HS2: a textbook train wreck for the UK economy

COMMENT There you have it: HS2 provides a textbook example of how not to manage a large-scale infrastructure project. A perfectly formed case study. Well done, everyone. Trebles all round. Rishi Sunak’s speech gave us the worst of all possible worlds. The long and the short of it is you won’t find anyone who really knows anything at all about project management, or railway engineering, or economics, or regeneration – nor any former prime ministers or chancellors come to that – who agrees with the decision to scrap the line past Birmingham. This is the stuff of books set for MBA courses in years to come, alongside: “Why are the British Bad at Manufacturing?” and such like. How not to do stuff. It makes you want to weep. The arguments have been well rehearsed – everything that could have been done wrong has been done wrong. What went wrong? First, the politics: why didn’t we start building out from the north in the first place? Unfathomable. Why couldn’t we bring more of the public with us? Why weren’t the local economic benefits for all the places affected properly sold through? Why isn’t someone pointing out that Crossrail/the Elizabeth Line (controversial enough when under construction) is now carrying one in six of all UK rail passengers every day? Secondly, the procurement: why did nobody learn the lessons of the (highly successful) delivery of HS1 when framing the contracts? A totally damning letter from the former director of London & Continental Railways in the broadsheets a few days ago said his team was never troubled to share its experiences. Utterly shocking. So there was no learning culture. And – for some perverse reason – apparently the overall budgets for HS2 were made visible to all those bidding, in stark contrast to the practice for HS1. Schoolgirl error or what? Thirdly, the public relations: what a fiasco. Never mind the total Horlicks of the last two weeks, the messages around HS2 were ill-framed from the get-go. It was never a project about fast journeys, it was always about freeing up capacity on the existing network. Oh, and the economy, stupid. Andy Haldane – no slouch in these matters – is right: if we were in any way smart and really wanted economic growth in this country, we wouldn’t just be looking to deliver HS2 in full, we’d follow with HS3, HS4, HS5 and then HS6 in short order. Where do we go now? It wasn’t as if we don’t – collectively – have the knowledge. We could have learnt, not just from HS1 and the Channel Tunnel (sorry, but I just cannot get over the tragic dereliction of duty that those guys were not thoroughly rinsed for know-how), but also from the likes of Terminal Five, the Elizabeth Line, the Hindhead Tunnel, the Edinburgh tram, you name it. We have done this stuff before. We know what works and what doesn’t. And one has to ask, what was the National Infrastructure Commission doing all this time? Deep sigh. So where do we go from here? Where does this leave our civic and industry leaders who have been pitching to investors on connectivity that now is not happening? Well, His Majesty’s Opposition is probably right to be cautious and reserve their position before it can properly scrutinise the figures. We all know the numbers are way out of whack, and any responsible government in waiting needs to keep its powder dry. But it should certainly be working with the northern mayors to find a construct of pledging to keep the spirit of HS2 – past Birmingham – alive until the entire project can be recalibrated and reset. I am pretty sure the real estate industry would get its shoulder to the wheel and help with this, if empowered to do so. But we need a full-scale inquiry into what has gone wrong here, and a solemn cross-party undertaking to learn the object lessons, for all time. A decision to regret This appalling decision is up there with all our other Great British Acts of Self Harm. Brexit immediately springs to mind, of course. As does – perhaps of more direct relevance – the Beeching cuts of the early 1960s. In short: we will live to regret this. It is still early days in the landing of a government announcement, but if it is true that HMG intends to try to panic-sell the affected land – acquired at great pains and expense under compulsory purchase orders – in order that any incoming government could not do a reverse ferret and before any evaluation can be shared with the public, then this will look like a total act of spite. We should call for a judicial review. Jackie Sadek is director of Rural & Urban Strategic. From 2016 to 2018, she was independent chair of the Constellation Partnership, comprised of the seven local authorities around Crewe Station looking to leverage the economic impact of the (then-planned) HS2 interchange