s solicitors sent a first pre-action protocol letter to the Defendant asserting that the screening opinion was flawed since (i) it appeared not to have taken into account the cumulative impact of the development in the light of the wind farm at Braich Ddu and the potential development at Mynydd Mynyllod and (ii) that it did “not inform the reader as to how [the Defendant] reached [its] negative screening opinion”. It was suggested that the planning permission granted was unlawful. 60. On 29 April 2013 the Defendant responded, arguing that it was “inconceivable that the author of the screening opinion failed to have regard … to the possible cumulative effects of the development” and gave reasons why that was so. The letter also said (at its paragraph 4.2.5), drawing attention to Mellor, that there was “no absolute requirement … that reasons appear on the face of a negative screening opinion”, but it was accepted “that the underlying reasons must at least be available on request.” It was then asserted that “no such request has been made by or on behalf of the … Claimant.” 61. The Claimant’s solicitors replied on 1 May and the letter contained this paragraph: “However, with regard to your paragraph 4.2.5, please could you provide any further reasoning for the screening opinion that was made. By this we mean contemporaneous reasons, and when you respond please could you confirm that what you send is just that.” 62. That paragraph appears to have been intended as a direct response to the effective invitation in paragraph 4.2.5 of the Defendant’s previous letter to make a request pursuant to Mellor, albeit the emphasis being on the reasons taken into account at the time of the decision. 63. The response from the Head of Legal and Democratic Services dated 22 May 2013 was as follows: “I have checked with my client department and there is nothing further to add to what has already been said in the Council’s letter of reply dated 29th April 2013. A check has been made of the planning file and I am sending you a copy of the covering letter to the applicant’s agent which was sent out with screening opinion on 15th March 2012 in case you do not already have a copy of the same.” 64. The second pre-action protocol letter was dated 31 July 2013. It raised matters concerning the meeting itself (to which I will return below), but merely reasserted the points made about the screening opinion and the alleged need for an EIA. 65. The response to that letter was dated 8 August 2013. So far as matters concerning the screening opinion were concerned, that letter essentially reasserted what had been said in the earlier letter. The paragraph relating to the case of Mellor was repeated, but the assertion that no “Mellor request” had been made by on behalf the Claimant was not repeated. It would seem, therefore, that the letter from the Claimant’s solicitors of 1 May 2013 was treated by the Defendant (as it was doubtless intended by the Claimant’s solicitors) to be Mellor-compliant. It is, to my mind, somewhat surprising in those circumstances that Mr Easton should argue that at no point did the Claimant “seek to obtain from [the Defendant] a reasoned explanation in accordance with Mellor”, but “[on] the contrary, [he] sought a contemporaneous account of the screening process”. Mr Hunter made a similar point, perhaps even more strongly, by suggesting that the Claimant’s solicitors “made clear they were not interested in a “Mellor” account of the reasons for the decision, insisting instead that they only wanted to see any “contemporaneous reasons” and that, accordingly, the Claimant “can hardly complain now that [the Defendant] did not provide what they specifically said they did not want.” 66. Whilst, at the end of the day, I do not think much turns on this, I should say quite clearly that I do not accept that the letter of 1 May did not constitute a “Mellor request” and I regard the contrary argument as somewhat opportunistic in the circumstances and does not reflect what I perceive to be behind a “Mellor request”. When a screening opinion has been formulated, it must have been formulated on the basis of reasoning that takes place at the time it is formulated. How else, one might ask, can the kind of careful and conscientious decision-making process referred to in R (Friends of Basildon Golf Course) v Basildon District Council (see paragraph 50 above), take place? There is nothing in Mellor, on my reading of the decision, that entitles a planning authority lawfully to arrive at a screening opinion on wholly inadequate reasoning and then to seek to justify that opinion by some ex post facto rationalisation of the opinion. What Mellor permits, in my view, is the subsequent articulation of the reasons that were taken into account at the time the opinion was formed (i.e., contemporaneously with the formation of the opinion) if those reasons had not been given at the time or were not fully set out at the time. If the initial expression of the reasons was incomplete, then it would be open to the planning authority to “fill any gaps in that reasoning” by a response to such a request, but not by that process to put forward wholly new reasons that were not in existence at the time of the original decision. I did not understand Mr Easton to suggest otherwise despite his submissions about whether there had been a “Mellor request” in this case. (For the sake of completeness, I would think that a planning authority could, in appropriate circumstances, say at some stage after a negative screening opinion has been given that subsequent events have confirmed the initial decision, but that is, of course, different from an ex post facto rationalisation of the opinion previously formed.) 67. The correspondence on this issue from the Defendant’s side does not contain any suggestion that Mrs Shaw had been consulted on any of the responses. The first response was along the lines that it was “inconceivable” that she would not have taken into account the cumulative impact of the proposed development and when the letter of 22 May 2013 (see paragraph 63 above) is considered, all that it reveals is that a check of the file had been carried out. I have noted that Mrs Shaw was on maternity leave at the time of the planning committee meeting on 20 February 2013 and it is possible that she was not troubled by the Defendant about these matters until she returned in or around September 2013. However, if there had been a note on the file that indicated her contemporaneous thinking, or indeed any subsequent thinking, on the issue of the screening opinion, I am sure it would have been revealed (or its substance revealed) in response to the letter of 1 May and I do not think that anyone on the Defendant’s side was at that time making a distinction between the contemporaneous thinking and any subsequent thinking on the issue. 68. What emerged on 1 October was Mrs Shaw’s account, some 18 months after the screening opinion was given, of the reasons that had led her to that opinion. What she said was as follows: “12. … given the proximity of the site to an existing wind farm (Braich Ddu wind farm, approximately 2.2 km away from the site within the administrative boundary Gwnedd County Council), and other wind farm developments within the wider locality (specifically the existing Wern Ddu wind farm in Gwddelwern and the consented wind farm developments within the southern section of the Clocaenog Forest Strategic Search Area), the cumulative effects of the proposal in combination with other consented and operational wind energy schemes were also taken into consideration. 13. However, whilst there is also a proposal for a nationally significant wind farm proposal immediately adjacent to the Syrior site (the proposed Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm), although I paid some regard to the proposal, I did not consider it appropriate to apportion significant weight to the cumulative impact of the Syrior proposal in combination with the Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm when assessing the potential environmental effects, given that an application for development consent had yet to be submitted to the Planning Inspectorate. I was therefore of the opinion that the Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm proposal [which] was still in the early pre-planning stages could not reasonably be considered to be “in planning”. 14. Having taken into account the comments of CCW, the 1999 Regulations and the guidance in EIA Circular 11/99, I concluded that whilst this development may result in some environmental effects, it would be unlikely to give rise to significant effects on the environment in this instance, due to its nature, size and location. I reached this view, having taken into account the likely impact of the proposal individually and in combination with the other wind farm schemes that I have mentioned previously in this witness statement.” 69. Miss Graham Paul raises issues about the intrinsic adequacy of that reasoning, but before addressing that matter I should deal with her arguments about the evidential value of the witness statement. With, as it seems to me, some justification, she complains that this process of reasoning should have been revealed at a much earlier stage in the litigation process. She says that the express assertion that the cumulative effects of the proposed development were considered at the time of the screening opinion had never been made prior to the witness statement and despite the request for details of any contemporaneous reasoning in the letter of 1 May 2013. She also says that no such assertion was made in the Defendant’s pre-action protocol responses or the Summary Grounds of Resistance (dated 12 September 2013), the highest the matter was put being that it was “inconceivable” that the cumulative effects were not considered. Miss Graham Paul submits that the witness statement can have been drafted only on the basis of an explanation given by Mrs Shaw long after the screening opinion was on the basis of recollection only, and in light of having seen the claim and indeed after having filed Summary Grounds of Resistance. What I imagine she is saying in effect is that it is easy in that situation for someone like Mrs Shaw to say “I must have taken this matter into account”, doubtless believing it to be the case, but in fact not necessarily having been the case. 70. This background led Miss Graham Paul to apply to cross-examine Mrs Shaw, an application resisted strongly by Mr Easton and Mr Hunter. Having read the essential papers in the case before the hearing I indicated that I proposed to approach the case on the basis that there was no contemporaneous documentation that evidences (directly, at any rate) Mrs Shaw’s thinking in March 2012. Consistent with its duty of candour the Defendant would have been obliged to tell me if that was incorrect. I was not so told and indeed everything seems to me to point in that direction. I indicated that I did not think cross-examination, which would be very unusual in this jurisdiction, would be helpful. 71. I remind myself of the observations of Stanley Burton J, as he then was, in S v Airedale NHS Trust [2002] EWHC 1780 (Admin) as to when the evidence of a witness can be rejected in the absence of cross-examination. He said this: “It is a convention of our litigation that at trial in general the evidence of a witness is accepted unless he is cross-examined and is thus given the opportunity to rebut the allegations made against him. There may be an exception where there is undisputed objective evidence inconsistent with that of the witness that cannot sensibly be explained away (in other words, the witness’s testimony is manifestly wrong), but that is not the present case. The general rule applies as much in judicial review proceedings as in other litigation, although in judicial review proceedings it is relatively unusual for there to be a conflict of testimony and even more unusual for there to be cross-examination of witnesses.” 72. The essential issues, therefore, seem to me to be whether there is some reason for the delay in Mrs Shaw’s recollection being advanced and, of course, whether other contemporaneous documentation suggests that the recollection now advanced is faulty such that I must conclude that it is “manifestly wrong”. 73. Issues surrounding the screening opinion did not arise until Mr Broughton’s letter of 22 January 2013 (see paragraph 38 above). I have been shown no response and I am inclined to think, although no specific evidence has been given about this, that Mrs Shaw had either gone on maternity leave by then or was on the verge of doing so. As I have said previously (see paragraph 67), I suspect the reason there was no direct engagement by Mrs Shaw with this issue until October 2013 was because for much, if not all, of the period since January/February of 2013 is that no-one thought it right to disturb her maternity leave. 74. However, whether that conclusion is or is not justified, the more important question is how the account she gave in her witness statement sits with the contemporaneous documentation that does exist. Miss Graham Paul’s essential argument is that witness statement is “at odds with the reasoning given on the face of the screening opinion itself and in the letters to the applicant of 20 February 2012 and 15 March 2012, which make no reference to potential cumulative effects in the context of EIA.” 75. I agree that that is so, but the reasons given for the opinion are so brief that there is very little that can be discerned about them other than that the development “would not give rise to significant effects”. Although this is a very foreshortened expression, it is obvious from the context that “effects” relate to “effects on the environment” and I do not think Miss Graham Paul suggests otherwise. But where can it be said that there is evidence that the cumulative impact of the proposed development was taken into account and where is the evidence about how it was taken into account? 76. Mr Easton draws attention to the fact that Mrs Shaw made a site visit (see paragraph 12 above) before sending her advisory letter (see also paragraph 12) to the agent for the Interested Parties. That letter, of course, referred to the possible need for an EIA and does (somewhat inaccurately) suggest that an EIA will “usually be required” when a Schedule 2 development exceeds the threshold of a hub height exceeding 15m, whereas, of course, it will only be required if the effects on the environment are “significant”. At all events, the application for the screening opinion (see paragraph 13 above) refers to the need to consider the visual impact of the proposal, including the “cumulative visual impact”, in the context of an EIA. The application then deals with the argument against an EIA that was deployed as set out in paragraph 13 above. It is, Mr Easton and Mr Hunter submit, legitimate to take into account the way in which the request for the screening opinion was expressed in order to determine what issues would have been in the planning officer’s mind at the time the opinion was concluded: see Smyth v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWHC 3844 (Admin), [77-79]. I accept that. 77. The next step in the process was the receipt of the CCW’s view. It was of the view that an EIA was not required, but that the impacts on the landscape (including the cumulative aspects) would be important at the planning application stage. Its view was that the Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm proposal should be taken into account. It is plain from the planning officers’ report of October 2012 (in the preparation of which Mrs Shaw was certainly involved) that even at that stage in the process, their view was that the cumulative impact of the proposal in combination with the proposed Mynydd Mynyllod windfarm was not something that should accorded anything more than “limited weight” because no planning application had yet been received. The inference I draw from this is that, if the view of the officers at that stage was that the Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm was not more than marginally relevant, it would have been even less relevant at the screening opinion stage – or, if not “even less relevant”, then equally only of marginal relevance at that stage as it was later. 78. So how do Mrs Shaw’s subsequently articulated reasons for reaching the opinion she did in March 2012 sit with those considerations and that documentation? In my judgment, they sit perfectly happily with them. There is nothing that makes me conclude that she did not have the issues that she mentions in her witness statement in mind when she formulated the screening opinion and I do not consider that her witness statement should be seen as an ex post facto rationalisation. Since Mrs Shaw only became employed in the position she held as from 2 January 2012, she would, I am sure, have had every reason to remember one of the first “wind farm cases” to cross her desk. 79. Whilst each case, of course, must depend on its own facts, I do consider that, but for the contents of her witness statement, I would have been driven to conclude that the reasons given in the notice were inadequately expressed. Such reasons do not have to be extensive, but some clues need to be given as to the reasoning and, frankly, there was little in the words used at that time to help even an informed reader know what the thinking was. There was no reference at all to the thinking on the “cumulative impact” issue. All that needed to be said (subject to the argument as to rationality: see paragraphs 82-85 below) was that, in relation to the cumulative impact of the proposal, the proposed Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm was regarded as only of limited relevance at that stage because it was not sufficiently advanced in the planning process for it to be accorded greater weight, but nothing at all was said. 80. However, I consider that the position was “rescued” by the witness statement. Miss Graham Paul did, at one stage, appear to suggest that even the articulation in the witness statement did not constitute a sufficiently expressed set of reasons. That, as it seems to me, was certainly a new argument and not one foreshadowed previously. I think that she felt that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bateman (see paragraphs 48 and 50-51 above) where quite detailed reasons were given which the majority concluded were inadequate) gave substance to the submission. There is, in my judgment, a danger in endeavouring to transpose the thinking that leads to a result on the details of one case into a similar process in another case. That case involved quite a complex proposal with potential environmental effects in a number of areas. That is very different from the present case. At all events, Miss Graham Paul had, in her Skeleton Argument, effectively accepted that, if the witness statement was accepted as an accurate statement of the reasons for the screening opinion, then it would be sufficient in terms of the articulation of the reasons. I think she was right to take that view then. If and to the extent that she has sought, by an application to amend to seek permission to apply for judicial review, to challenge the reasoning set out in the witness statement then I refuse the application. 81. That disposes of the argument concerning the reasoning. The next question that may conveniently addressed (though slightly out of the order in which the points were taken on the Claimant’s behalf) is whether the view formed in the screening opinion was irrational. Irrationality 82. Miss Graham Paul says that even if Mrs Shaw applied the correct threshold for the significance of any impacts, it was irrational to conclude that the effects were not significant when the conclusion in the officers’ report a few months’ later was that certain views would be “greatly harmed” by the cumulative impact (see paragraphs 30-31 and 40 above) and there were “potentially significant harmful landscape impacts”, judgments made giving “limited weight” to any potential cumulative effects arising from the proposed Mynydd Mynyllod wind farm. She asserts that this reasoning “does not add up”. 83. It is clear from Bateman at [18] that there is not necessarily any inherent inconsistency between a view being formed at the planning application stage that is different from the view at the screening opinion stage. The issue is clearly substantially one of judgment (see paragraph 49 above) and establishing Wednesbury unreasonableness in a context such as this is a “difficult obstacle”: see R (Newsmith Stainless Steel Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] EWHC (Admin) 74 at [7]. 84. It does seem to me that the Defendant is entitled to say that Mrs Shaw reached a conclusion that was consistent with the view of the CCW which was consulted on the application for the screening opinion and was of the view that an EIA was not required (see paragraph 15 above). Miss Graham Paul sought to suggest that the perspective of the CCW was in relation to the “likely impacts on natural heritage features” and that this was in some respects different from the issue that Mrs Shaw had to consider. I do not see that to be so. The CCW appeared to treat “landscape” issues as one of the “natural heritage features”, as indeed one might expect. 85. Against that background, I cannot see how an irrationality challenge to the screening opinion can succeed. Wrong threshold taken 86. Miss Graham Paul submits that the reasoning in the Mrs Shaw’s witness statement demonstrates that she applied too high a threshold for the expression “likely to have significant effects” and that it did not accord with the interpretation given to it in European jurisprudence. She submits that Mrs Shaw does not explain in her witness statement what she understood it to mean. 87. The approach that currently binds a planning officer in this situation (and which binds this court in evaluating it) is the approach to be found in Bateman and Loader (see paragraphs 44-51 above). It should be added that the approach is precautionary: see Loader at [43]. A serious possibility of significant environmental harm (a wide ambit being given to the word “significant” which is largely a matter of judgment for the planning authority) would seem to be the trigger. 88. For my part, I am unable to see where it is that Mrs Shaw misdirected herself on this issue. She used the word “likely” which is the word used in the Regulations, as indeed is the word “significant”. It seems to me an over-complication for every screening opinion to require some kind of (doubtless abbreviated) exegesis on the current state of the authorities on the meaning of these words which would seem to be the effect of Miss Graham Paul’s argument. In my view, this argument does not take the matter any further than the argument as to the rationality of the decision itself. The planning committee decision 89. It is clear that there was a strong recommendation from the officers to the planning committee that the application should be refused, essentially on grounds concerning the effect on the landscape: see paragraphs 30-31 and 40 above. They also advised that this was not to be treated as a “farm diversification” application, or at least limited weight should be attached to this suggestion: see paragraph 30. 90. Miss Graham Paul contends that, having regard to what was said by certain members of the committee during the debate, it is clear that some acted irrationally and/or took into account immaterial considerations. 91. Whilst no authorised transcript of the meeting is available, a transcript was, as I understand it, prepared by the Claimant personally of the observations made by committee members from a recording taken by someone present. The Claimant was present because he addressed the meeting. It has not been suggested that the note was in any way inaccurate. 92. Miss Graham Paul helpfully analysed all the comments that she submits indicated a wrong approach by certain members and she compartmentalised them under various headings. She will forgive me for not repeating the analysis in quite that detail, but I can give a flavour of what is being said by reference to a summary of the comments relied upon. 93. One member said he was “happy to support a young farmer” and that he was “for diversification in a situation” where a young man wants to come home and work on the farm. Another said that she was “also happy to support farmers”, that there are “only two farms that are left in that area” and that “it will help to keep a vibrant community in such rural areas”. Another made the point that “farmers were also businessmen who need to make a living” and that “we need to sort this out once and for all – farmers are there to make a living and it doesn’t matter how they do it as long as they survive.” Another, the local member asked for support for the proposal on account of “benefit [to the] community” and expressed concern about “the closure of many schools, pubs and shops in the immediate area”. 94. It is contended that comments like these evidence the conspicuous failure of some members to consider whether the scheme met the tests for farm diversification set out in the officers’ report and that there was a failure to engage with the significant harmful landscape impacts identified by the statutory consultees and the officers. It is said that this demonstrates either that immaterial considerations were taken into account and/or that those voting in favour of the application who expressed such views were acting irrationally. 95. Mr Easton responded by submitting that the members did not reject the views of officers in relation to landscape impact, but simply determined that greater weight should be accorded to farm diversification. He submits that this “was the archetypal planning balance in action.” He also drew attention to the proposition that the purpose of an officer’s report is not to decide the issue in question, but to inform the members of the relevant considerations relating to the application: R v. Mendip DC, ex p Fabre (2000) 80 P. & C.R. 500, at 509. 96. He also submitted that what occurred in this case was entirely familiar: members were advised by their officers to reject an application, but they determined that a different weight should be attached to the various material considerations and, by the majority decision, struck an overall planning balance. This result does not, he submits, enable the Claimant to surmount “the substantial hurdle of a rationality challenge”. 97. He analysed to some extent the contributions of the committee members and conceded that one contribution was expressed by reference to help for a “young farmer” which, he emphasised, was expressed in the singular). He submitted that it was quite possible to conclude from this that the member supported “young farmers in general, rather than the applicant with a particular set of personal circumstances.” In any event, he suggested, the other three members who expressed an opinion on matters such as this each referred to support for “farmers and farming in general” and that, accordingly, it is wrong to draw the inference that the committee (as a whole) determined the application on the basis of the personal circumstances of the Interested Parties instead of (or as well as) farm diversification. 98. He also suggested that this kind of textual analysis of a committee debate is “sterile” and that it is clear that the corporate decision was one in which the benefits of farm diversification tipped the balance in favour of planning permission and on that basis the committee disagreed with the advice of its officers. 99. I have made observations in the past about this kind of analysis which, with some diffidence, I repeat. In R (on the application of Oadby Hilltop and Meadowcroft Conservation Area Association, etc.) v Oadby and Wigston Borough Council and another [2011] EWHC 60 (Admin) I said this: “38. … I do think [it] would be highly unfortunate … if a practice or an “industry” was allowed to grow of obtaining transcripts of meetings of this kind as a matter of course and subjecting every word spoken to minute scrutiny in an endeavour to find the basis for an argument in support of a judicial review claim. That cannot be in the public interest. Whilst it would be impossible to say that such evidence should not be received in appropriate circumstances (because occasionally a transcript may offer the best evidence that a planning committee has or has not erred sufficiently for judicial review purposes), the development of the kind of practice to which I have referred would, to my mind, need resisting strongly. 39. It is important to recognise that a planning committee meeting is just that: a meeting of the members of a local planning committee. Decisions are made by a majority vote when an obvious consensus does not exist. As with most committees, whether of a public or private nature, individuals may come to a meeting with a preconceived notion of the view they will adopt to a particular item on the agenda. However, during the course of discussion, when other views are aired and debated, those preconceived views may change. That is the whole essence of a successful and dynamic committee and of what true service in a public office involves. If, as will sometimes be the case, the opportunity to articulate a changed view does not always present itself at the meeting, the record of someone’s oral contribution may be at variance with his or her eventual vote. All sorts of dynamics can occur that may mean that what someone is recorded as having said is not translated into an eventual vote that clearly indicates what was in the individual’s mind at the time of voting. 40. Furthermore, the actual articulation of an argument can sound very different when it is heard than how it appears to be from the written word in the form of a transcript. What may appear to have been strongly expressed may have been a “throw away” line and vice-versa. These are just a few considerations that make a fine textual analysis of what is said at such a meeting in the search for some clearly defined error of reasoning fraught with difficulty.” 100. Whilst the context was somewhat different, I see no reason to alter what I said there. I would also venture to draw attention to the final two paragraphs of my judgment in that case: “127. In The Queen on the application of Siraj v Kirklees Metropolitan Council … Sullivan LJ said this and, in doing so, drew on what Judge LJ had said: “It has been repeatedly emphasised that officers’ reports such as this should not be construed as though they were enactments. They should be read as a whole and in a commonsense manner, bearing in mind the fact that they are addressed to an informed readership, in this case the respondent’s planning subcommittee.” 128. I would respectfully suggest that at least the same caution needs to be observed in relation to the oral contributions of members of the committee … whose words may have been recorded. Unlike an officer’s report, the words will not have been formulated in the quiet of an officer’s room with all relevant documentary material to hand. Some words will doubtless have been prepared in advance, but they will need to have been adapted to the circumstances of the debate as it proceeds and, as I have indicated above, views may change during the course of the debate. That is a perfectly understandable and desirable feature of the proceedings of such a committee. It could operate to stifle the kind of open debate that is the lifeblood of effective local decision-making if a close textual analysis of those contributions was permitted to be made too readily.” 101. In my judgment, Mr Easton was right to make the points he did on this part of the case. I do not think that any of the comments highlighted on the Claimant’s behalf demonstrate clearly the kind of perverse reasoning (certainly on a collective basis) that would have to be shown before a court would interfere. 102. I recognise, of course, that those who see themselves as having lost the debate would wish to see the situation differently, but that is not, of course, the test. 103. My attention was drawn during the course of submissions to the case of Cherkley Campaign Limited) v Mole Valley District Council [2013] EWHC 2582 (Admin) and, after the oral arguments were concluded, to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the same case at [2014] EWCA Civ 567. It does not change any view that I had formed about the present case save to confirm that where, as here, the planning committee differs from the recommendations of the officers, it is entitled to bring its own evaluation of the weight to be given to the various material factors and the mere fact that the majority reaches a different conclusion in the balancing exercise does not mean that the conclusion is irrational. Conclusion 104. As I have indicated, the original notice concerning the screening opinion was inadequate and, following the approach in Bateman, would have led to the quashing of the planning permission. However, that inadequacy was rescued by Mrs Shaw’s witness statement that contained a sufficient articulation of a sufficiently cogent reasoning process to justify the negative screening opinion. 105. Thereafter, the application followed the kind of chequered history that may be the characteristic of many controversial planning applications with the eventual vote being very close and contrary to the officers’ recommendation. However, nothing in the planning committee’s decision-making, whether the process or the substantive decision, is susceptible to challenge on established public law grounds. Accordingly, this application must be dismissed. 106. I would express my appreciation to all Counsel for their excellent written and oral submissions.