Dundon v Kenna and others

Rent Act 1977 — Appeal against decision of a rent assessment committee — Complaint by landlord that he had not received notice of a hearing to which he was a party — Rent Assessment Committees (England and Wales) Regulations 1971 — The papers received by the panel office from the rent officer had shown that the appellant’s address was either ’22 Brooklands Road’ or ’22 Brooklands Road East’ (in fact the correct spelling was ‘Brookland’) — Certain interlocutory notifications were sent to the appellant addressed to ’22 Brooklands Road East’ and were acknowledged without any indication that the address should have been different — Subsequently, notifications of the date of the committee hearing were sent to ’22 Brooklands Road East, Liverpool L13 3EL’ (a correct postal description except that ‘Brookland’ should be singular) — It appeared that, in connection with an earlier case, the appellant had made an oral request that the decision should be communicated to him at a different address, 4 Normanton Avenue, Liverpool 7 — The appellant said that he had not received notice of the hearing in the present case and was not aware that it had taken place until some time later — Held that the committee or the panel were entitled to infer that 22 Brookland Road East was the appellant’s usual or last-known address for the purpose of regulation 11 of the 1971 regulations and there was no ground for setting the committee’s decision aside — The judge also dismissed a complaint that the committee had wrongly exercised their discretion in dealing with six flats at one day’s sittings — Court’s view that if there was a power to rehear (as to which no opinion was expressed) it would be sensible and fair to do so in presence of appellant This was a statutory appeal under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971 by the landlord, Mathew Dundon, from a decision of a rent101 assessment committee of the Merseyside and Cheshire Rent Assessment Panel concerning premises at 115 and 121 Ullet Road, Liverpool, consisting of six flats. The appellant, Mathew Dundon, appeared in person; Stephen Archer (instructed by Hill, Dickinson & Co, of Liverpool) represented Mrs G M Howarth, a respondent. Giving judgment, WEBSTER J said: This is an appeal by Mathew Dundon from a decision of the rent assessment committee of the Merseyside and Cheshire Rent Assessment Panel which was made On October 29 1980 in relation to premises at 115 Ullet Road and 121 Ullet Road, Liverpool, on Merseyside, the premises containing between them six flats. The appellant before the court is appealing from that decision and, although a number of grounds are relied upon, this court can take cognisance of two of them, namely that the contention that the appellant was not given notice of the hearing date on which that decision was made and in consequence was not present at the hearing, and that it was not his wish that the six flats should be dealt with at one hearing. I will assume for the purpose of this appeal that he is able in principle to challenge the decision of the committee to conduct the hearing in relation to the six flats on that one day. The regulations that govern the matter are the Rent Assessment Committees (England and Wales) Regulations 1971 (SI 1971 no 1065). Regulation 3(3) provides that notices of the date, time and place of any hearing shall be given by the committee not less than 10 days before the date of the hearing to, inter alia, the landlord. The appellant in this case, Mr Dundon, is the landlord of the premises which were the subject-matter of the decision under appeal. Regulation 4 provides that ‘At the hearing — (a) the parties shall be heard in such order, and subject to the provisions of these regulations, the procedure shall be such as the committee shall determine; . . . ‘. The only other regulation to which I need refer is regulation 11, which provides: Where any notice or other written matter is required under the provisions of these regulations to be given or supplied by the committee . . . it shall be sufficient compliance with the regulations if such notice or matter is sent by post in a prepaid letter and addressed to the party for whom it is intended at his usual or last known address. . . . The facts about the giving of notice have been sworn to by Mr Myers, who is the Secretary of the Merseyside and Cheshire Rent Assessment Panel, and although there is one matter sworn to in Mr Myers’ affidavit which Mr Dundon does not accept (although he is not able specifically to challenge it), there are other matters that he would add. The facts which I am about to recite are effectively unchallenged and indeed unchallengeable. They are these. When the files were received in the panel office from the rent officer, it was noticed that the appellant’s six applications for the registration of fair rents gave as his address 22 Brooklands Road on five of the applications and 22 Brooklands Road East, Liverpool 13, on the sixth. 22 Brooklands Road, Liverpool 13, was the address entered in the rent register. Mr Myers subsequently ascertained the correct spelling of the road referred to as ‘Brookland’ (in the singular). Brookland Road East and Brookland Road West were a continuous thoroughfare. The even house numbers in Brookland Road East run from 2 to 24 and continue in Brookland Road West from 26 to 86, so that 22 Brookland Road East is the correct address. Two notifications, dated August 8 and 18 respectively, that the appeals against the rent officer’s determination had been referred to the rent assessment panel by the rent officer, were sent by the panel to 22 Brooklands Road East. Two reply forms with a slip attached, each dated September 8 1980, were received by the panel on September 11 1980, and the acknowledgements did not contain any indication of a different address for the appellant. As a result it was assumed — it was a reasonable assumption or inference to make or draw — that it would be appropriate to send any further communication to the same address, namely 22 Brooklands Road East. In consequence two notifications of the hearing, each dated October 14 1980, were sent to the appellant by ordinary first-class post to 22 Brooklands Road East, Liverpool L13 3EL, which is the postal code, on October 15 1980. Mr Dundon, when addressing the court, made two points of relevance to this particular question. First of all he said that he had told the committee, or the panel, at a previous oral hearing that his address was 4 Normanton Avenue, Liverpool 17, from which he wrote subsequently the letter of November 12 1980. But in my judgment that cannot displace the inference the committee or the panel were entitled to draw as to his usual postal address. In my judgment the facts which I have recited were sufficient to establish that, for the purpose of regulation 11, 22 Brooklands Road East was Mr Dundon’s last-known address. Secondly, Mr Dundon when addressing me said that although the outward post book showed that the letter had been posted, it did not show the address to which it had been posted. Although for that reason he does not accept that the letter was posted to that address, I have to accept the unchallenged fact deposed to by Mr Myers in his affidavit that it was sent to that address. In my judgment the words of regulation 11 were satisfied and there is no reason to set aside the decision on the ground that the appellant was not given notice of the hearing in accordance with the regulations. The only other ground which, as I have said, raises on the face of the documents an arguable ground for setting aside the decision is that the committee wrongly decided to deal with the six flats at one sitting. In the notice of hearing sent to the appellant of October 14 1980, he was notified that the hearing with regard to flats A, B and C at 115 Ullet Road would take place respectively at 1.30, 1.50 and 2.10 pm on October 29 and that the hearing with respect to flats 1, 3 and 5, 121 Ullet Road would take place respectively at 2.30, 2.50 and 3.10 pm. I can see no basis on which it can be contended that the committee failed to exercise the discretion which they clearly had as to the time of these hearings. Accordingly I have to dismiss this appeal. I only add this. When he was arguing the appeal Mr Dundon made two things clear. One was that he thought that he had applied to the committee for a rehearing and had been refused it; and the other was that he thought that that was a matter that he was entitled to canvass in this appeal. It is not, in my judgment, a matter that he was entitled to canvass on this appeal, not merely for any technical reason — there is a technical reason in that the decision to refuse to rehear is not referred to in the notice of appeal — but really for a reason of greater substance, that in the documents, such as they are, there is not included any document containing a request for a rehearing and a refusal of one, nor is there any specific reference to any such request or refusal. I do not know whether there is a power to rehear or not. I am not able to express a view one way or the other. If there is power to rehear, I would have thought it would be sensible and fair for the committee to rehear the matter in the presence of Mr Dundon. But that is not a matter with which I can deal on this appeal. No order was made as to costs.