Jane, a private citizen, maintains that the activities of a company amount to a statutory nuisance for the purpose of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. She writes to the company, purporting to notify it, as required by section 82(6) of the Act, of her intention to lodge a (private) complaint with the magistrates’ court under subsection (1) of the section. There is nothing wrong with the form or content of the notice (which has duly specified the matters complained of), but, before the justices, the company objects that service was not effected in the manner required by section 160 of the Act.
For the busy reader, it is perhaps sufficient to note that, in the wake of the Divisional Court decision in Hewlings v McLean Homes East Anglia Ltd [2000] EGCS 100, the chances of making such an objection stick have to be seen as much reduced.
Under the terms of the section, it is open to a complainant to deliver a notice to a company, or to leave it at, or post it to, its “proper address”, which must be the “registered or principal office”. The section further provides that, in the case of a body corporate, the notice may be served on, or given to, the “secretary or clerk” of that body. The difficulty in Hewlings was that the notice was addressed to, and acknowledged by, a general manager located at the company’s main office, which was not its registered office.
The justices accepted the company’s argument that no delivery as such had taken place, and that postal service could be effected only at the registered address. The Divisional Court disagreed on both points, having concluded, inter alia, that a UK company could possess a principal office and clerk, and that the provisions, when read together, were permissive, not mandatory.
Fundamental to the various points made on construction (which might well have been differently decided in the context of a company law statute) was the view that a non-legalistic approach had to be taken to a provision that was intended to provide a straightforward remedy to “ordinary folk”.
Presumably, not to be confused with the wee or simple variety.
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Jane, a private citizen, maintains that the activities of a company amount to a statutory nuisance for the purpose of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. She writes to the company, purporting to notify it, as required by section 82(6) of the Act, of her intention to lodge a (private) complaint with the magistrates’ court under subsection (1) of the section. There is nothing wrong with the form or content of the notice (which has duly specified the matters complained of), but, before the justices, the company objects that service was not effected in the manner required by section 160 of the Act.
For the busy reader, it is perhaps sufficient to note that, in the wake of the Divisional Court decision in Hewlings v McLean Homes East Anglia Ltd [2000] EGCS 100, the chances of making such an objection stick have to be seen as much reduced.
Under the terms of the section, it is open to a complainant to deliver a notice to a company, or to leave it at, or post it to, its “proper address”, which must be the “registered or principal office”. The section further provides that, in the case of a body corporate, the notice may be served on, or given to, the “secretary or clerk” of that body. The difficulty in Hewlings was that the notice was addressed to, and acknowledged by, a general manager located at the company’s main office, which was not its registered office.
The justices accepted the company’s argument that no delivery as such had taken place, and that postal service could be effected only at the registered address. The Divisional Court disagreed on both points, having concluded, inter alia, that a UK company could possess a principal office and clerk, and that the provisions, when read together, were permissive, not mandatory.
Fundamental to the various points made on construction (which might well have been differently decided in the context of a company law statute) was the view that a non-legalistic approach had to be taken to a provision that was intended to provide a straightforward remedy to “ordinary folk”.
Presumably, not to be confused with the wee or simple variety.
