Hunter and others v Canary Wharf Ltd Hunter and others v London Docklands Development Corporation

Preliminary issues — Nuisance — Interference with television reception and deposit of dust on property — Whether television reception analogous with loss of prospect — Whether defence of statutory authority for erecting Canary Wharf — Test of occupation for suing in nuisance — Whether excessive amounts of dust deposited on property capable of giving rise to an action in tort — Court of Appeal finding that interference with TV reception not actionable — Deposits of dust could be actionable depending on physical damage and other circumstancesThe first action concerned the erection of the tower built at Canary Wharf, Limehouse, East London, which was built primarily for commercial purposes and was about 250m high and over 50m square. Before its erection, television reception in the Limehouse/East Poplar area was good. The claim was made against Canary Wharf in nuisance, the damage being the loss of enjoyment of TV and wasted licence fees. The issues with London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) in the second action was that the plaintiffs claimed for the deposit on their properties in east London of substantial quantities of dust, created as a result of the construction by LDDC of a road known as the Limehouse Link Road between 1989 and 1992. The official referee made certain findings against which the parties appealed. Held Interference with TV reception was not an actionable nuisance; deposit of dust could found an action for damages. 1. TV reception was properly to be regarded as analogous to loss of aspect. The law did not give an action to protect against the interception of a view. Thus to obstruct signals by erection of a building between the point of receipt and the source was not in law a nuisance. Similarly, no one could claim a right to have the general current of air over his neighbour’s property to be kept uninterrupted. 2. Canary Wharf also submitted that the tower was built under a statutory scheme and following a grant of planning permission. However, the planning authority had no jurisdiction to authorise a nuisance save in so far, and if at all, they had statutory power to change a character of a neighbourhood. Further, that planning permission could not be said, as a matter of law, to have licensed a nuisance even if it was an inevitable consequence of the use of the planning permission: Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd [1994] EGCS 209. 3. The issue of whether it was necessary to have a right of exclusive possession of the property to claim in nuisance had been answered by the official referee in the affirmative. However, there had been a trend in the law to give additional protection to occupiers in certain circumstances, so that, given that trend, it was no longer tenable to limit the sufficiency of that link by reference to proprietary or possessory interest in land. Thus occupying the property as a home provided a sufficient link with the property to enable the occupier to sue in private nuisance. 4. The deposit of dust was capable of giving rise to an action in negligence. Whether it did, depended on proof of physical damage and that depended on the evidence and the circumstances. Dust was an inevitable incident of urban life and the claim arose on the assumption of “excessive” deposits. Further reasonable conduct and a reasonable amount of cleaning to limit the ill-effects of dust could be expected of householders. Daniel Brennan QC, Charles Pugh and Sarah Moor (instructed by Leigh Day & Co) appeared for the plaintiffs; Lord Irvine of Lairg QC, Philip Havers QC and Daniel Stilitz (instructed by Ashurst Morris Crisp) appeared for the defendants.