BP Petroleum Developments Ltd v Ryder and others
(Before Mr Justice Peter GIBSON)
Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act 1966 — First application under Act in respect of the exploitation of petroleum — Application by BP Petroleum Developments Ltd as plaintiffs for grant of rights, additional to those already granted by private arrangement, to exploit the on-shore oilfield on defendants’ estate, which included Wytch Farm, Dorset — Consideration of issues, of general interest to oil industry and to landowners, in relation to conditions for the grant of such rights and the basis of compensation — After examining the statutory background, the judge decided that the four essential statutory conditions had been satisfied by the plaintiffs, namely, (1) that the rights were sought for the purposes contemplated by the production licence, (2) that the efficient exploitation of the petroleum was unduly hampered by the plaintiffs’ inability to obtain these rights, (3) that the grant of the rights was expedient in the national interest, and (4) that it was not reasonably practicable to obtain the rights by private arrangement — As regards the basis of compensation, the plaintiffs submitted that the compensation awarded under section 8 of the 1966 Act ought to be on the compulsory acquisition basis of the existing use value of the land rights (but with regard to legitimate potentialities) plus sums for injurious affection and disturbance — In addition section 8 specifically allowed at least a further 10% on account of the application being compulsory, but case law made it clear that account could not be taken of the power of veto which a landowner would have in the absence of compulsory powers — The basic principle of compensation should be the loss to the vendor, not the value to the purchaser, although the presence in the market of a special purchaser for whom the rights would have a particular value could be taken into account — The defendant landowners, on the other hand, submitted that the compensation should take account of the profits, likely to be large, which the plaintiffs would derive from their exploitation of the rights — Held by Peter Gibson J, after considering a number of authorities on the 1966 Act as well as case law on the general principles of compensation, that the correct basis was consistent with the judicial interpretation given to the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 in the cases to which it applied — This was the value of what the estate would lose by the enforced grant, namely, the rights over land having its existing agricultural and forestry use plus compensation for disturbance and injurious affection — The judgment works out in detail the calculation of the amounts payable in accordance with the above principles.
In a
supplementary judgment dealing with costs the judge applied the specific
provisions in section 3(2)(c) of the Petroleum Production Act 1934 — These were
that costs incurred by applicants for rights were not to be paid by the
landowners from whom the rights were sought; and that costs incurred by the
landowners were to be paid by the applicants unless the applicants had made an
unconditional offer equal to or greater than the amount awarded by the court —
In the present case the relevant offer by the plaintiffs was in fact much
greater than the court’s award — Held that the offer was unconditional within
the meaning of section 3(2)(c), despite some initially unquantified sums which
would become quantified on acceptance and despite being an offer ‘without
prejudice save as to costs’ — Accordingly all costs up to the receipt of the
offer would be borne by the plaintiffs and each party would bear their own
costs after that date with the exception of costs of an unsuccessful
interlocutory appeal by the plaintiffs, which would be borne by them
The following
cases have been referred to in this report.
Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act 1966 — First application under Act in respect of the exploitation of petroleum — Application by BP Petroleum Developments Ltd as plaintiffs for grant of rights, additional to those already granted by private arrangement, to exploit the on-shore oilfield on defendants’ estate, which included Wytch Farm, Dorset — Consideration of issues, of general interest to oil industry and to landowners, in relation to conditions for the grant of such rights and the basis of compensation — After examining the statutory background, the judge decided that the four essential statutory conditions had been satisfied by the plaintiffs, namely, (1) that the rights were sought for the purposes contemplated by the production licence, (2) that the efficient exploitation of the petroleum was unduly hampered by the plaintiffs’ inability to obtain these rights, (3) that the grant of the rights was expedient in the national interest, and (4) that it was not reasonably practicable to obtain the rights by private arrangement — As regards the basis of compensation, the plaintiffs submitted that the compensation awarded under section 8 of the 1966 Act ought to be on the compulsory acquisition basis of the existing use value of the land rights (but with regard to legitimate potentialities) plus sums for injurious affection and disturbance — In addition section 8 specifically allowed at least a further 10% on account of the application being compulsory, but case law made it clear that account could not be taken of the power of veto which a landowner would have in the absence of compulsory powers — The basic principle of compensation should be the loss to the vendor, not the value to the purchaser, although the presence in the market of a special purchaser for whom the rights would have a particular value could be taken into account — The defendant landowners, on the other hand, submitted that the compensation should take account of the profits, likely to be large, which the plaintiffs would derive from their exploitation of the rights — Held by Peter Gibson J, after considering a number of authorities on the 1966 Act as well as case law on the general principles of compensation, that the correct basis was consistent with the judicial interpretation given to the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 in the cases to which it applied — This was the value of what the estate would lose by the enforced grant, namely, the rights over land having its existing agricultural and forestry use plus compensation for disturbance and injurious affection — The judgment works out in detail the calculation of the amounts payable in accordance with the above principles.
In a
supplementary judgment dealing with costs the judge applied the specific
provisions in section 3(2)(c) of the Petroleum Production Act 1934 — These were
that costs incurred by applicants for rights were not to be paid by the
landowners from whom the rights were sought; and that costs incurred by the
landowners were to be paid by the applicants unless the applicants had made an
unconditional offer equal to or greater than the amount awarded by the court —
In the present case the relevant offer by the plaintiffs was in fact much
greater than the court’s award — Held that the offer was unconditional within
the meaning of section 3(2)(c), despite some initially unquantified sums which
would become quantified on acceptance and despite being an offer ‘without
prejudice save as to costs’ — Accordingly all costs up to the receipt of the
offer would be borne by the plaintiffs and each party would bear their own
costs after that date with the exception of costs of an unsuccessful
interlocutory appeal by the plaintiffs, which would be borne by them
The following
cases have been referred to in this report.
Archibald
Russell Ltd v Nether Pollok Ltd 1938 SC 1
Associated
Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd’s Application, Re
[1966] Ch 308; [1965] 3 WLR 1271; [1965] 2 All ER 547
Cedar
Rapids Manufacturing & Power Co v Lacoste
[1914] AC 569, PC
Chapman
Lowry & Puttick Ltd v Chichester District
Council (1984) 47 P&CR 674; [1984] EGD 568; 269 EG 955, [1984] 1 EGLR
188, LT
Consett
Iron Co Ltd v Clavering Trustees [1935] 2 KB
42
Consett
Iron Co Ltd’s Application, Re [1938] 1 All ER 439
Denaby
and Cadeby Main Collieries’ Application, ‘Colliery
Guardian’, November 30 1928, p 2180
Edwards v Minister of Transport [1964] 2 QB 134; [1964] 2 WLR 515;
[1964] 1 All ER 483; (1963) 62 LGR 223; 15 P & CR 144; [1963] EGD 244; 188
EG 1081, CA
Glassbrook
Bros Ltd v Leyson [1933] 3 KB 91
Gray v North Eastern Railway Co (1876) 1 QBD 696
Horn v Sunderland Corporation [1941] 2 KB 26; [1941] 1 All ER
480, CA
Lambe v Secretary of State for War [1955] 2 QB 612; [1955] 2 WLR
1127; [1955] 2 All ER 386, CA
Lucas and
Chesterfield Gas & Water Board, Re [1909] 1 KB
16
Lynall v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1972] AC 680; [1971] 3 WLR
759; [1971] 3 All ER 914, HL
Markham
Main Colliery Ltd, Re (1925) 134 LT 253
Naylor
Benzon Mining Co Ltd, Re [1950] Ch 567; [1950] 1
All ER 518; (1950) 1 P&CR 69
Pointe
Gourde Quarrying & Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendent
of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565, PC
Robinson
Brothers (Brewers) Ltd v Durham County
Assessment Committee (Houghton and Chester-le-Street Assessment Committee)
[1937] 2 KB 445; [1937] 2 All ER 298, CA; [1938] AC 321; [1938] 2 All ER 79, HL
SJC
Construction Co Ltd v Sutton Borough Council
(1975) 29 P&CR 322; [1975] EGD 725; 234 EG 363, [1975] 1 EGLR 105, CA
South
Eastern Railway Co v London County Council
[1915] 2 Ch 252
South
Shropshire District Council v Amos [1986] 1
WLR 1271; [1987] 1 All ER 340; [1986] 2 EGLR 194; (1986) 280 EG 635, CA
Stockport
Metropolitan Borough Council v Alwiyah
Developments (1986) 52 P&CR 278
Stokes v Cambridge Corporation (1961) 13 P&CR 77; [1961] EGD
207; 180 EG 839, LT
Vryicherla
Narayana Gajapatiraju v The Revenue Divisional
Officer, Vizagapatam [1939] AC 302; [1939] 2 All ER 317; 55 TLR 563, PC
Wrotham
Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd
[1974] 1 WLR 798; [1974] 2 All ER 321; (1973) 27 P&CR 296
This was an
application under the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act 1966 by the
plaintiffs, BP Petroleum Development Ltd (a subsidiary of British Petroleum Co
plc) for the grant of exploitation rights over land owned by the first and
second defendants, J C D Ryder and B G D Ryder, part of whose estate included
the Wytch Farm in Dorset. The application was to exploit234
the on-shore oilfield which became known as the Wytch Farm oilfield. The third
defendant, Walter Pitman, was the agricultural tenant of Wytch Farm; he took
part in the proceedings until the 13th day of the hearing, when agreement was
reached between him and BP and the Ryders. The Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food, representing the Forestry Commission, was the fourth
defendant, but took no part in these proceedings, having reached agreement with
the Ryders on sharing compensation.
Michael
Essayan QC and M J Driscoll (instructed by Slaughter & May) appeared on
behalf of the plaintiffs; Mark Waller QC, R H T Hildyard and Miss J H Conway
(instructed by Linklater & Paines) represented the defendants.
Giving
judgment, PETER GIBSON J said: This is an application by the plaintiff, BP
Petroleum Development Ltd (‘BP’), a subsidiary of the British Petroleum Co plc,
for the grant of rights over land owned by the first and second defendants, Mr
J C D Ryder and Mr B G D Ryder (‘the Ryders’), to enable BP to exploit the
on-shore oilfield known as the Wytch Farm oilfield in Dorset. The application
is made under the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act 1966 (‘the 1966
Act’). Although there have been many applications under the 1966 Act and its
predecessor legislation in respect of solid minerals, this is the first
application to be made in respect of petroleum. The issues raised by this
application relate to the conditions to be satisfied if the court is to grant
any of the rights sought and, if those conditions are satisfied, to the
consideration or compensation to be awarded in respect of the grant of such
rights. In the circumstances, those issues are of considerable importance to
the oil industry and to those owning or interested in lands rights over which
are sought by oil companies wishing to explore for and produce oil and gas
on-shore in the United Kingdom.
Before I
relate the relevant facts it is convenient to set out the statutory background
relevant to the application.
By the
Petroleum (Production) Act 1918 it was forbidden for any person other than one
acting on behalf of the Crown or a person holding a licence granted under the
Act to search or bore for or get petroleum (including natural gas) in its
natural state within the UK. Some licences were granted pursuant to that Act,
three of which were still subsisting when the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934
(‘the 1934 Act’) was passed. By that Act such petroleum was nationalised
without compensation and vested in the Crown save for petroleum obtained under
those three licences. Under section 2 of the 1934 Act the Board of Trade (now
the Secretary of State for Energy) was empowered to grant licences to search and
bore for and get petroleum for such consideration and on such terms as he
thinks fit. Section 3 makes the provisions of Part I of the Mines (Working
Facilities and Support) Act 1923 (‘the 1923 Act’), which Act as amended was
replaced by the 1966 Act, applicable with certain modifications in relation to
petroleum. It enables a person holding a licence under the 1934 Act to apply
for such ancillary rights as might be required for the exercise of the rights
granted by the licence, including a right to enter upon such land and to sink
boreholes therein for the purpose of searching for and getting petroleum, and a
right to use and occupy land for the erection of such buildings and laying and
maintenance of such pipes, and the construction of such other works as might be
required for the purpose of searching and boring for and getting, carrying
away, storing, treating and converting petroleum. This last mentioned purpose I
shall refer to compendiously as the purpose of exploiting petroleum. Under the
1923 Act applications were made to the Railway and Canal Commission (‘the
commission’) consisting of a High Court judge and two others. The commission
was, and the court on an application under the 1966 Act is, required by section
3(2)
(a) to have regard to the effect on the
amenities of the locality of the proposed use and occupation of the land in
respect of which rights were applied for,
(b) in determining the amount of any compensation
to be paid in respect of the grant of any right to make an additional allowance
of not less than 10% on account of the acquisition of the right being
compulsory, and
(c) to order the applicant to pay the costs
incurred in connection with the application by any person from whom a right is
sought to be obtained unless such person received an unconditional offer of
compensation equalling or exceeding the compensation awarded on the
application, in which event such person has to bear his own costs. The Board of
Trade was required to make regulations prescribing (inter alia) model
clauses to be incorporated in any licence. Model clauses have been made and
they provide for the Crown to receive royalty payments and they restrict the
licensee from entering into agreements to share the proceeds of sale of the
petroleum with any other person.
By section 1
of the 1966 Act the court was empowered to confer rights described in a table,
para 5 of which related to ancillary rights in respect of all minerals. By
subpara (1) of the paragraph an ancillary right might be conferred on a person
having the right to work minerals and who was working or desirous of working
the minerals if the right was required in order that the minerals might be
properly and conveniently worked by him and the proper and efficient working of
the minerals was unduly hampered by his inability or failure to obtain that
right. Section 3 imposed two limitations on the grant of rights. One, in
section 3(1), was that no right should be granted unless the court was
satisfied that the grant was expedient in the national interest. The other, in
section 3(2), was that no right should be granted unless it was shown that it
was not reasonably practicable to obtain the right by private arrangement for
any of four reasons, namely:
(a) that the persons with power to grant the
right are numerous or have conflicting interests;
(b) that the persons with power to grant the
right, or any of them, cannot be ascertained or cannot be found;
(c) that the persons from whom the right must be
obtained, or any of them, have not the necessary powers of disposition, whether
by reason of defect in title, legal disability or otherwise;
(d) that the person with power to grant the right
unreasonably refuses or demands terms which, having regard to the
circumstances, are unreasonable.
The procedure
to be followed on an application is set out in section 4. The applicant has to
send the application to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry setting
out the circumstances alleged to justify the grant of rights. The Secretary of
State must consider the application and unless, after communication with such
other interested parties (if any) as he may think fit, he is of the opinion
that a prima facie case is not made out, he is obliged to refer the
matter to the court. Section 5 specifies what the court may do on such a reference.
If satisfied that the requirements of the Act are complied with, it may grant
the right on such terms and subject to such conditions and for such period as
it may think fit. Section 5(2) provides that where a right is granted, such
compensation or consideration as in default of agreement might be determined by
the court shall be paid or given by the applicant in respect of the acquisition
of the right to such persons as the court might determine to be entitled
thereto. Further provisions governing compensation are contained in section 8.
By subsection (1) where a right is granted, the court may determine the amount
and nature of compensation or consideration and the persons to whom it is to be
paid or given either when it determines whether the right should be granted or
at any subsequent time. Subsection (2) (so far as is material) is in these
terms:
The
compensation or consideration in respect of any right . . . shall be assessed
by the court on the basis of what would be fair and reasonable between a
willing grantor and a willing grantee having regard to the conditions subject
to which the right is or is to be granted.
Thus the
properly instructed licensee wishing to acquire ancillary rights will apply
under the 1966 Act only if in a position
(1) to establish:
(a) that he requires those
rights for the exercise of the rights granted by his licence under the 1934
Act,
(b) that such rights are
required in order that the petroleum might be properly and conveniently
exploited by him and that the proper and efficient exploitation of the
petroleum is unduly hampered by his inability or failure to obtain those
rights,
(c) that the grant of the
rights is expedient in the national interest,
(d) that it has not been
reasonably practicable to obtain the rights by private arrangement for one or
more of the reasons set out in section 3(2) of the 1966 Act, and
(e) that it is appropriate for
the court to exercise its discretion to grant the rights, having regard, inter
alia, to the effect on the amenities of the locality of the proposed use
and occupation of the land,
(2) to put up with the delays consequent on the
application, namely,
(a) the time needed by the
Secretary of State to consider the application after communication with
interested parties and to reach a conclusion on whether a prima facie
case is not made out, and
235
(b) the time needed for the
hearing of the application referred to the court (including the possible
further delays consequent on any appeal), and,
(3) to estimate that the sum of —
(a) the likely award by the
court of
(i) the consideration and
compensation on a willing grantor/willing grantee basis and
(ii) the addition of at least
10% on account of the acquisition of the rights being compulsory,
(b) his own costs and, in
addition, unless the exception in section 3(2)(c) of the 1934 Act applies, the
costs of every other person from whom a right is sought, and
(c) the cost to him of the
delays consequent on the application, will be less than the lowest amount the
grantors of the rights were prepared to accept for the grant of the rights.
Add to all
this the uncertainties of litigation, particularly in relation to statutory
provisions never before considered by the court in relation to petroleum, and
the natural reluctance of an oil company to alienate the landowner by taking
him to court, and it is hardly surprising that every oil company has until this
case been prepared to settle with the landowner rather than to apply under the
1923 or 1966 Act.
BP has been
engaged in the exploration and production of oil on-shore in the UK for many
decades. Until 1981 it had drilled 80% of the wells drilled in the UK and since
the late 1930s it has been producing oil in the East Midlands. There has been a
marked increase in on-shore exploration in the 1980s and many other companies,
some relatively small, have obtained licences to search for oil. One such
company is Carless Exploration Ltd (‘Carless’), a subsidiary of Carless Capel
& Leonard plc. Although the parent company is long established, it had
never, either directly or through a subsidiary, engaged in the business of oil
exploration or production until Carless was incorporated in 1973. Carless is
the operator of the Humbly Grove oilfield in Hampshire. Between January 1981
and November 1986 some 240 wells were drilled on-shore in the UK, BP’s share of
which was about 50%. But of the 13 on-shore oilfields in the UK only Humbly
Grove is not operated by BP.
To explore for
oil, and if oil is found, to produce oil, the licence holder must acquire the
necessary land rights needed for those purposes. BP’s practice is first to carry
out a seismic survey of the area for which it is the licence holder and to
identify the geographical locations within which drilling sites should be
acquired. An ideal location is pinpointed with a surrounding area of tolerance
within which it would be acceptable to locate an exploration well. A site is
chosen after regard is had to factors such as the topography of the area, the
means of access, the location of settlements, the requirements and advice of
the planning and highways authorities and advice from the Nature Conservancy
Council and other environmental bodies. Usually the most suitable location for
a site is on agricultural land.
The landowner
and, where the site is tenanted, the tenant are then approached to grant the
necessary rights. BP’s practice is initially to seek a licence granting
exclusive rights to occupy an area of land for a short period, usually one or
two years. The area may be less than an acre, such as the 0.75-acre site at
Belvoir, or it may be several acres such as the 2- or 3-acre sites at the Wytch
Farm oilfield. If the site does not adjoin a public highway, the means of
access will also have to be acquired, and this will at times involve
constructing a new road or improving an existing farm track. BP negotiates a
rent for the site and any access and in addition pays compensation for the loss
of crop and, where appropriate, a disturbance payment. A tenant in occupation
will usually be paid an initial entry fee in addition to crop compensation. On
occasions BP purchases the land outright.
Having
acquired the site BP will put a hard surface on the land and drill an
exploratory borehole. For every 8 or 9 drilled, only one is likely to prove
commercially viable. Hence the normal practice of seeking initially only
temporary rights by licence. If oil is discovered, the discovery will be
appraised to determine the extent and flowrate of the oil reservoir. If it is a
dry hole or the oil is not present in commercial quantities the site will
normally be restored by BP to its original condition. It is BP’s preference to
include within the initial arrangements an agreement for the continued
occupation of the site after the initial period if oil is found in commercial
quantities. Usually such an agreement will provide for a 3-year rent review linked
to a mutually acceptable index. For the smaller oilfield such as at Kimmeridge
in Dorset, the oil brought to the surface at the well site is taken away by
tanker. For the larger oilfield, sites additional to well sites may be needed.
The oil will be piped from the well site to what is know as a gathering station
occupying a site substantially larger than the well site. At the gathering
station the oil will be given preliminary treatment and then removed by
pipeline, usually to another site known as an export terminal. From there the
oil is taken by rail to a refinery. Thus there are a gathering station and an
export terminal for both the Humbly Grove oilfield and the Wytch Farm oilfield;
but it is intended to pipe the oil from the developed Wytch Farm oilfield
directly to Southampton Water. Gas is often, if not invariably, produced with
the oil, and plant at the gathering station will separate the gases so
produced. Some gas may be suitable for domestic use and can be piped into the
gas network. Other gas will be taken away in the form of LPG by tanker or
pipeline. Some gas will be ‘flared’ (ie burnt) in special incinerators at the
gathering station. The gathering station will for convenience usually be sited
near the well sites, but it may be several miles from a more remote well site
in a large oilfield. A gathering station presents a scene of intensive
industrial development, the site being covered by plant of various forms and
sizes. In contrast, a well site in production consists for the most part of a
hard-surfaced area on which stands the machinery known as ‘nodding donkeys’,
one for each well, pumping up oil almost without noise.
In addition to
the sites, the oil company will need to acquire pipeline and cable easements,
the pipes and cables being laid underground. Appropriate rates for such
easements are agreed annually between oil companies and the Country Landowners
Association (‘the CLA’) and the National Farmers’ Union, which though not
binding on any landowner provide a useful guide as to the going rate.
On May 30 1968
Production Licence PL 089 was granted by the Secretary of State to the Gas
Council, the predecessor to British Gas, and BP in equal shares. That licence
was subsequently varied in 1972 and covers an area of 303 square kilometres in
Dorset and the period of the licence was extended for a further 40 years, so
that it expires on March 30 2014. British Gas subsequently assigned its
beneficial interest in the licence to a subsidiary, Gas Council (Exploration)
Ltd (‘GC(E)’), which became the operator under the licence. On May 17 1984
GC(E) sold its interest in the licence to five companies (including Carless)
known as the Dorset Group. BP became operator in place of GC(E) and all
property interests were assigned to BP.
The licence
area covers most of the Isle of Purbeck and extends into Poole Harbour. Within
that area there is a substantial private estate known as the Rempstone Estate
(‘the estate’), the northern part of which contains a significant part of the
Wytch Farm oilfield. The oilfield extends beyond the boundaries of the estate
and into Poole Harbour. An island, Furzey Island, in Poole Harbour is owned by
BP and the oilfield extends to that island. The estate was until fairly
recently held in a Settled Land Act settlement of which Major Dudley Ryder was
the life tenant and he and his sons, the Ryders, were the trustees. But he died
on April 9 1986 and the estate is now owned by the Ryders. It is 4,700 acres in
size. The area has been designated one of outstanding natural beauty and the
sites which BP wishes to acquire are within an area treated as Heritage Coast.
The main parts of the estate are Rempstone Hall, its grounds and adjoining
farmland, 1,570 acres of tenanted agricultural land, 1,085 acres of in-hand
farmland, nearly 1,600 acres let on a 999-year lease to the Forestry
Commission, 400 acres of in-hand woodland and more than 30 tenanted residential
properties. The Forestry Commission have planted row upon row of pine trees in
large plantations on their land, which they manage on a commercial basis. The
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, representing the Forestry
Commission, is the fourth defendant, but it has taken no part in these
proceedings, having reached agreement with the Ryders on sharing compensation.
Wytch Farm
lies in the northernmost part of the estate. Since 1947 the third defendant, Mr
Walter Pitman, has been the agricultural tenant of that farm, which extends to
just under 250 acres. It is a dairy farm on grade 4 agricultural land (ie the
lowest grade). Under his tenancy agreement dated December 19 1947 Mr Pitman has
a tenancy from year to year determinable on September 29 in any year by 12
months’ written notice. Further, the Ryders have the right to resume possession
of up to 10 acres in any one year for certain specific non-agricultural
purposes on three months’ notice terminating on the March or September quarter
day. Mr Pitman took part in these236
proceedings until the 13th day of the hearing, when agreement was reached
between him and BP and the Ryders.
In 1973 GC(E)
entered into negotiations with Major Ryder for the acquisition of a 2-acre site
for drilling an exploratory well. Agreement was reached for a licence of a site
close to Wytch Farm, and from October 1973 until the end of 1975 GC(E) drilled
various wells on that and further sites which it acquired from Major Ryder. As
is the practice in the industry, the well site for the first exploratory well
is called Well Site X and the subsequent well sites are lettered successively
A, B, C and so on. Oil was discovered and the results of appraisal tests were
favourable and confirmed the presence of an oil reservoir (‘the Bridport
Reservoir’) in the Jurassic Bridport Sandstone at a depth of 3,000 ft.
Consequently, GC(E) in January 1975 decided that the oilfield was worth
developing. Negotiations began between Mr Christopher Panes, a partner in
Messrs Savills, for GC(E) and Mr P S James ARICS, agent to the estate, for the
acquisition of the necessary long-term land rights. Initially GC(E) wished to
purchase the sites it required, but Major Ryder was not prepared to grant more
than a lease. Compensation and rents for the various sites were eventually
agreed with the estate in June 1977 for entry by GC(E) with effect from July 1
1977. The sites acquired were as follows: a gathering station of 14.2 acres set
in a Forestry Commission plantation; four well sites (X, A, B and D) the total
area of which was 9.53 acres of agricultural land; and a pumping station (at
Cleavel Point to extract and filter water from the sea and pump it to the
gathering station and the well sites) of 0.07 acre. The rent for those sites
totalled £1,445 per annum and represented an amount about four times the
agricultural value of the land. Capital sums of £13,565 were paid for injurious
affection and £29,500 for disturbance during the 3-year construction period.
Nearly £8,000 was paid for pipeline easements.
In addition, a
little over £11,000 was paid to the Forestry Commission for the surrender of
its lease of the gathering station. All the sites lie in the northernmost part
of the estate.
It was always
the intention of the parties that the rights granted to GC(E) would be embodied
in formal deeds. Leases were drafted, but they were not entered into until
February 2 1981.
One lease was
of the gathering station and of a road known as the Causeway built by GC(E)
over marshland east of Wytch Farm. The term of the lease is 40 years from July
1 1977 with 3-year rent reviews tied to increases in average farm rents in SW
England. Certain limited easements over certain estate roads were granted.
Among the restrictive covenants in the lease are covenants not to carry out any
additional works, other than those already agreed, on the gathering station
without further compensation (para 14 of Part IV of the First Schedule to the
lease), not to approach the gathering station except from the public highway to
Wytch Farm (para 17 ibid), to use the gathering station only for the
extraction, treatment and handling of oil and gas from the existing oilfields
at Wytch Farm and the Arne peninsula (to the north west of Wytch Farm) and for
onward transmission by underground pipelines and from no other oilfield without
negotiation and compensation (para 23 ibid) and not to deliver or take
away any oil to or from the gathering station by road tanker with the exception
of the delivery of fuels necessary for the running of the plant and for the
removal of LPG in up to two tankers in any one day except in case of emergency
(para 26 ibid). The original rent was £600 per annum, but after the
latest rent review at July 1 1986 the rent is now £2,640 per annum.
Another lease
of the same date was of Well Sites A, B, D and X for a term of 30 years from
July 1 1977 with similar rent review provisions and similar limited easements and
restrictive covenants preventing the carrying out of any additional works,
restricting the means of access, limiting the user to extracting oil and gas
from the existing oil fields and preventing except in emergency both flaring
and the use of road tankers. The original rent was £545 per annum but is now
£2,026 per annum.
A third lease
of the same date was of the pumping station. The main part of the land was
demised for 40 years from July 1 1977, but a small area was demised for only
five years. There are similar rent review provisions and similar limited
easements and there are restrictive covenants preventing the carrying out of
any additional works, restricting the means of access and limiting the use of
the premises to the extracting of sea water and its onward transmission for the
existing oilfields. The original rent was £300 per annum but is now £1,165 per
annum.
It was also
the intention of the parties that there would be three deeds of grant of
pipeline easements for 50 years from July 1 1977; but while written consents to
the laying of the existing pipelines were given in December 1976 and January
1977 on behalf of Major Ryder and his tenants and the pipelines have been laid
and licence fees of over £7,000 paid, the three deeds of grant which have been
drafted have never been executed.
GC(E)
constructed a water supply compound containing a control valve on 0.1 acre of
land at a site adjoining the B3351 highway and Thrashers Lane, but no formal
rights to the land were granted by the estate.
Late in 1977
during the drilling of a second well at Well Site D the opportunity was taken
to explore at greater depth. A further reservoir (‘the Sherwood Reservoir’) was
discovered between 5,000 and 6,000 ft deep in the Triassic Sherwood sandstone.
The Sherwood Reservoir is much larger than the Bridport Reservoir. Since 1980
oil has been produced from the Bridport Reservoir and small quantities of oil
have recently been produced from the Sherwood Reservoir. Currently production
of crude oil is at a rate of approximately 5,500 barrels per day (‘bpd’)
principally from the Bridport Reservoir. But if the additional rights for which
BP now applies are granted, the peak production that is expected to be achieved
is 60,000 bpd. The reserves of the Wytch Farm oilfield are estimated at between
250 and 300 million barrels and it is the largest on-shore oilfield in Western
Europe. Humbly Grove’s reserves, for example, are estimated at only 15 million
barrels. However, the Wytch Farm oilfield is only a small field in comparison
with, for example, North Sea oilfields. Thus the Brent Field has estimated
reserves of 1,760 million barrels and a peak production rate of 480,000 bpd,
while the Forties field has estimated reserves of 2,055 million barrels and a
peak production rate of 522,000 bpd.
GC(E) was
later granted a licence for a further site of 2.1 acres — Well Site F on the
Goathorn peninsula in the north-eastern part of the estate. This is an
attractive area of woodland owned by the estate. The licence was agreed with
effect from January 1 1978 at an initial rent of £550 per annum for the site and
access to it of 2 3/4 miles, and £1,000 per annum for the management of a
150-ft-wide tree screen round the site. The licence expired on December 31 1984
and has not been renewed by the estate. GC(E) also acquired a licence for Well
Site B2 close to the gathering station at its north-west extremity and as with
Well Site F a well was drilled but the licence has now expired.
So far 24
wells have been drilled on the well sites on the estate and both oil and gas
have been produced. The oil is taken by underground pipeline from the gathering
station to the export terminal at Furzebrook (outside the estate) and from
there by rail to a refinery. LPG is currently transported from the gathering
station by road tanker. Gas which is suitable for use on the domestic market is
piped directly into the British Gas network. The roads on the estate are narrow
and traffic to and from the gathering station is required to use a one-way
system along existing roads.
From July
1983, at a time when BP was about to become the operator under the production
licence, negotiations were entered into by BP with the estate with a view to BP
acquiring the additional rights to exploit the Wytch Farm oilfield. Over the
next three years attempts were made to reach agreement. In the course of the
negotiations on February 7 1985 BP made a detailed offer in writing for what it
then envisaged were its requirements, but that offer was rejected by the
estate.
On July 10
1986 BP lodged its application under the 1966 Act with the Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry, seeking the grant of the rights which it had sought by
its offer of February 7 1985. The Secretary of State took a point on the
jurisdiction of the court to grant pipeline easements under the 1966 Act,
suggesting that authorisation had to be sought under the Pipelines Act 1962
(‘the 1962 Act’), but subject to that point he referred the matter to the court
on November 28 1985. BP then sought and obtained a determination on the point
taken by the Secretary of State, Warner J on February 6 1986 holding that the
court did have jurisdiction to grant pipeline easements under the 1966 Act.
GC(E) had
obtained planning permission for the existing use of the existing sites for the
Wytch Farm oilfield. On April 12 1985 Dorset County Council granted planning
permission for the construction of a well site at Furzey Island. BP proposes to
connect the wells there by pipeline with the gathering station on the estate.
On March 4
1986 BP submitted 16 planning applications to the local mineral planning authority,
Dorset County Council. Before making those applications BP had discussions with
the council as to237
what the council would be likely to require as conditions for granting
permission. The council indicated that extensive tree-screening and landscaping
would be a prerequisite to the grant of permission and BP decided it would have
to amend its application in order to acquire the additional land needed for
that purpose. BP also conducted engineering studies which led it to decide that
further amendments to the application were necessary. It therefore applied for
and obtained leave to amend the application. The Ryders on June 2 1986 put in a
notice of objection pursuant to RSC Ord 96, r5 in which two preliminary points
were taken. One was that the court had no jurisdiction to consider an
application for rights differing from those in the application referred by the
Secretary of State. On July 11 1986 Hoffmann J dismissed that point. The other
point taken was that it was premature for BP to have made its application
before the outcome of the planning application was known. That, too, was
dismissed by Hoffmann J.
On August 19
1986 BP made a revised offer to take account of its revised requirements since
February 7 1985. That revised offer, too, was not acceptable to the estate.
Two other
interlocutory applications I should mention briefly. On discovery BP disclosed
a large number of files relating to what it considered to be confidential
negotiations which it had conducted with landowners and tenants of sites other
than on the estate. BP took the view that it should try to protect that
confidentiality, and one method it suggested was for the hearing of the
application to be in chambers. The Chief Master rejected that, and Vinelott J
dismissed BP’s appeal.
The other
application was one made to me in the following circumstances. BP obtained its
planning consents on November 11 1986 but had to undertake, in an agreement
made pursuant to section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 (‘a
section 52 agreement’), not to implement those consents until it had obtained
an authorisation pursuant to the 1962 Act for an oil export pipeline to
Southampton Water or appropriate consent for an alternative export route
acceptable to Dorset County Council. Authorisation under the 1962 Act was
sought by BP for an underground pipeline and in November 1986, when the hearing
of this application was fixed for mid-March, it had been expected that the
decision of the Secretary of State would have been obtained before the start of
the hearing. Through no fault of the parties the Secretary of State has not yet
given his decision. In February all the parties were anxious that the hearing
should commence in March and accordingly with the consent of the Ryders, BP
sought a direction from me that the court would hear and adjudicate on the
application notwithstanding that the decision of the Secretary of State had not
yet been obtained. It was common ground that such authority was likely to be
given and that even if it was not, an alternative export route would be found
so that the issues raised on this application would not be hypothetical. In the
circumstances I felt able to give the direction sought.
Accordingly on
March 18, 20 months after the application was lodged with the Secretary of State,
the hearing of the application commenced. It has been notable for the admirably
well-prepared presentation by each side of its case. It is evident that a great
deal of painstaking care has been shown in the thoughtful compilation of the
bundles of material put before me and in the preparation of schedules and
summaries to assist me. My task has thereby been greatly facilitated. I am
particularly indebted to Mr Essayan leading Mr Driscoll for BP and Mr Waller
leading Mr Hildyard for the Ryders for their lucid arguments.
The main
evidence has consisted of affidavit evidence, including in the case of the
experts, their exhibited reports. The principal deponents have also been
tendered for, and gave evidence in, cross-examination. The able cross-examiners
were able to demonstrate that in certain respects some of the experts had
overstated matters, but I do not doubt that each witness did his best to assist
the court truthfully. At the request of both sides I visited the Wytch Farm
oilfield and other parts of the estate. At the request of the Ryders I also
visited the Humbly Grove oilfield.
Rights
applied for
It is now
convenient to summarise the additional rights sought by BP. They fall under
seven headings.
(1) Gathering station and Causeway
BP seeks the
right for 50 years (terminable by BP after 30 years) to use and occupy 36.3
acres south of the existing gathering station as an extension thereto and to
use the gathering station as so extended and the Causeway for the purpose of
exploiting petroleum from the Sherwood as well as the Bridport Reservoirs. It
seeks the right to construct on all such land all such works as may be required
for that purpose. It seeks additional rights which in effect would release it
from the restrictive covenants to which I have referred in the lease of the
gathering station.
(2) Well sites
BP seeks the
right for 50 years (terminable by BP after 30 years) to use three further areas
totalling 10.42 acres for the purpose of exploiting petroleum. One area is an
extension to Well Site A and the others are Well Site B2 and Well Site F. Again
it seeks the right to construct on these and the existing well sites such works
as may be required for the purpose of exploiting petroleum from both
reservoirs. Again it seeks additional rights which would in effect release it
from those existing restrictive covenants to which I have drawn attention in
the lease of the well sites.
(3) Pumping station and water supply compound
BP seeks the
right for 50 years (terminable by BP after 30 years) to use an additional area
of 0.53 acre as an extension to the existing pumping station for extracting
salt water and pumping the same to the gathering station and to the well sites.
It also seeks the right to use the 0.1-acre site of the water supply compound.
Again it seeks additional rights which would in effect release it from the
existing limitations under the existing lease of the pumping station.
(4) Laydown and soil storage areas
BP seeks the
right to use four areas totalling 12.05 acres as laydown areas for the
temporary storage of equipment and materials. Three areas (one adjacent to Well
Site X, another adjacent to Well Site B and a third at Cleavel Point) it
requires for a period of from one to five years. The fourth, a strip 30m wide
and 1,200m long on the Goathorn peninsula, on which it intends to lay and
connect pipes and cables for pulling through a borehole drilled horizontally to
Furzey Island, it requires for a period which it estimates will not exceed six
months. It also seeks the right for up to 25 years to use two sites totalling
2.55 acres near Well Site X and at Cleavel Point respectively for the temporary
storage of soil, and on a third low-lying site of 6.1 acres north of the
gathering station it seeks to deposit soil permanently.
(5) Roads (including the Causeway)
BP seeks the
right for 50 years (terminable by BP after 30 years) to use, and where
necessary, improve the existing roadways on the estate and, in addition, to
construct and use a new roadway from Well Site A to Well Site F and a new
access road (‘the access road’) in the western part of the estate from Norden
Common to the gathering station.
(6) Pipelines and cables
BP seeks
rights similar to those which would have been conferred by the three Deeds of
Grant had they been executed and the right to use 10 strips of land 10m wide
with a total length of just over 8km for laying pipelines and cables
thereunder.
(7) Tree screening
BP seeks
185.74 acres for tree screening of which just over 130 acres adjoin the
extended gathering station, some 45 acres adjoin Well Sites A, D and F, 0.75
acre adjoins the pumping station and 8.5 acres adjoin the access road. BP does
not seek to exclude the Ryders from access to those areas.
Statutory
conditions
I propose to
consider next the statutory conditions which must be satisfied if the court is
to exercise its discretion to grant all or any of the rights sought by BP. That
the court has a discretion is clear from the language of section 1 of the 1966
Act, ‘The Court may . . . confer . . . rights’. I shall come back to the
question of discretion later, but it is convenient to mention one point now.
The procedure laid down in Ord 96 on this application envisages a form of
pleadings, namely an application by the applicant and, if any person wishes to
oppose the same, a notice of objection from him stating the grounds of
objection and any alternative methods of effecting the objects of the
application which he alleges may be used and the facts on which he relies. If
the notice of objection is silent on or concedes any point contained in the
application the court is entitled to take that into238
account in considering whether the statutory conditions are fulfilled and the
discretion ought to be exercised; but I do not think I am bound by the express
or implied consent of the parties and it must be established to my satisfaction
that those conditions are fulfilled.
There are four
statutory conditions prescribed:
(1) section 3(1) of the 1934 Act
(2) section 1 of the 1966 Act
The first
condition to be fulfilled is that BP requires the rights it seeks for the
exercise of the rights granted by the production licence (section 3(1) of the
1934 Act). With this can be taken the second condition, viz that BP requires
the rights in order that the petroleum might be properly and conveniently
exploited by it and that the proper and efficient exploitation of the petroleum
is unduly hampered by its inability or failure to obtain those rights (para 5
of the Table to section 1 of the 1966 Act).
It is BP’s
case that those conditions are fulfilled. It claims that it needs those rights
to enable it to operate the Wytch Farm oilfield to its full commercial capacity
and in particular to produce oil from the Sherwood Reservoir. It says it needs
the additional land at the gathering station because a larger processing plant
is required in order to treat the increased volume of oil that will be taken to
it, and it needs correspondingly larger tankage and other facilities. Thus it
will install a new gas-processing plant to receive gases from the crude oil
separators and to produce domestic gas and LPG. BP claims it needs the three
further well site areas to achieve the level of production planned; it will
construct additional well cellars to accommodate new wells; it needs to provide
sufficient space within the well site area for the safe and efficient operation
of the facilities thereon and for the provision of flare pits for testing
purposes. BP claims it needs the additional area at Cleavel Point to replace the
existing pumping station, which is too small, with a new pumping station needed
to extract and treat the much greater quantities of water to be used in
exploiting the Sherwood Reservoir. BP says it needs the right to use the water
supply compound because no right in respect thereof has yet been granted to it
by the estate. It claims it needs the laydown areas during the period it will
be carrying out construction operations. It claims it needs the right to use
and, where necessary, improve the estate roads to have access to and from the
facilities sought by the application and it needs to construct the access road
as a new and permanent road providing access to and from the gathering station,
which when built will avoid the need to use the existing narrow roads for heavy
traffic. It is a condition of the planning permission that the access road
shall be used. It claims it needs the right to lay new underground pipelines
and cables and to maintain and use existing and new pipelines and cables.
Because the development is in an environmentally sensitive area and to meet the
planning requirements of Dorset County Council, it claims it requires areas for
tree-screening and landscaping. Finally in relation to the lands the subject of
the leases, it claims it requires rights additional to those in the leases to
enable it to make full use of those lands without the restrictions imposed by
the restrictive covenants to which I have drawn attention and without certain
other minor restrictions in the leases. It claims that the restrictions on user
unduly impede the production capacities of the existing facilities.
In the notice
of objection the Ryders make no admissions as to BP’s claim that the
restrictions on user contained in the leases unduly impede the production capacities
of the existing facilities, but no other point is taken on BP’s claims to
require the additional rights. It is true, as the Ryders assert, that those
restrictions were freely negotiated by GC(E), but I have no doubt that in order
to achieve proper and intensive use of the land the subject of the existing
leases, additional rights should be granted so that the restrictions limiting
the user to and for the purposes of the existing oilfields (a term which the
Ryders contend, and BP now accepts, excludes the Sherwood Reservoir) ought to
be removed.
I should
mention three points raised by Mr Waller, although none of them was taken in
the notice of objection.
First, Mr
Waller questioned whether the court had jurisdiction to remove any restrictions
in a lease, it being common ground that the court could not vary an existing
lease or compel the grant of a new lease. He drew my attention to the
provisions in para 1(3) and 3(3) of the Table to section 1 of the 1966 Act
which expressly empower the court to confer rights freed from restrictions in
certain mining leases, and contrasted that with the wording of para 5. But
provided that what the applicant seeks is a right and that right is shown to be
required by BP for the exploitation of petroleum, in my judgment the fact that
the right in effect overrides a prohibition or restriction in an existing lease
does not prevent the court from granting that right. Once the right is granted,
the prohibition will not be capable of being enforced. Thus I see no
jurisdictional objection to granting a right to use the access road to gain
access to the existing gathering station notwithstanding the prohibition on
approaching the gathering station except from the public highway to Wytch Farm.
The second
point raised by Mr Waller was the length of the term for which BP sought
rights, exceeding as it does the present term of the production licence. Mr
Essayan protested at this, with justification: as no point was taken on this in
the notice of objection nor in cross-examination, no evidence was led by BP on
the point. However, I cannot see how I can ignore the point, given that it is a
statutory condition that the application requires the rights for the exercise
of rights granted by the production licence. Under clause 2(b) of the section
51 agreement BP is required to satisfy Dorset County Council that BP has
acquired control by ownership or agreement or by order of the court for a
minimum period of 50 years of the areas of land required to enable ‘the Land
Management Proposals’ and the requirements of the planning provisions in
respect of landscape management to be implemented. The Land Management
Proposals were submitted in support of the planning applications. Mr Essayan
accepted that the land which, to satisfy that clause, had to be acquired was
primarily the tree screening areas and not the whole of the land rights over
which are now sought by BP and that it will be appropriate to limit the lands
in respect of which rights for a 50-year period are sought to that which has to
be acquired to satisfy that condition. He also pointed out that the planning
conditions imposed in the planning consents included a condition governing the
restoration of sites to be acquired: the sites have to be the subject of a
5-year after-care and maintenance programme to be agreed with Dorset County
Council, and he submitted that BP had to be in a position to fulfil that
condition. I agree that the period for which the rights are to be granted must
be such as to enable BP to comply with that condition. But subject to those two
matters, I do not think that the period for the rights sought should exceed the
period of the licence.
The third
point related to the requirement in para 5(1) of the table to section 1 of the
1966 Act that the proper and efficient exploitation of the petroleum is unduly
hampered by BP’s inability or failure to obtain the rights it requires. Mr
Waller drew attention to the fact that BP adduced no evidence to show that it
was unduly hampered by having to pay the amounts demanded by the Ryders. But he
accepted that in the light of Glassbrook Bros Ltd v Leyson [1933]
3 KB 91 (in which it was held on similar wording that there had to be more than
economic hampering) he could not rely on the point at this stage. He said it
came in on the question of whether section 3(2) was satisfied. I agree with Mr
Essayan that, having regard to the words ‘inability or failure’, all the court
must be satisfied on is that the applicant does not have, but genuinely needs,
the rights he seeks in order to exploit petroleum. The requirement would be
satisfied even if the applicant culpably fails to obtain a needed right.
Questions of unreasonableness arise under section 3(2).
That leads me
to a further point which has occurred to me on the wording in Appendix F to the
application of the rights sought by BP. As at present advised (but I am
prepared to hear further argument on the point, if necessary) I would not be
prepared to make an order granting rights which do no more than remove
otherwise unresolved doubts as to existing rights, because as I have already
said the court must be satisfied that the rights sought are those which the
applicant does not have but genuinely needs. To give an example, BP seeks the
right to use not only the extension to the gathering station but also the
existing gathering station and the Causeway for the purpose of exploiting
petroleum and all activities incidental thereto. But the lease of the gathering
station and the Causeway already gives BP the right to use the same ‘for the
purpose of the extraction treatment and handling of oil and gas and purposes
ancillary thereto’, and it is far from clear to me that anything more would be
granted to BP by a right in the form sought.
Subject to the
foregoing comments, I am satisfied that the first and second statutory
conditions are met by BP.
(3) section 3(1) of the 1966 Act
The third
condition to be satisfied is that the grant must be expedient in the national
interest. BP says, and the Ryders accept, that the grant is expedient in the
national interest. I have no hesitation in agreeing. Here is a significantly
large oilfield on-shore and239
therefore easily accessible. Its development and subsequent operation are
likely to bring economic benefits to the nation in terms of employment, output
(measured as the gross domestic product resulting from the direct and indirect
effect of BP’s planned expenditure in respect of the oilfield) and government
revenue. In an independent report commissioned by BP it has been estimated that
in the first three years, during which BP plans to spend £265m on the
development of the existing facilities, 11,500 jobs will be created, and that
in each year the output would be £125m and the government revenue would be
£29m; further, over an estimated 20-year life of the oilfield, in each year
1,366 jobs would be secured, the output would be £17m, government revenue £114m
and the UK balance of payments would be benefited by no less than £313m. The
impact on employment locally would be particularly significant. It is in my judgment
so clearly in the national interest that the necessary rights to develop the
oilfield should be granted that I shall not elaborate the matter further.
(4) section 3(2) of the 1966 Act
The fourth
condition is that it is not reasonably practicable to obtain the rights by
private arrangement for any one or more of the four reasons set out in section
3(2). BP relies primarily on section 3(2)(d), claiming that the estate
unreasonably refused to grant the rights or demanded terms which having regard
to the circumstances were unreasonable. In the alternative it relies on section
3(2)(a), claiming that the Ryders had interests which conflicted with those of
Mr Pitman until agreement was reached between them in the course of the
hearing. In the further alternative it relies on section 3(2)(c), claiming that
the Ryders lacked the necessary powers of disposition in relation to at least
part of Mr Pitman’s land rights over which BP seeks, until the Ryders reached
agreement with Mr Pitman.
Mr Essayan
submitted that reasonableness is a question of law to be determined on the
facts as found and having regard to all the circumstances known to the court at
the hearing, including (a) the course of negotiations, (b) the views formed by
the court as to the proper terms, including the basis and level of compensation
to be paid, subject to which any grants of rights should be made and (c) the
national interest. Mr Waller’s criticism of BP’s approach on this point was
that in effect BP started with what compensation the court would award under
section 8 before deciding whether there had been unreasonableness under section
3(2)(d), and this, as he put it, turned the 1966 Act on its head.
I of course
accept that the court would have no jurisdiction to assess the consideration
and compensation under section 8 unless the applicant had first satisfied the
court that the condition in section 3(2) was fulfilled. In my judgment it is
also clear that an unreasonable refusal or unreasonable demand for the purposes
of section 3(2)(d) is one which no reasonable man would make (see the Glassbrook
case supra at p 123 per Romer LJ), and that there may be, for
example, a range of demands which reasonable men might make. Further, it is
appropriate to bear in mind what the applicant himself has offered in the
course of negotiations as that, too, may exceed what the court would award;
but, for example, a demand only slightly in excess of what is offered may
appear to the court to be not unreasonable in all the circumstances. Another
point of particular importance in this case is the fact that it is common
ground that a landowner might reasonably demand an amount, over and above the
section 8(2) consideration or compensation, for saving the oil company the time
and expense of an application under the 1966 Act. Accordingly, if the court
looks ahead to what it would assess under section 8 as fair and reasonable, it
must bear firmly in mind that a demand in excess of the amount to be assessed
is not automatically unreasonable. As Lord Hanworth MR said in the Glassbrook
case at p 110:
To say or
hold that unless the respondent obtains all that he asks for he was
unreasonable seems to me to impose an incorrect standard of what is reasonable
and what is unreasonable.
But subject to
those comments it seems to me both natural and indeed inevitable that in
deciding on the question of what is unreasonable for the purpose of section
3(2)(d) the court will have some regard to the basis of consideration and
compensation under section 8(2). That is how the commission in the case of The
Denaby and Cadeby Main Collieries’ Application (the Colliery Guardian,
November 30 1928, p 2180, 1) appear to have approached the matter. Salter J,
giving the leading judgment, first determined the amount of consideration for
the rights sought, and the report of the judgment then continued (at p 2181):
An excessive
demand was not necessarily an unreasonable one, but in this case [the
landowner] had demanded nearly three times what he was entitled to and
represented that he might have demanded twice as much as he did. His Lordship
thought that he demanded terms which having regard to the circumstances were
unreasonable.
So, too, in
the Glassbrook case the Court of Appeal decided the question of
unreasonableness after having regard to what the commission considered were the
appropriate terms for a grant.
In other words
there is likely to be some correlation between the basis and amount of the
court’s assessment and what may reasonably be demanded by the landowner. If,
for example, the court concludes that production-related payments cannot
property be awarded under section 8, in my judgment it would not be reasonable
for a landowner to demand such payments.
I would make
one further comment on what is unreasonable lest my subsequent conclusions on
the facts are misunderstood. Reasonableness must be judged in relation to the
particular demands or refusals and not by reference to the general personal
qualities of the person making the demand or refusal. A man who is aptly
described in general as a reasonable man may nevertheless make what objectively
can be seen to be in the circumstances an unreasonable demand or refusal. Mr M
J Ramsay Willis, the chartered surveyor who acted for the estate throughout the
negotiations, impressed me as a man of high intelligence, well able to reason
with force and clarity. But those admirable attributes do not of course mean
that I must find the demands he made for the estate to have been not
unreasonable.
Subject to the
foregoing comments, I would accept Mr Essayan’s submissions on
unreasonableness, supported as they are by the Glassbrook case, Archibald
Russell Ltd v Nether Pollok Ltd 1938 SC 1 and the Deneby and
Cadeby case. I propose to consider (A) the demands made by the estate, (B)
the correct basis of compensation under section 8(2), (C) the amount I would
award under section 8(2) if satisfied that I can and should grant the rights to
BP, (D) the additional amount under section 3(2)(b) of the 1934 Act, (E) the
reasonableness of the demands, and (F) the practicability of obtaining those
rights by private arrangement. If the statutory conditions are fulfilled, I
shall consider whether the court should exercise its discretion to grant the
rights. I shall then consider whether section 3(2)(a) or (c) of the 1966 Act is
satisfied.
(A) The demands
At this point
I shall deal with another point of law which arose: should the court look only
at the open negotiations between the parties or should the court also take into
account what was said in those parts of the negotiations between the parties
which were conducted ‘without prejudice’?
Mr Essayan submitted the former is correct but that on either footing
section 3(2)(d) is satisfied. Mr Waller submitted that the latter is correct
but that on either footing section 3(2)(d) is not satisfied. With Mr Essayan’s
consent I have in fact looked at all the documents, but in agreeing to that
course he made clear that BP’s primary submission was that the court should
consider only the open negotiations.
It is trite
law that evidence of ‘without prejudice’ negotiations is inadmissible (see, for
example, South Shropshire District Council v Amos [1987] 1 All ER
340). It is a question of fact whether any negotiations, or documents passing,
between the parties are ‘without prejudice’ within that principle, but if
satisfied that they are, then in my judgment I must exclude such evidence. It
cannot be right that a party which is willing to make a proposal only ‘without
prejudice’ and declines to put that proposal in an open letter should be able
to rely on that proposal as evidence of his reasonable behaviour.
In the present
case there can be no doubt that some of the negotiations were ‘without
prejudice’ negotiations. In particular there were two meetings, one on November
26 1984 between Mr Frampton, who from May 1984 was in charge of the Wytch Farm
negotiations for BP, and Mr Willis, and the other on September 24 1985 between
Mr Frampton and Mr Anthony Panes [FRICS CAAV] of Savills for BP and Mr Willis,
each of which meetings, I am satisfied, was conducted on a ‘without prejudice’
basis. There is no evidence that the ‘without prejudice’ nature of the
communications at those meetings was ever waived. Accordingly, in my judgment,
the alleged unreasonableness of the estate must be judged without reference to
what was said at those meetings.
In addition to
those meetings certain other communications240
appear to have been ‘without prejudice’ in that letters were marked as such.
But I was told by Mr Waller that he and Mr Essayan had not agreed on which communications
were ‘without prejudice’ nor was I invited to determine this question other
than in relation to the two meetings which I have mentioned, and I propose to
adopt the convenient course followed by both counsel of considering whether
section 3(2) is satisfied first by reference to the open correspondence relied
on by BP in the application, and then, in case I am wrong in excluding the two
‘without prejudice’ meetings, by reference to all the negotiations between the
parties.
The open
correspondence commences with a letter dated July 20 1983 from BP to Mr Willis,
setting out its proposals for a continuing arrangement between BP as the
operator designate at the Wytch Farm oilfield and the estate. BP indicated that
it wanted a single agreement to cover all existing and future sites for which,
in accordance with what it accurately described as ‘general practice in the UK
between landowners and the oil industry for sites for the purposes of exploring
for and producing any deposits of petroleum’, it suggested rentals based upon
acreage-related payments made annually in advance and subject to adjustment
periodically against recognised published indices. The payments, BP said, would
be related to the rentals which the land would otherwise command, namely an
agricultural land rental (and BP indicated it would be prepared to treat
afforested land as commanding the higher agricultural rental), to which BP
would apply a multiplier for disturbance and rights of access along estate
roads. It offered to pay the occupier for loss of crops on a gross yield basis
and it suggested that pipeline easements should be subject to the standard
arrangements approved by the National Farmers Union and the CLA. BP in turn
asked Mr Willis to set down details of his suggested basis for assessing
rentals. Mr Willis’ response by letter dated July 25 1983 was to say that from
its meeting with him BP would know the basis upon which the estate required to
be paid and once BP’s representative had instructions to negotiate under the
headings which he, Mr Willis, outlined at the meetings he would be pleased to
see BP’s representative again. The meetings to which Mr Willis referred were
meetings held on July 4 and 13 which neither side suggested were on a ‘without
prejudice’ basis. The headings which Mr Willis outlined were that BP should
make a bonus payment for the granting of a lease, a royalty or throughput
payment by reference to the gross value of the liftings of oil and gas on the
estate and a delay and fallback rental based on industrial rents should the
throughput payments fall below the fallback rental. Mr Willis thereafter
adamantly adhered to his demand for a bonus payment and a throughput rental
with a fallback industrial rent, but despite BP’s requests he refused to
quantify the estate’s ideas as to the appropriate level of remuneration.
Thus in
response to a request dated June 1 1984 Mr Willis in a letter dated June 5 1984
stated:
My clients
remain, in principle, perfectly prepared to grant you the facilities you need
but . . . consider it reasonable that they should be remunerated on a basis
related to the gross annual value of the liftings from the field. If, for some
reason, you will not agree to such a basis of payment, the statutory procedure
will have to be invoked, the near inevitability of which my clients long ago
accepted
On February 7
1985 Mr Frampton wrote to Mr Willis, making BP’s formal and detailed offer of
an industrial rent basis in an endeavour to reach agreement rather than apply
under the Act. That offer was worth some £260,000 in initial rents and a lump
sum (as increased on March 19 1985) of £69,150 for pipeline and cable
easements. Mr Willis replied on February 21 1985 expressing surprise that Mr
Frampton’s offer was so far removed from the basis which he, Mr Willis, had
indicated would be acceptable. He questioned whether BP would be able to
satisfy the statutory conditions under the 1966 Act and continued:
The
alternative, by which you can be assured of an early grant of the facilities
which you need, is to pay site rents in line with the market in industrial
ground rents and an annual sum related to the volume of oil and gas which will
be extracted by virtue of my Clients’ grant once and whenever such a
calculation exceeds total site rents
He described
what he was demanding as ‘a perfectly reasonable commercial arrangement which
would no more than reflect the value to [BP] of the facilities which my clients
have always been willing to provide’. He ended the letter by emphasising that
unless Mr Frampton was instructed to continue negotiations on the basis which
Mr Willis had put forward, further discussions would be fruitless. In that
letter for the first time the estate’s demands were made by reference to the
volume, and not the value, of the liftings.
On March 19 Mr
Frampton wrote back expressing the view that the estate’s insistence on
production-related payments was unreasonable, but requesting that Mr Willis set
out in detail and with figures the terms upon which the estate was willing to
offer to BP the facilities on the estate’s land which BP sought so that BP
could consider fully the estate’s own proposals. Mr Willis’ response was to say
that if BP wished to continue negotiations aimed at a settlement based on an
industrial ground rent and a mutually acceptable level of payment by relation
to volume, Mr Willis would be happy to arrange a further meeting. There was no
alteration in the estate’s attitude thereafter and BP lodged its application on
July 10 1985.
There are
three significant features of the estate’s demands as revealed by the open
correspondence: (1) the estate was demanding payments calculated by reference
to the liftings of oil and gas, initially by their value and latterly by their
volume; (2) the estate insisted on the acceptance of the principle of
production-related payments as a condition of progress in the negotiations, but
(3) it refused to set out in detail or with figures what it was demanding.
I shall now
describe the course of the negotiations on the alternative footing that it is
permissible to look at all the negotiations including those conducted ‘without
prejudice’.
At the very
first meeting between BP’s representatives and Mr Willis on July 4 1983, Mr
Willis, when asked whether he had any idea what the estate’s terms would be,
replied that he had a very clear idea and then proceeded to outline his views
on what he described in his own minutes of the meeting as ‘the need for a
totally new basis for the financial relationship between surface acreage owners
and the oil companies engaged in onshore oil exploration and production in the
United Kingdom’. He likened the present situation to that which had existed in
Texas at the turn of the century and referred to certain Texas legislation
under which landowners were able to participate in the gross value of oil
brought to the surface of their land. He said the estate would be looking for
payment based on the Texas model under the three headings which I have
mentioned, an initial bonus payment, a royalty payment calculated as a
percentage of the gross value of the liftings of oil and gas (and he mentioned
that 12 1/2% was the minimum royalty in Texas) and delay and fallback rents
based on industrial rents. Mr Willis said that a different level of throughput
payment would be appropriate for oil and gas lifted from outside the estate but
passed through the gathering station. He then explained that throughput payment
was absolutely fundamental to the estate’s negotiating position. When asked by
BP if he felt it an appropriate time to put forward figures, he replied that he
had outlined the three headings under which the estate could expect to be paid,
but he saw BP as ‘the supplicants to the Rempstone throne’ and he felt it was
for BP to open the bidding along the lines which he suggested. He told BP that
it should be in no doubt as to his determination to achieve a new basis for the
payment of surface acreage owners and that he was prepared with the support of
the CLA to achieve this by new legislation if necessary.
I pause there
to observe that Mr Willis, as he confirmed in his cross-examination, knew that
he was proposing a totally new basis never adopted before in the United
Kingdom, but was insisting as a condition precedent to negotiations that BP
accept the principle of throughput payments even before it knew what that
acceptance would be likely to cost. That he considered the estate to be in an
extremely strong position vis-a-vis BP is plain from this and the subsequent
meetings.
At a further
meeting on July 13 1983 the BP representatives set out the terms it was at that
time offering landowners, namely approximately 10 times agricultural rental
values. Mr Willis reiterated the estate’s demands under the headings of bonus
(which he described as an absolute requirement on which he would make no
concessions), throughput and fallback rents related to industrial ground rents
of £10,000 per acre per annum. That figure, which was the one figure Mr Willis
did put forward at that time, was, he said in cross-examination, based on
figures from an industrial estate in Southampton, notwithstanding its very
different location and its distance from the estate. He insisted that success
in the negotiations depended entirely on BP’s willingness to pay realistically
under the three headings, although he was prepared to settle the throughput
payments and the fallback rents under one heading so that the initial fallback
rent would be increased on a 3-year rent review by a factor arrived at by
relating the output value at the date of the lease to the241
output value of the review. Mr Willis at that meeting stated what he was
subsequently to repeat, that he did not intend to write letters recording his
views. In cross-examination he accepted that the most likely reason why he did
not want to write letters was that they might afterwards be quoted against him
if the matter came to court proceedings.
I have already
referred to BP’s letter of July 20 1983 in which Mr Willis was asked for
details of his suggested basis for assessing rentals. Mr Willis’ own note of
his reaction to that was ‘Not until [my] principles are agreed’ and that is
reflected in his open letter of July 25 1983 to which I have referred.
BP then
appointed a chartered surveyor, Mr Edwards of Bernard Thorpe & Partners, to
act on its behalf, and he met Mr Willis on August 22 1983. Mr Willis expressed
the view that the landowner was entitled to participate in the profit from oil
once it reached the surface and referred to the Texas practice of the landowner
taking 12 1/2% of the gross market value of the liftings. He subsequently
recognised that the view he expressed was incorrect and by October 1983 he
considered (but did not reveal to BP) that 2 1/2% was the right amount. At that
meeting for the first time there was express recognition that BP would have to
apply under the 1966 Act if agreement could not be reached.
On September
28 1983 Mr Edwards made a ‘without prejudice’ offer in writing, whereby BP
offered to surrender its leases and to enter into a new agreement for the
existing sites and easements, with an extension to the gathering station. BP
offered a capital sum of £750,000, plus a further £50,000 for each new well
site, plus £300 per annum per acre. There was a further meeting on October 12
1983 between Mr Willis and Mr Edwards to discuss the offer. Mr Willis made
clear that the amount of the offer fell very far short of what would be
acceptable to the estate, and suggested that if BP was prepared to pay a
substantial capital payment for entering into a lease the estate might leave
the terms to be settled by the court. Again he refused to put forward a figure
for that capital payment though when asked if £750,000 was a suitable figure he
said it was not, and he in fact had in mind £20m at that time. In a further
conversation between Mr Willis and Mr Edwards on October 19 1983, Mr Edwards
asked for confirmation that the capital sum would be taken into account when
the terms were referred to the court, but Mr Wills said that he regarded the
two as totally separate and that it must be agreed beforehand that it was
irrelevant and no part of the dispute which had been referred. Mr Edwards
demurred at this, saying that he could not see how BP could pay a large sum,
‘say £5m’, and then refer the agreed terms to the court which might order BP to
pay on a production-related basis, in which case it would have paid twice. Mr
Willis recorded that he said to Mr Edwards that ‘this was a risk which BP ran
and the penalty they were paying for not agreeing now to pay on a
production-related basis’. Thus the choice he was putting to BP was to accept
his suggestion of paying a bonus plus throughput payments plus fallback rents
or pay a substantial ‘penalty’ if it chose to have the terms settled by the
court.
In a ‘without
prejudice’ letter dated October 24 Mr Edwards expressed interest in BP making a
capital payment for the grant of a lease and in the court determining the
consideration provided that the capital sum was £750,000 and that was taken
into account by the court. Again Mr Willis was urged to set out the figures he
had in mind but he never did so. What Mr Willis had in mind at that time was a
capital sum of £15,125,000 computed on the footing that that was 50% of the
capitalised value of what the estate would receive if the court awarded a
production-related payment equal to 2 1/2% of the value of the liftings. He
explained in cross-examination that the capital sum was to cover the 50/50
chance that the estate might not get the production-related ruling from the
court. Thus what Mr Willis wanted was the certainty of the estate receiving
half of the production-related value, as he saw it, of the rights to be granted
to BP even if the court ruled against production-related payments together with
the court’s award on a less favourable basis, while if the court ruled as he thought
it should the estate would be awarded the full production-related value and on
top of that it would receive 50% more by means of the capital payment.
On November 23
there was a further meeting, this time attended by Mr James Ryder as well as Mr
Willis for the estate and Mr Mowll of BP as well as Mr Edwards. Mr Willis again
said that he had no intention of writing any letters nor of setting down in
writing the estate’s requirements except to say that it was perfectly willing
to grant the facilities required in return for payment on a throughput basis.
When cross-examined on this he accepted that he thereby wanted to avoid the
‘ultimate risk’ of committing the estate to a position that the court might
hold to be unreasonable. Four possibilities were discussed. One was that there
should be a two-tier bonus payment, part of which would be non-returnable and
part would be taken into account by the court in assessing the compensation for
the lease. But at no time did the estate indicate the amount of either part nor
the total of the bonus which it was seeking. The second was that the land
required should be sold subject to an annual rentcharge indexed to a factor to
be agreed. But again nothing more was said to specify what amounts the estate
was seeking. The third was that BP was to pay a non-returnable bonus spread
over a number of years and site rents indexed to a factor to be agreed. Again
the estate did not indicate the amounts it was seeking. The fourth was that the
estate would form a company to become a partner in the consortium to develop
Wytch Farm, such company’s liability to make a capital contribution to be
funded by the bonus BP would pay the estate. Thus the estate would not have to
find any money to become a partner and Mr Willis hoped that any further
contributions it might have to make would be met out of its share of revenue.
Mr Willis again emphasised that the estate felt in a very strong position and
said that the estate was perfectly prepared to see the statutory process for
the acquisition of compulsory powers and an award of consideration by the
court. At that stage, he said, the only alternative was a bonus payment and
annual consideration related to throughput.
BP on December
5 1983 wrote to Mr James Ryder, again indicating that any production-related
payment was unacceptable and that while interested in the idea of a two-tier
bonus payment it would only agree to a nominal initial payment to be excluded
from the consideration awarded by the court. There was a further meeting on May
31 1984 between Mr Wills, Mr Mowll and Mr Frampton. Again Mr Willis emphasised
his requirement of a production-related settlement. BP suggested that an
agreement be reached on the existing basis offered by BP but there would be a
provision that if a different basis for arriving at land values for oil-related
purposes became generally accepted, the estate would have the benefit of the
different basis. Mr Willis rejected this. He said that if the basis generally
used in the United Kingdom was to change, then it would need to be brought
about in the present negotiations. In his cross-examination by Mr Essayan the
following passage occurred:
Q. What you
were concerned about is that if you did not establish in these negotiations
with BP the principle of production-related payments, there was a very real
risk that nobody would establish it in any other proceedings?
A. I think if
one is being entirely realistic about it, Wytch Farm had been seen for some
time possibly as the likely catalyst for the resolution of this difference
between those who felt that the existing legislation permitted landowners to be
paid in some form which acknowledged the value of access to the volume of oil
and those who did not. So I think the answer is yes, it did seem that this was
the most likely circumstance in which this would be resolved.
It was
suggested by BP at that meeting that BP should receive a lease to enable it to
proceed with the development work and the appropriate remuneration would be
determined by an arbitrator or the court, but Mr Willis indicated that this
would be acceptable only if, as Mr Frampton’s notes record, ‘the estate
received a substantial initial payment in consideration for allowing us to
proceed with our development without the delay which would be involved if we had
to enforce our legal rights in order to obtain the land required.’ Mr Willis in cross-examination explained
this:
In commercial
terms, it seemed to me that there was a very considerable advantage to BP from
an early settlement of this difficulty to enable them to obtain an early start;
yes, I did feel that that early start should command a price.
But Mr Willis,
despite being pressed a number of times, refused to quantify his requirements
although Mr Frampton gained the impression, probably from what he had learned
from Mr Edwards of the discussion on October 19 1983 when the figure of £5m had
been mentioned by Mr Edwards, that Mr Willis was thinking of a figure of £5m or
more.
On June 1 1984
Mr Frampton wrote the open letter to which I have already referred, asking Mr
Willis to reconsider his refusal to come up with a counteroffer quantifying the
estate’s demands, and on June 5 1984 Mr Willis replied in the letter to which I
have also referred, demanding remuneration on a basis related to the gross value
of liftings, but not giving any figures. On October 16 1984 there was a meeting
between Mr Frampton and Mr Willis at which Mr242
Frampton outlined BP’s land requirements and conceded that its previous offer
of £300 per acre was out of date and that BP was thinking in terms of £2,500
per acre. For his part Mr Willis indicated that the estate’s position had not
changed. As he explained in cross-examination,
I felt that
it was probably my last chance of persuading BP to pay handsomely for the
facilities which we were being asked to grant.
On November 26
1984 the first of the ‘without prejudice’ meetings to which I earlier drew
attention was held. At that meeting for the first time Mr Willis gave some
indication of the rental figure the estate was seeking. He said that quite
apart from a substantial capital payment (the amount of which he refused to
quantify) for the estate agreeing to grant the facilities required, the estate
would be looking for an average annual income of £2m over the lifetime of the
project, even though that sum was, as Mr Willis accepted, probably in excess of
the freehold value of all the land comprising the northern part of the estate.
Mr Willis indicated that there were three choices for BP: (1) to pay a capital
sum plus an average of £2m per annum, (2) to pay a capital sum and agree terms
of a reference to the court to adjudicate on the basis upon which payment
should be made, with a further reference, in default of agreement, to the Lands
Tribunal, and (3) to apply under the 1966 Act. Mr Willis said that the third
course would establish BP’s new relationship with the estate on the worst
possible footing. Mr Frampton made a revised offer of about £260,000 per annum
plus a capital sum of £100,000 for pipeline easements, but that was rejected.
On February 7
1985 Mr Frampton made BP’s formal and detailed offer which was rejected by Mr
Willis on February 21 1985 as I have already described. On March 19 1985 Mr
Frampton wrote the letter to which I have already referred, asking Mr Willis to
quantify the estate’s demands, but, as I have already stated, Mr Willis in his
reply on March 22 1985 did not comply with that request and maintained his
demand that the principle of volume-related payments be accepted as a condition
of further negotiations.
On June 20
1985 there was a telephone conversation between Mr Willis and Mr Frampton in
which Mr Willis confirmed that the estate was still seeking a bonus plus annual
payments of £2m but stated that he did not mind calling the production-related
payments something else so long as the estate received the same amount over the
life of the field.
After BP put
in its application, the second ‘without prejudice’ meeting to which I have
referred was held on September 24 1985. On that occasion Mr Willis put forward
two specific proposals. Proposal A was that BP would pay a lump sum of £5m plus
an initial rent of £500,000 for all the land rights BP required then and
thereafter, such rent to be reviewed annually by reference to the volume of oil
not limited to that produced on the estate but passing through the gathering
station, so that if 6,000 bpd were produced at the date of the lease and the
level of production were 24,000 bpd at the date of the review, the rent would
rise to £2m. Proposal B was for BP to pay a bonus of £2m and a base rent of
£1.5m to be reviewed annually by reference to a mutually agreed national index
of industrial rents. Mr Willis accepted that Proposal B was only a different
way of assessing the figures on a production-related basis and represented a
broad-brush spreading of the estimated production-related return over a 40-year
period. Those proposals were unacceptable to BP.
If I may
summarise the salient features of the negotiations as revealed by the fuller
documentation, they are in effect the same as those to which I have already
drawn attention as revealed by the open correspondence save that at the
‘without prejudice’ meeting on November 26 1984 the annual rental (but not the
bonus payment) was quantified by Mr Willis and that at the ‘without prejudice’
meeting on September 24 1985 for the first time the total demands were
specified. BP says that the demands were unreasonable in that they were
excessive.
(B) The basis of compensation
It is BP’s
primary case that the consideration or compensation to be awarded under section
8 of the 1966 Act should be on the basis of the existing use value of the land
rights which it seeks plus sums for injurious affection and disturbance to
which must be added the additional allowance required by section 3(2)(b) of the
1934 Act on account of the acquisition of the rights being compulsory. Mr
Waller submitted on the 23rd day of the hearing in the course of his reply that
BP should not be allowed to contend for so low a value as existing use value
because of the following passage in para 32.6 of the application:
A payment to
an owner of land for the grant of rights such as those sought by BP should be
measured by reference to the existing use value of the land affected (viz
principally agricultural or forestry use) and the use, namely an equivalent of
an industrial use, to which it is to be put. The proper measure it is
submitted, lies between the existing and proposed use value.
But Mr Essayan
on the second day of the hearing had submitted (without protest from Mr Waller)
that the basis of compensation was the value of the land to the grantor, which
he specified as the existing use value of the land with all its potentialities
and in reading the authorities on that and the third day of the hearing he
stressed those in which the compensation was held to be on the basis of the
existing use value. Further, a schedule prepared by Mr Driscoll and put in by
BP at an early stage of the hearing showed amounts payable under various bases
of valuation including an existing use valuation. I also observed that in the
written submissions which Mr Waller helpfully handed to me when he opened the
Ryders’ case, BP’s view was expressed as including this:
When
considering whether a landowner is demanding terms that are unreasonable it is
prima facie unreasonable to be demanding in excess of existing use value
or that value ‘enhanced’ by whatever BP/+ conceivably some other oil company is
offering as an act of generosity
(my italics).
It does not
appear to me that the Ryders have been put at any disadvantage by BP contending
for existing use value and in all the circumstances I do not think it right to
disallow that contention.
In the light
of the evidence of Mr Christopher Panes [FRICS] giving the rental value of the
agricultural land required by BP as between £35 and £40 per annum per acre, BP
is content to take the higher figure of £40 per acre and apply that to all the
additional acres required by BP, including the woodland, notwithstanding that
its existing use value will be lower than that of the agricultural land. BP
accepts that it is bound by the terms of the existing leases under which rents
higher than the existing use rental values are payable. The initial annual
rents per acre which BP will pay on the existing use basis amount to £15,635
for the sites required for 30 to 50 years (of which £5,999 is the total of the
rents which will continue to be paid under the existing leases), plus £828 for
the laydown and soil storage sites required for 1 to 5 years, plus a lump sum
of £600,897 (made up of £333,000 for injurious affection and disturbance,
£144,345 for value of the timber in the woodlands and £123,552 for the pipeline
and cable easements). Of the lump sum £25,000 has been agreed as a disturbance
payment for Mr Pitman.
BP’s alternative
case is that the court should award compensation and consideration on the basis
of the evidence of Mr Edmond, the head of BP’s Lands and Environment Section of
the United Kingdom Land Division of BP since June 1984, and alternatively of Mr
Christopher Panes.
Mr Edmond gave
evidence of other transactions entered into by BP for the acquisition of
exploration and production sites and on that basis his valuation was £2,500 per
acre per annum. This produces a total of £215,355 per annum for the initial rents
for areas required for 30 to 50 years (including the areas subject to the
existing leases). In addition he would add certain valuations taken from Mr
Panes, namely rents of £40,475 per annum for the laydown and soil storage areas
required for 1 to 5 years plus a lump sum of £273,997 (being the £600,897 lump
sum payment to which I have already referred, plus £6,100 for the deposit of
soil on the 6.1-acre site, less the £333,000 for injurious affection and
disturbance).
Mr Christopher
Panes gave his opinion that the rentals should be calculated by reference to
the existing use value, but, in the case of agricultural land and woodland of
which BP was obtaining the exclusive use, subject to a multiplier of 10 and, in
the case of other woodland, subject to a multiplier of 5. This produced initial
rents of £60,630 per annum for areas required for 30 to 50 years. In addition
he gave his opinion that £40,475 per annum should be paid for the laydown and
soil storage areas plus a lump sum of £741,252 (which differs from the lump sum
in BP’s primary case only in that he recommended an enhanced compensation, in
excess of actual capital value, of £278,000 be paid for the timber in the
woodland).
Two other sets
of figures produced by BP should be mentioned. The offer which BP made to the
estate (as revised on August 19 1986 when BP became aware that it required a
larger area than that specified in its original application) was of initial
rents of £303,440 for the areas required for 30 to 50 years plus £40,475 per
annum for243
the laydown and soil storage areas plus a lump sum of £405,252. Mr H J D
Webster [BSc FRICS] of Savills also gave a valuation on the same hypothetical
basis as that used by BP to make that offer, viz that the land had a light
industrial use but that account had to be taken of the lack of facilities for
an industrial site on the estate. On that basis the initial rents would be
£282,295 for the areas required for 30 to 50 years, £36,500 would be the rent
for the laydown and soil storage areas and there would be a lump sum of
£408,252 payable.
With these
figures should be contrasted the figures for which the estate contends. The
initial valuation of the Ryders’ independent expert, Mr A R Parker [BSc FRICS]
of Fuller Peiser, was of annual rents of £2,450,000 to £3,250,000 per annum for
the rights required for 30 to 50 years to which should be added certain figures
given by Mr Willis (and accepted by Mr Parker), namely, £119,300 for the
laydown and soil storage areas and a lump sum of £197,000 (comprising £125,000
for the pipeline and cable easements and £72,000 for depositing soil on the
6.1-acre site. On the 17th day of this hearing Mr Parker, when commencing his
oral evidence, produced a third report revising his valuation of the areas
required for 30 to 50 years to figures of £1,750,000 to £2,500,000 per annum. I
should also record that while Mr Waller supported Mr Parker’s valuation, in his
closing submissions he put forward rather lower rental figures for those areas,
namely, £584,600 (made up of the 70.45 acres for the gathering station and well
sites and 2.7 acres of the access road, all at £8,000 per acre). To that has to
be added a figure (estimated by Mr Parker to be £6,000 per acre for the well
sites and gathering station) to represent the benefit of tree-screening. Mr
Waller accepts that on the estate’s figures no further sum is to be added for
injurious affection or disturbance.
All the
estate’s figures are therefore substantially greater than BP’s figures,
including BP’s offer which, it has made clear, it put forward only in an
attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement. It is common ground that valuations
based on industrial rents are inappropriate and cannot be the basis on which
the court will make its award under section 8.
I return to
the 1934 and 1966 Acts. I draw attention to the following points:
(1) Under the 1934 Act petroleum was nationalised
without compensation. Parliament must have contemplated the possibility of oil
and gas existing in commercial quantities and yet the landowner was to receive
nothing from the Crown for what had been taken away from him. If that was a
wrong to landowners, as I think it was, it is nevertheless a wrong done by
Parliament which it is not for this court to cure by indirect means.
(2) The Secretary of State under statutory
authority confers a monopoly on each licensee to exploit oil in the licence
area. Furthermore it is common ground that the effect of the model clauses is
to exclude any form of royalty to the landowner.
(3) The licensee is empowered to cause the
compulsory acquisition of the rights he needs subject to satisfying the
statutory conditions, including the requirement of expediency in the national
interest.
(4) The court is to assess the compensation or
consideration in respect of the grant of rights. Compensation suggests that the
grantor suffers loss as a result of the grant for which he needs to be
compensated. Consideration suggests that the rights (or some of them) to be
granted have a price.
(5) The compulsory nature of the actual acquisition
and, in contrast, the voluntary nature of the hypothetical bargain between
willing grantor and willing grantee which is to form the basis of the court’s
assessment under section 8 are emphasised by the provision in section 3(2)(b)
of the 1934 Act requiring the allowance of at least 10% on account of the
acquisition being compulsory.
(6) The assessment on the basis of what would be
fair and reasonable between a willing grantor and a willing grantee suggests a
hypothetical bargain in the open market between an owner having the rights in
question and a grantee wishing to acquire those rights, no potential purchaser
being excluded from the market. The grantor must not be reluctant to sell and
the purchaser must not be reluctant to buy, and if a price is the best price
that can be obtained, the grantor cannot be assumed to refuse to sell because
he thinks it is too low nor can the grantee be assumed to refuse to buy because
he thinks it is too high.
(7) The same measure of compensation is
applicable whether the applicant is seeking rights in respect of minerals which
are or are not nationalised and whether the applicant is an emanation of the
state such as the National Coal Board or a company with private shareholders.
The crucial
difference between the parties is as to the principles to be applied to the
assessment of the consideration and compensation under section 8(2). It is BP’s
submission that the general principles of compulsory acquisition apply to the
compulsory acquisition of the rights. It is the Ryders’ submission that those
principles have no application, being governed by specific statutory provisions
which are different from and were not incorporated into the 1966 Act.
The compulsory
acquisition of land is of course the creature of statute. By the Lands Clauses
Consolidation Act 1845 (‘the Lands Clauses Act’) public undertakings were
empowered to acquire land compulsorily from a landowner who became entitled to
compensation. Similar provisions incorporating referentially the Lands Clauses
Act enabled railway companies, even though they had private shareholders, to
acquire land (see section 6 of the Railway Clauses Act 1845). By section 63 of
the Lands Clauses Act, in estimating the purchase money or compensation regard
was to be held not only to the value of the land to be purchased or taken but
also the damage, if any, to be sustained by the owner of the land by reason of
the severing of the land from the other lands of such owner, or otherwise
injuriously affecting such other lands. It is to be noted that no specific
rules were laid down by that Act for assessing the purchase money or
compensation (to which for convenience I shall refer only as compensation). The
principles on which compensation was awarded were developed through the decided
cases, subject to the modifications imposed by subsequent legislation. Three
heads of compensation were recognised: (a) the value of the land taken, (b)
loss due to disturbance (although not specifically mentioned in section 63, it
appears to have been assumed that the owner had to be compensated for
disturbance as an element in the price of the land), and (c) damage caused to
other land of the owner by severance or injurious affection. Until the
Acquisition of Land Act 1919 (‘the 1919 Act’) the value of the land was the
value to the owner; the market value was regarded as a minimum rather than as a
maximum, because to a particular owner land might be worth more than its market
value. Further the common practice was to allow an extra sum, often 10%, on
account of the acquisition being compulsory. But by section 2 of the 1919 Act,
rules for assessing compensation were laid down which (1) provided for the
value of the land to be the open market value, the seller being a willing
seller, (2) stopped any allowance being made on account of the acquisition
being compulsory, and (3) provided that the special suitability or adaptability
of the land for any purpose should not be taken into account if that purpose
was a purpose to which it could be applied only in pursuance of statutory
powers or for which there was no market apart from the special needs of a
special purchaser or the requirement of a governmental or other authority. But
the assessment of the compensation for disturbance and injurious affection was
left unaltered.
Apart from the
special statutory rules introduced by the 1919 Act, some general principles
governing the assessment of compensation in compulsory purchase cases were
stated by Eve J in South Eastern Railway Co v London County Council [1915]
2 Ch 252 at p 258 as follows:
(1) the value to be ascertained is the value to
the vendor, not its value to the purchaser; (2) in fixing the value to the
vendor all restrictions imposed on the user and enjoyment of the land in his
hands are to be taken into account, but the possibility of such restrictions
being modified or removed for his benefit is not to be overlooked; . . . . (4)
increase in value consequent on the execution of the undertaking for or in
connection with which the purchase is made must be disregarded; (5) the value
to be ascertained is the price to be paid for the land with all its
potentialities and with all the use made of it by the vendor . . .
The alteration
by the 1919 Act of the basis of assessment to the open market value did not
affect the principle that what was to be valued was that which the vendor was
losing.
The fourth
principle is now commonly known as the Pointe Gourde principle from the
case by which it was affirmed. Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport Co
Ltd v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565. One must disregard
any increase in value due to the scheme underlying the acquisition.
A consequence
of these principles is that the profitability of the land to the acquirer is
irrelevant to the assessment of compensation save to the extent that it can be
shown that such profitability is a consideration affecting the value of the
land to the owner. Thus in Cedar Rapids Manufacturing & Power Co v Lacoste
[1914] AC 569244
the Privy Council rejected valuations based on what the undertaking would bring
in by way of profit to the undertakers and, of the three parcels the subject of
that case, held that the values of two were current use values but that in
respect of the third there was a possibility of a special purchaser paying
‘something more’ above current use value in the hope of acquiring the necessary
rights to proceed with the scheme.
Another
principle which in my judgment is of general application in all compulsory
acquisition cases is that it is impermissible to take into account the power of
veto which a landowner has in the absence of compulsory powers. In Edwards
v Minister of Transport [1964] 2 QB 134 a suggestion that a claimant had
such a power which should be taken into account in assessing compensation was
rejected by the Court of Appeal, Harman LJ at p 156 saying:
I do not find
anywhere in the textbooks or in any of the authorities any suggestion that a
kind of ransom value, to which a man having a power of veto might hold the
promoting authority, was the measure of his damage; for in fact he does not
have a right of veto and the question, therefore, does not really arise.
Similarly, in Stockport
Metropolitan BC v Alwiyah Developments (1983) 52 P&CR 278, where
the respondents had applied under para (aa) of section 84(1) and section 84
(1A) of the Law of Property Act 1925 for the modification of a restrictive
covenant, the appellant council argued that the power to bargain for a price
for the discharge of the covenant was a benefit of substantial value for which
it was entitled to be compensated. That argument was rejected by the Court of
Appeal, Eveleigh LJ saying at p 282:
Any loss of a
greater sum that might have been obtained by bargaining is not, in my opinion,
a consequence of the discharge or modification of the covenant, but a
consequence of the failure to negotiate some other sum before the powers of the
Lands Tribunal under section 84 were invoked
Finally on
this aspect of the case, it is a fundamental principle in all compulsory
acquisition cases that the compensation which a landowner is entitled to
receive should not exceed what he has lost, because, as Scott LJ said in Horn
v Sunderland Corporation [1941] 2 KB 26 at p 49:
if it does,
it will put an unfair burden on the public authority or other promotors who on
public grounds have been given the power of compulsory acquisition, and it will
transgress the principle of equivalence which is at the root of statutory
compensation, the principle that the owner shall be paid neither less nor more
than his loss.
The particular
application of that principle in that case was that as the value of
agricultural land, ripe for development, was fixed on the basis of building
land, compensation for disturbance could only be awarded to the extent (if any)
that the agricultural value of the land together with the compensation for
disturbance exceeded the value of the land as building land. It is common
ground between the parties that in the present case the principle would be
applicable if either Mr Edmond’s valuation or the estate’s valuation were to be
accepted by the court; in either event, as the land is not being valued as
agricultural land or woodland, there would be nothing to be paid by BP for
injurious affection or disturbance.
Mr Essayan
submitted that these general principles are all applicable to assessing the
consideration payable under the 1966 Act, being in no way dependent on
particular statutory provisions, and that this is supported by the authorities
on the 1923 Act. Mr Waller contended that the compulsory acquisition principles
had no application to the 1934 or 1966 Acts. He submitted that those Acts had
not expropriated the right of the landowner to bargain by reference to that to
which the land gave access and that the statutory language supported the view
that the Lands Clauses Act principles had no application. In particular he
stressed the importance of negotiations in the statutory scheme and pointed out
that there was no express exclusion of any factor that would naturally enter
into negotiations between a willing grantor and a willing grantee and that
section 8(2) was not concerned simply with compensation for loss, and he
contrasted the language of the 1962 Act under which the minister is given power
either to authorise the compulsory purchase of land (and the provisions of the
Lands Clauses Act are expressly incorporated) or to make a compulsory rights
order, in which event it is expressly provided that compensation is to be
assessed by reference to the depreciation of the ‘value of the interest’. Mr
Waller further pointed out that BP was not a public undertaking which could
make a compulsory acquisition under the Lands Clauses Act. Even without going
to the authorities on the 1923 Act, I do not find Mr Waller’s arguments
persuasive. To my mind he attaches too much importance to the negotiations as a
guide to what the court will assess under section 8(2). Section 3(2)(a), (b)
and (c) of the 1966 Act envisage circumstances where there will be no
negotiations but the court must nevertheless assess compensation on the same basis
as for an application in which the applicant relies on section 3(2)(d). I can
derive little assistance from a comparison with other Acts like the 1962 Act.
The 1966 Act had to cater for a far wider range of rights to be acquired
compulsorily than the 1962 Act. The fact that BP is not a public undertaking
seems to me of no significance given that it can only acquire rights if it is
in the public interest to do so, and I have already noted that the railway
companies also had private shareholders. The Lands Clauses Act referred to the
purchase money or compensation in much the same way as the 1966 Act refers to
the consideration or compensation and yet it is firmly established that it is
the loss to the grantor that must be valued on compulsory acquisition. To my
mind it would be very surprising if the general principles of compulsory
acquisition, which seem to me to have the merit of common sense, did not apply
to the particular form of compulsory acquisition authorised by the 1934 and
1966 Acts.
I next turn to
the authorities on the 1923 Act to see to what extent they support the rival
submissions.
The first case
is Re Markham Main Colliery Ltd (1925) 134 LT 253. In that case the
applicant colliery applied to the commission under the 1923 Act for rights to
work minerals under freehold and copyhold lands. Compensation was assessed for
the freeholders (who were to lose part of the freehold by the removal of coal)
on the basis of the royalty payable elsewhere in Yorkshire. There was no
question of an enhanced price being paid for loss of a power of veto nor for
the fact that it was convenient for the colliery (which was very up-to-date and
held leases in contiguous areas) to work the coal. Nothing was said of the
profitability of the colliery from working those seams. The value was assessed
on the basis of what the rights were worth to any colliery. When assessing
compensation for the copyholders Sankey J, giving the leading judgment, drew
attention to their legal position as being in possession of minerals under the
land, even though the ownership of the minerals was in the lord of the manor,
and as being able to prevent the lord from working the minerals apart from the
1923 Act, and to the evidence that the practice that had been adopted in
numerous cases outside the 1923 Act was for the copyholder and the lord to
share the royalties, usually in equal shares. The argument of the copyholders
was that the same practice should prevail. Counsel for the lord mentioned an
argument that the copyholders’ right to prevent the coal being taken had gone
by virtue of the application under the Act, but he is recorded as having said
that he did not want to take the point and that he accepted that the
copyholders should receive part (which he submitted should be 20%) of the royalties.
In the light of that concession and that contention, Sankey J at p 257 said:
‘the court has to come to some decision as to what would be the proper division
of the royalties in this case’. The commission awarded the lord two-thirds and
the copyholders one-third of the royalties. Mr Waller relied on this case
because, he said, the copyholder was in a position comparable with the
landowner whose land had provided access to the oil. But there are differences.
The copyholder could prevent the lord from working the coal under his land even
if the surface was not disturbed and the argument that the Act removed that
right was by concession not pursued. A landowner cannot prevent a licensee oil
company which has a well outside his land from lifting oil and gas which may
come from under his land. More importantly, the particular decision in the
Markham case turned on the evidence of the common practice for the lord and the
copyholder to share the royalties and on the concession made by the lord. In
the present case not only is there no question of the estate sharing the
Crown’s royalties but it is common ground that the estate cannot obtain a
royalty from BP; indeed it is strongly contended by BP that the power of veto
which the estate would have apart from the 1966 Act cannot affect the value of
the compensation.
The second
case is the Denaby and Cadeby Main Collieries case in 1928. In that case
the applicant colliery applied to the commission for certain mining rights. It
already had certain mining leases expiring in 1948 under one of which it had
sunk a shaft which would then revert to the landlord. The colliery applied for
the right to work the coal for 60 years under an area of Lord Cromwell’s land
and that was granted by the commission which determined the royalty therefor as
the purchase money for the coal. The commission then considered the rent for
the shaft which would have to be used for working the coal. The problem for the
commission was that although the shaft would245
become Lord Cromwell’s freehold property in 1948 he would be unable to obtain
any benefit from it because the colliery would by virtue of the commission’s
award have the exclusive use of it for the 40 years commencing in 1948. The
colliery accepted that it should have to pay an annual rent from 1948 onwards.
Salter J at p 2181 is reported thus:
[It] was
fairer to the lessee to put the payment in the form of an annual payment in the
form of a tonnage rate on the coal carried rather than a fixed sum, and, since
the shaft might give access to other coal than the lessor’s, the rate should be
calculated on all coal raised. The amount of the shaft rent should be such rate
per ton of coal raised as would be the result of negotiations in 1948 for a 40
year lease. The parties would have some regard to the cost of construction but
not much. They would consider much more the cost of replacement — that is what
it would cost the proposed lessee to sink a shaft elsewhere. They would
consider the then life of the mine and the expected profit of working it.
At p 2181 he
continued:
If the
applicants were to scrap their equipment in 1948 or sell it at a valuation to
an incoming lessee, they would lose the opportunity of getting all the
remaining coal in the area and would be liable to pay Mr Montague
another owner
of land from which the colliery had obtained a lease
a minimum
rent of £1,000 for many years for nothing. Therefore there would be in 1948 a
very strong inducement to the applicants to come to terms with Lord Cromwell
and a very strong inducement to Lord Cromwell to come to fair terms, as the
applicants could give him better terms than another lessee. He could not
however adopt the view that if the applicants left no one else would take Lord
Cromwell’s coal. He was satisfied that the difference in net profit due to the
provision of the shaft and buildings would be about 3 3/4d per ton on all coal
brought to the surface, but it did not follow that in negotiations in 1948 the
landlord would be able to obtain the whole of this increased profit.
So he reduced
the rent to 2 1/2d per ton.
As Mr Waller
rightly pointed out, that was a case where undoubtedly regard was had to the
profits of the grantee in fixing a rent commencing 20 years ahead for the
shaft. But the facts of the case were unusual and Salter J does not spell out
the principles on which he based his conclusions. I would explain that case on
the basis that the value of the shaft for 40 years from 1948 was estimated to
be what would be obtained for it in a market which included the colliery as a
special purchaser wanting the rights in the shaft for particular reasons of its
own, but in which there would be other persons interested in becoming lessees,
that in such a market competing would-be lessees would measure their bids by
reference to the effect on their profits of paying a rental for the shaft
rather than incurring the expense of sinking a shaft elsewhere, and that
accordingly would be reflected in the value to the landowner of the shaft
rental. In contrast, in the present case BP as the licensee under the 1934 Act
has a monopoly and there are no other competitors in the market bidding for the
right to have access to the oil. Nor is there any equivalent of an existing
shaft the right to exploit which the landowner is to lose. Nor, apart from one passing
reference in a telex in January 1982 sent by Carless, is there evidence of an
oil company measuring its offer for land rights by reference to the expected
profitability of a site. In that telex Carless, seeking the views of its
partners as to the maximum rent it should offer the landowner at Humbly Grove X
who had rejected earlier offers, noted at the end of the telex what was the
cost of a 1% royalty in relation to a well producing 100 bpd at $30 per barrel,
namely £4,500. But that is an isolated reference by way of a postscript comment
and not typical of the way oil companies decided on rents they would be
prepared to pay.
In Consett
Iron Co Ltd v Clavering [1935] 2 KB 42 the applicant colliery
company had wayleave rights under leases which were negotiated prior to the
1923 Act. They required it to pay annual sums which were so high that it
claimed it was impeded in the working and carrying away of the coal. It applied
under the Mining Industry Act 1926 to be released from the contractual
obligation to pay such sums and instead asked that it should pay a reduced
rental. The commission (with MacKinnon J presiding) concluded that the colliery
was correct in its submissions and ordered that it pay rents at a greatly
reduced annual rental of £10 per acre. The land through which the wayleave ran
was mainly agricultural, but it had acquired an additional value for building
purposes. In the Court of Appeal Slesser and Roche LJJ held that the statutory
condition that the working and carrying away of coal were impeded was not
satisfied by financial obligations under a lease. Greer LJ dissented on that
point, but alone of the three judges examined the principles applicable to
awards of compensation under the 1923 Act. He described at pp 51 and 52 the
rents payable under the leases as rents which the landowners could not have
obtained for their land but for the fact that it was absolutely necessary for
the colliery company to acquire the wayleave to enable their collieries to be
worked and contrasted that with the principle of compulsory acquisition under
the Lands Clauses Act that the fact that the land is wanted by a railway
company or other undertaking cannot be taken into account as enhancing the
value of the land to the landowner. He went on at pp 54 to 57 to indicate that
similar principles applied to compulsory acquisitions pursuant to the 1923 Act
which, he said, gave powers to the commission to deprive a landlord of his
common law right to hold out for the highest rent he could get from the
necessities of the mineowner, and only gave him compensation confined to a fair
consideration for the compulsory grant. Greer LJ, therefore, was clearly of the
view that the landowner could not obtain compensation for the loss of any power
of veto.
The colliery
company surrendered its leases and applied again to the commission, this time
presided over by Finlay J, for the rights which the commission in the earlier
case would have granted at the annual rental of £10 per acre (Re Consett
Iron Co Ltd’s Application [1938] 1 All ER 439). The view as to compensation
adopted by the commission in the earlier case was adopted again by the
commission, that is to say that the compensation was based on the agricultural
or building value of the land plus compensation for severance or loss of
amenity even though the greater prosperity of the applicant company at the time
of the second case was noted. The rival contention was that the contractual
rents under the surrendered leases were the appropriate measure of compensation
was rejected on the ground that those rents were unreasonable, having been
described by MacKinnon J as ‘the price of the grantors’ willingness’. At p 447
Finlay J expressed the view that no assistance was to be derived from the Lands
Clauses Act, the right basis for compensation being under the 1923 Act, and he
doubted whether any real analogy at all was to be drawn between the sum to be
paid by way of compensation for a mineral wayleave and the sum to be paid for a
compulsory purchase under the Lands Clauses Act. Nevertheless the decisions of
the commission when presided over by MacKinnon J as well as when presided over
by Finlay J were that the compensation was to be valued on the basis of the
existing use of the land and not on the basis of what the colliery might be forced
to pay a landowner exercising a power of veto or of what it was worth to the
colliery to pay for the rights in question. Their decisions were therefore
entirely consistent with the general principles of the Lands Clauses Act.
In Re
Naylor Benzon Mining Co Ltd [1950] Ch 567 a mining company which owned
certain land which it had mined for ironstone and which was nearly worked out
applied for the grant of rights to mine neighbouring land. Wynn-Parry J noted
in his judgment that the company was in a particularly favourable position to
mine that land the boundary of which it had reached by mining its own land.
When he turned at p 578 to the construction of section 9 of the 1923 Act
(corresponding to section 8(2) of the 1966 Act) he referred to the opposing views
of the parties, the respondent landowner contending that the subsection
presupposed freedom of negotiation between the parties and that it was proper
to take account of the company’s favourable circumstances to justify royalties
higher than those prevailing in the district, the company contending that the
court should apply the principles enunciated by Eve J in the South Eastern
Railway Co case to which I have referred. He referred to certain remarks of
Fletcher Moulton LJ in Re Lucas and Chesterfield Gas & Water Board [1909]
1 KB 16 at p 30, which included the following:
To my mind
[the decided cases] lay down the principle that where the special value exists
only for the particular purchaser who has obtained powers of compulsory
purchase it cannot be taken into consideration in fixing the price, because to
do otherwise would be to allow the existence of the scheme to enhance the value
of the lands to be purchased under it.
He also
referred to another judicial statement of the principle that in compulsory
acquisition cases compensation is on the basis of the value to the owner as he
holds the land, and after setting out the wording of section 63 of the Lands
Clauses Act commented:
Judicial
interpretation of that section has given rise to the principles enunciated by
Eve J, which I have read, including the principle that the value to be
ascertained is the value to the vendor not to the purchaser.
He referred to
the 1919 Act which, as he recognised, did not apply to the case, noted that the
wording the 1923 Act, ‘on the basis of what would be fair and reasonable
between a willing grantor and a willing grantee’, differed from the wording in
section 63 of the246
Lands Clauses Act, ‘the value of the land to be purchased’, but compared the
words in section 63, ‘the purchase money or compensation’, with the words in
section 9 of the 1923 Act, ‘the compensation or consideration’. He expressed
his conclusion in this way:
As Eve J
pointed out in [the South Eastern Railway Co case], the adoption in
compensation cases of any other principles than those enunciated by him would
lead to startling results, the most obvious being that it would upset all
uniformity of value. Further as Fletcher Moulton LJ pointed out in [the Lucas
case], it would offend against the principle that a man cannot give more than
he has. There is no authority interpreting the effect of the phrase in section
9 of the [1923 Act] which I am considering which directly binds me, but in my
opinion the same principles which have been applied in the application of
section 63 . . . ought to be applied to cases under section 9 . . . which in my
view, on its true construction, is a section directing the assessment of
compensation and therefore designed to give to a man the fair value to him of
what is being taken from him.
Mr Waller
rightly drew attention to two points. First, it does not appear that the second
Consett case, in which Finlay J expressed the view that no assistance
could be derived from the Lands Clauses Act, was cited to Wynn-Parry J. But in Naylor
Benzon he was applying not the Lands Clauses Act but the principles
established by the cases decided under that Act. Second, Fletcher Moulton LJ’s
cited statement of ‘principle’ in the Lucas case was as pointed out in Vryicherla
Narayana Gajapatiraju v The Revenue Divisional Officer Vizagapatam
[1939] AC 302 (‘the Indian case’) at p 319, not the view of Vaughan Williams LJ
(who also sat in the Lucas case) and was disapproved by the Privy
Council in the Indian case. If one ignores the special provisions introduced by
the 1919 Act, the true position of a purchaser with compulsory powers who is
the only possible purchaser or the only person for whom land has a special
value was stated by Lord Romer in the Indian case in two passages which were
approved by the Court of Appeal in Lambe v Secretary of State for War
[1955] 2 QB 612: ([1939] AC at p 312)
The
disinclination of the vendor to part with his land and the urgent necessity of
the purchaser to buy must alike be disregarded. Neither must be considered as
acting under compulsion. This is implied in the common saying that the value of
the land is not to be estimated at its value to the purchaser. But this does
not mean that the fact that some particular purchaser might desire the land
more than others is to be disregarded. The wish of a particular purchaser,
though not his compulsion, may always be taken into consideration for what it
is worth
and [1939] AC
at p 319
It must, of
course be conceded that the existence of the scheme must not be allowed to
enhance the price, if by ‘scheme’ is meant the fact that compulsory powers of
acquisition have been obtained for the purpose of carrying into effect a
particular scheme for the profitable use of the potentiality. The valuation
must always be made as though no such powers had been acquired, and the only
use that can be made of the scheme is as evidence that the acquiring authority
can properly be regarded as possible purchasers. But their Lordships have some
difficulty in seeing why the taking into consideration of the fact that the
special value exists for those purchasers only should be said to be allowing
the existence of the scheme to enhance the value of the lands. The only
difference that the scheme has made is that the acquiring authority, who before
the scheme were possible purchasers only, have become purchasers who are under
a pressing need to acquire the land; and that is a circumstance that is never
allowed to enhance the value.
But that
qualification of Fletcher Moulton LJ’s remarks does not, to my mind, invalidate
the reasoning of Wynn-Parry J that the general principles of compulsory
acquisition under the Lands Clauses Act do apply to compulsory acquisition
under the 1923 Act.
The last case
under the 1923 Act to which I must refer is Re Associated Portland Cement
Manufacturers Ltd’s Application [1966] Ch 308. In that case the applicant
company was on the point of exhausting its existing supplies of brick earth and
sought a grant of rights over agricultural land to win and work further brick
earth. The dispute between the company and the landowner was first as to
whether an annual rent and royalty or a lump sum was the appropriate form of
the compensation and second the quantum of the compensation. Buckley J held
that he must investigate the nature of comparable transactions in the free
market so far as they could be found, that the right sought was in the nature
of a profit-a-prendre and involved the right to deprive the landowner of part
of his freehold which was a capital asset of the landowner. He commented at p
324 on the fact that when the land was handed back the freehold would have been
impoverished by the removal of the brick earth and that the land would be less
valuable as an agricultural holding. He reached the conclusion that in a free
market a lump sum price would be paid. At p 326 he said that the landowner had
to be compensated for the loss of the minerals and assessed a value for the
brick earth, for the diminution in value of the agricultural land and for
disturbance. There was no enhancement for the special and urgent need of the
company. The assessment was made on a basis, consistent with the Naylor
Benzon case, of compensating the landowner for what he was losing measured
by reference to the market.
The effect of
these authorities is to support the conclusion that, consistently with the
general principles applicable to compulsory acquisitions under the Lands
Clauses Act, on applications under the 1966 Act:
(1) the grantor must receive consideration or
compensation on the basis of the value of what he has lost, not on the basis of
the value to the grantee of what he is acquiring;
(2) the value is of the rights over land with its
existing use and subject to its existing restrictions, but together with all
its potentialities; and, subject to not receiving more than he has lost, the
landowner is entitled to compensation for disturbance and injurious affection
as well;
(3) the existence of the scheme underlying the
compulsory acquisition must be disregarded, but the presence in the market of a
purchaser for whom the rights have a special value may be taken into account;
(4) the loss of the bargaining power of the
landowner through his veto which he enjoyed until compulsory powers are invoked
by the making of the application is not a factor to be taken into account.
Are there any
other authorities which militate in favour of a different approach? Mr Waller relied on what he called analogous
situations.
First he
referred me to the well-known decision of the Lands Tribunal in Stokes v
Cambridge Corporation (1961) 13 P&CR 77. In that case the
corporation was acquiring compulsorily a substantial site for industrial
development, but in order to carry out the development a further strip of land
would have to be acquired to provide access; it was held that the owner of that
strip could be expected to sell for one third of the increase in value of the
land acquired that was attributable to the access and, accordingly, the price
for the development site should be reduced by the cost of acquiring the access.
The indirect valuation of the access strip depended on the assessment by the
Lands Tribunal of the market price of that strip, and although the reasoning of
the tribunal is not explicit it would appear that it must have treated the
market as comprising more than one would-be developer and that the bidders
would be prepared to bid substantially more than the existing use value of the
strip. Similarly in another Lands Tribunal decision, Chapman, Lowry &
Puttick Ltd v Chichester District Council (1984) 47 P&CR 674 in
which the tribunal had to assess the compensation for land providing access to
a development site, the access land was held to have a substantial value above
existing use value because the needs of other possible owners of the
development land had to be considered as well as the needs of the acquiring
authority. If these cases cannot be rationalised in this way, I would
respectfully doubt if they were correctly decided. In contrast in the present
case, there is only one licensee to whom the rights have a special value and
who might be expected to bid above the existing use value.
Next Mr Waller
referred me to two restrictive covenant cases. In Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd
v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798, Brightman J awarded as damages
for breach of a restrictive covenant not to develop an estate a percentage (5%)
of the estimated profits of the development. In SJC Construction Co Ltd
v Sutton Borough Council (1975) 29 P&CR 322 the compensation awarded
by the Lands Tribunal under section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925 to
modify a restrictive covenant (against developing a site) was half the
realisable development of the site. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was
dismissed. But as was explained in the Stockport case, the Court of
Appeal was there approving the valuation of the loss of amenity. In my judgment
such cases are of no real assistance in the present case. It is accepted by the
Ryders that it would be contrary to the model clauses attached to BP’s licence
to share in the profits. Further the loss of amenity in the present case bears
no relationship to the profits that BP will derive from its operations on the
land and can be adequately assessed by reference to the more conventional
assessment of the disturbance and injurious affection suffered by the estate.
247
Mr Waller
relied on the position of a copyholder sharing royalties with the lord owning
the minerals. I have already discussed in relation to the Markham case
the difference between the copyholder and the landowner in the present case.
Mr Waller also
placed reliance on a Texas statute of 1917, as interpreted in 1928 by the Texas
Supreme Court, providing for the landowner as well as the state to receive
royalties in respect of oil owned by the state but produced on the landowner’s
land. But with respect I can obtain no guidance from foreign legislation passed
many years ago in circumstances which appear to have no similarity to
circumstances here.
Mr Waller also
relied on the principle established in rating cases, where there is no true
open market and no reliable comparables, that it is permissible in relation to
land used for profit to consider the profitability to the tenant in assessing
the rent at which the hereditament might reasonably be expected to be let from
year to year (see, for example, Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd v County
of Durham Assessment Committee [1938] AC 321). It is pertinent to observe
that a valuation on a profits basis for rating purposes is now rare in view of
the fact that most public utility undertakings are now assessed by reference to
a statutory formula. Further one can readily see that for rating purposes it
would be unacceptable that a substantial property which can only be let to one
person should have no or only a nominal value and make no contribution to the rates.
But no authority (whether under the Lands Clauses Act or the 1923 Act) has been
cited to me which supports the application of that rating principle to
compulsory purchase cases, and in such cases to measure the compensation by
reference to the profitability of the grantee would offend the principle that
it is the value to the grantor for the loss he suffers which must be assessed.
I would add that the evidence before me also suggests that in the real world
rental values in the open market are not assessed by reference to the
profitability of the lessee’s use of the land, and that there is scant evidence
of oil companies measuring their offers for land rights by reference to the
profits they will earn from that land.
I am therefore
not persuaded by Mr Waller’s analogous situations that an approach other than
in accordance with the principles that I have discerned from the cases decided
under the 1923 Act should be preferred. None of those cases is authority
binding on me on this point, but in my judgment it makes good sense and would
ensure uniformity of value to adopt the like approach. In contrast, if the
compensation is to be measured by reference to the profitability to an oil
company of particular land, the quantum would vary in every case. Further, as
Mr Willis said in answer to a question as to how he would value access to oil:
I think that
is a difficult thing to try to do because if one is going to try to arrive at a
justifiable and scientific valuation of that one would need far, far more
knowledge about the oil industry and indeed the particular company or companies
with which one was negotiating than currently I have and probably would ever
have.
Mr Waller
listed what he described as three critical factors to be taken into account
both in considering whether a landowner has made unreasonable demands and in
assessing consideration or compensation. I shall consider them in turn. The
first is the factor that the land and the right to sink boreholes provide
access to the oil. I accept that it is an intrinsic quality of the land that
oil lies underneath it. But the fact that access to oil is being provided is
relevant only in so far as it affects the value of what the landowner loses by
the grant of rights. The oil is not his to lose. It is possible to sink
boreholes to obtain access to oil on other land adjacent to and not comprised
in the well sites, and in theory it would be possible to let such alternative
sites and grant like rights to others. But in reality there will be no takers
for such purposes. The true key to the oil is the licence granted to the
licensee, giving him and him alone the right to bore for and produce oil. The
presence of oil will cause the licensee oil company to be in the market for the
rights, but the landowner’s right to extract a high price from the oil company
by virtue of his power of veto to prevent the oil company coming on to his land
becomes irrelevant once the compulsory powers of the 1966 Act are invoked.
The second
factor is the profits to be derived from the use by BP of the land. In my
judgment that is a factor that is irrelevant unless it can be shown (and it has
not been shown) to affect the assessment of value to the owner in the real
world; otherwise it would offend the principle that it is the value to the grantor
of what he has lost, and not the value to the grantee, that is relevant.
The third
factor is the use of the gathering station not only for the oil and gas lifted
from the well sites on the estate but also for oil and gas lifted elsewhere.
Again that seems to me to be an irrelevant factor unless it can be shown that
it affects the assessment of value to the owner or causes additional
disturbance. The landowner is entitled to be compensated for any additional
pipeline easements that the bringing in of oil and gas from outside the estate
will necessitate. But thereafter it matters not to the landowner how little or
how great is the volume of oil and gas passing through those pipes nor from
where the oil and gas came. The rental value of the gathering station depends
neither on the profitability of the oil company nor on the cost of the plant
erected thereon. To the extent that the additional oil and gas from outside the
estate will cause additional disturbance such as by necessitating the
attendance of more persons with their vehicles to come on to the estate that
will be a factor, though in this case a very slight one, in the amount of
compensation.
In my
judgment, therefore, the correct basis of valuation under section 8(2) of the
1966 Act of the rights to be acquired is the value of what the estate will lose
by the grant, that is to say the rights over land having its existing
agricultural and forestry use plus compensation for disturbance and injurious
affection.
I come now to
the question whether the special interest of an oil company like BP in
acquiring rights will cause the value to exceed existing use value. In valuing
those rights, Mr Essayan submitted, the fact that the licensee has a licence
and that the rights have a special value to him fall to be ignored because of
the Pointe Gourde principle. Mr Waller submitted that the special
adaptability or adventitious value of the land is, even on compulsory
acquisition principles (apart from the 1919 Act), not to be ignored but is
reflected in the value and that land providing access to oil is land having a
special adaptability or an adventitious value.
I accept that
the fact of BP obtaining compulsory powers for the purpose of exploiting the
oil is to be disregarded. But I do not see why the fact that the presence of
oil and gas in the Wytch Farm oilfield gives to the licensee (but only to the
licensee) a special interest in acquiring the rights should be ignored. It
would be unreal to ignore the fact that the licence had removed all competition
from other oil companies but has made the licensee a possible purchaser of
those rights because of their special value to him. That special value will be
reflected in the value to the estate of the rights because the licensee would
be prepared to pay more to secure those rights than those interested in
purchasing the land only for its agricultural or forestry value.
How much more
it is to be assumed that the licensee would be prepared to pay? Mr Waller relied on the evidence of the
prices paid by oil companies without recourse to the 1966 Act as providing a
guide to the appropriate enhancement factor. Mr Edmond’s evidence was that
until 1970 the rentals that BP paid for acquiring sites for exploration,
drilling and production purposes bore some relation to the prevailing
agricultural rents in that commonly a landowner would be paid from two to five
times those rents. But in the 1970s rents paid by BP increased and Mr Edmond
accepted that for the last few years the rents paid have borne no relationship
to agricultural values. As he stated in his first report, ‘site rental levels
now tend to be based on what the operator has paid for similar facilities in
the area in the recent past’. His valuation of £2,500 per acre very
considerably exceeds the existing use value and it is clear that BP has in a
number of cases paid even more than that. Further, Carless at Humbly Grove is
paying rentals several times greater than £2,500.
In the light
of that evidence Mr Essayan’s submission that such evidence of the market
affords no guide to what is fair and reasonable as between a willing grantee
and a willing grantor might at first sight appear very bold. But evidence of
what actually occurs in a real market may be of little assistance in
ascertaining value for a statutory purpose. For example, in Lynall v Inland
Revenue Commissioners [1972] AC 680, where a substantial minority holding
in a private company had to be valued for estate duty purposes, the Revenue led
evidence, described by Harman LJ in the Court of Appeal ([1970] Ch 138 at p
150) as very strong, that in the real world it was the invariable practice to
provide information in confidence to a would-be purchaser and without such
information no sale of such a holding would ever go through. But it was held by
the House of Lords that a sale on the basis of such information would not be a
sale in the open market postulated by the Finance Act 1894 and so such evidence
fell to be ignored.
If one looks
at the matter from the grantor’s viewpoint, very understandably the owner of
agricultural land is hardly likely to be a248
willing grantor to an oil company grantee. Mr Willis was cross-examined on
this:
Q. It’s right,
is it not, that no proprietor of an agricultural estate is going to be at all
keen to have an oilfield development on his land unless he recovers
substantially more than he could get out of his farming operation?
A. Yes, I
think that is entirely right.
In other words
landowners require to be paid a substantial amount above agricultural use value
to overcome that unwillingness.
I have already
indicated earlier in this judgment the considerations which the well-advised
oil company would have in mind in deciding whether to conclude a bargain with
the landowner rather than apply under the 1966 Act. Mr Christopher Panes gave
evidence that his instructions from his oil company clients, when he was
negotiating the acquisition of sites, were to be generous, though it is right
to add that he said that he considered that his clients were at the extreme end
of willingness when agreeing to rentals well above the existing use values. An
oil company will always be anxious to maintain good relations with the
landowner. Mr Frampton described BP’s policy as going beyond compensating the
landowner and as giving ‘a little bonus in the interests of good
neighbourliness’. He accepted what Mr Waller put to him, that the enhanced
existing use price reflected an attempt to gain the landowner’s co-operation,
saying that it was intended to give the landowner full compensation for what BP
was taking away from him and to ensure that he was very happy with the
settlement which they had reached. The bad effect on relations between the oil
company and the landowner if the oil company did not conclude an amicable
agreement with the landowner but invoked the 1966 Act was one of the points
taken by Mr Willis in the negotiations in an attempt to secure a settlement,
and he accepted in cross-examination that such invocation did not improve
relationships.
Mr Willis was
then asked:
Therefore it
follows, does it not, that it would normally be in the interests of oil
companies to pay in negotiations something over and above what they might stand
to be ordered to pay if they applied to the court and the matter of
compensation was determined by the court?
His reply was:
Yes, I think
we have heard Mr Panes referring to this as the generosity factor. I may also
call it that and I am quite sure that they have paid more than they felt they
ought to have paid in the past in order to avoid references to the court
One reason why
oil companies have been anxious to avoid references to the court is because of
the delays that thereby would be entailed and Mr Willis accepted that any
reasonably minded oil company should be prepared to pay a substantial sum to
avoid such delays. Mr Frampton referred to the alternative to reaching
agreement with the landowner as the ‘very long and complicated process’ of
invoking the 1966 Act and he pointed out that in many exploration activities
there was a timetable within which BP needed to drill wells to satisfy the
Department of Energy requirements, and such time-scales would often preclude an
application under the 1966 Act. In a telex sent by Carless in January 1982,
which I have already mentioned, Carless referred to the desirability of
reaching agreement with the landowner ‘to . . . avoid a long drawn out legal
wrangle which would be messy all round’.
In my judgment
the willing grantor and the willing grantee under the 1966 Act are not to be
treated as affected by such considerations which have militated in favour of
bargains being struck at prices reflecting the landowner’s unwillingness and
the oil company’s anxieties. Accordingly I do not think that the evidence of
prices which have been paid by oil companies is evidence of true comparables.
I was referred
to various cases in which the special value to a special purchaser of an asset
had been considered. They show that, depending on the circumstances of the
case, that factor does result in an increase in the value above what ordinary
purchasers would pay for the asset without that special value. I intend only to
refer to the Indian case* on this point as much reliance was placed by Mr
Waller on it. The subject-matter of that case was the value of a water supply
on land which was being compulsorily acquired in circumstances in which, the
Privy Council held, there was only one purchaser, the acquiring authority, of
the special adapability of the land as a water supply. It was held that that
fact did not mean that no or only a negligible value could be attributed to the
water supply. The Subordinate Judge had fixed the value of the water supply by
reference to the profitability to the landowner of that supply if he had been
able to exploit it immediately. The Privy Council reduced that value by more
than 50% because the landowner himself could not exploit the water supply,
there would be a delay before the supply could be exploited and the acquiring
authority would be unwilling to pay so much. The estimate of the value in that
case turned on the particular circumstances, but it is important to note that
the value of the water supply was measured not by reference to the
profitability to the acquiring authority but by reference to the value of the
water supply to the landowner.
*Editor’s
note: Vryicherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v The Revenue Divisional
Officer, Vizagapatam [1939] AC 302.
However, it is
right to acknowledge that the Privy Council in that case did not approve of the
concept of estimating value by reference to an imaginary auction at which the
special purchaser would put in a bid only just sufficient to beat those bidding
on the basis that the land had no special value for them. But, if I may say so
with the greatest respect, the description of the imaginary auction which Lord
Romer gave ([1939] AC at p 315) to reject its concept is one which is apt only
where there are competing special purchasers and not a single special
purchaser. It is of course not the only way one might imagine the best prices
being achieved, but it is a concept commonly employed (see, for example, the Cedar
case, supra at pp 579, 580) and for my part in a case such as the
present I think it useful. In the real world the willing special purchaser
would bid a price sufficient to make sure he would beat all who were acquiring
the lands for their existing use. I cannot see the logic of a purchaser,
however willing, being assumed to pay a price far in excess of other bidders.
The willing grantor is to be assumed to be willing to sell at the best price he
can obtain and he cannot be assumed to insist on a reserve price measured by
reference to some value other than what is fairly and reasonably obtainable in
the market.
(C) The amount to be assessed under section 8(2)
Mr Essayan
submitted that if the licensee as a special purchaser is to be taken into
account, an additional 5% would be appropriate as being the ‘something more
envisaged in the Cedar case (supra at p 580) as being payable. I
would assess the addition a little higher than that for him to be certain that
he will acquire the rights he seeks. In my judgment it would be fair and
reasonable to give effect to the presence in the market of the special
purchaser by increasing the consideration for the rights over the additional
land now sought from £40 per annum per acre to £45, subject to three-year rent
reviews tied to the value of agricultural land in South-West England’.
The rent
(without a rent review) will also apply to the laydown and soil storage areas,
in which I would include the strip on the Goathorn peninsula intended to be
used as a laydown and construction site before it is required for a pipeline
and cable easement.
There is, in
effect, no dispute between the parties as to the amounts to be paid by BP as
capital sums for the value of the trees in the woodland areas and for pipeline
and cable easements and I accept BP’s figures of £144,345 and £123,552
respectively.
Turning to the
question of the appropriate compensation for disturbance and injurious affection,
I would first comment that beautiful though parts of the estate are, the
northern part of the estate where the oilfield lies is largely subject to two
factors which have an adverse effect on the beauty of that part of the estate.
The fact is that they already exists a substantial oilfield in production on
the estate and parts of that oilfield, in particular certain well sites, are
very visible as matters now stand. The second is that large parts of the area
are Forestry Commission plantations managed as a commercial operation. To this
observer at least such plantations do very little for the beauty of the estate
and it is within such a plantation that the major area of land to be acquired,
that for the gathering station, is sited. BP is to improve the effectiveness of
the existing trees as a screen. Of the three well sites not subject to the
existing leases, one is an extension of an existing well site and is to be
properly screened with trees while the other two are existing well sites the
licences for which have expired. I was impressed on my view with the evident
care with which the route of the access road has been selected so as to be as
unobtrusive as possible. Dorset County Council has imposed stringent
requirements including tree screening and the restriction of traffic to the
access road, all in the interests in minimising the impact of the development,
and the evidence of BP’s environmental expert, Mr Pearson, satisfied me that
the steps to be taken are likely to be effective.
Mr Christopher
Panes put forward the figures for injurious affection and disturbance on which
BP relies, namely £190,000249
(being his figure for injurious affection in respect of various properties and
rights less what was paid under this heading in 1977) and £143,000 (being the
present value of amounts for disturbance over a five-year period) respectively.
There was not in fact very much dispute between the parties on the detailed
figures, Mr Willis accepting Mr Panes’ figures in respect of residential and
agricultural properties. I need only comment on three matters.
There was a
dispute between Mr Panes and Mr Willis on sporting rights, Mr Panes assessing
the injurious affection at 10% of the capital value of such rights and
assessing the injurious affection at £2,000. This was limited to 500 acres of
let farms, as the value of the farms in hand included sporting. Mr Panes was
not cross-examined on this evidence. However, Mr Willis gave evidence that he
valued the loss of sporting at £5,000 per month, a sum which greatly exceeded
Mr Panes’ valuation of the annual rental of those sporting rights. Mr Willis
was cross-examined on this but only on the basis that the estate had never let
the sporting rights at as much as £5,000 per annum and had in fact charged £600
under an informal arrangement. In my judgment Mr Willis is right in suggesting
that the injurious affection and disturbance should be calculated by reference
to what the sporting rights might fetch and not by reference to what occurred
on a generous letting to friends. But the difficulty I find with his evidence
is that I am left with no idea as to how he arrived at his figure of £5,000
whereas Mr Panes spelt his reasoning out in his examination. In the
circumstances I am not prepared to disagree with Mr Panes’ figures the details
of which were challenged.
The second
matter is this. Certain of the restrictions in existing leases are in effect to
be modified by the grant of rights. Take, for example, the covenant not to
carry out additional works without compensation. The right to carry out such
works is to be conferred. BP is not offering any consideration or compensation
for that specific right other than what is included in the sums for injurious
affection and disturbance. Mr Waller accepted that this was not a matter capable
of precise quantification but it should lead the court to assess a higher
rental value. I do not see how I fix such a figure and Mr Essayan seems to me
to be correct in arguing that the estate is entitled not to consideration
therefor but only to compensation for any injurious affection and disturbance.
In respect of all additional works that are contemplated in the construction
period, in my judgment Mr Panes’ estimates are sufficient. But in respect of
further works which may be carried out beyond that period but within the
periods of the existing leases and which cause loss to the estate, in my
judgment the estate ought to retain the rights to compensation. The order that
I make will so provide in relation to that and all other restrictive covenants
the effect of which BP seeks to modify by the grant of additional rights which
could cause loss to the estate outside the construction period.
The third
matter is that it is not apparent to me what BP is offering on the existing use
basis for the deposit of soil on the 6.1-acre site. Plainly it must pay for the
use of that site in the year in which it intends to deposit soil thereon and
for any loss caused thereafter while the soil settles. I will, if necessary,
hear further argument on this point. Subject to those comments I accept BP’s
figures of £333,000 for injurious affection and disturbance.
(D) Section 3(2)(b) of the 1934 Act
Should the
allowance which the court must make on account of the acquisition of the rights
being compulsory be the minimum of 10% as Mr Essayan submitted or some greater
percentage as Mr Waller urged but without quantifying what it should be? There is no guidance given in the Act as to
any upper limit or as to the type of consideration that should weigh with the
court if a figure other than 10% is to be given.
I have the
greatest sympathy with a landowner whose land is to be taken from him for a
period because of an oil development which he does not want, but it would not
be right to let that sympathy affect my judgment unless there are solid grounds
related to the compulsory nature of the acquisition which justify allowing a
figure of more than 10%. Mr Waller submitted that if the assessment of
compensation under section 8(2) was on a basis which did not give effect to the
likelihood that BP will make substantial profits, then it should lead the court
to go above 10%. In my judgment that is an impermissible reason to increase the
allowance as the court would be arrogating a discretion to provide a more
generous basis of compensation to the landowner than Parliament provided.
In my judgment
there are no grounds for increasing the allowance above 10%. The estate already
has an oilfield in production on it. This is not a case where a landowner for
particular personal reasons not compensatable by the consideration or
compensation assessed under section 8(2) has been unwilling to grant the right
sought; in such a case it may be that the court would award an additional
allowance. On the contrary the estate has always maintained its willingness to
grant rights subject to receiving what it considers to be adequate
compensation. Accordingly I shall award only 10% under section 3(2)(b) of the
1934 Act.
(E) The unreasonableness of the demands
I can now
return to the question whether section 3(2)(d) is satisfied in the present
case.
I look at the
question first in relation to the demands appearing from the open
correspondence. In my judgment it was unreasonable for the estate to demand
production-related payments. It is not disputed by the estate that the earlier
demands by reference to the value of the oil and gas were on a basis that could
not be sustained by reason of the model clauses. The demand for volume-related
payments constituted what was a second-best attempt by Mr Willis to obtain for
the estate a share in the benefit to BP of the petroleum. But the estate does
not own the petroleum and takes no risk in its exploitation. Such a basis for
payment could not apply to an assessment under section 8(2) because it rests on
a share of the value of the benefit to the grantee and not on the value of what
the grantor is losing. The fact, much relied on by Mr Waller, that BP did not
put in any evidence that it would be hampered in exploiting the petroleum by
paying in accordance with the estate’s demands is therefore immaterial.
Further, production-related payments have never been made to any landowner in
the United Kingdom for rights to exploit petroleum. At one stage Mr Willis
placed reliance on agreements reached between BP and other oil companies on the
one hand and the local authority in the Shetland Islands on the other for the
use of harbour facilities at Sullom Voe, the oil companies agreeing to certain
throughput payments linked to the tonnage of oil extracted from North Sea
fields and passing through those facilities. But the circumstances obtaining at
Sullom Voe were entirely different from those with which I am concerned. Those
agreements were in part to make the usual payments required by harbour
authorities and related to the amount of cargo passing through the harbour and
partly to alleviate problems resulting from the coming of the oil industry to
the Shetlands for what is likely to be only a limited period. In any event,
volume-related payments do not provide a satisfactory basis of measuring the
benefit to an oil company of obtaining access to oil because they wholly ignore
the fluctuations that may occur in the price of oil. As the last few years have
demonstrated the price of oil can fall dramatically. Mr Willis very fairly
accepted in cross-examination that a volume-related payment is less logical
than a royalty, that a rent review on the basis of volume could be unfair and
illogical in extreme cases if the price went down and there was a weakness in
using that mechanism in the light of serious fluctuations in the price of oil.
Mr Waller
accepted that, if the value to BP of the rights must be excluded, the estate’s
demands were unreasonable. I would add that a fortiori it was
unreasonable for the estate to insist on the acceptance of the principle of
production-related payments as a condition of progress in the negotiations.
Further, in my judgment it was unreasonable to make its demands without
quantifying them despite BP’s repeated requests that it should do so.
Finally, even
if it were proper to treat the figures put forward at the hearing as demands
relevant to section 3(2)(d), it is plain that the amounts I am prepared to
award are considerably less than the estate is demanding. The court must have
regard to all the circumstances which include the fact that BP at one time
itself offered amounts very much greater than my assessment, but it is
nevertheless clear that the demands were and are so excessive as to be
unreasonable. In my judgment, therefore, section 3(2)(d) is satisfied.
On the
alternative basis that all the negotiations are looked at, the more detailed
picture that emerges makes the same conclusion inevitable for similar reasons.
The only differences are that a partial quantification of the demand was made
on November 26 1984 and that after the application was lodged the total demands
were specified on September 24 1985. Throughout the demands were on or by
reference to the production-related basis that I have held to be unjustified.
Further, the demands when quantified were unreasonable as being grossly
excessive.
(F) The practicability of obtaining the rights by
private arrangement
I need not
delay on this condition because the history of the250
negotiations (whether or not the ‘without prejudice’ negotiations are taken into
account) clearly demonstrates that the unreasonable demands of the estate made
it not reasonably practicable to obtain the rights through private arrangement.
Mr Willis saw the negotiations in respect of so large an oilfield as Wytch Farm
as a catalyst, a unique opportunity to break the mould of payments by oil
companies to landowners; hence his obduracy in the negotiations in insisting on
production-related payments in one form or another.
Accordingly, I
hold that the statutory conditions are satisfied and that the court has
jurisdiction to grant the rights sought by BP subject to the qualifications I
have mentioned earlier.
Discretion
Should the
court exercise its discretion to grant the rights? Under section 3(2)(a) of the 1934 Act the
court is required to have regard to the effect on the amenities of the locality
of the proposed use and occupation of the land. I have no reason to think that
that aspect has not been fully taken care of by the conditions imposed by
Dorset County Council in giving planning permission. Satisfied as I am that it
is in the national interest to grant the rights, I shall do so, subject to BP
obtaining authorisation under the 1962 Act for an oil export pipeline to
Southampton Water or appropriate consent for an alternative export route
acceptable to Dorset County Council.
Section
3(2)(a) and (c) of the 1966 Act
Mr Essayan
submitted that section 3(2)(a) was satisfied because the Ryders and Mr Pitman
had conflicting interests until they reached agreement in the course of the
hearing, alternatively that section 3(2)(c) was satisfied because the Ryders
until that agreement lacked the necessary powers of immediate disposition in
respect of those parts of Mr Pitman’s land rights over which BP requires. At
the start of the hearing there were several unresolved disputes between the
Ryders and Mr Pitman. One such dispute was as to the validity of notices to
quit served on Mr Pitman by the estate, and it is accepted by the Ryders that,
even if right on that dispute, they could not give vacant possession of part of
the relevant land until September 1988. I need not go into further details
because the only point that has been debated is the short point: must the
condition in section 3(2)(a) or (c) be satisfied only at the commencement of
the hearing or at the moment of determination if the court is to have
jurisdiction under the 1966 Act. Mr Essayan argued for the earlier date,
suggesting that it would be absurd if the court were deprived of jurisdiction
by events occurring in the course of the hearing or even after the hearing but
before judgment. I have no hesitation in accepting Mr Waller’s submission that
the condition must be satisfied at the moment of determination. The court must
take account of all relevant events occurring up to the moment it determines
the application and I do not see how it could properly give judgment on the
footing that a statutory condition is satisfied when to its knowledge that has
been falsified by an event subsequent to the commencement of the hearing.
Accordingly had BP not been able to satisfy me on section 3(2)(d) I would not
have had jurisdiction to grant the rights it seeks.
Alternative
‘market’ valuation
Finally, in
case this matter goes further and I am held wrong in my conclusions that the
proper basis of assessment is existing use value plus injurious affection and
disturbance, I shall make my findings on the footing that the court must make
its assessment by reference to the bargains reached between landowners and oil
companies outside the 1966 Act.
A considerable
volume of evidence was led by both sides on this. Mr Panes, in addition to
conducting negotiations for GC(E) in 1977, has acted for British Gas in other
transactions as well as for the landowner at Kimmeridge, Dorset, in
negotiations with BP and he gave evidence of a number of transactions in the
South of England. To my mind his evidence of actual transactions and the other
evidence put before me by the other experts do not support his thesis that the
value can still be obtained by applying a multiplier of 10 to the agricultural
value of land. While that may have been the case before 1980, oil companies
have been paying well above that amount in the last few years and I think Mr
Edmond was right to say that the going rate is no longer tied to a multiplier
of such value. Mr Edmond, who has been in charge since 1984 of BP’s
negotiations for sites other than that at Wytch Farm, gave evidence of
acquisitions by BP throughout England. In estimating rents per acre paid by BP
his general practice was to include in the total acreage all access roads
whether or not BP had the exclusive use of those roads and in this he was in
dispute with Mr Willis, who excluded the acreage of access roads which were
shared. I think the fairer method lies between the two approaches. The oil
company pays for more than the mere site acreage but the landowner who retains
the right to share the use of the access road grants to the oil company less
than he would grant if the oil company had exclusive use of the access. Mr
Edmond and Mr Willis were at one in treating certain payments not called rents
as part of the rents, but they disagreed over payments agreed annually for
several years for an option to drill at Kimmeridge. But Mr Edmond’s and Mr
Christopher Panes’ evidence shows that this was not a disguised rental payment.
In several instances in recent years BP has been prepared to pay annual sums
calculated as I have indicated which exceed the rate of £2,500 per acre, but it
is right to say that in some of those cases (Belvoir, Bransgore and Kimmeridge)
there were special circumstances affecting the sites which caused BP to agree
to pay the landowner a higher price to win his agreement.
Mr Willis,
despite his 15 years’ experience as a chartered surveyor, has no personal
knowledge of deals concluded between oil companies and landowners for
exploration and production sites. He produced a schedule of what he regarded as
comparable sites selected by reference to certain criteria, including
geographical location (limited to Dorset or an adjoining county), the existence
of reserves in commercial quantities and settlements reached after commercial
negotiations. Such criteria are open to criticism. They suggest, for example, that
the land at Wytch Farm is comparable with land at Humbly Grove, in the
neighbouring county of Hampshire, and that differences such as the better
quality of the agricultural land, the better roads and the closeness of Humbly
Grove to Basingstoke count for little whereas, in contrast, every site in the
East Midlands can be ignored simply for geographical reasons. Further a
criterion such as that the negotiations should have been ‘commercial’ is in Mr
Willis’ words ‘extremely subjective’. Mr Willis accepted that even on his own
criteria other sites should have been included.
Emphasis was
laid by Mr Willis on the bargains struck at Humbly Grove by Carless with
landowners and especially on the transactions whereby land was acquired for a
rent at Humbly Grove X, B and C and Herriard X, A and B. If one treats the
three Herriard sites together (because they were acquired at the same time from
a single owner) and the shared access area at half the site rate, the annual
rent per acre agreed in October 1985 for a production lease at Herriard was
nearly £14,000. For Humbly Grove X the annual rent per acre agreed in November
1984 was £8,333. For Humbly Grove B (if one treats the shared access in the
same way) the rent agreed in May 1985 was just over £5,000. For Humbly Grove C
(if one converts a capital payment of £55,000, made in addition to rent, into a
rent equivalent at 6% for 30 years) the rent agreed in April 1985 was £5,864.
However, I have no doubt but that these rates, which are higher than those
obtained elsewhere, were paid as a result of special factors. First, Carless is
a small and inexperienced oil company for which the speedy development of the
first oil discovery it had ever made (namely at Humbly Grove) was of major
commercial importance. Second, although Carless did employ an experienced
negotiator, Mr Lawrence, for some unexplained reason in the case of the
Herriard negotiations he chose to offer the landowner from the very outset that
any production lease should be on the basis of industrial rents. Such
remarkably poor tactics were visited on Carless quite naturally by the
landowner, who insisted on being paid the equivalent of the high industrial
rents prevalent in the Basingstoke area, and it was impossible for Carless to
go back on Mr Lawrence’s offer. Before reaching agreement with Carless, the
landowner had a discussion with Mr Willis who advised him to seek the figure
the landowner was to achieve. Two of the Herriard sites were in a park designed
by Repton. Third, Carless had to submit within a limited time period on overall
planning application for all 10 sites it needed in the Humbly Grove oilfield,
and if Carless had failed to agree terms for any one site, it would have had to
resubmit a revised application and suffer the delay consequent thereon. Fourth,
in relation to Humbly Grove C there was a particular problem as the original
choice of a scrubland site had to be abandoned because of conservation
objections. Agreement had to be reached quickly with the landowner in time to
put Carless’ application before the planning authority and the alternative site
chosen by Carless was on agricultural land which the landowner had previously
indicated was not to be used as a site. In my judgment the consideration
(including the capital sum) paid by Carless reflects the weak bargaining
position in which Carless found itself, anxious as it was to secure agreement
with the landowner. Fifth, at Humbly Grove X the landowner gave Carless notice
to quit and Mr Willis said that from his study of the documents Carless had
had its tail seriously twisted there and he accepted the statement of Mr
Butterfield, the project director of Carless, that Carless had to accede to the
landowner’s demand.
Mr Waller drew
special attention to Humbly Grove B because the rent was agreed notwithstanding
that Carless had the contractual right to have it determined by arbitration. By
then the rents of all the Humbly Grove sites except Herriard had been agreed
and, while I must treat parts of Mr Butterfield’s evidence with reserve as a
result of Mr Waller’s cross-examination, I see no reason to doubt his evidence
that the rent that was offered was not willingly offered but was what Carless
saw as the consideration at which it could settle with the landowner.
In my judgment
it is significant that although some time has passed since Carless agreed the
rents at Humbly Grove and although Mr Willis suggested that Humbly Grove ‘is
widely regarded as the oilfield which, in the last five years, has set the pace
for site rents in the south of England’, he could not point to a single example
of a concluded bargain in which it can be said to have set the pace. On the
contrary, the rents agreed there are substantially higher than those which
Carless itself has negotiated elsewhere in recent years.
Finally I turn
to the evidence of Mr Parker on whose valuation the estate placed chief
reliance. He is a chartered surveyor of 30 years’ experience, but he has had no
experience of negotiations for exploration or production sites. He estimated
the appropriate compensation on the basis of a rental value for the well sites
of £32,000 to £46,000 per acre and two-thirds of that value for the gathering
station, those figures comprehending the value to BP of the roads and the
tree-screening areas. I do not find his reasoning convincing.
The starting
point for his calculations was the rents at Herriard on the ground that they
were achieved in arm’s length commercial negotiations, unlike, he suggested,
some of the other Humbly Grove negotiations (including Humbly Grove B) and for
that reason he did not take the advantage of all the Humbly Grove rents. I can
only say that his concept of arm’s length commercial negotiations is
idiosyncratic and he was never able to explain satisfactorily why he did not
base his calculations on the rents for any other sites. The Herriard field is
still only at the appraisal stage. His choice of Herriard appears to me to have
been governed by the fact that they were the highest rents obtained anywhere.
It is right to add that in his third report he reduced the annual rent per acre
at Herriard which he takes to be £16,000 (because he ignores the access area),
on account of the lower Humbly Grove rents, but only by £1,000, and why he
limited that reduction to £1,000 he did not explain. He then added 10% to the
Herriard rents because they were agreed more than a year ago in October 1985
and he assumed they might have moved upwards, even though he accepted that he
had no grounds for challenging Mr Butterfield’s evidence that Carless did not
anticipate paying higher rents there. His next step was to make a comparison of
Wytch Farm and Humbly Grove (including Herriard). In his first report he
arrived at a factor of 2.5 to apply to Humbly Grove ‘in recognition of the
superior factors evident at Wytch Farm’. He did not then explain in detail how
he had calculated that factor, although he had stated that he had studied the
relative statistics of Wytch Farm to Humbly Grove and in particular he noted
that the operating costs of Wytch Farm appeared to be in the region of 20% of
those at Humbly Grove. In fact, the true figure, as Mr Parker acknowledged in
his third report, was 40%, but in explaining in that report how he had arrived
at his factor of 2.5 he said that the alteration in the percentage of costs
made no difference to the figure of 2.5 in his earlier report. He then made a
comparison between Humbly Grove and Wytch Farm in terms of recoverable
reserves, peak production, gross revenue and future average gross revenue and
arrived at a mean relativity of 1,735%. Had he taken some other statistics such
as net cash flow, that relativity would have been very different. His next step
was to assess what proportion of the value of the overall operation at Wytch
Farm could be attributed to the land itself by reference to Humbly Grove, even
though he had no figures for the value of Humbly Grove. He stated that he would
normally expect that the value of the land required for the purpose of a
continuing business to represent 20 to 25% of the total value (excluding goodwill)
of the business carried on at that land. I pause only to say that it was a bold
generalisation (which was never put to any other expert) and, even if accurate,
the figure for any particular type of business must depend on the particular
circumstances of that business. There is not a shred of evidence to support the
applicability of anything like such a figure to an oilfield anywhere. He
asserts that the value of the land providing access to the recoverable reserves
must reflect its special importance to the whole business but that against that
is to be offset the requirement of a greater acreage and the differing costs of
site investment required to exploit the two fields, and he comes out with a
figure of 15% as the appropriate percentage of the difference between the two
oilfields to be attributed to the particular qualities of Wytch Farm: 15% of
1,735% is 260%, which he rounds down to a factor of 2.5. So many are the
unproved assumptions in this reasoning that I can only say that I am
unpersuaded of its validity.
The matter
does not rest there, because to the £15,000 per acre base rate which he
increased by 10%, as I have already explained, he applied the 2.5 multiplier
and then added a figure, which he assessed at £6,000 per acre, by reference to
what it would cost to provide soil mounds to screen the well site and gathering
station. I find it hard to follow the logic of valuing the benefit of the tree
screens, which do exist, by reference to mounds, which do not and which on Mr
Pearson’s unchallenged evidence would never be permitted.
Mr Parker also
sought to support his valuation by reference to industrial rents, taking £6,000
per acre as the industrial rent for the sites on the estate in the absence of
oil (a figure which is excessive in the light of Mr Webster’s evidence, which I
found convincing) and then arbitrarily increasing that figure to figures of
£36,000 to £40,000 to take account of the presence of oil. But he conceded in
cross-examination that if the value of access to oil is taken into account it
is irrelevant to consider the rent paid for industrial sites not providing
access to oil.
In my
judgment, it is appropriate to consider all sites in England known to have been
acquired, whether for a rent or (as at Welton) by way of an outright purchase
when a rental equivalent can be estimated, for landowners in recent years by BP
as well as Amoco, British Gas and Carless (including all the Humbly Grove
sites), taking account of special factors which may have affected, upwards or
downwards, the rents agreed. I have noted that there is a tendency for rents
for sites producing oil to be somewhat higher than for exploration sites. I am
satisfied that Mr Edmond’s figure of £2,500 is now too low a rent, but I am no
less convinced that the £8,000 per acre finally urged on me by Mr Waller is far
too high. Having regard to all the evidence, I would assess the appropriate
rent on this basis for the well sites, gathering station, pumping station,
water supply compound and the access road at £3,200 per acre. As this is so far
above existing use values, there would be no payment for injurious affection or
disturbance. I would accept Mr Panes’ valuation of the rents for the laydown
and soil drainage areas other than on the Goathorn peninsula (namely £34,100
per annum) because of his experience in negotiating rents for such sites. For
the laydown area on the Goathorn peninsula I would award a rent of £2,500 per
acre per annum for the period of its use prior to its being required for a
pipeline and cable easement. I would also accept his valuation of £6,100 for
the 6.1-acre site for soil deposit, subject to the possibility of further
claims being made against BP if the land cannot be used normally after a year.
I would also accept his valuation of £100 per acre for the tree-screening areas
and £1,500 per acre for the timber. The sum for pipeline and cable easements
would again be £123,552.
July 15 1987
In a further
judgment, PETER GIBSON J said: I am now asked to determine a question on costs.
The matter is governed by a specific provision in the Petroleum Production Act
1934, section 3(2)(c). That provides:
the costs in
connection with the application incurred by the applicant shall not be ordered
to be paid by any person from whom a right is sought to be obtained; and the
costs so incurred by each such person shall, unless the Commission is satisfied
that an unconditional offer in writing was made by the applicant to that person
of a sum as compensation equal to or greater than the amount of any
compensation awarded to him by the Commission, be ordered to be paid by the
applicant.
The court, on
an application under the 1966 Act, stands in the shoes of the commission and it
is common ground that this provision governs the question of costs.
What has
happened in the present case is this. An offer, subject to contract, was made
by BP on February 7 1985 on an industrial rent basis. It was slightly amended a
little later to increase the sum offered for the pipeline easements. The rights
which were then sought by BP were in respect of a smaller area of land than has
been the subject of251
the application which I have heard.
After the
application was made under the 1966 Act, as I have recounted in my judgment, it
was appreciated that further rights over further land would have to be acquired
inter alia to meet the planning conditions of the local planning
authority. A revised offer was made on August 19 1986, again subject to
contract.
A further
letter which is relevant was sent on August 16 1986, which was in what is now
commonly known as Calderbank form.* It
was expressed to be ‘without prejudice save as to costs’. It expressly
contemplated that the offer made in that letter was both unconditional within
the meaning of section 3(2)(c) of the 1934 Act and a Calderbank offer, so that
BP reserved the right to refer to the offer at the hearing when the court came
to deal with the question of costs, but the offer was otherwise to be treated
as privileged from disclosure to the court.
*Editor’s
note: So called from a dictum, now generally accepted, by Cairns LJ in Calderbank
v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93, 106, to the effect that an offer may be made
without prejudice ‘Save as to costs’.
The offer
contained in the Calderbank letter was even greater than the offer made by BP
in the letter of August 19 subject to contract, and in my judgment I have
already referred to the amounts offered subject to contract.
It is clear
that the consideration that was offered by the Calderbank letter was very much
in excess of the amounts that the court has awarded. One need look only at the
payments that would be made, either immediately or within the first year. In
the Calderbank letter, the offered payments for long-term rights came to a
total of £363,180 per annum plus £55,890 per annum for short-term rights, with
a lump sum payment of £426,870, a total, therefore, of over £800,000 in that
first year (and, of course, in subsequent years the payments were to be of
still substantial amounts), whereas under the award of the court the long-term
payments totalled just under £18,000 per annum, the short-term payments just
over £1,500 per annum and there was a lump-sum payment of nearly £636,000, a
total in that first year of just over £650,000, and in subsequent years the
annual payments are, in comparison, very small.
The Calderbank
letter, however, did contain certain offers which were not quantified in the
sense that it was expressly stated that land areas and rights comprised in all
leases were to be amended at the request of BP to meet any requirements of the
planning authority or of the Secretary of State for Energy, with the consequent
pro rata adjustments for rent or lump-sum payments. It was stated that those
payments could be agreed between the parties or arbitration might be used to
determine any dispute. Further, it was also stated that the trees, shrubs and
scrub on the tree-screening areas were to be purchased at a valuation, so that
the exact amount was not stated.
Mr Essayan
submits that there was an unconditional offer by BP in the form of the subject
to contract letters. This was a point which he did not press, in my view
rightly. It seems to me to be plain that an offer subject to contract is one
subject to a condition and, therefore, cannot satisfy section 3(2)(c). Such an
offer is capable of being withdrawn at any time before the contract is
concluded and it seems to me that the essence of section 3(2)(c) is that there
should be an offer not subject to conditions but one which would be capable of immediate
acceptance so as to constitute a firm contract between the parties.
The main
debate has centred on the Calderbank offer. Let me go back to the wording of
section 3(2)(c). It is in two parts. The first limb provides in absolute terms
that costs in connection with the application incurred by the applicant shall
not be ordered to be paid by a person from whom a right is sought to be
obtained. So, provided that the costs in question can be characterised as being
in connection with the application, it is clear that an applicant such as BP is
not able to recover its costs from, for example, the Ryders.
The second
limb relates to the costs of a person such as the Ryders. Again, there is a
mandatory provision that the costs of such a person shall be ordered to be paid
by the applicant, but that is subject to a specific condition excepting that
result. It must be shown to the satisfaction of the court (and I take it that
must be shown by the applicant) that there is an unconditional offer in writing
by the applicant of a sum as compensation equal to or greater than the amount
of compensation awarded by the court.
If there be
such an unconditional offer, what are the consequences? They are not spelt out in the statutory
provision. In contrast, in the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 there was a
provision in section 34 to this effect:
All the costs
of any such arbitration and incident thereto shall be borne by the promoters of
the undertaking unless the arbitrators shall award the same or a less sum than
shall have been offered by the promoters, in which case each party shall bear
his own costs incident to the arbitration.
Mr Waller, in
resisting Mr Essayan’s submissions on the Calderbank offer and in submitting
that the unconditional offer must be made before the application is made by the
applicant, referred me to the decision of the Divisional Court in Gray v
North Eastern Railway Co (1876) 1 QBD 696. In that case the court held
that the offer had to be made before arbitration proceedings commenced and, in
so doing, the court followed an earlier decision of the Divisional Court.
In my
judgment, that case, decided under the earlier Act, can be distinguished from
the present case, turning as it does on the different wording of section
3(2)(c). Under section 34, all the costs of the arbitration had to be borne by
the promoters unless the specific condition was satisfied, in which case the
court had no discretion but was obliged to order that each party should bear
his own costs. If there were a late offer, it would have been quite wrong in
many cases to penalise the parties other than the promoters by requiring those
parties to bear their own costs.
As I read section
3(2)(c) the court is left with its ordinary discretion as to costs if the court
is satisfied in accordance with section 3(2)(c); but no doubt in such
circumstances it will usually say that the costs up to the unconditional offer
in writing should be borne by the applicant. In other words, the applicant
cannot, by making a late offer, evade the thrust of the section.
The purpose of
section 3(2)(c) in including the exception from the general rule in the first
limb and the mandatory part of the second limb must have been, as I see it, to
discourage the person from whom a right is sought from holding out for
exorbitant sums, which he might do if there were no sanction in costs. In my
judgment, it makes good sense, therefore, that the court should retain a discretion
as to costs if the condition is satisfied, and when one has particular regard
to the fact that this is a provision dealing only with applications for oil
rights and that the rights may be complicated, requiring amendment from time to
time, I cannot see why there should be any precondition that the offer must be
made before application is brought.
Was the
Calderbank offer an unconditional offer within the meaning of the section? Mr Waller submitted that it was not, for a
number of reasons. The first was that, because it was marked without prejudice
save as to costs and accordingly because the letter could not be referred to in
the course of the hearing, it was, in effect, a conditional offer, the
condition being as to referring to the letter in open court during the hearing.
I cannot see
that that is a relevant condition. What is important is that the offer should
be one capable of immediate acceptance so as to constitute a binding contract.
Accordingly, I would not accept that that made the offer conditional.
Then Mr Waller
submitted that because of the unquantified sums referred to in the letter as to
the valuation of the trees and as to the further areas, the offer was not
sufficiently precise and unconditional. In my judgment, that is not correct.
The basis of valuation is stated and, in my judgment, it is a sufficiently
clear and unconditional offer to be capable of acceptance and to produce
certainty once accepted.
The third
point that was taken was that there were differences between what was applied
for and what was obtained and my attention was drawn to some amendments that
were made. But the basis of the offer, in my judgment, was clear, and on any
footing it could be said with certainty that the offer was greater than the
sums which were awarded. Again, I would not be prepared to say that the offer
was not within section 3(2)(c) on this ground.
It seems to
me, therefore, that the costs incurred prior to the Calderbank letter being
received, if properly described as being in connection with the application,
must be paid for by BP. Costs after that time are in the discretion of the
court, but ordinarily would have to be borne by each side. The only
difficulties that have been drawn to my attention relate to costs which were
reserved on certain interlocutory applications.
There was an
application to Hoffmann J, dealing with certain preliminary issues. That
application was heard on July 11 1986, the judge, in effect, deciding against
the Ryders. Mr Essayan submitted that BP should not have to pay those costs but
that the court retained its ordinary discretion in such matters, and he pointed
to the absurdity if a frivolous application were pursued by a party from
whom a right was sought to be obtained and the costs have to be borne by the
applicant. No doubt in an extreme case the court will say that costs incurred
were not properly within the intendment of the wording ‘in connection with the
application’, but nothing that I have heard has indicated to me that the costs
of the points taken before Hoffmann J could be so described, even though the
Ryders were unsuccessful. The points could have been taken at the trial; it was
thought convenient to take them by way of preliminary issue. Despite their lack
of success before Hoffmann J, in my judgment the court has no discretion in the
matter because the costs were in connection with the application and must,
therefore, be borne by BP.
I turn to the
costs of two subsequent applications. BP was unsuccessful before Vinelott J, on
an appeal from the Chief Master’s ruling against the hearing in chambers of the
application. Mr Essayan in effect conceded that BP would have to pay the costs
of that unsuccessful appeal; and I think that is right.
There was a
further application to me relating to the hearing. I was asked to give
directions in respect of the hearing. The costs of this application, it seems
to me, should be borne by the parties as both parties supported the application
and both were interested in an early decision in this matter. Accordingly, in
my judgment, the costs after the Calderbank letter was received should be left
to the parties to bear, save for the costs of the appeal to Vinelott J to be
borne in the manner I have indicated.
All costs up
to date of receipt of the Calderbank letter to be borne by BP. Each party to
bear its own costs after the date of receipt of the Calderbank letter, save
that the costs of the appeal to Vinelott J to be borne by BP.