Planning committees in the spotlight
The rules governing the workings of planning committees garner little attention even in industry publications and are normally of interest only to the geekiest of planning lawyers. Imagine, therefore, the squeals of delight that emanated from those planning lawyers when they were presented with the opportunity to expound on not one, but two, news items about this topic in March.
In this article, I focus on one of these – a Supreme Court decision upholding the wide latitude of planning authorities to regulate their own business and procedures – but I will briefly return to the other at the end.
The facts of the case
The rules governing the workings of planning committees garner little attention even in industry publications and are normally of interest only to the geekiest of planning lawyers. Imagine, therefore, the squeals of delight that emanated from those planning lawyers when they were presented with the opportunity to expound on not one, but two, news items about this topic in March.
In this article, I focus on one of these – a Supreme Court decision upholding the wide latitude of planning authorities to regulate their own business and procedures – but I will briefly return to the other at the end.
The facts of the case
R (on the application of Spitalfields Historic Building Trust) v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council and another [2025] UKSC 11; [2025] EGCS 53 was a judicial review of the grant of planning permission by Tower Hamlets Council in 2021 to redevelop the Old Truman Brewery on Brick Lane. The application was initially considered at a planning committee meeting in April 2021. The committee heard public representations, including from the appellant, Spitalfields Historic Building Trust, which was an objector. The committee voted to defer consideration and determination of the application in order for officers to explore further planning obligations to address objections.
The application was then considered again by the committee in September 2021. Three of the five members who attended the earlier meeting were in attendance. Of the other two, one was no longer on the committee and the other observed remotely, meaning they were not, as a matter of law, present nor entitled to vote. There were other members on the committee but they did not attend. Had they attended, they would not have been permitted to vote on the application, as the council’s standing orders only permit a member to vote on an item if they were present throughout the committee’s consideration of the matter.
The committee resolved to grant planning permission by two votes to one. The chair voted against and would have had a casting vote had the votes been equal. The permission was granted.
The Supreme Court decision
The SHBT’s challenge against the grant of planning permission was dismissed by the High Court and its appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. Only one ground of appeal remained before the Supreme Court: that it was unlawful for the council to adopt the rule in its standing orders that restricted voting by members and, therefore, the planning committee’s decision was unlawful.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It accepted a councillor’s ability to vote is a central feature of their role, but held this was neither absolute nor fundamental. It rejected the SHBT’s argument that this could only be restricted by primary legislation and not by council standing orders. The council had a statutory power to make standing orders regulating the circumstances in which a member is entitled to vote.
The Supreme Court explained that this power is not unrestricted. Any standing orders restricting a councillor’s ability to vote would be subject to “heightened scrutiny” by the courts. This is to protect the important democratic principle that a councillor should be able to represent their constituents and the public in the local authority’s area by voting on matters affecting them, which is central to local authority decision-making.
In this case, the council’s restrictive voting rule protected the integrity of the decision-making process and enhanced its public legitimacy and public confidence in the ultimate decision. It ensured the decision was made only by members who had heard all of the planning officer’s presentation and the public representations.
Furthermore, the purpose of conferring a power on local authorities to make standing orders is to allow them to adopt measures specific to their area and to enhance the quality of decision-making.
More “effective” local democracy?
The other major news item in March that excited planning lawyers was the introduction of the Planning and Infrastructure Bill. When enacted, it will give the government powers to dictate the size and composition of planning committees and to require members to undergo mandatory training.
The government’s rationale is to ensure planning committees operate “as effectively as possible”. This chimes with the tenor of the Supreme Court judgment, which avoided affirming the “right” of a councillor to vote and instead emphasised that, if there are any “rights” concerned, it is the rights of the constituents who look to their council to “take effective and lawful action for their benefit”.
Critics of the Bill have accused the government of an attack on local democracy. However, we should take from the Supreme Court judgment a reminder that voting in itself is not the be-all and end-all of local democracy. Ultimately, local democracy serves the people in each local area – should we not seek to ensure, therefore, that it is effective?
Brian Cheung is a senior associate in the planning and environment team at Ashurst
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